Plato Republic 1.341

Πλάτωνος Πολιτεία . On the name, characters, and date of action of the dialogue, see Introd. §§ 1, 2, 3.

συκοφαντεῖν is explained in ἐξ ἐπιβουλῆς—κακουργοῦντά σε, where κακουργοῦντα (as Schneider observes) is not used as in 338 D of putting an evil or sophistical interpretation on a theory, but of damaging a man's personal reputation and credit: “scilicet existimationis et pecuniae detrimentum facturus sibi videbatur sophista ideoque Socratem se, quamquam frustra, impugnare in sequentibus quoque criminatur.”

μὴ λαθών : “si non latueris” (Schneider). Stephanus conjectured μήν and Ast με for μή: but either change would destroy the antithesis between λανθάνειν and βιάζεσθαι—secret guile and open fraud: cf. II 365 D ἀλλὰ δὴ θεοὺς οὔτε λανθάνειν, οὔτε βιάσασθαι δυνατόν. Hirschig's excision of μὴ λαθών greatly impairs the emphasis.

τὸν ὡς ἔπος εἰπεῖν . The only exact parallel to this use of ὡς ἔπος εἰπεῖν in Plato is Laws 656 E σκοπῶν δ’ εὑρήσεις αὐτόθι τὰ μυριοστὸν ἔτος γεγραμμένα ἢ τετυπωμένα οὐχ ὡς ἔπος εἰπεῖν μυριοστὸν ἀλλ’ ὄντως. This idiomatic phrase is rare before Plato, who uses it 77 times with the meaning ‘to put the matter in a word,’ implying that other and possibly more exact means of describing the thing in question might be found. In 52 of these cases the phrase is combined with πᾶς or οὐδείς and their family of words, in the sense of fere, propemodum: its use in other connexions is in part a return to old poetic usage; cf. Aesch. Pers. 714 , Eur. Hipp. 1162 , Heracl. 167. See Grünenwald in Schanz's Beiträge zur hist. Synt. d. gr. Spr. II 3, pp. 21 ff. The other examples in the Republic are V 464 D, VIII 551 B, IX 577 C.

ὃ νῦν δὴ ἔλεγες : viz. in 340 E κατὰ τὸν ἀκριβῆ λόγον. The antecedent is the phrase ἀκριβεῖ λόγῳ. The conjecture of Benedictus, ὅν for ὅ, though adopted by several editors, would (as Schneider remarks) leave it uncertain whether λόγῳ or τόν was referred to by the relative. There is no MS authority for ὅν.

ξυρεῖν ‐‐ λέοντα . παροιμία ἐπὶ τῶν καθ) ἑαυτῶν τι ἢ ἀδύνατα ποιεῖν ἐπιχειρούντων λεγομένη (Schol.). The proverb is very rare, and does not seem to occur elsewhere in classical Greek.

οὐδὲν ὢν καὶ ταῦτα : ‘though you were a nonentity at that too’: i.e. at bluffing me, as well as in other respects. So (I think) Schneider, rightly (“aber auch darin ist's nichts mit dir”). Others (e.g. Shorey in A. J. Ph. XVI p. 234) explain ‘and that too though you are a thing of naught.’ But in that case καὶ ταῦτα would surely precede οὐδὲν ὤν. Tucker can hardly be right in making καὶ ταῦτα simply ‘moreover’ ‘too,’ ‘and proved a failure, too.’ Nor (in spite of J. B. Mayor in Cl. Rev. X p. 110) is it quite enough to translate (with Campbell) ‘though here again you are nobody,’ i.e. ‘with as little effect as ever.’

καὶ λέγε ‐‐ ὄντα is expunged by Herwerden, but the emphatic reiteration is in keeping with the whole tone of the passage. For the sense we may recall the words of the so-called oath of Hippocrates εἰς οἰκίας δὲ ὁκόσας ἂν ἐσίω, ἐσελεύσομαι ἐπ’ ὠφελείῃ τῶν καμνόντων (Vol. 1. p. 2 ed. Kühn).

ἑκάστῳ τούτων : viz. τοῖς κάμνουσι, τοῖς ναύταις, and in general the sub jects upon whom the art is exercised. The expression is a little vague (cf. VIII 543 C note) but it is rash and unnecessary to insert εἴδει or write ἑκάστῳ <τῶν εἰδῶν> τούτων, as Tucker recommends.

ἆῤ οὖν ‐‐ τελέαν εἶναι . I have retained this reading, in deference to the MSS, but it is open to grave objection. As the sentence stands, the meaning is that every art (as well as every object of an art—this is implied by καί) has one συμφέρον, viz. to be as perfect as it can, but no other. In the sequel this is interpreted to mean that no art needs any additional ἀρετή; since it is ( qua art) perfect already: οὔτε γὰρ πονηρία οὔτε ἁμαρτία οὐδεμία οὐδεμιᾷ τέχνῃ πάρεστιν κτλ. (342 B). But the words of the sentence ἆρ’ οὖν—τελέαν εἶναι have to be taken very loosely in order to admit of this interpretation. We must suppose them equivalent to ‘No art has a συμφέρον of its own, unless you are to call the fact that it is perfect its συμφέρον.’ If Plato had written the passage as it stands in q and in the margin of Flor. U (both MSS probably of the fifteenth century), it would be open to no objection: ἆρ’ οὖν καὶ ἑκάστῃ τῶν τεχνῶν ἔστι τι ξυμφέρον ἄλλο <οὗ προσδεῖται>, ἢ <ἐξαρκεῖ ἑκάστη αὐτὴ αὑτῇ, ὥστε> ὅ τι μάλιστα τελέαν εἶναι; This reading was adopted by Bekker, and by Stallbaum in his first edition; and a careful study of the whole passage confirms the judgment of Schneider, “Platonem non solum potuisse, sed etiam debuisse vel haec ipsa vel consimilia scribere.” The same sense, expressed more briefly, may be obtained by the insertion of δεῖ before εἶναι: ‘has every art also a ξυμφέρον besides (i.e. besides the ξυμφέρον of its object), or must it be as perfect as possible?’ <*>κάστην does not require to be repeated any more than in 346 A below. The alteration is very slight; for δεῖ εἶναι, δεῖναι may have been written by mistake and δ afterwards ejected.

νῦν κτλ. : ‘has now been invented.’ The art of medicine is not coeval with body. I can see no reason for thinking (with Campbell) that νῦν is corrupt for ἡμῖν.

σῶμά ἐστι πονηρὸν κτλ. Lys. 217 B ἀναγκάζεται δέ γε σῶμα διὰ νόσον ἰατρικὴν ἀσπάζεσθαι καὶ φιλεῖν.

ὅπως ἐκπορίζῃ . This is said by Weber (Schanz's Beiträge II 2, p. 67) to be the only example in Plato of ὅπως with the subjunctive after a preterite tense.