Plato Republic 5.479

ὁ χρηστός . Antisthenes is perhaps in Plato's mind (Dümmler Antisth. p. 42). Others have thought of Isocrates, but with less reason. λεγέτω μοι, φήσω, καὶ ἀποκρινέσθω certainly sounds like a personal challenge. See also on 476 D and 480 A.

ἰδέαν τινά . ἰδέα has not yet been used in the Republic of the Idea; hence τινά. Krohn ( Pl. St. pp. 64, 96) has pointed this out, but makes too much of it. In ἰδέα, as Cohen remarks ( Platons Ideenlehre u. d. Mathematik p. 12), “das ἰδεῖν pulsirt”: cf. 475 E τοὺς τῆς ἀληθείας —φιλοθεάμονας, VI 486 D and Symp. 211 D .

ἀεὶ ‐‐ νομίζει . μέν after ἀεί—see cr. n.—is retained by Schneider and others. It is however much harsher than the ordinary cases of μέν without δέ (see on 475 E), and the majority of MSS agree with II in omitting it. Madvig would delete the article before καλά; but its retention provides a better antithesis to ἄν τις ἓν τὸ καλὸν φῇ εἶναι. τὰ καλά is here the plural, not of καλόν τι, but of τὸ καλόν; and Plato means that the φιλοθεάμων has many standards of beauty: cf. 479 D notes

ἐκεῖνος ‐‐ καί . These words are certainly genuine, though omitted in Ξ, and supposed by Hartman to be a marginal note on ὁ χρηστός. οὐδαμῇ ἀνεχόμενος by itself would be comparatively tame.

τούτων γὰρ δή κτλ. The many καλά ‘are’ and ‘are not,’ because they are beautiful and not-beautiful. We may infer, on the other hand, that the αὐτὸ κάλλος always ‘is,’ because (among other reasons) it is always beautiful. In other words, the essence of an Idea consists in its eternal unity and identity with itself. Cf. Symp. 211 A , where the αὐτὸ καλόν is said to be οὐ τῇ μὲν καλόν, τῇ δ’ αἰσχρόν, οὐδὲ τότε μέν, τότε δ’ οὔ, οὐδὲ πρὸς μὲν τὸ καλόν, πρὸς δὲ τὸ αἰσχρόν, οὐδ’ ἔνθα μὲν καλόν, ἔνθα δὲ αἰσχρόν, ὡς τισὶ μὲν ὂν καλόν, τισὶ δὲ αἰσχρόν. This passage will explain what Plato means by saying that there is not one of the πολλὰ καλά which is not also αἰσχρόν. Cf. also Bosanquet Companion pp. 213 f. Krohn ( Pl. Fr. p. 73) argues that this passage is inconsistent with the Maxim of Contradiction as laid down in IV 436 B. But Plato does not mean that τὰ πολλὰ καλά are αἰσχρὰ κατὰ ταὐτὸν καὶ πρὸς ταὐτόν, nor should ἅμα in 478 D be interpreted in this sense. A particular καλόν is ἅμα καλὸν καὶ αἰσχρόν, ὡς τισὶ μὲν ‐ὂν καλόν, τισὶ δὲ αἰσχρόν. Cf. Zeller^{4} II I, p. 627 note 2.

τὰ πολλὰ διπλάσια are πρὸς μὲν τὸ διπλάσια, πρὸς δὲ τὸ ἡμίσεα, whereas the αὐτὸ διπλάσιον is always and in every relation διπλάσιον: see last note and VII 523 C ff., Phaed. 102 B , C. The examples of διπλάσια, μεγάλα, βαρέα are examples and nothing more; the others, καλά, δίκαια, ὅσια, are relevant in a wider sense, for the aim of the philosopherking is to frame his καλλίπολις on the model of the αὐτὸ ἀγαθόν. See on 476 A.

ἀμφοτέρων ἕξεται : “utrisque adhaerescet” Stallbaum.

τοῖς ἐν ταῖς κτλ. ἐπαμφοτερίζουσιν is certainly neuter, as Schneider shews, and not masculine: cf. ταῦτα ἐπαμφοτερίζει below. The word is very frequently used in agreement with neuter or inanimate subjects: see Stephanus Hase Thes. s.v. The ‘children's riddle’ is (according to one of the two versions given by the Scholiast) αἶνός τίς ἐστιν ὡς ἀνήρ τε κοὐκ ἀνὴρ | ὄρνιθα κοὐκ ὄρνιθ’ ἰδών τε κοὐκ ἰδών, | ἐπὶ ξύλου τε κοὐ ξύλου καθημένην | λίθῳ τε κοὐ λίθῳ βάλοι τε κοὐ βάλοι. Athenaeus (X 452 C) assigns it (on the authority of Clearchus) to Panarces. The interpretation is “a eunuch aimed at a bat which he saw imperfectly sitting upon a reed with a pumice-stone and missed him” (J. and C.). This riddle was used as an exercise in logic among the Stoics (Dümmler Antisth. p. 43), but that is not a sufficient reason for supposing (with Dümmler) that they took it from Antisthenes.

τῆς βολῆς πέρι κτλ. The MSS apparently read περί: πέρι is due to Benedictus. Stephanus wishes to delete the second, Richards the first preposition, but the whole sentence is loosely constructed, as if a mere child's riddle was not worth remembering or dwelling on: ‘the children's riddle about the eunuch, don't you know, about hitting the bat, what it was the riddle says he struck it with, and on what it was sitting.’ ᾧ and not ὡς (as Baiter supposed) is the reading of A.

καὶ γὰρ ταῦτα κτλ. ταῦτα is of course τὰ πολλά, as Jowett and others rightly explain. Campbell appears strangely to take it of the children's riddle. I agree with Ast that ἐπαμφοτερίζειν—see cr. n.—must be wrong. It is usual to supply ἔοικε, but this is very difficult, and the categoric affirmative is much more to the point. For the error see Introd. § 5. Hartman hastily pronounces οὔτ’ ἀμφότερα οὔτε οὐδέτερον spurious on the ground that “illas res οὐδέτερον esse modo ( οὔτε εἶναι—νοῆσαι) dictum est,” and that “non verum est illas res non esse ἀμφότερα.” The text is perfectly sound. Phenomena, says Glauco, cannot be ‘fixedly conceived of’ as either a being or b not being, nor yet as c neither of the two. The fourth alternative is to ‘fix them in the mind’ as d both being and not being. This too is impossible, although we may say that they ‘both are and are not’ (477 A, 478 D). The reason is that they are not, in the last analysis, ‘both being and notbeing,’ but something between the two, as Socrates presently points out. (See also on οἷον in 478 D.) Phenomena cannot be fixedly conceived ( παγίως νοῆσαι) in any kind of way, because they have no fixity themselves. They are in a constant state of Heraclitean flux: cf. κυλινδεῖται, πλανητόν in D and (for παγίως) IV 434 D note

τὰ τῶν πολλῶν κτλ. : “the multitude's multitudinous formulae” Bosanquet. The words refer to general rules, standards, canons, believed in by the multitude (cf. τὰ τῶν πολλῶν δόγματα VI 493 A), who have on every single subject many such standards ( πολλὰ νόμιμα), mutually inconsistent and uncoordinated, because they do not know that τὸ καλόν, τὸ ἀγαθόν etc. are each of them ἕν. They say, for example, ‘τὸ ἡδύ is καλόν,’ ‘τὸ συμφέρον is καλόν,’ ‘τὸ ἀγαθόν is καλόν,’ and so on. Such assertions give the appearance of plurality to τὸ καλόν, by connecting it, not indeed with the objects of sense, but with other εἴδη (cf. 476 A, 476 C notes). The form in which Plato expresses his conclusion ( τὰ τῶν πολλῶν πολλὰ νόμιμα καλοῦ πέρι and not simply τὰ πολλὰ καλά) prepares us for VI 484 C, where the whole purpose of this enquiry is disclosed. It is the business of the philosopher-king to bring order out of chaos by remodelling the νόμιμα of the many in conformity with the Idea. He must not allow them to predicate κοινωνία of εἴδη unless the εἴδη really intercommunicate.

πολλὰ καλά . Is καλά the plural of ‘ the beautiful,’ or of ‘ a beautiful’? This question is raised by Bosanquet, who answers it thus: “the sentence about formulae leads me to interpret it in the former sense=‘many standards,’ or cases accepted as standards, ‘of beauty.’” Cf. 479 A, where however we have πολλὰ τὰ καλά, and its antithesis ἓν τὸ καλόν. The expression πολλὰ καλά must, I think, be taken in its usual sense, as the plural of καλόν τι; but it includes not only the objects of sense, but also νόμιμα περὶ καλοῦ, which are themselves πολλὰ καλά, because they connect αὐτὸ τὸ καλόν with another εἶδος. See last note.

αὐτὰ ἕκαστα : the generalised expression including αὐτὸ καλόν, αὐτὸ δίκαιον and all the Ideas. Cf. VI 507 B note