Plato Republic 5.461

ἂν λάθῃ . “Si non latuerit foetus praeter legem susceptus, ne in lucem quidem edetur, sed antea opprimetur” (Schneider). Cf. C below.

γεννήσεται = ‘will be produced’ must, if right, refer to birth (“hervorkommen wird” Schneider), otherwise φύς is superfluous. Bekker and others are possibly right in reading γενήσεται with Ξ^{1} q, and some other MSS: cf. Hdt. VI 69, where Stein prints γεγενημένος in place of γεγεννημένος. See Introd. § 5.

φὺς ἅς . See cr. n. and Introd. § 5.

ἐξ ὠφελίμων κτλ. Cf. IV 424 A note

ὑπὸ σκότου . Cf. (with J. and C.) σκότιος=‘an unlawful child.’

γεγονώς =‘produced,’ ‘a product of,’ is cancelled by Hartman; but φύς is too far away, and γίγνεσθαι (‘to be produced’) is sufficiently accurate: cf. γένηται in 461 C.

ἀνέγγυον : ‘unauthorised,’ because the child of an irregular union. An ἀνέγγυος γάμος is a marriage without an ἐγγύη or contract between the parents of the betrothing parties (Blümner Privatalt. p. 262 note 2).

ᾧ. ᾗ is read by Ξ, Vind. E and Eusebius ( Praep. Ev. XIII 19. 18); but αὐτούς includes both sexes, and in such cases the masculine is preferred to the feminine. Hartman strangely thinks

ᾧ neuter.

θυγατρὶ κτλ. The cases enumerated are all in the direct line, and nothing is said forbidding unions between ‘brothers’ and ‘sisters.’ See however 461 E note Greek law permitted the marriage of uncles with nieces, aunts with nephews, and even half-brothers and halfsisters, provided they were not ὁμομήτριοι (Becker's Charicles E. T. p. 478, with the passages there cited). Some of Plato's contemporaries, notably the Cynics, entertained peculiarly revolting views on this subject, and the question was frequently agitated in his time: see Dümmler Proleg. zu Pl. St. pp. 52 ff. The Stoics agreed with the Cynics: see the authorities cited in Henkel Stud. zur Geschichte d. Gr. Lehre vom Staat p. 30.

καὶ ταῦτά γ’ ἤδη κτλ. : ‘and all this only after we have exhorted them’ etc. ἤδη goes with ἀφήσομεν (or the like) understood after πάντα. J. and C. wrongly connect πάντα with προθυμεῖσθαι (‘to use all diligence’). The voice should pause a little before διακελευσάμενοι.

μηδ’ εἰς φῶς κτλ. : ne in lucem quidem efferre. Much less shall we permit it to live if born: see App. IV. μηδέ prepares the way for ἐὰν δέ τι βιάσηται κτλ. Hartman strangely prefers μή, “cum post μάλιστα coniunctio μηδέ prorsus frigeat.” But μάλιστα μέν is, of course, ‘if possible.’

μηδὲ ἕν . See cr. n. μηδέ γ’ ἕν occurs in a few inferior MSS besides A, and is read by Baiter and others, but we do not find γε thus interposed between οὐδέ ( μηδέ) and εἷς.

γένηται κτλ. γένηται sc. κύημα. βιάσηται means ‘force its way’ sc. εἰς τὸ φῶς (J. and C.). The extreme emphasis shews what importance Plato attached to this provision. The procuring of abortion, though perhaps in certain cases punishable by law (Meier and Schömann Att. Process p. 381), was in practice common enough: see Blümner Privatalt. p. 76. Plato permits it also in the Laws (740 D). The general Greek sentiment on this matter is fairly represented by Aristotle when he says ( Pol. H 16. 1335^{b} 22 ff.) ὡρίσθαι γὰρ δεῖ τῆς τεκνοποιίας τὸ πλῆθος. ἐὰν δέ τισι γίνηται παρὰ ταῦτα συνδυασθέντων, πρὶν αἴσθησιν ἐγγενέσθαι καὶ ζωήν, ἐμποιεῖσθαι δεῖ τὴν ἄμβλωσιν· τὸ γὰρ ὅσιον καὶ τὸ μὴ διωρισμένον τῇ αἰσθήσει καὶ τῷ ζῆν ἔσται .

τιθέναι κτλ. : ‘so deal with them.’ τιθέναι is more delicate than ἐκτιθέναι, which was read before Bekker, although it has no MS authority. Herwerden suggests that τιθέναι means θάπτειν (as in 469 A), but Plato expresses himself with more refinement. τροφῆς does not mean, as some are fain to believe, merely the educational system reserved for the guardians: see on 459 E and App. IV.

πατέρας κτλ. : ‘how will they distinguish one another's fathers’ etc.? The Aristophanic parallel is here very close: Πῶς οὖν οὕτω ζώντων ἡμῶν τοὺς αὑτοῦ παῖδας ἕκαστος | ἔσται δυνατὸς διαγιγνώσκειν; Τί δὲ δεῖ; πατέρας γὰρ ἅπαντας | τοὺς πρεσβυτέρους αὑτῶν εἶναι τοῖσι χρόνοισιν νομιοῦσιν ( Eccl. 635—637). The question touches an obvious difficulty in any system of the community of children; but, as a link in the chain of evidence connecting the Ecclesiazusae and the Republic, the parallel deserves to carry weight, although it has sometimes been pressed too far. See on the one hand Teichmüller Lit. Fehd. 1 pp. 18—19 and Chiappelli Riv. di Filolog. XI p. 213, and on the other Zeller^{4} II 1. p. 551 note 2. Cf. also App. I.

δεκάτῳ κτλ. : ‘in the tenth month and also in the seventh month.’ δή (as J. and C. remark) draws attention to the more exceptional case: cf. II 367 C note The Greek cannot, I think, be taken as an inexact way of saying “from seven to ten months after” (J. and C.). In point of fact the majority of ancient writers on the subject denied that children were ever born in the eighth month of pregnancy: see Gellius Noct. Att. III 16 and Censorinus de die natali 7. 2.

ἐγέννων : ‘were engaged in begetting children’: cf. 460 E, and 461 B ( τῶν ἔτι γεννώντων). Richards has pointed out ( Cl. Rev. IV p. 7) that the imperfect refers “to the whole time of life during which father and mother were allowed, if the lot fell upon them, to take part in the regular unions.” Cf. Tim. 18 D νομιοῦσι δὲ πάντες πάντας αὐτοὺς ὁμογενεῖς, ἀδελφὰς μὲν καὶ ἀδελφοὺς ὅσοιπερ ἂν τῆς πρεπούσης ἐντὸς ἡλικίας γίγνωνται. Jowett's version—“all who were begotten at the time when their fathers and mothers came together”—mistakes both ἐν and ἐγέννων. Schneider translates the passage correctly.

ὥστε ‐‐ ἅπτεσθαι . I agree with Richards in understanding this of the “irregular unions which were last mentioned” (461 C). But in spite of the explicit reference in ὃ νῦν δὴ ἐλέγομεν, Plato has not as yet forbidden such unions between ‘brothers’ and ‘sisters’: see 461 C note The discrepancy is hard to explain, especially as the list in 461 C seems intended to be exhaustive. The effect of the prohibition (owing to the meaning now given to ‘brother’ and ‘sister’) would be greatly to restrict, but not to abolish, unauthorised liaisons.

ἀδελφοὺς κτλ. refers only to State-marriages, as ὁ κλῆρος shews. Without this exemption Plato's proposals would (according to Richards l.c.) “have rendered all unions whatever practically impossible.” Surely not; although they would have unduly favoured the τηλύγετος παῖς. A son, for example, who is born when his mother is 21 and his father 26, cannot marry till he is 49, because he is 29 before his bride can possibly be born, and she cannot marry under 20; whereas a son, whose father is 54 and mother 39 when he is born, can marry a girl only one year younger than himself, because his father and mother retire at 55 and 40 respectively. Did Plato intend the sons of elderly couples to marry young, and those of young couples to marry late? Such an inference is unlikely, although it is the logical outcome of his theories. In any case Plato did well to introduce a saving clause. The κομψὸς κλῆρος, obedient to the archons, would couple ‘brothers’ and ‘sisters,’ whenever it seemed desirable in the interests of the State, so long as they were not really blood-relations. (This the archons of course would know.) Apollo's priestess would platonize. We must suppose that her assent is given in advance, and once for all (although προσαναιρῇ is present and follows ξυμπίπτῃ), unless she had an accredited representative on the spot, which there is nothing to indicate. On Plato's attitude to Apollo see IV 427 C note

ἑπομένη ‐‐ πολιτείᾳ . This topic was not specified in the original distribution of the subject (458 B), but it is closely connected with ὡς μακρῷ βελτίστη. Plato does not deal with it till 464 B.

βεβαιώσασθαι κτλ. Hirschig cancelled παρὰ τοῦ λόγου: but cf. (with Stallbaum) Gorg. 489 A ἵνα—βεβαιώσωμαι ἤδη παρὰ σοῦ. ‘The argument’ is personified, as often.

ἆρα . <εἰ> ἄρα was suggested by Dobree; but cf. (with Stallbaum) Gorg. 475 B πρῶτον μὲν δὴ σκεψώμεθα, ἆρα—ὑπερβάλλει κτλ. The exact translation is ‘to enquire, Do the institutions we have described’ etc.

ἔχομεν οὖν κτλ. Cf. IV 422 E. στάσις was the greatest evil which a Greek city had to fear, and Athens had suffered from it grievously. Now individualism was the peculiar pride and glory of the Athenian State (Thuc. II 37), so that we need not wonder if Plato traced στάσις to individualism, and rushed to the opposite extreme. Cf. Krohn Pl. Fr. p. 4, Pöhlmann Gesch. d. ant. Kommunismus etc. pp. 146—184, and see on II 369 A.

ποιῇ μίαν . J. and C. assert that Plato “has no idea of a unity of opposites or differences— τὸ ἀντίξουν συμφέρον,” and Aristotle argues to the same effect in Pol. B 2. 1261^{a} 22 ff. But it is in fact on such a unity that the entire fabric of Plato's city rests: see IV 423 D note, and cf. also 432 A, 443 D. The perfect city is a ἕν with three πολλά—rulers, auxiliaries, farmers and artisans, or, if rulers and auxiliaries are classed together as guardians, then with two. Plato's object throughout this episode is to keep the whole city ‘one’ by preventing one of its constituent factors, viz. the guardians, from becoming ‘many.’ If the guardians are united—so he holds—no danger to the city's unity need be apprehended from the others (465 B). With the sentiment generally cf. Ar. Eccl. 594 and 674 ( μίαν οἴκησίν φημι ποιήσειν συρρήξασ’ εἰς ἓν ἅπαντα | ὥστε βαδίζειν εἰς ἀλλήλους). See also on 463 E and App. I.

οἱ μὲν ‐‐ τῆς πόλεως . As when a national disaster is made the occasion of a party victory. Plato may be thinking of scenes which he had witnessed in his native city. Bosanquet cites an excellent illustration from Dem. de Cor. 217.

καὶ ‐‐ ταὐτά : i.e. ὅταν μὴ ἅμα φθέγγωνται—τό τε ἀλλότριον καὶ τὸ οὐκ ἀλλότριον. Hartman ejects καὶ περὶ τοῦ ἀλλοτρίου as a “futile interpretamentum” on τὸ οὐκ ἐμόν. There is nothing to prove that καὶ—ταὐτά was read by Aristotle ( Pol. B 3. 1261^{b} 18), Plutarch (140 D, 484 B, 767 D), Iamblichus ( de vita Pythag. 167) or Proclus ( in remp. ed. Kroll II pp. 78. 28, 365. 11), though Iamblichus uses the word ἀλλότριον instead of Plato's οὐκ ἐμόν. But as none of these authors pretends to be quoting Plato's ipsissima verba, the omission proves nothing. Although the words add nothing to the sense, they approach the matter from another point of view, and are in my judgment certainly genuine.

ἐν ᾗτινι κτλ. ‘Thus in whatever city the largest number of men agree in applying these expressions, “mine” and “not mine,” to the same thing,’ etc. τοῦτο agrees with the nearest of the two objects, viz. τὸ ἐμόν. For the use of ἐπί cf. Parm. 147 D . The reading ἐπὶ τὸ αὐτό—see cr. n.—is as old as Iamblichus: see the passage referred to above, where Iamblichus has ἐπὶ τὸ αὐτὸ τὸ ἐμὸν φθέγγεσθαι καὶ τὸ ἀλλότριον. It is retained by the majority of editors; but no other instance of λέγειν ἐπί τι has yet been adduced, and the expression is certainly very strange. φέρειν ὄνομα ἐπί τι ( Soph. 237 C , D: cf. also Tim. 37 E ), of which Schneider reminds us, is a different thing from λέγειν ὄνομα ἐπί τι. Various emendations have been proposed. The choice seems to me to lie between ἐπὶ τῷ αὐτῷ and ἐπὶ τοῦ αὐτοῦ. The latter emendation—which I once adopted—was (as I learn from Schneider) proposed by Küster instead of ἐπὶ τὸ αὐτό in Iamblichus: cf. ὥσπερ ἐπὶ τοῦ δακτύλου ἐλέγομεν VII 524 E (‘in the case of the finger’) al. Although the genitive may be right, the dative now seems to me slightly more natural and easy. Hartman ejects ἐπὶ τὸ αὐτό altogether, but there is no occasion for the knife. Cf. IV 436 B note For the error see Introd. § 5.

καὶ ἥτις δὴ κτλ. δή is illative, and καί ‘also.’ καὶ—ἔχει (sc. ἄριστα διοικεῖται) is certainly interrogative, as Schneider pointed out: see in D below τοῦτο δ ἐρωτᾷς. Plato recurs to his favourite analogy between man and the State: cf. II 368 E f. notes

οἷον ὅταν κτλ. Poschenrieder ( Die Pl. Dial. in ihrem Verhältnisse zu d. Hippokratischen Schr. p. 67) cites a remarkable parallel from the author of the treatise de locis in homine (Littré VI p. 278 c. 1) εἴ τις βούλεται τοῦ σώματος ἀπολαβὼν μέρος κακῶς ποιέειν τὸ σμικρότατον, πᾶν τὸ σῶμα αἰσθήσεται τὴν πεῖσιν, ὁκοίη ἄν τις ᾗ, διὰ τόδε, ὅτι τοῦ σώματος τὸ σμικρότατον πάντα ἔχει, ὅσαπερ καὶ τὸ μέγιστον· τοῦτο δ’ ὁποῖον ἄν τις πάθῃ ἐπαναφέρει πρὸς τὴν ὁμοεθνίην ἕκαστον πρὸς τὴν ἑωυτοῦ, ἤν τε κακόν, ἤν τε ἀγαθόν ᾗ· καὶ διὰ ταῦτα καὶ ἀλγέει καὶ ἥδεται ὑπὸ ἔθνεος τοῦ σμικροτάτου τὸ σῶμα, ὅτι ἐν τῷ σμικροτάτῳ πάντ’ ἔνι τὰ μέρεα καὶ ταῦτα ἐπαναφέρουσι ἐς τὰ σφῶν αὐτῶν ἕκαστα καὶ διαγγέλλουσι πάντα. The ‘sympathy’ of the different parts of the human body was a Hippocratean tenet ( ξυμπαθέα πάντα de alimento IX c. 23 Littré). Cf. Shakespeare Othello III 4. 146—148, “For let our finger ache, and it indues Our other healthful members ev'n to that sense Of pain.” Plato goes farther, and represents the partnership as extending also to the soul: see next note.

πᾶσα ἡ κοινωνία κτλ. : ‘the entire partnership pervading the body with the soul, organized into a single composite organization, viz. that of the ruling power in the partnership’ etc. Plato's language is precise, but difficult. I take ἡ—ψυχήν as defining the κοινωνία. κατὰ τὸ σῶμα is written rather than τοῦ σώματος, because the partnership is not only a partnership of body with soul, but also a partnership of the different parts of body with one another. τεταγμένη—see cr. n. and App. V —appears to suit σύνταξις better than τεταμένη. A σύνταξις is the ordered combination of two or more elements: cf. Tim. 24 C and Laws 903 D ψυχὴ συντεταγμένη σώματι. The words τοῦ ἄρχοντος define the σύνταξις; although neuter in gender, they really refer, not to the soul, but to the whole σύνταξις or σύνολον, i.e. ὁ ἄνθρωπος. It is ὁ ἄνθρωπος who rules in the partnership, although he is himself a partner only in the sense in which the whole is partner with its parts. The expression ὁ ἄνθρωπος τὸν δάκτυλον ἀλγεῖ is thus seen to be as exact as possible. The confusion between τεταγμένος and τεταμένος is easy: συντεταμένως, for example, and συντεταγμένως are often confused in MSS: see Ast's Lex. Plat. s.v. ξυντεταμένως and my edition of the Apology p. 127. Cf. also infra 474 A note

ἐν αὐτῇ : i.e. ἐν τῇ κοινωνίᾳ (so also Schneider), not (as Stallbaum) ἐν τῇ ψυχῇ. Plato means that every single man ( ἑνὸς ἀνθρώπου above) is a single organized whole—a partnership in which the whole is partner with, and rules, the parts. See also App. V.

ᾔσθετό ‐‐ ξυνήλγησεν : ‘momentary’ aorists: cf. Theaet. 156 E .

ἄλλου ὁτουοῦν : sc. besides the finger.

ἑνὸς δὴ κτλ. We may compare the Stoic doctrine “incommoda autem et commoda (ita enim εὐχρηστήματα et δυσχρηστήματα appello) communia (sc. inter sapientes) esse voluerunt” (see Cicero de Fin. III 69, and Madvig's note). Not a few of Plato's regulations in Book V foreshadow the communistic theories of Stoicism: see Dyroff Ethik d. alten Stoa pp. 211 f., 226—231. Plato however contrives to make his communism live; whereas the Stoics seldom did.

αὕτη . See cr. n. Schneider says αὐτή is “ea potissimum,” referring to VII 516 B, where however we should (I believe) read οὗτος. See note ad loc. Here αὕτη is required by the contrast with εἴτε καὶ ἄλλη τις μᾶλλον. For the error cf. VIII 552 A, where q and several MSS wrongly read αὐτή. See also Introd. § 5.

ἔστι . For the syntax see on II 363 A. ἔστι is a privileged verb in Attic prose: cf. Kühner Gr. Gr. II p. 61.