Plato Republic 1.334

Πλάτωνος Πολιτεία . On the name, characters, and date of action of the dialogue, see Introd. §§ 1, 2, 3.

στρατοπέδου γε κτλ. The στρατηγός must be both φυλακτικος τε καὶ κλέπτης according to Socrates in Xen. Mem. III 1. 6.

κλέπτειν and

κλέμμα were used (especially by Spartans) with reference to military operations involving surprise and stealth (Classen on Thuc. v 9. 5).

κλέπτης ‐‐ ἀναπέφανται . Cf. Hipp. Min. 365 C ff., where this view is worked out at length, ib. 369 B ἀναπέφανται ὁ αὐτὸς ὢν ψευδής τε καὶ ἀληθής and Xen. Mem. IV 2. 20 ff. ἀναπέφανται, as J. and C. remark, expresses an unexpected result—here a paradox. Like ὁ ἑκὼν ἁμαρτάνων ἀμείνων, the conclusion is a logical inference from the Socratic identification of virtue and knowledge, made without regard to experience.

ἀγαπᾷ , ‘esteems,’ is said with reference to ἐσθλόν in Hom. Od. XIX 395 f. μητρὸς ἑῆς πατέρ’ ἐσθλόν, ὃς ἀνθρώπους ἐκέκαστο | κλεπτοσύνῃ θ’ ὅρκῳ τε. The suggested ἄγαται for ἀγαπᾷ τε would be too strong: see Symp. 180 B μᾶλλον— θαυμάζουσιν καὶ ἄγανται—ὅταν ὁ ἑρώμενος τὸν ἐραστὴν ἀγαπᾷ, where the meaning of ἀγαπᾷ is shewn by οὕτω περὶ πολλοῦ ἐποιεῖτο in 180 A.

τοῦτο ‐‐ ἔτι . So Euthyphro (15 B) harks back to his first definition of piety (6 E) after he has been refuted by Socrates. Cf. also VII 515 E note

δοκεῖ does double duty, first with τοῦτο and then with δικαιοσύνη: cf. VI 493 A, VII 517 B, 525 B, 530 B and (with Stallbaum) Ap. 25 B . Hartman needlessly doubts the text.

φίλους δὲ λέγεις κτλ. The same mode of argument recurs in 339 B ff. Cf. also Hipp. Maior 284 D.

φίλοι κτλ. Schneider rightly observes that κατὰ δὴ τὸν σὸν λόγον below tends to shew that ἀλλ’ ὅμως —βλάπτειν is interrogative. The argument is in the form of a dilemma: either a it is just to injure those who do us no injustice (and benefit those who do), or b it is just to injure friends and benefit foes. The first alternative is immoral ( πονηρός), and the second directly opposed to Simonides' view. Socrates suppresses the words which I have put in brackets, because they lessen rather than increase the immorality of the conclusion: the second alternative is expressed in full as the αὐτὸ τοὐναντίον ἢ τὸν Σιμωνίδην ἔφαμεν λέγειν .

ὅσοι κτλ. : not ‘those of mankind who are in error’ (J. and C.) but ‘those who have mistaken their men’: cf. Phaedr. 257 D τοῦ ἑταίρου συχνὸν διαμαρτάνεις. So also Schneider, and Davies and Vaughan.

πονηροὶ γὰρ κτλ. Stallbaum (followed by D. and V.) wrongly takes αὐτοῖς as ‘in their eyes.’ The reasoning is difficult only from its brevity. If it is δίκαιον βλάπτειν ἀδίκους, and men sometimes suppose that a man is good when he is bad ( πονηροὶ γὰρ αὐτοῖς εἰσὶν ‘for they have bad friends’), then since friend has been defined as one whom we suppose to be good (334 C), it is sometimes δίκαιον βλάπτειν φίλους. Stallbaum's view is quite inconsistent with the definition of friends in 334 C as οὓς ἄν τις ἡγῆται χρηστούς.

τὸν φίλον καὶ ἐχθρόν . Hartman (with some inferior MSS) wishes to insert τόν before ἐχθρόν; but cf. infra III 400 D and many other examples cited by himself. To pronounce them all corrupt is to destroy the basis on which our knowledge of Platonic idiom rests.

τὸν δοκοῦντά τε ‐‐ καὶ τὸν ὄντα . The meaning required—‘he who both seems and is good’—would be more correctly expressed by τὸν δοκοῦντά τε—καὶ ὄντα (so Ast and others), but “aliquid tribuendum interpositis ἧ δ’ ὅς, quae negligentiam repetendi, si est negligentia, saltem excusant” (Schneider, who compares also infra 341 B ποτέρως λεγεις τὸν ἄρχοντά τε καὶ τὸν κρείττονα). In τὸν δὲ δοκοῦντα μέν, ὄντα δὲ μή Polemarchus expresses himself more accurately.