Plato Republic 2.376

ὅτι ‐‐ προπεπονθώς . Schneider justly observes that ὅτι is not likely to be an interpolation, and might easily have disappeared before ὅν, as it has in A (see cr. n.). In itself the presence of ὅτι is an improvement. For οὐδὲν δή v (supported also by Stobaeus Flor. 43. 149) reads οὐδέν, which may be right. Cobet's οὐδὲ ἕν is too emphatic.

οὐ πάνυ ‐‐ τὸν νοῦν : ‘I have hardly thought of the matter till now.’ μέχρι δεῦρο is more idiomatic than μέχρι τούτου in this sense, but Xen. Cyr. VIII 8. 9 and Dem. de Cor. 48 are closely analogous instances. The alternative rendering ‘my observation has hardly extended so far’ is (in view of οὔπ ω τοῦτο ἐθαύμασας;) less suitable.

ὡς ἀληθῶς φιλόσοφον . ὡς ἀληθῶς indicates that φιλόσοφον is to be taken in its etymological sense: cf. I 343 C note The dog shews ‘a love of knowledge’ because he loves the known, and hates the unknown. Brandt ( Zur Entwick. d. Pl. Lehr. v. d. Seelentheilen p. 10) ingeniously takes φιλόσοφον as= σοφὀν τοὺς φίλους: but the other interpretation is more natural and relevant. There is perhaps an allusion to the Cynics: see Schol. in Arist. ed. Brandis (Berlin 1836) 23^{b} 16 ff. τετάρτη δὲ (SC. αἰτία τοῦ κληθῆναι Κυνικοὺς) ὅτι διακριτικὸν ζᾧον ὁ κύων γνώσει καὶ ἀγνοίᾳ τὸν φίλον καὶ τὸν ἀλλότριον ὁρίζον· ὃν γὰρ γιγνώσκει, νομίζει φίλον εἶναι καὶ εἰ ῥόπαλον ἐπιφέροιτο, ὃν δὲ ἀγνοεῖ ἐχθρόν, καὶ εἰ δέλεαρ ἐπιφερόμενος εἴη. οὕτως οὗν καὶ οὗτοι τοὺς μὲν ἐπιτηδείους πρὸς φιλοσοφίαν φίλους ἐνόμιζον καὶ εὐμενεῖς ἐδέχοντο, τοὺς δὲ ἀνεπιτηδείους ἀπήλαυνον δίκην κυνῶν κατ’ αὐτῶν ὑλακτοῦντες, and Philoponus ib. 35^{a} 5—12. The Cynics were themselves very fond of pointing the moral from the lower animals to man (Dümmler Proleg. p. 58 note 2), and Plato here paints them not unkindly in colours of their own. It should be noted that throughout II—IV Plato uses φιλόσοφος and φιλοσοφία with less of an intellectual than of a moral connotation. In the earlier books the word is for the most part connected with a gentle considerate disposition or character, whether naturally implanted or the result of culture (cf III 410 E, 411 C, 411 E): in 407 C the sense is somewhat different. See Nettleship in Hellenica pp. 77—79, and Krohn Pl. St. p. 71. It is not until the latter part of Book V (473 B ff.) where Plato is proposing to enter on the third and final stage of his ideal city, viz. the κατάστασις τῶν ἀρχόντων, that the intellectual aspect of the word begins to predominate over the moral. Cf. IV 439 D note

φύσει is better taken with φιλόσοφον than with πρᾶος. Cf. 375 B.

ἆρά τι προὔργου κτλ. See on 368 E.

ἵνα μὴ ‐‐ διεξίωμεν . See cr. n. The omission in the text of A may be accidental (see Introd. § 5), but the sentence is certainly a difficult one. If the MSS are right, the meaning must be “For we do not want to be tedious,”— but συχνός is rather ‘lengthy’—“and we do not want to leave unsaid what is required for completeness” (J. and C., comparing for συχνός Theaet. 185 E , Phil. 23 B al.). The conjectures of Teuffel ( Rhein. Mus. 1850 p. 469) and Herwerden ( Mnem. N. S. XI p. 339)— ἵνα ἢ (so q) ἐῶμεν συχνὸν (so v) λόγον ἢ ἱκανὸν (so v) διεξίωμεν and ἵνα μὴ ἢ ἐῶμεν συχνὸν λόγον ἢ οὐχ ἱκανὸν διεξίωμεν— improve the antithesis, but are much too violent. It is safest to retain the MS reading until a thoroughly satisfactory emendation appears. Dr Jackson suggests ἵνα μὴ ἐῶμεν ἱκανὸν λόγον ἢ οὐχ ἱκανὸν διεξίωμεν.

τίς οὖν ἡ παιδεία; κτλ. The educational scheme contained in Books II and III contributes to the purgation of the τρυφῶσα πόλις, and thereby helps to complete Plato's second picture of an ideal city: see on 372 D ff. For the correct understanding of these regulations it is well to bear in mind (1) that Plato's object in this preliminary discipline is to train the character rather than the intellect (cf. IV 430 C note), and (2) that all the guardians have to pass through this curriculum. The higher scheme of education (in Book VII), on the other hand, is confined to those guardians who are to be made Rulers in the State, and its express aim is to educate the intellect rather than the will. See especially VI 502 E, VII 521 D—522 A notes The best discussion on Plato's theory of education in its broader aspects is still, I think, Nettleship's Essay in Hellenica pp. 67—180. Platon's Erziehungstheorie n. s. Schrift. dargestellt von Dr A. Drygas Schneidemühl 1880 is a useful summary. For Plato's criticism of poetry, we may refer in particular to Heine's excellent dissertation De rat. quae Platoni c. poet. Gr. intercedit etc. Vratislaviae 1880, and to Reber's Plato und die Poesie Leipzig, 1864.

ἔστιν δέ που — μουσική . The usual Greek view (see for example Isocr. 15. 180—185), corrected by Plato in III 410 C ff.

εἶπον . Richter ( Fl. Jahrb. 1867 p. 141) revives Muretus' conjecture εἶδος: but εἶπον is alone satisfactory. The confusion of ο and ω occurs in Inscriptions from the third century B.C. onwards (Meisterhans^{3} p. 24 note 128). See also Introd. § 5.

λόγων δὲ ‐‐ ἕτερον . The word ‘lies’ is here used by Plato in its popular sense of that which is false in fact: his own definition of the ‘veritable lie’ is different: see 382 B note ‘Lies’ are necessary—so Plato holds—in education: only they must be moral lies. Under ‘lies’ he includes stories ( μῦθοι) about the gods, about the daemons and heroes long since dead, about a future life—all of them subjects where the alleged facts cannot be verified. The ἀληθεῖς λόγοι are concerned with men, and are passed over by Plato, because he could not state his view without anticipating the conclusion which the Republic is intended to prove (see III 392 A—C). This point is missed by Krohn ( Pl. St. p. 12).

πλούτου δὲ οὐδέν and Liebhold ( Fl. Jahrb. 1888, p. 107)

κόσμου δὲ ἄλλο μὲν <ἔχοντ)> οὐδέν for τοῦτον δὲ ἄλλο μὲν οὐδέν. Neither of these proposals has any plausibility, and it is best to regard this as one of the places where we owe the right reading to Π .