Plato, Republic, Paul Shorey (Translator), 7.533

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[533] 533a “You will not be able, dear Glaucon, to follow me further,¹ though on my part there will be no lack of goodwill.² And, if I could, I would show you, no longer an image and symbol of my meaning, but the very truth, as it appears to me—though whether rightly or not I may not properly affirm.³ But that something like this is what we have to see, I must affirm.⁴ Is not that so?” Surely. “And may we not also declare that nothing less than the power of dialectics could reveal⁵ this, and that only to one experienced⁶ in the studies we have described, and that the thing is in no other wise possible?” “That, too,” he said, “we may properly affirm.” “This, at any rate,” said I, “no one will maintain in dispute against us⁷: 533b that there is any other way of inquiry⁸ that attempts systematically and in all cases to determine what each thing really is. But all the other arts have for their object the opinions and desires of men or are wholly concerned with generation and composition or with the service and tendance of the things that grow and are put together, while the remnant which we said⁹ did in some sort lay hold on reality—geometry and the studies that accompany it— 533c are, as we see, dreaming¹⁰ about being, but the clear waking vision¹¹ of it is impossible for them as long as they leave the assumptions which they employ undisturbed and cannot give any account¹² of them. For where the starting-point is something that the reasoner does not know, and the conclusion and all that intervenes is a tissue of things not really known,¹³ what possibility is there that assent¹⁴ in such cases can ever be converted into true knowledge or science?” None, said he.
Then, said I, “is not dialectics the only process of inquiry that advances in this manner, doing away with hypotheses, up to the first principle itself in order to find confirmation there? And it is literally true that when the eye of the soul¹⁵ is sunk 533d in the barbaric slough¹⁶ of the Orphic myth, dialectic gently draws it forth and leads it up, employing as helpers and co-operators in this conversion the studies and sciences which we enumerated, which we called sciences often from habit,¹⁷ though they really need some other designation, connoting more clearness than opinion and more obscurity than science. Understanding,¹⁸ I believe, was the term we employed. But I presume we shall not dispute about the name¹⁹ 533e when things of such moment lie before us for consideration.” “No, indeed,” he said.²⁰

Republic. Plato. Paul Shorey (Translator). Cambridge, MA. 1935-37.

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Current edition Perseus

Republic (English) (Plato in Twelve Volumes, Vol. 5-6. Shorey, Paul, translator. Cambridge, MA, Harvard University Press; London, William Heinemann Ltd. 1935-37 (printing).)

Editions (1)

Πολιτεία Perseus (Platonis Opera Tomus IV: Tetralogia VIII. Burnet, John, editor. Oxford: Clarendon Press, 1905.) — 7.533 focus

[533] 533a
οὐκέτʼ, ἦν δʼ ἐγώ, ὦ φίλε Γλαύκων, οἷός τʼ ἔσῃ ἀκολουθεῖν—ἐπεὶ τό γʼ ἐμὸν οὐδὲν ἂν προθυμίας ἀπολίποι—οὐδʼ εἰκόνα ἂν ἔτι οὗ λέγομεν ἴδοις, ἀλλʼ αὐτὸ τὸ ἀληθές, ὅ γε δή μοι φαίνεται—εἰ δʼ ὄντως ἢ μή, οὐκέτʼ ἄξιον τοῦτο διισχυρίζεσθαι· ἀλλʼ ὅτι μὲν δὴ τοιοῦτόν τι ἰδεῖν, ἰσχυριστέον. ἦ γάρ;
τί μήν;
οὐκοῦν καὶ ὅτι ἡ τοῦ διαλέγεσθαι δύναμις μόνη ἂν φήνειεν ἐμπείρῳ ὄντι ὧν νυνδὴ διήλθομεν, ἄλλῃ δὲ οὐδαμῇ δυνατόν;
καὶ τοῦτʼ, ἔφη, ἄξιον διισχυρίζεσθαι. 533b
τόδε γοῦν, ἦν δʼ ἐγώ, οὐδεὶς ἡμῖν ἀμφισβητήσει λέγουσιν, ὡς αὐτοῦ γε ἑκάστου πέρι ὃ ἔστιν ἕκαστον ἄλλη τις ἐπιχειρεῖ μέθοδος ὁδῷ περὶ παντὸς λαμβάνειν. ἀλλʼ αἱ μὲν ἄλλαι πᾶσαι τέχναι ἢ πρὸς δόξας ἀνθρώπων καὶ ἐπιθυμίας εἰσὶν ἢ πρὸς γενέσεις τε καὶ συνθέσεις, ἢ πρὸς θεραπείαν τῶν φυομένων τε καὶ συντιθεμένων ἅπασαι τετράφαται· αἱ δὲ λοιπαί, ἃς τοῦ ὄντος τι ἔφαμεν ἐπιλαμβάνεσθαι, γεωμετρίας τε καὶ τὰς ταύτῃ ἑπομένας, ὁρῶμεν ὡς ὀνειρώττουσι μὲν 533c περὶ τὸ ὄν, ὕπαρ δὲ ἀδύνατον αὐταῖς ἰδεῖν, ἕως ἂν ὑποθέσεσι χρώμεναι ταύτας ἀκινήτους ἐῶσι, μὴ δυνάμεναι λόγον διδόναι αὐτῶν. ᾧ γὰρ ἀρχὴ μὲν ὃ μὴ οἶδε, τελευτὴ δὲ καὶ τὰ μεταξὺ ἐξ οὗ μὴ οἶδεν συμπέπλεκται, τίς μηχανὴ τὴν τοιαύτην ὁμολογίαν ποτὲ ἐπιστήμην γενέσθαι;
οὐδεμία, ἦ δʼ ὅς.
οὐκοῦν, ἦν δʼ ἐγώ, ἡ διαλεκτικὴ μέθοδος μόνη ταύτῃ πορεύεται, τὰς ὑποθέσεις ἀναιροῦσα, ἐπʼ αὐτὴν τὴν ἀρχὴν 533d ἵνα βεβαιώσηται, καὶ τῷ ὄντι ἐν βορβόρῳ βαρβαρικῷ τινι τὸ τῆς ψυχῆς ὄμμα κατορωρυγμένον ἠρέμα ἕλκει καὶ ἀνάγει ἄνω, συνερίθοις καὶ συμπεριαγωγοῖς χρωμένη αἷς διήλθομεν τέχναις· ἃς ἐπιστήμας μὲν πολλάκις προσείπομεν διὰ τὸ ἔθος, δέονται δὲ ὀνόματος ἄλλου, ἐναργεστέρου μὲν ἢ δόξης, ἀμυδροτέρου δὲ ἢ ἐπιστήμης—διάνοιαν δὲ αὐτὴν ἔν γε τῷ πρόσθεν που ὡρισάμεθα—ἔστι δʼ, ὡς ἐμοὶ δοκεῖ, οὐ περὶ 533e ὀνόματος ἀμφισβήτησις, οἷς τοσούτων πέρι σκέψις ὅσων ἡμῖν πρόκειται.
οὐ γὰρ οὖν, ἔφη.
ἀλλʼ ὃ ἂν μόνον δηλοῖ πως τὴν ἕξιν σαφηνείᾳ λέγειν ἐν ψυχῇ ἀρκέσει;
ναί.

Notes on the current edition

Republic

1. This is not mysticism or secret doctrine. It is, in fact, the avoidance of dogmatism. but that is not all. Plato could not be expected to insert a treatise on dialectical method here, or risk an absolute definition which would only expose him to misinterpretation. The principles and methods of such reasoning, and the ultimate metaphysical conclusions to which they may lead, cannot be expounded in a page or a chapter. They can only be suggested to the intelligent, whose own experience will help them to understand. As the Republic and Laws entire explain Plato’s idea of social good, so all the arguments in the dialogues illustrate his conception of fair and unfair argument. Cf. What Plato Said, Index s. v. Dialectics, and note f below.

2. For the idiom οὐδὲν προθυμίας ἀπολίποι Cf. Symp. 210 A, Meno 77 A, Laws 961 C, Aesch. Prom. 343, Thucyd. viii. 22. 1, Eurip. Hippol. 285.

3. On Plato’s freedom from the dogmatism often attributed to him Cf. What Plato Said, p. 515 on Meno 86 B.

4. On Plato’s freedom from the dogmatism often attributed to him Cf. What Plato Said, p. 515 on Meno 86 B.

5. The mystical implications of φήνειεν are not to be pressed. It is followed, as usual in Plato, by a matter-of-fact statement of the essential practical conclusion ( γοῦν)that no man can be trusted to think straight in large matters who has not been educated to reason and argue straight.

6. Plato anticipates the criticism that he neglects experience.

7. i.e. dispute our statement and maintain. The meaning is plain. It is a case of what I have called illogical idiom. Cf. T.A.P.A. vol. xlvii. pp. 205-234. The meaning is that of Philebus 58 E, 59 A. Other science may be more interesting or useful, but sound dialectics alone fosters the disinterested pursuit of truth for its own sake. Cf. Soph. 295 C, Phaedr. 265-266. Aristotle, Topics i. 2. 6, practically comes back to the Platonic conception of dialectics. The full meaning of dialectics in Plato would demand a treatise. It is almost the opposite of what Hegelians call by that name, which is represented in Plato by the second part of the Parmenides. The characteristic Platonic dialectic is the checking of the stream of thought by the necessity of securing the understanding and assent of an intelligent interlocutor at every step, and the habit of noting all relevant distinctions, divisions, and ambiguities, in ideas and terms. When the interlocutor is used merely to relieve the strain on the leader’s voice or the reader’s attention, as in some of the later dialogues, dialectic becomes merely a literary form.

8. Cicero’s

via et ratione.

περὶ παντός is virtually identical with αὐτοῦ γε ἑκάστου πέρι. It is true that the scientific specialist confines himself to his specialty. The dialectician, like his base counterfeit the sophist ( Soph. 231 A), is prepared to argue about anything, Soph. 232 cf., Euthyd. 272 A-B.

9. Cf. 525 C, 527 B.

10. The interpreters of Plato must allow for his Emersonian habit of hitting each nail in turn as hard as he can. There is no real contradiction between praising mathematics in comparison with mere loose popular thinking, and disparaging it in comparison with dialectics. There is no evidence and no probability that Plato is here proposing a reform of mathematics in the direction of modern mathematical logic, as has been suggested. Cf. on 527 A. It is the nature of mathematics to fall short of dialectics.

11. Cf. Phileb. 20 B and on 520 C, p. 143, note g.

12. Cf. on 531 E.

13. The touch of humor is the expression may be illustrated by Lucian, Hermotimus 74, where it is used to justify Lucian’s skepticism even of mathematics, and by Hazlitt’s remark on Coleridge,

Excellent talker if you allow him to start from no premises and come to no conclusion.

14. Or admission. Plato thinks of even geometrical reasoning as a Socratic dialogue. Cf. the exaggeration of this idea by the Epicureans in Cic. De fin. i. 21

quae et a falsis initiis profecta, vera esse non possunt: et si essent vera nihil afferunt quo iucundius, id est, quo melius viveremus.

Dialectic proceeds διὰ συγχωρήσεων, the admission of the interlocutor. Cf. Laws 957 D, Phaedr. 237 C-D, Gorg. 487 E, Lysis 219 C, Prot. 350 E, Phileb. 12 A, Theaet. 162 A, 169 D-E, 164 C, Rep. 340 B. But such admissions are not valid unless when challenged they are carried back to something satisfactory— ἱκανόν—(not necessarily in any given case to the idea of good). But the mathematician as such peremptorily demands the admission of his postulates and definitions. Cf. 510 B-D, 511 B.

15. Cf. on 519 B, p. 138, note a.

16. Orphism pictured the impious souls as buried in mud in the world below; cf. 363 D. Again we should not press Plato’s rhetoric and imagery either as sentimental Platonists or hostile critics. See Newman, Introd. Aristot. Pol. p. 463, n. 3.

17. All writers and philosophers are compelled to speak with the vulgar. Cf. e.g. Meyerson, De l’explication dans les sciences, i. p. 329:

Tout en sachant que la couleur n’est pas réellement une qualité de l’object, à se servir cependant, dans la vie de tous les jours, d’une locution qui l’affirme.

18. Cf. on 511 D, pp. 116-117, note c.

19. This unwillingness to dispute about names when they do not concern the argument is characteristic of Plato. Cf. What Plato Said, p. 516 on Meno 78 B-C for numerous instances. Stallbaum refers to Max. Tyr. Diss. xxvii. p. 40

ἐγὼ γάρ τοι τά τε ἄλλα, καὶ ἐν τῇ τῶν ὀνομάτων ἐλευθερίᾳ πείθομαι Πλάτωνι

20. The next sentence is hopelessly corrupt and is often considered an interpolation. The translation omits it. See Adam, Appendix XVI. to Bk. VII., Bywater, Journal of Phil. (Eng.) v. pp. 122-124.

Commentary

Commentary on Plato, Republic (Plato. The Republic, Vol 1-2. Adam, James, editor. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1902-1903.) focus

οὐδ’ εἰκόνα ἂν ἔτι κτλ. : such as we saw before in VI 506 E ff. Glauco's question refers to the method, Socrates' reply to the object, of Dialectic: it is of course impossible to separate the two. On διισχυρίζεσθαι followed by ἰσχυριστέον see I 336 E note

ὅτι μὲν δεῖ κτλ. Cf. VI 505 E ff., supra 517 C ( δεῖ ταύτην ἰδεῖν κτλ.), 519 C, 526 E ( ὃ δεῖ αὐτὴν παντὶ τρόπῳ ἰδεῖν). These passages are strongly in favour of δεῖ as against δή (see cr. n.), which Schneider, Hermann, and Stallbaum retain. ἰδεῖν is unpleasing if we read δή, and μὲν δή is not free from difficulty here. For μέν without δέ following see V 475 E note

τόδε γοῦν κτλ. Socrates proceeds to establish what he has just asserted, viz. that only dialectic can reveal the Good to those who are versed in the propaedeutic ‘arts’ or sciences. In this at least (he says) every one will agree with us, viz. ‘that it is some other μέθοδος’ (different from the five propaedeutic ‘arts’) ‘which endeavours in every case to apprehend by scientific procedure concerning each several self’ (e.g. αὐτοῦ καλοῦ, αὐτοῦ δικαίου, etc.) ‘that which they severally are’ (the οὐσία of each) e.g. ὃ ἔστιν καλόν, etc. Cf. 531 D οὐ γάρ που δοκοῦσί γε σοι οἱ ταῦτα (the five propaedeutic ‘arts’) δεινοὶ διαλεκτικοὶ εἶναι. Socrates continues: while all the other arts (except τὰ μαθηματικά) address themselves πρὸς δόξας ἀνθρώπων, etc., even the mathematical ‘arts’ give no λόγος of their ὑποθέσεις (and so do not apprehend the ὃ ἔστιν of their subject). Dialectic and Dialectic alone does this (533 C), so that Dialectic is the ἄλλη τις μέθοδος and alone satisfies our needs. τόδε is the object of λέγουσιν, on which, and not on ἀμφισβητήσει, ὡς depends. ἄλλη means other than ὧν νῦν δὴ διήλθομεν. ἀλλά is opposed to the negative notion contained in ἄλλη (another μέθοδος, not that of the five ‘arts,’ but etc.). Badham arbitrarily proposes to read ὅρῳ περιλαμβάνειν for ὁδῷ περὶ παντὸς λαμβάνειν. The expression περὶ παντός ‘about everything’ is of course different from αὐτοῦ ἑκάστου πέρι, and μέθοδος ὁδῷ is the kind of collocation in which Plato delights. For other views on this sentence see App. XIV.

αἱ μὲν ἄλλαι κτλ. Cf. Phil. 55 E — 58 E. Plato is thinking of a threefold classification of arts under κολακική, ποιητική, and ἐπιμελητική or the like (J. and C., comparing Gorg. 463 ff., 501, 502, Soph. 222 E , 265 ff., Pol. 261 ff.).

τετράφαται is one of Plato's archaisms: see on I 330 B. Such forms are not found in inscriptions after 410 B.C. (Meisterhans^{3} p. 166).

γεωμετρίας ‐‐ ταύτῃ . For the syntax cf. VI 511 B note

ὀνειρώττουσι κτλ. Krohn ( Pl. St. pp. 179—181) accuses Plato of a sudden volte face in regard to mathematical studies. It is true that the same language is used of δόξα in V 476 C (cf. VII 520 C), but there are dreams and dreams, and we may fairly say that if the προπαιδεία is only a dream in comparison with Dialectic, at least it is one of those dreams which come through the gates of horn.

ᾧ γὰρ ἀρχὴ κτλ. See VI 510 C, D notes ὁμολογίαν means ‘agreement’ ‘harmony’ (“Übereinstimmung” Schneider), viz. of ἀρχή, τελευτή and τὰ μεταξύ, not ‘admissions’ (as D. and V. translate): cf. ὁμολογουμένως l.c.

οὐκοῦν κτλ. ‘Well then,’ said I, ‘the method of dialectic alone proceeds by the destruction of hypotheses to the actual first principle, in order to make its results secure.’ Dialectic examines and cancels ( ἀναιρεῖ) one ὑπόθεσις after another, till in the end it reaches the Idea of Good. Suppose for example that ὁσιότης is the subject of discussion. Various ὑποθέσεις are proposed, tested, and overthrown. Out of the ruins of the former ὑποθέσεις we built a new and better one, which must in its turn be thoroughly tested, tried, and perhaps overthrown, before it can serve as a stepping-stone to one which is higher, truer and better: cf. 534 B, C. Now this process of testing, revising, discarding, is not, ideally speaking, complete until we examine the relations of our ὑπόθεσις of ὁσιότης with all νοητά, and in such an examination we apply the same ‘hypothetical method’ throughout the whole noetic sphere, testing and correcting all our ὑποθέσεις by one another. In the final stage, which is of course only an ideal, all our ὑποθέσεις become exact counterparts of the Ideas, and we have reached the ἀρχή or Good. Thereafter the results of Dialectic are βέβαια: see VI 511 B. The earlier steps in this dialectical ascent may be illustrated from many, if not most, of the Platonic dialogues. For ἀναιροῦσα cf. Arist. Topic. Γ 6. 120^{a} 6—31, and especially Eth. Eud. II 6. 1222^{b} 27 f. κινουμένης τῆς ἀρχῆς πάντα μάλιστ’ ἂν τὰ δεικνύμενα μεταβάλλοι, αὐτὰ δ’ αὑτὰ οὐ μεταβάλλει ἀναιρουμένου θατέρου ὑπὸ θατέρου, ἂν μὴ τῷ τὴν ὑπόθεσιν ἀνελεῖν καὶ δἰ ἐκείνης δεῖξαι. The word is often used in connexion with the Eleatic dialectic, of which Plato's ἡ ἐξ ὑποθέσεως ἀνάλυσις (Alcin. Isag. 7), here described, is a development: see RP^{7}. §§ 95 note a, 105 A—106, 110—115. For other views on this passage see App. XV: and for a farther discussion of the method itself and its permanent value in the history of investigation consult App. III.

βορβόρῳ . The image is taken from Orphic theology: cf. II 363 D note

ἔν γε τῷ πρόσθεν . VI 511 D, E.

ἔστι δ’ , ὡς κτλ. Cf. Laws 864 A. Plato constantly reminds us that he has no fixed terminology (see Hirmer Entst. u. Komp. d. pl. Pol. p. 647 and Hirzel Der Dialog pp. 246 ff.), and the ancients were well aware of this fact, though modern interpreters of Plato too often forget it; see the references collected by Hermann Gesch. u. Syst., p. 573 note 106 and D. L. III 63 (quoted by Hirmer).

οὐ γὰρ οὖν, ἔφη . See cr. n. The interpolation which follows these words in all MSS except Ξ is discussed in App. XVI.

ἀρέσκει οὖν . See cr. n. Though γοῦν is in A and Ξ, a majority of MSS read οὖν, which is alone suitable. The same error occurs in one or more MSS in V 455 E and VI 506 C (Schneider).

Plato Republic 7.533

Paul Shorey (Translator)

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