Plato, Republic, ed. John Burnet, 1.344

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[344] λέγω γὰρ 344a ὅνπερ νυνδὴ ἔλεγον, τὸν μεγάλα δυνάμενον πλεονεκτεῖν· τοῦτον οὖν σκόπει, εἴπερ βούλει κρίνειν ὅσῳ μᾶλλον συμφέρει ἰδίᾳ αὑτῷ ἄδικον εἶναι ἢ τὸ δίκαιον. πάντων δὲ ῥᾷστα μαθήσῃ, ἐὰν ἐπὶ τὴν τελεωτάτην ἀδικίαν ἔλθῃς, ἣ τὸν μὲν ἀδικήσαντα εὐδαιμονέστατον ποιεῖ, τοὺς δὲ ἀδικηθέντας καὶ ἀδικῆσαι οὐκ ἂν ἐθέλοντας ἀθλιωτάτους. ἔστιν δὲ τοῦτο τυραννίς, ἣ οὐ κατὰ σμικρὸν τἀλλότρια καὶ λάθρᾳ καὶ βίᾳ ἀφαιρεῖται, καὶ ἱερὰ καὶ ὅσια καὶ ἴδια καὶ δημόσια, ἀλλὰ 344b συλλήβδην· ὧν ἐφʼ ἑκάστῳ μέρει ὅταν τις ἀδικήσας μὴ λάθῃ, ζημιοῦταί τε καὶ ὀνείδη ἔχει τὰ μέγιστα—καὶ γὰρ ἱερόσυλοι καὶ ἀνδραποδισταὶ καὶ τοιχωρύχοι καὶ ἀποστερηταὶ καὶ κλέπται οἱ κατὰ μέρη ἀδικοῦντες τῶν τοιούτων κακουργημάτων καλοῦνται—ἐπειδὰν δέ τις πρὸς τοῖς τῶν πολιτῶν χρήμασιν καὶ αὐτοὺς ἀνδραποδισάμενος δουλώσηται, ἀντὶ τούτων τῶν αἰσχρῶν ὀνομάτων εὐδαίμονες καὶ μακάριοι 344c κέκληνται, οὐ μόνον ὑπὸ τῶν πολιτῶν ἀλλὰ καὶ ὑπὸ τῶν ἄλλων ὅσοι ἂν πύθωνται αὐτὸν τὴν ὅλην ἀδικίαν ἠδικηκότα· οὐ γὰρ τὸ ποιεῖν τὰ ἄδικα ἀλλὰ τὸ πάσχειν φοβούμενοι ὀνειδίζουσιν οἱ ὀνειδίζοντες τὴν ἀδικίαν. οὕτως, ὦ Σώκρατες, καὶ ἰσχυρότερον καὶ ἐλευθεριώτερον καὶ δεσποτικώτερον ἀδικία δικαιοσύνης ἐστὶν ἱκανῶς γιγνομένη, καὶ ὅπερ ἐξ ἀρχῆς ἔλεγον, τὸ μὲν τοῦ κρείττονος συμφέρον τὸ δίκαιον τυγχάνει ὄν, τὸ δʼ ἄδικον ἑαυτῷ λυσιτελοῦν τε καὶ συμφέρον. 344d
ταῦτα εἰπὼν ὁ Θρασύμαχος ἐν νῷ εἶχεν ἀπιέναι, ὥσπερ βαλανεὺς ἡμῶν καταντλήσας κατὰ τῶν ὤτων ἁθρόον καὶ πολὺν τὸν λόγον· οὐ μὴν εἴασάν γε αὐτὸν οἱ παρόντες, ἀλλʼ ἠνάγκασαν ὑπομεῖναί τε καὶ παρασχεῖν τῶν εἰρημένων λόγον. καὶ δὴ ἔγωγε καὶ αὐτὸς πάνυ ἐδεόμην τε καὶ εἶπον· ὦ δαιμόνιε Θρασύμαχε, οἷον ἐμβαλὼν λόγον ἐν νῷ ἔχεις ἀπιέναι πρὶν διδάξαι ἱκανῶς ἢ μαθεῖν εἴτε οὕτως εἴτε ἄλλως 344e ἔχει; ἢ σμικρὸν οἴει ἐπιχειρεῖν πρᾶγμα διορίζεσθαι ὅλου βίου διαγωγήν, ᾗ ἂν διαγόμενος ἕκαστος ἡμῶν λυσιτελεστάτην ζωὴν ζῴη;
ἐγὼ γὰρ οἶμαι, ἔφη ὁ Θρασύμαχος, τουτὶ ἄλλως ἔχειν;
ἔοικας, ἦν δʼ ἐγώ—ἤτοι ἡμῶν γε οὐδὲν κήδεσθαι, οὐδέ τι φροντίζειν εἴτε χεῖρον εἴτε βέλτιον βιωσόμεθα ἀγνοοῦντες ὃ σὺ φῂς εἰδέναι.

Republic. Plato. ed. John Burnet. Oxford. 1905.

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Current edition Perseus

Πολιτεία (Greek) (Platonis Opera Tomus IV: Tetralogia VIII. Burnet, John, editor. Oxford: Clarendon Press, 1905.)

Translations (1)

Republic Perseus (Plato in Twelve Volumes, Vol. 5-6. Shorey, Paul, translator. Cambridge, MA, Harvard University Press; London, William Heinemann Ltd. 1935-37 (printing).) — 1.344 focus

[344] I mean, of course, the one I was just speaking of, 344a the man who has the ability to overreach on a large scale. Consider this type of man, then, if you wish to judge how much more profitable it is to him personally to be unjust than to be just. And the easiest way of all to understand this matter will be to turn to the most consummate form of injustice which makes the man who has done the wrong most happy and those who are wronged and who would not themselves willingly do wrong most miserable. And this is tyranny, which both by stealth and by force takes away what belongs to others, both sacred and profane, both private and public, not little by little but at one swoop.¹ 344b For each several part of such wrongdoing the malefactor who fails to escape detection is fined and incurs the extreme of contumely; for temple-robbers, kidnappers, burglars, swindlers, and thieves the appellations of those who commit these partial forms of injustice. But when in addition to the property of the citizens men kidnap and enslave the citizens themselves, instead of these opprobrious names they are pronounced happy and blessed² not only by their fellow-citizens 344c but by all who hear the story of the man who has committed complete and entire injustice.³ For it is not the fear of doing⁴ but of suffering wrong that calls forth the reproaches of those who revile injustice. Thus, Socrates, injustice on a sufficiently large scale is a stronger, freer, and a more masterful thing than justice, and, as I said in the beginning, it is the advantage of the stronger that is the just, while the unjust is what profits man’s self and is for his advantage. 344d
After this Thrasymachus was minded to depart when like a bathman⁵ he had poured his speech in a sudden flood over our ears. But the company would not suffer him and were insistent that he should remain and render an account of what he had said. And I was particularly urgent and said, I am surprised at you, Thrasymachus; after hurling⁶ such a doctrine at us, can it be that you propose to depart without staying to teach us properly or learn yourself whether this thing is so or not? Do you think it is a small matter⁷ that you are attempting to determine 344e and not the entire conduct of life that for each of us would make living most worth while? Well, do I deny it?⁸ said Thrasymachus. You seem to, said I, or else⁹ to care nothing for us and so feel no concern whether we are going to live worse or better lives in our ignorance of what you affirm that you know.

Commentary

Commentary on Plato, Republic (Plato. The Republic, Vol 1-2. Adam, James, editor. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1902-1903.) focus

Πλάτωνος Πολιτεία . On the name, characters, and date of action of the dialogue, see Introd. §§ 1, 2, 3.

ἢ τὸ δίκαιον : i.e. ἢ τὸ δίκαιον εἶναι τῷ δικαίῳ. The reading αὑτῷ (found in A, but no dependence can be put on this MS in such matters) would require the omission of the article before δίκαιον (so Stallbaum and others). Tucker inclines to render ‘how much more he is personally benefited by being unjust than by justice,’ but the ordinary view is preferable.

ἣ οὐ κτλ. This laboured sentence is perhaps intended as a parody of some sophistic style: cf. Gorg. 448 C .

ὧν depends on

μέρει .

ἀνδραποδισταί : ‘kidnappers.’ The word is defined by Pollux III 78 as ὁ τὸν ἐλεύθερον καταδουλωσάμενος ἢ τὸν ἀλλότριον οἰκέτην ἀπαγόμενος. Thessaly had an evil name for this kind of crime (Blaydes on Ar. Plut. 521 ); but the frequent references to it in Attic literature shew that Greece itself was not exempt. See on IX 575 B and the article in Stephanus-Hase Thes. s.v.

τῶν τοιούτων κακουργημάτων is usually explained as depending on κατὰ μέρη, but as κατὰ μέρη is adverbial, this is somewhat awkward. It is perhaps better to regard the genitive as partitive, τι being omitted as in κινήσειεν ἂν τῶν ἀξίων λόγου νόμων IV 445 E, where see note.

πρὸς τοῖς ‐‐ χρήμασιν is virtually equivalent to πρὸς τῷ τὰ τῶν πολιτῶν ἀφελέσθαι, and combined by zeugma with δουλώσηται. Cf. I 330 E note

εὐδαίμονες ‐‐ κέκληνται . The generic singular τις has become a plural, as in Phaed. 109 D , infra VII 536 A. Envy of tyranny and tyrants was common in the Athens of Plato's younger days: compare Gorg. 484 A , 470 D (where it is maintained by Polus that Archelaus of Macedon is εὐδαίμων, and Socrates says ὀλίγου σοι πάντες συμφήσουσι ταῦτα Ἀθηναῖοι καὶ οἱ ξένοι 472 A) and Alc. II 141 A ff. The plays of Euripides in particular (see VIII 568 A) often eulogised the tyrant: e.g. Troad. 1169 ff., Fr. 252, Phoen. 524 ff. In earlier days Solon's friends had blamed him for not making himself tyrant of Athens: see the dramatic fragment (33 ed. Bergk), where the prevalent passion for tyranny is forcibly expressed in the lines ἤθελον γάρ κεν κρατήσας, πλοῦτον ἄφθονον λαβὼν | καὶ τυραννεύσας Ἀθηνῶν μοῦνον ἡμέραν μίαν, | ἀσκὸς ὕστερον δεδάρθαι κἀπιτετρῖφθαι γένος (4—6). See also Newman's Politics of Aristotle I pp. 388—392.

οὐ γὰρ ‐‐ τὴν ἀδικίαν . Cf. Gorg. 483 A φύσει μὲν γὰρ πᾶν αἴσχιόν ἐστιν, ὅπερ καὶ κάκιον, τὸ ἀδικεῖσθαι, νόμῳ δὲ τὸ ἀδικεῖν.

ἱκανῶς γιγνομένη : ‘realised on an adequate scale’ (D. and V.). For the construction of γίγνεσθαι with an adverb cf. (with Ast) Soph. 230 C and infra VI 504 C. After τὸ δ’ ἄδικον below, Herwerden would insert τό to go with ἑαυτῷ λυσιτελοῦν τε καὶ ξυμφέρον, but only τυγχάνει (and not τυγχάνει ὄν) is to be understood after ἄδικον; nor is the last clause intended as a strict and formal definition of injustice.

καταντλήσας . For the metaphor cf. infra VII 536 B, Lys. 204 D , Lucian Dem. Enc. 16 (imitated from this passage) and other examples in Blaydes on Ar. Wasps 483 .

ἐμβαλών : cf. Theaet. 165 D , Prot. 342 E . The whole expression recalls the Latin proverb scrupulum abeunti (Cic. de Fin. IV 80).

διαγόμενος . The use of this verb in Soph. El. 782 χρόνος διῆγέ με, Dem. 18. 89 πόλεμος—διῆγεν ὑμᾶς, Xen. Rep. Lac. I 3 and elsewhere is in favour of regarding διαγόμενος (‘living’) as grammatically passive and not middle both here and in Laws 758 A. Cf. Stephanus-Hase Thes. s.v. διάγω.

ἐγὼ γὰρ κτλ. I agree with Stallbaum and others in taking this sentence as interrogative: ‘do you mean that I think otherwise about this matter?’ i.e. think that it is not a question of βίου διαγωγή. J. and C. complain that this interpretation is “wanting in point.” It is surely much to the point to make Thrasymachus repudiate the imputation of trifling. His doctrine appears all the more dangerous when he confesses that it is no sophistic paradox, but a rule of life. I can see nothing to justify Apelt's conjecture ἔγωγ’ ἄῤ for ἐγὼ γὰρ ( Observ. Crit. p. 11).

ἤτοι ἡμῶν γε . ἤτοι or ἤτοι—γε= ‘or else’ (not ‘or rather’ as J. and C.). The regular construction is ἤτοι—ἤ, and ἤ—ἤτοι was condemned by the grammarians as a solecism, though it occurs in Pind. Nem. 6. 5. With the use of ἤτοι in this passage cf. III 400 C, IV 433 A τοῦτό ἐστιν—ἤτοι τούτου τι εἶδος ἡ δικαιοσύνη. Emendations have been suggested on all these passages of Plato: here ἤ τοι (van Prinsterer, Hartman) and in the other two passages ἤ: but we are not justified in altering the text. Cf. Kugler de partic. τοι eiusque comp. ap. Pl. usu p. 14.

Plato Republic 1.344

ed. John Burnet

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