Plato, Republic, Paul Shorey (Translator), 5.477

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[477] That is. How could 477a that which is not be known? We are sufficiently assured of this, then, even if we should examine it from every point of view, that that which entirely¹ is is entirely knowable, and that which in no way is is in every way unknowable. Most sufficiently. Good. If a thing, then, is so conditioned as both to be and not to be, would it not lie between that which absolutely and unqualifiedly is and that which in no way is? Between. Then if knowledge pertains to that which is and ignorance of necessity to that which is not, 477b for that which lies between we must seek for something between nescience and science, if such a thing there be. By all means. Is there a thing which we call opinion? Surely. Is it a different faculty from science or the same? A different. Then opinion is set over one thing and science over another, each by virtue of its own distinctive power or faculty. That is so. May we say, then, that science is naturally related to that which is,² to know that and how that which is is? But rather, before we proceed, I think we must draw the following distinctions. What ones? 477c
Shall we say that faculties,³ powers, abilities are a class of entities by virtue of which we and all other things are able to do what we or they are able to do? I mean that sight and hearing, for example, are faculties, if so be that you understand the class or type that I am trying to describe. I understand, he said. Hear, then, my notion about them. In a faculty I cannot see any color or shape or similar mark such as those on which in many other cases I fix my eyes in discriminating in my thought one thing 477d from another. But in the case of a faculty I look to one thing only—that to which it is related and what it effects,⁴ and it is in this way that I come to call⁵ each one of them a faculty, and that which is related to⁶ the same thing and accomplishes the same thing I call the same faculty, and that to another I call other. How about you, what is your practice? The same, he said. To return, then, my friend, said I, to science or true knowledge, do you say that it is a faculty and a power, 477e or in what class do you put it? Into this, he said, the most potent of all⁷ faculties. And opinion—shall we assign it to some other class than faculty. By no means, he said, for that by which we are able to opine is nothing else than the faculty of opinion.⁸ But not long ago you agreed that science and opinion are not identical. How could any rational man affirm the identity of the infallible with the fallible?

Republic. Plato. Paul Shorey (Translator). Cambridge, MA. 1935-37.

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Current edition Perseus

Republic (English) (Plato in Twelve Volumes, Vol. 5-6. Shorey, Paul, translator. Cambridge, MA, Harvard University Press; London, William Heinemann Ltd. 1935-37 (printing).)

Editions (1)

Πολιτεία Perseus (Platonis Opera Tomus IV: Tetralogia VIII. Burnet, John, editor. Oxford: Clarendon Press, 1905.) — 5.477 focus

[477] 477a
ὄν· πῶς γὰρ ἂν μὴ ὄν γέ τι γνωσθείη;
ἱκανῶς οὖν τοῦτο ἔχομεν, κἂν εἰ πλεοναχῇ σκοποῖμεν, ὅτι τὸ μὲν παντελῶς ὂν παντελῶς γνωστόν, μὴ ὂν δὲ μηδαμῇ πάντῃ ἄγνωστον;
ἱκανώτατα.
εἶεν· εἰ δὲ δή τι οὕτως ἔχει ὡς εἶναί τε καὶ μὴ εἶναι, οὐ μεταξὺ ἂν κέοιτο τοῦ εἰλικρινῶς ὄντος καὶ τοῦ αὖ μηδαμῇ ὄντος;
μεταξύ.
οὐκοῦν ἐπὶ μὲν τῷ ὄντι γνῶσις ἦν, ἀγνωσία δʼ ἐξ ἀνάγκης ἐπὶ μὴ ὄντι, ἐπὶ δὲ τῷ μεταξὺ τούτῳ μεταξύ τι καὶ ζητητέον 477b ἀγνοίας τε καὶ ἐπιστήμης, εἴ τι τυγχάνει ὂν τοιοῦτον;
πάνυ μὲν οὖν.
ἆρʼ οὖν λέγομέν τι δόξαν εἶναι;
πῶς γὰρ οὔ;
πότερον ἄλλην δύναμιν ἐπιστήμης ἢ τὴν αὐτήν;
ἄλλην.
ἐπʼ ἄλλῳ ἄρα τέτακται δόξα καὶ ἐπʼ ἄλλῳ ἐπιστήμη, κατὰ τὴν δύναμιν ἑκατέρα τὴν αὑτῆς.
οὕτω.
οὐκοῦν ἐπιστήμη μὲν ἐπὶ τῷ ὄντι πέφυκε, γνῶναι ὡς ἔστι τὸ ὄν; —μᾶλλον δὲ ὧδέ μοι δοκεῖ πρότερον ἀναγκαῖον εἶναι διελέσθαι.
πῶς; 477c
φήσομεν δυνάμεις εἶναι γένος τι τῶν ὄντων, αἷς δὴ καὶ ἡμεῖς δυνάμεθα ἃ δυνάμεθα καὶ ἄλλο πᾶν ὅτι περ ἂν δύνηται, οἷον λέγω ὄψιν καὶ ἀκοὴν τῶν δυνάμεων εἶναι, εἰ ἄρα μανθάνεις ὃ βούλομαι λέγειν τὸ εἶδος.
ἀλλὰ μανθάνω, ἔφη.
ἄκουσον δὴ ὅ μοι φαίνεται περὶ αὐτῶν. δυνάμεως γὰρ ἐγὼ οὔτε τινὰ χρόαν ὁρῶ οὔτε σχῆμα οὔτε τι τῶν τοιούτων οἷον καὶ ἄλλων πολλῶν, πρὸς ἃ ἀποβλέπων ἔνια διορίζομαι παρʼ ἐμαυτῷ τὰ μὲν ἄλλα εἶναι, τὰ δὲ ἄλλα· δυνάμεως 477d δʼ εἰς ἐκεῖνο μόνον βλέπω ἐφʼ ᾧ τε ἔστι καὶ ὃ ἀπεργάζεται, καὶ ταύτῃ ἑκάστην αὐτῶν δύναμιν ἐκάλεσα, καὶ τὴν μὲν ἐπὶ τῷ αὐτῷ τεταγμένην καὶ τὸ αὐτὸ ἀπεργαζομένην τὴν αὐτὴν καλῶ, τὴν δὲ ἐπὶ ἑτέρῳ καὶ ἕτερον ἀπεργαζομένην ἄλλην. τί δὲ σύ; πῶς ποιεῖς;
οὕτως, ἔφη.
δεῦρο δὴ πάλιν, ἦν δʼ ἐγώ, ὦ ἄριστε. ἐπιστήμην πότερον δύναμίν τινα φῂς εἶναι αὐτήν, ἢ εἰς τί γένος τιθεῖς;
εἰς τοῦτο, ἔφη, πασῶν γε δυνάμεων ἐρρωμενεστάτην. 477e
τί δέ, δόξαν εἰς δύναμιν ἢ εἰς ἄλλο εἶδος οἴσομεν;
οὐδαμῶς, ἔφη· ᾧ γὰρ δοξάζειν δυνάμεθα, οὐκ ἄλλο τι ἢ δόξα ἐστίν.
ἀλλὰ μὲν δὴ ὀλίγον γε πρότερον ὡμολόγεις μὴ τὸ αὐτὸ εἶναι ἐπιστήμην τε καὶ δόξαν.
πῶς γὰρ ἄν, ἔφη, τό γε ἀναμάρτητον τῷ μὴ ἀναμαρτήτῳ ταὐτόν τις νοῦν ἔχων τιθείη;

Notes on the current edition

Republic

1. παντελῶς: cf.

μηδαμῇ

and 478 D

πάντως

. Not foreseeing modern philology Plato did not think it necessary to repeat these qualifying adverbs in 478 B

ἢ ἀδύνατον καὶ δοξάσαι τὸ μὴ ὄν

, which is still sometimes quoted to prove that Plato was yet naively unaware of the distinction between is-not-at-all (does not exist) and is-not-this-or-that.

2. Apart from the metaphysical question of the relativity of all knowledge, the word ἐπιστήμη in Greek usage connotes certainty, and so Plato and Aristotle always take it. But more specifically that which (always) is, for Plato, is the idea which is not subject to change and therefore always is what it is, while a particular material thing subject to change and relativity both is and is not any and every predicate that can be applied to it. And since knowledge in the highest sense is for Plato knowledge of abstract and general ideas, both in his and in our sense of the word idea, knowledge is said to be of that which is. It is uncritical to ignore Plato’s terminology and purpose and to talk condescendingly of his confusing subjective with objective certainty in what follows.

3. The history of the word δύναμις has been studied in recent monographs and its various meanings, from potentiality to active power, discriminated. Cf. J. Souilhé, Etude sur le terme δύναμις dans les Dialogues de Platon, Paris , 1919, pp. 96, 163 ff. But Plato makes his simple meaning here quite plain, and it would be irrelevant to bring in modern denunciations of the old faculty psychology.

4. Cf. my note on Simplic. De An. 146. 21, Class. Phil . xvii. p. 143.

5. Cf. Ion 537 D

οὕτω καλῶ τὴν μὲν ἄλλην, τὴν δὲ ἄλλην τέχνην

6. ἐπί: Cf. Parmenides 147 D-E

ἕκαστον τῶν ὀνομάτων οὐκ ἐπί τινι καλεῖς;

7. Cf. Protagoras 352 B, Aristotle Eth. 1145 b 24.

8. For the various meanings of δόξα Cf. Unity of Plato’s Thought, p. 47

the word δόξα may be used in this neutral, psychological sense; it may be taken unfavorably to denote mere opinion as opposed to knowledge, or favorably when true opinions and beliefs are set in antithesis to the appetites and instincts.

Commentary

Commentary on Plato, Republic (Plato. The Republic, Vol 1-2. Adam, James, editor. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1902-1903.) focus

κἂν εἰ ‐‐ σκοποῖμεν . Further investigation from other points of view cannot weaken the conviction which Socrates and Glauco have already formed. The phrase is another indication that we are not here proving the Ideal Theory: see last note. Hartman should not have revived Ast's conjecture ἔχομεν <ἢ> καὶ πλεοναχῆ σκοπῶμεν.

εἰ ἐπὶ κτλ. See cr. n. Hermann's conjecture, that ἐπεί has been lost before ἐπί, has met with most favour. But ἐπεὶ ἐπί has an unpleasing sound, and εἰ might just as easily have disappeared as ἐπεί. Schneider and Stallbaum (with Ξ and the older editors) read οὐκοῦν ἐπὶ μὲν—ἐπὶ τῷ μεταξὺ δὲ κτλ., but the reading of q is intrinsically better, and the error an easier one. The reference in ἦν (‘is, as we saw’) is to 476 e—477 A.

κατ) αὐτὴν ‐‐ αὑτῆς : ‘each of them in accordance just with its own peculiar power,’ i.e. in accordance with this, and nothing else. αὐτήν is ipsam in the sense of solam. Cf. 477 D, where it is shewn that δυνάμεις should be classified on this same principle: also 478 A ἐφ’ ἑτέρῳ ἄρα ἕτερόν τι δυναμένη ἑκατέρα αὐτῶν πέφυκεν. The reading κατὰ τὴν αὐτήν—see cr. n.—gives precisely the wrong sense. Schneider and others— perhaps rightly—omit αὐτήν (with Vind. F), while Baiter adopts Hermann's ἄλλην —a very improbable correction. It is best, I think, to follow Schmidt, supposing that αὐτήν was accidentally omitted, and afterwards wrongly replaced.

μᾶλλον δὲ κτλ. Socrates had somewhat awkwardly called δόξα a δύναμις, and at the same time spoken of it as possessing a δύναμις. The present sentence introduces a sort of πάρεργον in which the notion δύναμις is more accurately defined. We may infer that δυνάμεις in the sense of (the intellectual) ‘powers’ was unfamiliar at the time when this section was written. It was perhaps— like ποιότης for example—one of Plato's experiments in language. ‘Faculties’ is, I think, too concrete to be a right translation.

αὐτήν is difficult. It is not quite easy to understand the word as ipsam, especially as it is so far from ἐπιστήμην. Had Plato written αὐτὴν τὴν ἐπιστήμην, or ἐπιστήμην—καὶ αὐτήν there would have been little or no difficulty. As it is, if the text is right, we should probably (with Schneider and others) regard αὐτήν as tautological: cf. IV 428 A note Should we perhaps read Δεῦρο δὴ πάλιν, ἦν δ’ ἐγώ, ὦ ἄριστε, <ἐπὶ> ἐπιστήμην. πότερον κτλ.? The conjecture is not convincing, although it was at ἐπιστήμη that the digression began in 477 B. “If I were to make any change” says Jackson “I would put αὐτήν before or after τίθης.”

οἴσομεν . Θ with two Vienna MSS reads θήσομεν, which is also a correction in Cesenas M. θήσομεν was likewise conjectured by Cobet. A precise parallel is hard to find; but φέρειν is used elsewhere of the operations of the mind (cf. 478 B), and θήσομεν would not be likely to suffer corruption, especially as εἰς τί γένος τίθης occurs just before.

δόξα . Instead of δόξα O. Schneider ( Versuch ein. genet. Entw. d. Pl. ἀγαθόν p. 13) would read δύναμις, but δυνάμεθα should of course be taken in its full etymological sense.

πῶς γὰρ ἂν ‐‐ τιθείη . The infallibility of knowledge is a cardinal principle with Plato: cf. Gorg. 454 D and Theaet. 152 C , 186 C ff. See Zeller^{4} II 1, p. 591.

Plato Republic 5.477

Paul Shorey (Translator)

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