τοὺς ἔξωθεν κτλ.
Isocrates seems to have taken this as a personal attack, as perhaps it was intended to be. His reply may be found in
Antid. 260 ff.
περὶ τοὺς πολιτικοὺς λόγους ἡμεῖς ὄντες, οὓς ἐκεῖνοί φασιν εἶναι φιλαπεχθήμονας (cf.
φιλαπεχθημόνως ἔχοντας here),
πολὺ πραότεροι τυγχάνομεν αὐτῶν ὄντες· οἱ μὲν γὰρ ἀεί τι περὶ ἡμῶν φλαῦρον λέγουσιν, ἐγὼ δ’ οὐδὲν ἂν εἴποιμι τοιοῦτον, ἀλλὰ ταῖς ἀληθείαις χρήσομαι περὶ αὐτῶν κτλ. See the interesting discussion in Dümmler l.c. pp. 8 ff.
αὑτοῖς
and not
αὐτοῖς is certainly what Plato wrote. False philosophers, like bad scholars, are always abusing one another. The middle, which is reciprocal, is also decisive in favour of
αὑτοῖς: cf.
Charm. 154 A
λοιδορουμένους ἀλλήλοις. J. and C. (with Stallbaum and the editors generally, except Schneider) read
αὐτοῖς, remarking that “it was by no means an uncommon practice of the old philosophers to abuse the people.” Plato is not speaking of the old philosophers at all, but only of sophists and pretenders, who do not abuse, but flatter and cajole the people (493 A ff.).
ἀεὶ περὶ ἀνθρώπων κτλ.
The seeker after Truth does not indulge in personalities (cf. Arist.
Eth. Nic. IV 9. 1125^{a} 5 ff. and
Rhet. II 4. 1381^{b} 7), or scandal (
Theaet. 173 D
: cf. 174 E ff.). His singleminded pursuit of Truth leaves him neither time nor inclination to talk about people.
πολύ γε
: sc.
ἥκιστα. Adimantus accommodates his answer to the last clause of Socrates' question. See on V 465 E.
σχολή
. Cf.
Theaet. 172 D
ff.
εἰς τεταγμένα ἄττα κτλ.
With the general sense cf.
Theaet. 174 D
ff.,
Phaed. 79 C
, D,
Tim. 47 B
, C and Euripides
Fr. 902
ὄλβιος <*>στις τῆς ἱστορίας |
ἔσχε μάθησιν |
μήτε πολιτῶν ἐπὶ πημοσύνην |
μήτ’ εἰς ἀδίκους πράξεις ὁρμῶν |
ἀλλ’ ἀθανάτου καθορῶν φύσεως |
κόσμον ἀγήρων, πῇ τε συνέστη |
καὶ ὅπῃ καὶ ὅπως. |
τοῖς δὲ τοιούτοις οὐδέποτ’ αἰσχρῶν |
ἔργων μελέτημα προσίζει. Euripides' lines are conceived in the spirit of Plato and exactly illustrate his meaning, especially if, as is usually supposed, they refer to the philosopher Anaxagoras. An eloquent modern parallel may be found in Stevenson's ‘
Virginibus puerisque’ p. 260.
ὁρῶντας
. For the change from singular to plural cf. I 347 A note
κοσμίῳ
. It has been thought that there is a play on
κόσμος in the sense of the Universe or Heavens. But the philosopher's gaze outsoars the Heavens, and is fixed on the
ὑπερουράνιος τόπος, where the Ideas dwell (
Phaedr. 247 C
).
διαβολὴ κτλ.
ἐν πᾶσι is neuter, ‘albeit misrepresentation is rife everywhere,’ “there is always detraction going on” (J. and C.).
ἂν οὖν τις κτλ.
Cf. 484 C.
δημοτικῆς ἀρετῆς
. Not scientific virtue, because its intellectual basis in the minds of the people is
ὀρθὴ δόξα, and not
ἐπιστήμη. See IV 430 C note, and on
δημοτικὴ ἀρετή generally Zeller^{4} II 1, pp. 593—601, and Archer-Hind's edition of the
Phaedo App. I. The ‘demotic virtue’ which the philosopher constructs is of course the best of its kind.
ὃ οὐ πάνυ ῥᾴδιον
. Cf. 499 C note Plato's
κάθαρσις is sufficiently drastic. He would rusticate the entire population above ten years of age, and bring up the remainder in the principles of his
καλλίπολις (VII 540 E ff. note).
διενέγκοιεν
. See cr. n. Schneider retains
διενεγκεῖν, comparing other passages in which
ὅτι is followed by an infinitive. Instances of this irregularity occasionally occur (Kühner
Gr. Gr. II p. 877), but it is unusually awkward here, and the majority of editors are probably right in following
q. With the sentiment cf.
Laws 735 B—736 C, where the necessity of an initial
κάθαρσις is equally insisted on, and various forms of legislative purgation are described.
μήτε ἰδιώτου κτλ.
The individual is cleansed by the Socratic elenchus, which purges him of his false persuasion of knowledge: cf.
Soph. 230 B
—E, where this kind of
κάθαρσις is expounded in detail. Gildersleeve (
A. J. Ph. III p. 201) points out that the ‘articular infinitive’ with
ἄν is rare in Plato.
γράφειν νόμους
: ‘to paint or draft laws.’ Richards is inclined to cancel
μηδὲ—νόμους as involving “a most awkward and inartistic confusion of the figure (painting) with the thing figured (legislation).” Nothing is more usual in Plato than such a ‘confusion,’ if the phrase employed bears, like
γράφειν νόμους, or is capable of bearing, like
ἀνδρείκελον below, a meaning of its own as well as an application in the simile, and it is a narrow conception of art which pronounces the idiom inartistic. Cf. 507 A note and
Euthyph. 3 A
with my note ad loc., and see also on V 451 B. Cobet's
ἐγγράφειν νόμους, which Baiter adopts, is another unsuccessful attempt to obliterate this characteristic feature of Plato's stvle.
παραλαβεῖν καθαράν
. Plato would cite as examples a tutor who is entrusted with the sole authority over a child, and legislators who (as in the
Laws 702 B ff.) receive autocratic power in order to found a colony. Cf. 499 B note
τὸ φύσει δίκαιον
is assuredly the Idea of Justice, as opposed to
τὸ νόμῳ δίκαιον ‘conventional justice’: cf. 500 C and (for
φύσει) V 476 B. See also on X 598 A. Bosanquet ignores the most essential and characteristic feature of Plato's teaching when he remarks that “the ‘natural’ principles of justice and other moral qualities are no doubt those which Plato believes himself to have found present, in various degrees, throughout inorganic and organic nature and the animal world, and culminating in the life of man.” It is better to let Plato soar where we cannot follow him than thus to clip his wings. See the Appendix to Book VII
On Plato's Dialectic.
καὶ πρὸς ἐκεῖνο κτλ.
The legislative painter looks now at his model (the
φύσει δίκαιον etc.), now at his picture (the
δίκαιον etc. which he is implanting among men), rubbing out one part and painting another in again (
τὸ μὲν—ἐγγράφοιεν), till he is satisfied with the result. He combines and mixes various
ἐπιτηδεύματα or institutions, till he produces the true
ἀνδρείκελον or ‘colour and likeness of true Manhood’; just as the painter mixes various colours to produce his
ἀνδρείκελον or flesh-tint.
ἀνδρείκελον in
painting was a sort of flesh-colour, made by mixing various colours together: see
Crat. 424 E
, Xen.
Oec. 10. 5, Arist.
de gen. an. I 18. 725^{a} 26 and Ruhnken on Timaeus
Lex. s.v. To this Plato of course alludes, but he intends us also to take the word in its etymological signification, as is clear from
θεοείκελον below. The stress in
ἀνδρείκελον, as in
θεοειδές and
θεοείκελον, is on the first part of the compound: it is not the mere
ἀνθρωποειδές, but the
Man-like, at which the legislator aims: cf. the force of
ἄνδρα in 498 E.
ἀνδρείκελον might be translated by ‘the human form divine,’ except that ‘form’ suggests a wrong notion. For other views on this passage see App. V.
θεοείκελον
.
Il. I 131 et al. It is pleasing to meet with so cordial and spontaneous an acknowledgment of Homer as a kindred spirit in a passage so full of Plato's characteristic idealism. There is more than a grain of truth in Longinus' observation:
μόνος Ἡρόδοτος Ὁμηρικώτατος ἐγένετο; Στησίχορος ἔτι πρότερον ὅ τε Ἀρχίλοχος, πάντων δὲ τούτων μάλιστα ὁ Πλάτων ἀπὸ τοῦ Ὁμηρικοῦ κείνου νάματος εἰς αὑτὸν μυρίας ὅσας παρατροπὰς ἀποχετευσάμενος (
περὶ ὕψους 13. 3). By the words
τὸ ἀνδρείκελον—θεοείκελον Plato means to suggest that Man is then most manlike when he most resembles God: and (as Tennyson says) “then most godlike being most a man.” Cf. IX 589 D note This sure and abiding conviction of the presence of a divine element within us, rendering our nature essentially and truly human, makes itself felt in nearly all the dialogues of Plato. It is the ultimate source of all his idealism, religious and metaphysical, no less than moral and political, and may well be considered the most precious and enduring inheritance which he has bequeathed to posterity.
ὅ τι μάλιστα
should be taken with
ποιήσειαν, and
εἰς ὅσον ἐνδέχεται with
θεοφιλῆ: ‘until, as far as possible, they have made mere human characters as dear to God as human characters can be.’ For the
σχῆμα ἐκ παραλλήλου see Schanz,
Nov. Comm. Pl. pp. 12—15. Schneider can hardly be right in connecting
ὅ τι μάλιστα with
ἀνθρώπεια. For
θεοφιλῆ Badham conjectured
θεοειδῆ—a most arbitrary change, though approved by Cobet and Baiter. How could
θεοειδῆ have degenerated into
θεοφιλῆ, which is in all the MSS? The opposite corruption was far more likely. Plato means us to understand that God loves those most who most resemble Him: cf. X 612 E and
Laws 716 C.
ἔφησθα
. V 474 A.
αὐτό
: viz. the statement
ὡς τοιοῦτος —αὐτούς with its interpretation in the preceding exposition.
φήσει
. We should expect
φήσουσι, but the transition from plural to singular is common (see on 1 347 A), and Plato is probably thinking of the objector in 487 C (
φαίη ἄν τις κτλ.): cf. 489 D and 490 D.
οὐκ ἀγαθήν just above (instead of
μὴ ἀγαθήν as in
μὴ τὴν φύσιν) prepares the way for
φήσει, by shewing that the infinitives are beginning to escape from the sway of
ἀμφισβητῆσαι. φήσει in
φήσει λογιζόμενος II 366 A furnishes an exact parallel to
φήσει here. The best MSS—see cr. n.—read
φήσειν, which is retained by Schneider and others. If
φήσειν is right, we must either (1) refer it to
ἕξουσι, and suppose that the future is “ob
ἔσεσθαι pro
φάναι receptum” (Schneider, Stallbaum), or (2) supply an
οἴει (J. and C.). Neither explanation is in my judgment possible.
φήσεις, the reading of
q and editors before Bekker, may be defended from 489 B and 489 D, where Adimantus is identified with the antagonist of 487 C, but the corruption is not a very likely one. Madvig,
more suo, expels the word. Cf.
Introd. § 5.
μὴ ἧττον
. Herwerden would insert
χαλεπούς or
πικρούς, Richards
ἀγρίους or
ἀγριαίνειν. If
ἧττον is pronounced with emphasis, its meaning is easily caught, after
ἧττον in Adimantus' reply. It is virtually a quotation: “wollen wir nicht statt dieses weniger” etc. (Schneider).
