οὔτε γε κτλ.
καί appears before
οὔτε in
ΠΞ
q and a majority of MSS, but the reading of A is, I now think, right. We should translate ‘At all events, said I, they are unwilling to extinguish this kind of mischief when it is beginning to break into a flame, either by preventing’ etc. If they quenched it in its earlier stages, then the
πτωχοί would not be
πολλοί: and
πολύν bears the emphasis in both the previous sentences. For this use of
γε see 559 B note, and cf. IX 581 C and (with Schneider) Isocr.
Paneg. 153. With
ἐκκαόμενον cf.
Ar.
Peace 1132
. D. and V. understand the word of ‘cauterizing,’ wrongly, as
ἀποσβεννύναι shews.
ὅπῃ
. I formerly, with two inferior MSS, Bekker and Ast, read
ὅποι, which is certainly more exact: see the examples cited by Blaydes on
Ar.
Clouds 858
τὰς δ’ ἐμβάδας ποῖ τέτροφας; The verb
βούλεται is however treated as more than a mere auxiliary, and the relative accommodated to it by a species of attraction, even at the cost of sacrificing something of the peculiar force of
τρέπειν. Translate ‘to dispose of one's property as one likes.’
ἕτερον νόμον
. Plato's language here and in
ὃς μετ’ ἐκεῖνόν ἐστι δεύτερος seems to imply that such a law would not be altogether a novelty in Greece. According to Theophrastus (
Frag. 97. 5 Wimmer=Stob.
Flor. 44. 22), it found a place among the laws of Charondas:
ἐὰν δέ τις πιστεύσῃ, μὴ εἶναι δίκην· αὐτὸν γὰρ αἴτιον εἶναι τῆς ἀδικίας. Plato makes a similar provision in
Laws 742 C, 849 E, 915 E.
τοὺς μὲν δὴ κτλ.
μέν balances
δέ after
σφᾶς, and should not be taken with
δή in the ordinary sense of the collocation
μὲν δή: so that there is no reason to omit
δή (with
Ξ and two other MSS) on the ground that
μὲν δή comes too late in the sentence.
δή “priori membro dilatando inservit et vinculi per
μέν iniecti nexum relaxans alterum membrum ut nova interrogatione instructum minus miremur efficit” (Schneider, comparing
Laws 751 E).
ἆρ’ οὐ τρυφῶντας κτλ.
Note the usual Platonic chiasmus.
παραβάλλωσιν
: ‘come alongside,’ originally perhaps a nautical expression (J. and C.), as in Arist.
de gen. anim. III 11. 763^{a} 31. The usage occurs again in
Lys. 203 B
, and tolerably often in Aristotle.
ἢ καὶ κτλ.
ὅταν extends its influence to
καταφρονῶνται and
ἴδῃ. On
θεώμενοι κτλ. Schneider remarks “post verba
ἀλλήλους θεώμενοι exspectabatur
μηδαμῇ ὡς πρότερον περὶ ἀλλήλων διανοῶνται, vel tale quid, quod ad utrosque se invicem conspicientes pertineret; cuius loco statim divisione facta quid iam de pauperibus divites, de divitibus pauperes sentiant, infertur. Cuius non inconsequentiae, sed breviloquentiae significandae causa supra post
θεώμενοι comma—sustuli.” The effect is analogous to that produced by so-called partitive apposition (IV 431 A note), of which idiom a somewhat similar extension occurs in V 465 C, where see note. Richards suspects corruption, proposing to read either (1)
θεωμένων and perhaps also
ἢ κἄν or
ἢ καὶ <ἐάν> instead of
ἢ καί, or (2) simply to insert
καί before
μηδαμῇ. The second proposal is neat and scholarly; but
καί was unlikely to disappear, and Plato's rapidity of thought and style renders him particularly liable to grammatical and other irregularities in his more spirited and dramatic passages: cf. VI 488 C, D, VII 531 A, and infra 558 A. See also on 549 D above.
ταύτῃ
is emphatic, implying that it is otherwise when danger does not threaten.
πολλὰς κτλ.
: ‘with quantities of alien fat about him’ (
viel fremdes Fleisch an sich habend, Schneider), ‘cumbered with much fat.’
παχεῖς ‘bloated’ was, it may be remembered, a nickname for oligarchs: see Gilbert
Gr. Staatsalt. II p. 275 note 2 and Neil's edition of Ar.
Knights App. II p. 209.
ἀλλοτρίας is ‘not his own,’ i.e. no real part of him, and hence useless, superfluous. As Graser points out (
Spec. advers. in serm. Pl. p. 91), it is Homer's
γναθμοῖσιν ἀλλοτρίοισι (
Od. XX 347) which is the source of this and other kindred uses of
ἀλλότριος, e.g. Thuc. I 70. 6 and Isocr.
Faneg. 86. Hermann thinks the meaning is that he has grown fat at the expense of others, like the drone. This explanation is less pointed, and the drone represents not the rich oligarch, but the
πτωχός (555 E). With the feeling of this passage cf. Plut.
Apoph.
Reg. et Imp. 192 D
τοῖς πολυσάρκοις ἐπολέμει (
Ἐπαμεινώνδας)
καί τινα τοιοῦτον ἀπήλασε τῆς στρατιᾶς, εἰπὼν ὅτι μόλις αὐτοῦ σκέπουσι τὴν γαστέρα ἀσπίδες τρεῖς ἢ τέσσαρες.
ἄνδρες ‐‐ οὐδέν
. ‘We have them at our mercy: for they're good for nothing.’
ἄνδρες ἡμέτεροι is virtually an exhortation to rise in revolt: hence
παραγγέλλειν. The omission of the article heightens the dramatic effect: cf. X 617 D.
ἡμέτεροι has a colloquial ring (‘they are ours’). A kindred meaning, but without any colloquial touch, appears in
Xen.
Cyr. II 3. 2
(quoted by Schneider
Addit. p. 65)
ἢν μὲν ἡμεῖς νικῶμεν—δῆλον ὅτι οἵ τε πολέμιοι ἡμέτεροι καὶ τὰ τῶν πολεμίων ἀγαθὰ πάντα: cf. also VII 5. 73. This interpretation, which Schneider finally suggested, has the support of A, II and other MSS. Baiter's
ἄνδρες ἡμέτεροι εἰσὶ παρ’ οὐδέν has found considerable favour, and gives a fair sense, but
παρ’ οὐδέν (for which see Jebb on
Soph.
Ant. 466
) appears to me unpleasantly weak.
ἄνδρες ἡμέτεροι εἰσὶν οὐδέν (
q and others) is intrinsically better (cf. 562 D), and may be right, but the intrusion of
γάρ in the best MSS remains a difficulty, and
παραγγέλλειν (as in Baiter's reading) is shorn perhaps of its full force. It is on the whole easier, I think, to understand
ἡμέτεροι as I do than to explain the insertion of
γάρ in our two oldest and best MSS.
οὐκοῦν ὥσπερ κτλ.
Cf.
Soph.
O. T. 961
σμικρὰ παλαιὰ σώματ’ εὐνάζει ῥοπή. The Platonic simile is imitated by Arist.
Pol. Z 6. 1320^{b} 33 ff. and may also, as Stallbaum thinks, have been in Demosthenes' mind when he wrote
Ol. II 21.
ἔξωθεν ἐπαγομένων κτλ.
A familiar feature in the history of Greek revolutions: cf. Whibley
Gk Olig. p. 52 and (for examples) Gilbert
Gr. Staatsalt. II
passim.
καὶ ὡς τὸ πολὺ κτλ.
: ‘and the magistracies in the city are for the most part given by lot.’ These words, which depend, of course, on
ὅταν, explain
ἐξ ἴσου—ἀρχῶν, and should be taken in close connexion with that clause, as Ast long ago pointed out. The difference in tense (
μεταδῶσι but
γίγνωνται), no less than the meaning, clearly indicates that the two clauses do not express two separate and distinct acts. It is by means of the lot that
ἰσότης is secured; and hence democracy is not established until offices are assigned thereby: cf. Hdt. III 80
πάλῳ μὲν ἀρχὰς ἄρχει and Arist.
Rhet. I 8. 1365^{b} 32
δημοκρατία μὲν πολιτεία ἐν ᾗ κλήρῳ διανέμονται τὰς ἀρχάς, with Whibley
Gk Olig. p. 35 and Greenidge
Gk Const. Hist. pp. 139 ff. The clause was, strangely enough, condemned by Hermann. Plato was not likely to omit all mention of the most characteristic and necessary factor in the establishment of a democracy, especially as he introduces the same feature in describing the democratical man (561 B
ὥσπερ λαχούσῃ). J. and C., with Schneider and others, read
γίγνονται, for which there is very little MS support, remarking that ‘the subjunctive is inexact, because any words dependent on
ὅταν should describe a characteristic of the origin of democracy, not merely a characteristic of democracy.’ The fact is that the words do explain the origin of democracy by explaining
ἐξ ἴσου μεταδῶσι κτλ., where the aorist is rightly used of the act by which democracy is established; whereas if we read
γίγνονται the clause must be taken by itself, and then it can only express a characteristic of democracy after that constitution is in force, so that its proper place would be in the next chapter. It should be observed that in no ancient democracy that we know of was the lot employed in electing to
all magistracies: see Gilbert l.c. II p. 318. For this reason Plato writes
ὡς τὸ πολύ .
τίνα δὴ οὖν κτλ.
The psychological principle of Democracy, as well as of Oligarchy, is
τὸ ἐπιθυμητικόν. But whereas in Oligarchy everything was subjected to the dominion of one particular desire, viz. the desire of wealth (550 C note), Democracy, on the other hand, is the political embodiment of absolute freedom and equality among all desires, unnecessary as well as necessary: see on 558 C ff. The materials for Plato's picture of democracy are of course taken from Athens more than any other single city. It is an extraordinarily vivid sketch; and indeed Plato's whole account of democracy and the democratical man (557 A—565 C), in spite of manifest exaggerations, brings Athens nearer to us than almost any monument of ancient literature, Aristophanes alone excepted. We can see that Plato was fully alive to the wonderful variety and colour of Athenian life; but even on this ground democracy did not appear to him worthy of praise. Multiplicity and variety are the offspring of that fatal
ἀνομοιότης which works ruin alike in the city and the soul (547 A note). In other respects, Plato represents democracy as a land of Hedonism, peopled by Anarchy and Waywardness, and darkened by the shadow of the Tyranny to which it must at last succumb. Nearly all the greatest writers of Greek antiquity were on the whole unfavourable to democracy, except of course the Orators: and least of all in Plato could democracy expect a champion. For the other side of the picture, we should of course take Pericles' speech in Thuc. II 35 ff. See Neil's
Knights of Aristophanes pp. vii ff.
δῆλον γὰρ κτλ.
It is the
ἀνήρ rather than the
πολιτεία which is the ultimate object of our search; but as the
ἀνήρ in a democracy will be
δημοκρατικός τις, we cannot understand him until we understand
δημοκρατία. Hence the question
ποία τις—πολιτεία. Cf. 545 B, C.
ἐλευθερίας
. ἐλευθερία was the fundamental
ὑπόθεσις of ancient democracy:
ὑπόθεσις μὲν οὖν τῆς δημοκρατικῆς πολιτείας ἐλευθερία, says Aristotle
Pol. Z 2. 1317^{a} 40. Cf. 562 B. It involves, according to Aristotle l.c., two ideas, viz. (1)
τὸ ἐν
μέρει ἄρχεσθαι καὶ ἄρχειν, (2)
τὸ ζῆν ὡς βούλεταί τις (ib. 1317^{b} II). Throughout this chapter Plato illustrates the second of these characteristics. Cf. Whibley
Gk Olig. pp. 33—35.
παρρησία
and
ἐξουσία
are democratical watchwords; see e.g.
Gorg. 461 E
,
Eur.
Hipp. 422
,
Ion 671 ff., and Thuc. VII 69 (
τῆς—ἀνεπιτάκτου πᾶσιν ἐς τὴν δίαιταν ἐξουσίας) with II 37. 2 and infra 557 D, 563 E, Arist.
Pol. Z 4. 1318^{b} 39 al.
ὥσπερ ἱμάτιον κτλ.
For the asyndeton cf. VI 497 B note
ποικίλον=‘many-coloured’ is cancelled by Herwerden and J. J. Hartman. The word is in every MS and thoroughly harmonises with Plato's characteristic fulness of style: ‘like a many-coloured garment, diversified with every shade of colour.’ In itself it is the antithesis of
ἁπλοῦς, and symbolical of kaleidoscopic diversity and changefulness, just as in recent years we have heard the expression ‘Joseph's coat of many colours’ applied to a versatile and distinguished statesman. See also on 561 E.
ἄνθεσι is not ‘flowers’ (as seems to be generally supposed), but ‘dyes,’ ‘colours’ (IV 429 D note): nor need
πεποικιλμένη be understood of embroidery: for
ποικίλλειν means no more than ‘to diversify with colours’ and implies nothing whatever as to the process: cf. II 378 C. On the verbal play in
ἄνθεσι—ἤθεσι see III 406 B note For
ἦν δ’ ἐγώ repeated cf. VII 522 A note
πάντα γένη κτλ.
Cf.
Laws 681 D
πολιτείας σχῆμα—ἐν ᾦ δὴ πάντα εἴδη καὶ παθήματα πολιτειῶν καὶ ἅμα πόλεων ξυμπίπτει γίγνεσθαι. On
ἐξουσίαν see 557 B note
τοῦτον ἐκλέξασθαι κτλ.
Pericles (Thuc. II 37. 1) regarded the Athenian constitution as a
παράδειγμα: Plato humorously describes it as a motley aggregate of
παραδείγματα. Democracy is
πόλεις παμπολλαί, ἀλλ’ οὐ πόλις, the different varieties of individuals living in it representing so many different constitutions. In view of 561 C we may even go farther, and say that every democratical individual is himself a kaleidoscopic succession of polities—
χαμαιλέων τις καὶ σαθρῶς ἰδρυμένος (ap. Arist.
Eth. Nic. I 11. 1100^{b} 6). Hence, as Plato would hold, the waywardness and instability of democratic policy, constantly reversing to-morrow what it decrees today. See Thuc. I 44, II 65, III 36 ff., IV 28 and VIII 1. Democracy in fact, from Plato's point of view, is the political expression of monochronous Hedonism: cf. 558 A and 561 C notes
ἀνάγκην
. The Athenians gloried in their
ἀνειμένη δίαιτα. See Thuc. II 39. 1 and
Laws 642 C
μόνοι γὰρ ἄνευ ἀνάγκης, αὐτοφυῶς, θείᾳ μοίρᾳ, ἀληθῶς καὶ οὔ τι πλαστῶς εἰσιν ἀγαθοί .
