Plato Republic 1.331

Πλάτωνος Πολιτεία . On the name, characters, and date of action of the dialogue, see Introd. §§ 1, 2, 3.

ἡδεῖα ‐‐ γηροτρόφος . ἡδεῖα is suggested by Pindar's γλυκεῖα, and καὶ ἀγαθή, as presently appears, is not part of the quotation, but goes with ἐλπίς and is added by Plato in contrast to μετὰ κακῆς ἐλπίδος.

γηροτρόφος κτλ. : ‘to nurse him in old age, as Pindar also says.’ γηροτρόφος is best taken by itself and not with ἀγαθή .

ἀτάλλοισα κτλ . ἀτάλλω is used of rearing children, and helps out the idea of γηροτρόφος: δὶς παῖδες οἱ γέροντες. It is not clear how the fragment is to be arranged, nor to what class of Pindar's poems it belongs. See Bergk Poet. Lyr. Gr.^{4} I p. 452.

εὖ οὖν ‐‐ σφόδρα . The emphasis is quite in keeping with Cephalus' age and character; and Hartman is certainly wrong in condemning the clause: cf. 329 C, 331 B.

ὀφείλοντα ‐‐ θεῷ θυσίας τινάς . Phaed. 118 A εἶπεν, ὃ δὴ τελευταῖον ἐφθέγξατο, ὦ Κρίτων, ἔφη, τῷ Ἀσκληπιῷ ὀφείλομεν ἀλεκτρυόνα· ἀλλὰ ἀπόδοτε καὶ μὴ ἀμελήσητε. Wealth is in Cephalus' view the indispensable χορηγία ἀρετῆς.

ἀλλά γε ἓν ἀνθ) ἑνός . ἀλλά γε is extremely rare in Attic prose: in the Platonic corpus it occurs—according to the best manuscript authority—here and in Rep. VIII 543 C, Phaed. 86 E , Hipp. Maior 287 B, Phaedr. 262 A ( ἀλλά γε δή), Phaed. 116 D (id.). In some of these passages ἀλλ’ ἄγε has been conjectured — wrongly, as I think (with Schneider), at all events in the passage from the Republic:—but ἀλλ’ ἄγε cannot be read in the Phaedrus and Hippias Maior. There is no a priori objection to the collocation, which is also implied in ἀλλὰ γάρ ( γ’ ἄρα); and in later Greek ἀλλά γε aroused no objection. The meaning is ‘but still,’ originally ‘yes, but’: as Schneider says, “ γε in his dictionibus concedit aliquatenus praecedentia, sed magis urget sequentia.” There is perhaps also a dramatic motive for putting ἀλλά γε into the mouth of Cephalus: see on οὐ μέντοι γε in 329 E. Against the reading of Stobaeus ( Flor. 94. 22) ἀλλὰ ἕν γε ἀνθ’ ἑνός, we may urge the further objection that the idiomatic phrase ἓν ἀνθ’ ἑνός (‘setting one thing against another,’ as Jowett correctly translates it) seems to depend for its peculiar force (like μόνος μόνῳ and the like) on the juxtaposition of its two parts: cf. Phil. 63 B ( ἓν ἀνθ’ ἑνός) and Laws 705 B ( ἀνθ’ ἑνὸς ἕν). The passage quoted by Stallbaum from Euripides Orest. 651 ἓν μὲν τόδ’ ἡμῖν ἀνθ’ ἑνὸς δοῦναί σε χρή is quite different and does not mean ‘hoc praecipue,’ but ‘one thing in return for one thing,’ as is clear from lines 646 f.

οὐκ ἐλάχιστον is not adverbial (as Hartman and others suppose), but belongs to τοῦτο: ‘setting one thing against another, I should regard this as not the least important object for which wealth is most useful to a man of sense.’ The emphasis is characteristic: cf. 329 C, 331 A.

τὴν ἀλήθειαν κτλ. This theory of justice or righteousness is deduced from the words of Cephalus: τὸ γὰρ μηδὲ ἄκοντά τινα ἐξαπατῆσαι ἢ ψεύσασθαι being generalised into ἀλήθειαν (truthfulness, cf. τἀληθῆ λέγειν below), and μηδ’ αὖ ὀφείλοντα ἢ θεῷ θυσίας τινὰς ἢ ἀνθρώπῳ χρήματα into ἀποδιδόναι ἄν τίς τι παρά του λάβῃ. Cf. (with Wohlrab) Mimn. Fr. 8 ἀληθείη δὲ παρέστω | σοὶ καὶ ἐμοί, πάντων χρῆμα δικαιότατον. It is simply Truth and Honesty, the two chief ingredients in the popular conception of morality.

ἁπλῶς οὕτως : ‘quite without qualification.’ For this idiomatic οὕτως cf. ῥᾳδιως οὕτω II 377 B note

οἷον τοιόνδε λέγω . Similar points of casuistry are raised in Socrates' conversation with Euthydemus ap. Xen. Mem. IV 2 12 ff.

οὐδ’ αὖ κτλ. I have removed the comma before οὐδέ, because the ὁ in ὁ ἀποδιδούς covers both participles, the person in both cases being the same.

ἔφη . There is not sufficient reason for changing the best supported reading ἔφη, ἐγω to ἔφην ἐγώ. Polemarchus is throughout the introduction represented as a vivacious person: e.g. in ὁρᾷς οὖν ἡμᾶς—ὅσοι ἐσμέν (327 C), and in the lively emphasis with which he breaks in just above: πάνυ μὲν οὖν—εἴπερ γέ τι χρὴ Σιμωνίδῃ πείθεσθαι. True to his name, he is first to mingle in the fray. It is this φιλολογία on the part of his son which draws a smile from Cephalus: over-much προθυμία always struck the Greeks as laughable: cf. e.g. Eur. Ion 1172 ff. The words in which Socrates addresses Polemarchus σὺ ὁ τοῦ λόγου κληρονόμος are also somewhat more appropriate if the title was self-chosen. Cephalus leaves the argument to be carried on by the assembled company (for ὑμῖν does not mean Polemarchus and Socrates alone): whereupon Polemarchus, seizing hold on the word παραδίδωμι in its sense of ‘transmit,’ ‘bequeath,’ playfully claims the right to inherit his λόγος as Cephalus' eldest son and heir. It may be added that ἔφη ἐγώ was much more likely to be changed to ἔφην ἐγώ than vice versa. With the Greek compare Phaed. 89 C ἀλλὰ καὶ ἐμέ, ἔφη, τὸν Ἰόλεων παρακάλει.

ἅμα ᾔει πρὸς τὰ ἱερά . Soph. Fr. 206 γήρᾳ πρεπόντως σῷζε την εὐφημίαν. The editors quote Cicero Epp. ad Att. IV 16. 3 “credo Platonem vix putasse satis consonum fore, si hominem id aetatis in tam longo sermone diutius retinuisset.” Cf. the words of Theodorus in Theaet. 162 B οἶμαι ὑμᾶς πείσειν ἐμὲ μὲν <*>ᾶν θεᾶσθαι καὶ μὴ ἕλκειν πρὸς τὸ γυμνάσιον, σκληρὸν ἤδη ὄντα, τῷ δὲ δὴ νεωτέρῳ τε<*>καὶ ὑγροτέρῳ ὄντι προσπαλαίειν. It is worthy of note that the entrance and exit of Cephalus are alike associated with the services of religion: see 328 C and Introd. § 2.

ὁ τοῦ λόγου κληρονόμος . See on παῖδες ἐκείνου τοῦ ἀνδρός II 368 A.

τὰ ὀφειλόμενα ‐‐ ἐστι . Probably some current saying attributed to Simonides: there is nothing like it in his fragments. The words do not profess to be a definition of justice: if they did, τό would appear before δίκαιον. It is not likely that Simonides himself explained this particular saying as Polemarchus does, although he would not have disapproved of the explanation. In Xen. Hier. II 2 he is represented as saying that tyrants are ἱκανώτατοι—κακῶσαι μὲν ἐχθρούς, ὀνῆσαι δὲ φίλους. The words of Socrates σὺ μέν, ὦ Πολέμαρχε, ἴσως γιγνώσκεις, ἐγὼ δὲ ἀγνοῶ tend to fix the responsibility of the explanation on Polemarchus alone. Probably Simonides (if the saying is his) meant no more than that we should ‘render unto Caesar the things which are Caesar's.’ Plato virtually confesses in 332 B that his interpretation is forced.

ἔμοιγε : said with confidence, as Σιμωνίδῃ γε with emphasis and some mockery: with you one might disagree, but not with Simonides.

σοφὸς ‐‐ θεῖος . Cf. Prot. 315 E . σοφός and θεῖος were fashionable words of praise: in the mouth of Socrates they are generally ironical. Plato's own connotation of the word θεῖος is given in Men. 99 C οὐκοῦν, ὦ Μένων, ἄξιον τούτους θείους καλεῖν τοὺς ἄνδρας, οἵτινες νοῦν μὴ ἔχοντες πολλὰ καὶ μεγάλα κατορθοῦσιν ὧν πράττουσι καὶ λέγουσιν; Ὀρθῶς ἂν καλοῖμεν θείους τε, οὓς νῦν δὴ ἐλέγομεν χρησμῳδοὺς καὶ μάντεις καὶ τοὺς ποιητικοὺς ἅπαντας· καὶ τοὺς πολιτικοὺς οὐχ ἥκιστα τούτων φαῖμεν ἂν θείους τε εἶναι καὶ ἐνθουσιάζειν, ἐπίπνους ὄντας καὶ κατεχομένους ἐκ τοῦ θεοῦ, ὅταν κατορθῶσι λέγοντες πολλὰ καὶ μεγάλα πράγματα, μηδὲν εἰδότες ὦν λέγουσι.

ἀνήρ . I formerly read ἁνήρ, but ἀνὴρ (in the predicate) is satisfactory enough: cf. Men. 99 D θεῖος ἀνήρ, φασίν, οὗτος.

παρακαταθεμένου κτλ. Xen. Cyr. I 6. 31 ff. καὶ ἔτι προβὰς (sc. ἐπὶ τῶν ἡμετέρων προγόνων γενόμενός ποτε ἀνὴρ διδάσκαλος τῶν παίδων ) ταῦτα ἐδίδασκεν ὡς καὶ τοὺς φίλους δίκαιον εἴη ἐξαπατᾶν, ἐπί γε ἀγαθῷ, καὶ κλέπτειν τὰ τῶν φίλων, ἐπί γε ἀγαθῷ: Mem. IV 2. 17 ff.

ὁτῳοῦν is to be taken with παρακαταθεμένου and not with ἀπαιτοῦντι.

καίτοι γε ὀφειλόμενον . There is the same dispute about καίτοι γε as about μέντοι γε and ἀλλά γε (see on 329 E, 331 B). καίτοι γε has the best MS authority in its favour here and in IV 440D: elsewhere in Plato it is not well-attested except in the νοθευόμενοι, where it occurs Min. 318 E , Axioch. 364 B , 368 E. καίτοι γε is also found occasionally in Aristophanes, Xenophon, Aristotle, and the orators: see Blaydes on Ar. Ach. 611 , and the Lex. Arist. Many distinguished critics would emend the idiom everywhere; but the instances are far too numerous for such a drastic policy. The difference between καίτοι ὀφειλόμενόν γε που (which Hoefer de part. Plat. p. 38 would read) and καίτοι γε ὀφειλόμενον would seem to be that in the former more stress is thrown on the word ὀφειλόμενον, in the latter on τοι. καίτοι γε is ‘and surely’ rather than ‘quamquam’ (as Kugler holds de part. τοι eiusque comp. ap. Pl. usu p. 20), cf. IV 440 D note The periphrasis ὀφειλόμενον—ἐστι is used of course to correspond to τὰ ὀφειλόμενα in E above: such periphrases (the principle of which is explained in Euthyph. 9 E ff.) are extremely common in Plato. See W. J. Alexander in A. J. Ph. IV pp. 299 ff.