Plato, Republic, Paul Shorey (Translator), 7.523

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[523] “It seems likely 523a that it is one of those studies which we are seeking that naturally conduce to the awakening of thought, but that no one makes the right use¹ of it, though it really does tend to draw the mind to essence and reality.” “What do you mean?” he said. “I will try,” I said, “to show you at least my opinion. Do you keep watch and observe the things I distinguish in my mind as being or not being conducive to our purpose, and either concur or dissent, in order that here too we may see more clearly² whether my surmise is right.” “Point them out,” he said. “I do point them out,” I said, “if you can discern that some reports of our perceptions 523b do not provoke thought to reconsideration because the judgement³ of them by sensation seems adequate,⁴ while others always invite the intellect to reflection because the sensation yields nothing that can be trusted.⁵” “You obviously mean distant⁶ appearances,” he said, “and shadow-painting.⁷” “You have quite missed my meaning,⁸” said I. “What do you mean?” he said. “The experiences that do not provoke thought are those that do not 523c at the same time issue in a contradictory perception.⁹ Those that do have that effect I set down as provocatives, when the perception no more manifests one thing than its contrary, alike whether its impact¹⁰ comes from nearby or afar. An illustration will make my meaning plain. Here, we say, are three fingers, the little finger, the second and the middle.” “Quite so,” he said. “Assume that I speak of them as seen near at hand. But this is the point that you are to consider.” What? “Each one of them appears to be 523d equally a finger,¹¹ and in this respect it makes no difference whether it is observed as intermediate or at either extreme, whether it is white or black, thick or thin, or of any other quality of this kind. For in none of these cases is the soul of most men impelled to question the reason and to ask what in the world is a finger, since the faculty of sight never signifies to it at the same time that the finger is the opposite of a finger.” “Why, no, it does not,” he said. Then, said I, “it is to be expected that such a perception will not provoke or awaken¹² 523e reflection and thought.” “It is.” “But now, what about the bigness and the smallness of these objects? Is our vision’s view of them adequate, and does it make no difference to it whether one of them is situated¹³ outside or in the middle; and similarly of the relation of touch, to thickness and thinness, softness and hardness? And are not the other senses also defective in their reports of such things?

Republic. Plato. Paul Shorey (Translator). Cambridge, MA. 1935-37.

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Current edition Perseus

Republic (English) (Plato in Twelve Volumes, Vol. 5-6. Shorey, Paul, translator. Cambridge, MA, Harvard University Press; London, William Heinemann Ltd. 1935-37 (printing).)

Editions (1)

Πολιτεία Perseus (Platonis Opera Tomus IV: Tetralogia VIII. Burnet, John, editor. Oxford: Clarendon Press, 1905.) — 7.523 focus

[523] 523a
κινδυνεύει τῶν πρὸς τὴν νόησιν ἀγόντων φύσει εἶναι ὧν ζητοῦμεν, χρῆσθαι δʼ οὐδεὶς αὐτῷ ὀρθῶς, ἑλκτικῷ ὄντι παντάπασι πρὸς οὐσίαν.
πῶς, ἔφη, λέγεις;
ἐγὼ πειράσομαι, ἦν δʼ ἐγώ, τό γʼ ἐμοὶ δοκοῦν δηλῶσαι. ἃ γὰρ διαιροῦμαι παρʼ ἐμαυτῷ ἀγωγά τε εἶναι οἷ λέγομεν καὶ μή, συνθεατὴς γενόμενος σύμφαθι ἢ ἄπειπε, ἵνα καὶ τοῦτο σαφέστερον ἴδωμεν εἰ ἔστιν οἷον μαντεύομαι.
δείκνυʼ, ἔφη.
δείκνυμι δή, εἶπον, εἰ καθορᾷς, τὰ μὲν ἐν ταῖς αἰσθήσεσιν 523b οὐ παρακαλοῦντα τὴν νόησιν εἰς ἐπίσκεψιν, ὡς ἱκανῶς ὑπὸ τῆς αἰσθήσεως κρινόμενα, τὰ δὲ παντάπασι διακελευόμενα ἐκείνην ἐπισκέψασθαι, ὡς τῆς αἰσθήσεως οὐδὲν ὑγιὲς ποιούσης.
τὰ πόρρωθεν, ἔφη, φαινόμενα δῆλον ὅτι λέγεις καὶ τὰ ἐσκιαγραφημένα.
οὐ πάνυ, ἦν δʼ ἐγώ, ἔτυχες οὗ λέγω.
ποῖα μήν, ἔφη, λέγεις;
τὰ μὲν οὐ παρακαλοῦντα, ἦν δʼ ἐγώ, ὅσα μὴ ἐκβαίνει 523c εἰς ἐναντίαν αἴσθησιν ἅμα· τὰ δʼ ἐκβαίνοντα ὡς παρακαλοῦντα τίθημι, ἐπειδὰν ἡ αἴσθησις μηδὲν μᾶλλον τοῦτο ἢ τὸ ἐναντίον δηλοῖ, εἴτʼ ἐγγύθεν προσπίπτουσα εἴτε πόρρωθεν. ὧδε δὲ ἃ λέγω σαφέστερον εἴσῃ. οὗτοί φαμεν τρεῖς ἂν εἶεν δάκτυλοι, ὅ τε σμικρότατος καὶ ὁ δεύτερος καὶ ὁ μέσος.
πάνυ γʼ, ἔφη.
ὡς ἐγγύθεν τοίνυν ὁρωμένους λέγοντός μου διανοοῦ. ἀλλά μοι περὶ αὐτῶν τόδε σκόπει.
τὸ ποῖον;
δάκτυλος μέν που αὐτῶν φαίνεται ὁμοίως ἕκαστος, καὶ 523d ταύτῃ γε οὐδὲν διαφέρει, ἐάντε ἐν μέσῳ ὁρᾶται ἐάντʼ ἐπʼ ἐσχάτῳ, ἐάντε λευκὸς ἐάντε μέλας, ἐάντε παχὺς ἐάντε λεπτός, καὶ πᾶν ὅτι τοιοῦτον. ἐν πᾶσι γὰρ τούτοις οὐκ ἀναγκάζεται τῶν πολλῶν ἡ ψυχὴ τὴν νόησιν ἐπερέσθαι τί ποτʼ ἐστὶ δάκτυλος· οὐδαμοῦ γὰρ ἡ ὄψις αὐτῇ ἅμα ἐσήμηνεν τὸ δάκτυλον τοὐναντίον ἢ δάκτυλον εἶναι.
οὐ γὰρ οὖν, ἔφη.
οὐκοῦν, ἦν δʼ ἐγώ, εἰκότως τό γε τοιοῦτον νοήσεως οὐκ 523e ἂν παρακλητικὸν οὐδʼ ἐγερτικὸν εἴη.
εἰκότως.
τί δὲ δή; τὸ μέγεθος αὐτῶν καὶ τὴν σμικρότητα ἡ ὄψις ἆρα ἱκανῶς ὁρᾷ, καὶ οὐδὲν αὐτῇ διαφέρει ἐν μέσῳ τινὰ αὐτῶν κεῖσθαι ἢ ἐπʼ ἐσχάτῳ; καὶ ὡσαύτως πάχος καὶ λεπτότητα ἢ μαλακότητα καὶ σκληρότητα ἡ ἁφή; καὶ αἱ ἄλλαι αἰσθήσεις ἆρʼ οὐκ ἐνδεῶς τὰ τοιαῦτα δηλοῦσιν;

Notes on the current edition

Republic

1. Plato’s point of view here, as he will explain, is precisely the opposite of that of modern educators who would teach mathematics concretely and not puzzle the children with abstract logic. But in the Laws where he is speaking of primary and secondary education for the entire population he anticipates the modern kindergarten ideas (819 B-C).

2. For σαφέστερον cf. 523 C. Cf. Vol. I. p. 47, note f, on 338 D, and What Plato Said, p. 503, on Gorg. 463 D.

3. Cf. Phileb. 38 C. Unity of Plato’s Thought, n. 337.

4. ἱκανῶς is not to be pressed here.

5. For οὐδὲν ὑγιές cf. 496 C, 584 A, 589 C, Phaedo 69 B, 89 E, 90 E, Gorg. 524 E, Laws 776 E, Theaet. 173 B, Eurip. Phoen. 201, Bacch. 262, Hel.. 746, etc.

6. The most obvious cause of errors of judgement. Cf. Laws 663 B.

7. Cf. Vol. I. p. 137 on 365 C.

8. The dramatic misapprehension by the interlocutor is one of Plato’s methods for enforcing his meaning. Cf. on 529 A, p. 180, note a, Laws 792 B-C.

9. Cf. Jacks, Alchemy of Thought, p. 29:

The purpose of the world, then, being to attain consciousness of itself as a rational or consistent whole, is it not a little strange that the first step, so to speak, taken by the world for the attainment of this end is that of presenting itself in the form of contradictory experience?

αἴσθησις is not to be pressed. Adam’s condescending apology for the primitive character of Plato’s psychology here is as uncalled-for as all such apologies. Plato varies the expression, but his meaning is clear. Cf. 524 D. No modern psychologists are able to use sensation, perception, judgement, and similar terms with perfect consistency.

10. For προσπίπτουσα Cf. Tim. 33 A, 44 A, 66 A, Rep. 515 A, 561 C, Laws 791 C, 632 A, 637 A, Phileb. 21 C; also accidere in Lucretius, e.g. iv. 882, ii. 1024-1025, iv. 236 and iii. 841, and Goethe’s

Das Blenden der Erscheinung, die sich an unsere Sinne drängt.

11. This anticipates Aristotle’s doctrine that substances do not, as qualities do, admit of more or less.

12. We should never press synonyms which Plato employs for ποικιλία of style or to avoid falling into a rut of terminology.

13. κεῖσθαι perhaps anticipates the Aristotelian category.

Commentary

Commentary on Plato, Republic (Plato. The Republic, Vol 1-2. Adam, James, editor. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1902-1903.) focus

φύσει belongs to ἀγόντων (Schneider) rather than to εἶναι (Stallbaum and others), as is clear from the antithesis χρῆσθαι δ’ οὐδεὶς αὐτῷ ὀρθῶς (explained in 525 C).

τό γ’ ἐμοὶ δοκοῦν . Cf. 517 B note Plato is careful to eschew the appearance of dogmatism, even where his convictions are most profound.

ὡς ἱκανῶς κτλ. is taken by Krohn ( Pl. Fr. p. 91) as excluding the possibility of Ideas of concrete things. Such an inference is unwarranted. ἱκανῶς, ‘adequately’ ‘satisfactorily’ (cf. E below), does not imply that sensation can apprehend everything there is to know about e.g. a finger, but merely that in the case of a finger etc., sensible perception is as a rule all that we demand: we are not impelled to summon νόησις to our aid. Even the perception of a finger may awaken the intelligence, and in such cases we shall be led to the Idea of finger (523 D note).

ὡς τῆς αἰσθήσεως κτλ. On αἰσθήσεως see 523 C note ποιούσης has been doubted by Ast, who conjectures νοούσης; “sed αἰσθήσεως non est νοεῖν” (Schneider). The Greek means ‘produces no sound result,’ “nichts zuverlässiges giebt” (Schneider): the product of sensation is, in such cases, ὕπουλον or νοσῶδες. For οὐδὲν ὑγιές metaphorically used cf. Phaed. 90 E and (with Schneider) Ar. Plut. 50 , 355 ( πρὸς ἀνδρὸς οὐδὲν ὑγιές ἐστ’ εἰργασμένου).

τὰ πόρρωθεν κτλ. readily suggest themselves to Glauco, for they were familiar examples of optical delusion in the Platonic school: cf. (for πόρρωθεν φαινόμενα ) Prot. 356 C , Theaet. 191 B , infra X 602 C ff., and (for ἐσκιαγραφημένα) II 365 C note

αἴσθησιν . Strictly speaking, of course, αἴσθησις by itself does not, and cannot, present us with a judgment of any kind. It merely furnishes a particular sensation, which is referred to our mental picture of the objects in question, and the resulting judgment is not αἴσθησις, but δόξα, which is, according to Plato, a combination of μνήμη and αἴσθησις (see Phil. 38 B ff. with Bury's notes). And in point of fact, the sort of contradictory judgments which are here ascribed to the initial step in the psychological process, viz. αἴσθησις (524 A), have already been attributed to δόξα in V 479 B—479 E. We have already seen that Plato throughout the whole of this part of the Republic is not careful to distinguish between αἰσθητόν (especially ὁρατόν) and δοξαστόν (VI 510 A note); and the same tendency shews itself again here. But in this part of the dialogue, Plato's argument is no way affected by his imperfect analysis of the psychological process involved in such a judgment as ‘This is a finger.’ The relevant consideration is that in such cases the intellect is not, as a rule, aroused, and this is equally true whether we regard the judgment as an act of αἴσθησις alone or as the joint product of αἴσθησις and μνήμη.

εἴτ’ ἐγγύθεν κτλ. (like ὡς ἐγγύθεν etc. below) is said to prevent misapprehension, in view of Glauco's τὰ πόρρωθεν etc. in B.

ὧδε δὲ κτλ. The best commentary on the following exposition is Phaed. 101 A ff., especially 102 B ff.: cf. also Theaet. 154 C . These passages should be carefully read in connexion with the view enunciated here. I have endeavoured to explain some of the wider bearings of Plato's principle in a pamphlet on Classical Education published by Deighton, Bell and Co. 1895: see also App. II and Nettleship Hellen. pp. 152 ff. We should bear in mind that the antithesis of ἕν and πολλά was the fons et origo of Greek philosophy, and runs throughout its entire history. In Plato's time the question had become acute in connexion particularly with the problem of predication, and it was in trying to solve this special form of the antinomy that Plato devised his theory of Ideas. Nothing could be more natural or just than that his philosopher-kings should receive their first scientific impulse from the problem which had proved so great an intellectual stimulus in the past, and which had also led Plato himself to the goal whither he would have his guardians arrive, the contemplation of the Idea.

ἐάν τε ἐν μέσῳ κτλ. : i.q. <*>άν τε ἐν μέσῳ ᾖ ὁ ὁρώμενος κτλ. This is said with reference to their size: cf. E below and Phaed. 102 B , C, where the difficulty is explained by the theory of Ideas. Thus b is both great and small, great relatively to a, small relatively to c. Similarly with the other antinomies. The Philebus dismisses such puzzles as τὰ δεδημευμένα τῶν θαυμαστῶν περὶ τὸ ἓν καὶ πολλά (14 D)—an indication perhaps of the priority in date of the Republic (cf. VI 505 C note and Jackson in J. Ph. X pp. 263 ff.).

ἀναγκάζεται is said of the ‘Drang nach Wahrheit’: cf. 524 C, E, 525 D and 518 E ff. It is not the ‘nature’ of Soul to acquiesce in falsehood: for man is an οὐράνιον φυτόν, οὐκ ἔγγειον (IV 443 B note).

τῶν πολλῶν . Some exceptional natures, who are endowed with an uncommon share of noble curiosity, may find intellectual stimulus even in perceptions such as these: cf. 523 B note Ast, who missed the point, wanted to excise the phrase. Herwerden seriously proposes <μὰ> τὸν Ἀπόλλω.

οὐδαμοῦ : ‘at no stage’ viz. in the psychological process, not exactly ‘never’ (as Jowett, D. and V. etc.).

Plato Republic 7.523

Paul Shorey (Translator)

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