τῶν μὲν ἀγαθῶν ‐‐ ἑκουσίως
. See IV 438 A note
ἢ οὐ ‐‐ εἶναι
. It is necessary expressly to equate
ἀληθεύειν with
ἀληθὴς δόξα, because ordinarily it means to speak rather than to think what is true. Cf. II 382 A. Hartman approves of Ast for bracketing the words “quod argumentationem turbant,” but the contrary is true. Men unwillingly relinquish what is good.
ἀληθεύειν is good; and
ἀληθὴς δόξα is
ἀληθεύειν; therefore we unwillingly relinquish
ἀληθὴς δόξα—which is just what we wished to prove.
τραγικῶς
: i.e.
ὑψηλολογούμενος, in lofty high-flown metaphorical language such as may well become obscure: cf. VIII 545 E.
κλέπτειν thus used is tragic: cf. (with J. and C.)
Soph.
Ant. 681
εἰ μὴ τῷ χρόνῳ κεκλέμμεθα .
τοίνυν
=‘praeterea’ here, not ‘igitur’: I 339 D note
τι δείσαντες
=‘having some fear’ (J. and C.).
τοῦτο ὡς ποιητέον κτλ.
: ‘that it is their duty to do that which on each occasion they think it is best for them to do in the interests of the State.’ I have provisionally retained the reading of the best MSS, although it is open to suspicion on several grounds. The position of
τοῦτο is unusual, and
αὑτοῖς ποιεῖν is, to say the least, superfluous. Gaisford (with whom Cobet agrees) wished to expunge the entire clause as a gloss on
δόγματος. This solution, though drastic, may be right: for an explanation of
δόγματος is hardly needed after 412 D, E, and
τοῦτο looks like the commencement of an explanatory note ‘this, viz. that’ etc. A simpler alternative, adopted by most editors, is to cancel
αὑτοῖς ποιεῖν, but it is difficult to see why a scribe should have introduced the words. The sentence, if genuine, seems to want the finishing touch. Cf. 407 D note
προθεμένοις ἔργα
. It is clear that Plato is referring to specific tests, and not (as Bosanquet seems to think) to the duties of war and the public service generally. So also Susemihl (
Gen. Entw. II p. 143), and Steinhart (
Einleitung p. 173), the latter of whom compares, not very aptly, the tests of the Pythagorean brotherhood and the appalling spectacles displayed in the mysteries. Three kinds of tests are required: (1)
κλοπή, (2)
βία, (3)
γοητεία. Examples of the second kind are furnished by the severer discipline of gymnastic, the chase etc.: cf.
Laws 633 B ff., where the probationary value of these and similar exercises is appropriately insisted on by the Spartan stranger. It was fully recognised in the Spartan
ἀγωγή (Plut.
Lyc. 17. 4 ff.). The third order of tests may be illustrated from
Laws 634 A, B, 635 C, 647 D ff., 649 A, 673 E ff.
ἡ ἐν οἴνῳ βάσανος (649 D) consists in giving wine to test men's selfcontrol (
τοῦ σωφρονεῖν ἕνεκα μελέτης 673 E). Plato gives no account of the first variety; but a good illustration of one species of it (cf.
τοὺς μεταπεισθέντας 413 B) is provided by the speeches of self-seeking statesmen and unpatriotic sophists and poets. It is a curious fact that Plato's
κλοπή still leaves a loophole by which vicious poetry may creep in again. On the general question, Plato does well to insist on the educational value of temptation; the theory and practice of modern times recognises it in connexion with
βία, but experience too often shews that
κλοπή and
γοητεία mean playing with fire. Cf. Grote
Plato III p. 328.
τοῦ τῆς ‐‐ θεατέον
. Two
εἴδη of tests have been described,
κλοπή and
βία: the third is
γοητεία. I incline to think that Stallbaum is right in restoring
τοῦ τῆς: see cr. n. and
Introd. § 5.
τούτοις ‘misere languet,’ and if a dative were needed, it should rather be
αὐτοῖς. Herwerden expunges
θεατέον; but asyndeton before
ὥσπερ is frequent in sentences of this kind.
δυσγοήτευτος
. For the change from plural to singular cf. I 347 A note