Notes on the current edition
Republic
1.
Cf.
Parmen. 130 C,
Tim. 51 B, 52 A, and my
De Platonis Idearum doctrina, pp. 24-25; also E. Hoffmann in
Wochenschrift f. klass. Phil. xxxvi. (
1919) pp. 196-197. As we use the word tree of the trees we see, though the reality (
αὐτὸ ὃ ἔστι) is the idea of a tree, so they would speak of the shadows as the world, though the real reference unknown to them would be to the objects that cause the shadows, and back of the objects to the things of the
real world of which they are copies. The general meaning, which is quite certain, is that they wold suppose the shadows to be the realities. The text and the precise turn of expression are doubtful. See crit. note.
παριόντα is intentionally ambiguous in its application to the shadows or to the objects which cast them. They suppose that the names refer to the passing shadows, but (as we know) they really apply to the objects. Ideas and particulars are homonymous. Assuming a slight illogicality we can get somewhat the same meaning from the text
ταὐτά.
Do you not think that they would identify the passing objects (which strictly speaking they do not know) with what they saw? Cf. also P. Corssen,
Philologische Wochenschrift,
1913, p. 286. He prefers
οὐκ αὐτά and renders:
Sie würden in dem, was sie sähen, das Vorübergehende selbst zu benennen glauben.
2.
The echo and the voices (515 A) merely complete the picture.
3.
Phaedo 67 D
λύειν
, and 82 D
λύσει τε καὶ καθαρμῷ. λύσις
became technical in Neoplatonism.
4.
Lit.
by nature.
φύσις in Plato often suggests reality and truth.
5.
The entire passage is an obvious allegory of the painful experience of one whose false conceit of knowledge is tested by the Socratic
elenchus. Cf.
Soph. 230 B-D, and for
ἀπορεῖν
Meno 80 A, 84 B-C,
Theaet. 149 A,
Apol. 23 D. Cf. also
What Plato Said, p. 5123 on
Meno 80 A, Eurip.
Hippol. 247
τὸ γὰρ ὀρθοῦσθαι γνώμαν ὀδυνᾷ
,
it is painful to have one’s opinions set right, and 517 A, 494 D.