Plato Republic 10.611

ὁτιοῦν ‐‐ ἀθάνατα . All things are either mortal or immortal: hence the immortal, if increased at all, must be so at the expense of the mortal, which will accordingly in course of time be exhausted. Cf. Phaed. 70 C —72 E, especially 72 B ff., where a similar train of reasoning is employed to prove ἐκ τῶν τεθνεώτων τοὺς ζῶντας γίγνεσθαι καὶ τὰς τῶν τεθνεώτων ψυχὰς εἶναι.

τῇ ἀληθεστάτῃ φύσει κτλ. In its true and essential nature soul is akin to the simple and incomposite: see Phaed. 78 B —81 A.

αὐτὸ πρὸς αὑτό goes with ἀνομοιότητος—διαφορᾶς: cf. διαφέρεσθαι πρὸς αὑτό and the like. The translation ‘viewed by itself’ (D. and V.) is quite wrong.

ὡς νῦν ἡμῖν ἐφάνη ἡ ψυχή refers to the tripartite division of soul in IV 435 A ff.: cf. (with Campbell) infra C νῦν δὲ εἴπομεν κτλ., 612 A νῦν δὲ—διεληλύθαμεν and (for the use of νῦν) ὥσπερ νῦν in VI 504 D and III 414 B note It is much less natural to connect the clause with ἀίδιον (“eternal as we have just proved the soul to be” D. and V., with whom Jowett and apparently also Schneider agree. Prantl and others take the right view). Now that he has proved the soul to be immortal, Plato takes the opportunity to suggest a revision of the psychology of Book IV, in which soul was treated as composite (435 A note): for nothing that is composite can well be immortal (cf. Phaed. l.c.). According to the theory which is rather suggested (612 A) than fully worked out in this chapter, the socalled lower ‘parts’ are not of the essence of soul at all, but only incidental to its association with body, and consequently perishable. Cf. Phaed. 66 C ff., 79 C, D and the θνητὸν εἰδος ψυχῆς of Tim. 69 C ff. Plato expresses himself with great reserve (612 A), but apparently intends us to believe that soul in its truest nature is λογιστικόν, and that the λογιστικόν alone is immortal (so also Simson Begriff d. Seele bei Plato p. 128: cf. also Grimmelt de reip. Pl. comp. et unit. p. 94 and Nettleship Lect. and Rem. II p. 357).

οἱ ἄλλοι . The reference is generally supposed to be to the arguments of the Phaedo. Krohn however ( Pl. St. p. 266) compares παλαιὸς—λόγος οὗ μεμνήμεθα ( Phaed. 70 C ), where Plato is thinking of Orphic and Pythagorean beliefs, and suggests that οἱ ἄλλοι should here be interpreted in the same way; while Pfleiderer ( Zur Lösung etc. p. 41) sees an allusion to the Phaedrus and Meno. That the arguments of the Phaedo are included in the reference, is extremely probable both on other grounds, and also on account of the remarkable affinity between that dialogue and the whole of this section; but Plato's words are wide enough to cover all the proofs of immortality current in the Platonic school, whether published or not.

ἀναγκάσειαν ἄν . See on VI 490 C.

καθαρόν : sc. from body and its attendant evil: cf. Phaed. 81 B ff.

εὑρήσει : sc. τις, which is easily supplied after the verbal διαθεατέον: cf. (with Schneider) Euthyd. 299 D οὐκοῦν ἀεὶ δεῖ αὐτὸ ἔχειν—ἐν ἑαυτῷ; καὶ εἴη ἂν εὐδαιμονέστατος, εἰ ἔχοι κτλ.

ἐναργέστερον ‐‐ διόψεται . The theory of Justice and Injustice in Book IV rested on a psychology which explained soul not as καθαρόν, and by itself, but present in body (cf. 612 A). Plato hints that the new psychological standpoint will give us a new and higher conception of Justice. I agree with Hirzel ( der Dialog 1 pp. 237 f.) in holding that this higher conception can only be the Idea. The plural refers to different conceptions of Justice and Injustice, rather than to “their various forms” (as J. and C. explain).

τὸν θαλάττιον Γλαῦκον . Glaucus, who had originally been a fisherman himself, when transmuted into a sea-god, became a patron god of sailors and fishermen. See Roscher Lex. d. Myth. s.v. and Frazer on Paus. IX 22. 7.

τά τε παλαιὰ ‐‐ ἄλλα δέ . For τε followed by δέ cf. II 367 C note

ἐκκεκλάσθαι . See cr. n. The reading κεκλάσθαι is found only in one inferior MS besides A. It is rather less suitable in point of meaning, and “quum ἐκκλᾶν perrarum, κλᾶν usu tritum sit, duorum codicum gratia vulgatum mutare durum videtur” (Schneider).

εἰς τὴν φιλοσοφίαν αὐτῆς . Cf. Phaed. 79 D ὅταν δέ γε αὐτὴ καθ’ αὑτὴν σκοπῇ, ἐκεῖσε οἴχεται εἰς τὸ καθαρόν τε καὶ ἀεὶ ὂν καὶ ἀθάνατον καὶ ὡσαύτως ἔχον, καὶ ὡς συγγενὴς οὖσα αὐτοῦ ἀεὶ μετ’ ἐκείνου τε γίγνεται, ὅτανπερ αὐτὴ καθ’ αὑτὴν γένηται καὶ ἐξῇ αὐτῇ, καὶ πέπαυταί τε τοῦ πλάνου καὶ περὶ ἐκεῖνα ἀεὶ κατὰ ταὐτὰ ὡσαύτως ἔχει, ἅτε τοιούτων ἐφαπτομένη.

ξυγγενὴς ‐‐ ὄντι . Cf. Phaed. 79 A ff., especially 80 A, B and Laws 899 D, 959 B, Tim. 90 A , C. Here we have yet another expression of the profound conviction which inspires the teaching of Plato, that man is an οὐράνιον φυτόν, οὐκ ἔγγειον. Herwerden would omit τῷ before ἀεὶ ὅντι, but the article adds emphasis by making ἀεὶ ὄντι look like a different category from ‘the divine and immortal,’ which is treated as a unity. Cf. I 334 E note

οἵα ἂν γένοιτο ‐‐ ἐπισπομένη . In the light of 611 B, C we may suppose that when the soul altogether follows after the divine it shakes itself clear of the body and the lower parts of soul associated therewith, and appears in its true unity as pure λογιστικόν<*> Cf. Grimmelt l.c. p. 94 and 608 D note

τοῦ πόντου ‐‐ ἐστίν . The imagery, which is of course suggested by the comparison with Glaucus of the sea, reminds us of Phaed. 109 B —110 B.

περικρουσθεῖσα is used with exactly the same meaning and construction as περιεκόπη in VII 519 A. The word is particularly appropriate here, because it might well be used of striking a vessel of any kind in order to shake off the integuments with which it has become incrusted in the depths of the sea. Cf. also the metaphorical use of circumcisa in Cic. de Fin. I 44. παρακρουσθεῖσα (Morgenstern) gives a wrong meaning, and περικουφισθεῖσα, which Liebhold suggests, is tame and inadequate.

πέτρας ‐‐ ὄστρεα is bracketed by Herwerden and Richards, the latter proposing as an alternative to insert καί before ἃ νῦν. The image is scarcely bolder than τὰς τῆς γενέσεως ξυγγενεῖς ὥσπερ μολυβδίδας in VII 519 A, and the comparison with Glaucus easily carries it through. ‘Stripped of stones and shellfish—the numerous and wild accretions of earth and stone which in consequence of these “happy” feastings as they are called have fastened themselves about her in her present state, because it is on earth that she feasts.’ Liebhold's conjecture γῇ ἐνοικουμένῃ and Madvig's γῆν ἑστιουμένῃ or γῆν εἰσῳκισμένῃ may be taken as indications of how far these critics are qualified to deal with the text of Plato. Plato means of course that the soul which feeds on earth becomes of the earth, earthy. Man is an οὐράνιον φυτόν ( Tim. 90 A ) and should draw his sustenance from Heaven. The best commentary on the whole passage is VII 519 A, B, with the extracts from the Phaedo cited ad loc.: cf. also IX 586 A, B notes For the ‘happy feastings’ see on IV 421 B.

εἴτε ‐‐ ὅπως . For this formula cf. Phaed. 100 D and Laws 899 B. Plato seems clearly to imply that soul in its true nature is μονοειδής, although he refrains from dogmatising on the subject here. See on 611 B.

οὐκοῦν κτλ. ‘Well then,’ said I, ‘did we not in our discourse clear away the imputations against Justice and abstain from bringing forward the wages’ etc. Jackson is inclined— perhaps rightly—to make the sentence categoric and not interrogative. In τὰ ἄλλα ἀπελυσάμεθα the word ἄλλα refers to the other points raised by Thrasymachus (I 337 A ff.), Glauco and Adimantus (II 358 E ff.), besides the complaint that Justice is usually recommended not on its own merits, but for the sake of its results (II 362 E ff.). For ἀπελυσάμεθα cf. VI 499 E ἀπολυόμενος τὴν τῆς φιλομαθίας διαβολήν , Ap. 37 B , Phaedr. 267 D , Arist. Rhet. III 14. 1415^{b} 37, 15. 1416^{a} 5 al. Other explanations of this difficult word and the variant ἀπεδυσάμεθα are discussed in App. V. Instead of ἐπηνέγκαμεν, I formerly read (with Cobet, Baiter and J. and C.) ἐπῃνέκαμεν. The scribe of Paris A (see cr. n.) seems to have had both readings before him, but to have finally decided in favour of ἐπῃνέκαμεν, which is in exact correspondence with μισθοὺς δὲ καὶ δόξας πάρες ἄλλοις ἐπαινεῖν II 367 D. All the other MSS read ἐπηνέγκαμεν except Par. K, which has ἐπηνέσαμεν. ἐπηνέγκαμεν should probably be preferred, both on account of the MS evidence, and still more because the aorist seems necessary to balance ἀπελυσάμεθα and ηὕρομεν. There is no special reason why the word ἐπαινεῖν in II 367 D should be echoed here: and it is not employed of Homer and Hesiod in II 363 A, to which ἔφατε refers. For the confusion cf. (with J. and C.) Pol. 307 A , where some MSS read ἐπηνέγκαμεν, and others ἐπῃνέκαμεν.

αὐτὸ δικαιοσύνην . See on II 363 A.

τὸν Γύγου δακτύλιον . II 359 C note

Ἄϊδος κυνῆν . See Il. V 844 f. αὐτὰρ Ἀθήνη | δῦν’ Ἄϊδος κυνέην, μή μιν ἴδοι ὄβριμος Ἄρης, with Leaf ad loc. Leaf observes that “the name Ἀίδης here evidently preserves something of its original sense, the Invisible ( Ἀvίδης).” For other examples of the proverb see Blaydes on Ar. Ach. 390 .

νῦν ἤδη ἀνεπίφθονον . We may without prejudice consider the question of rewards, now that we have judged virtue and vice upon their merits; and it is even necessary to do so, if we are to take account of all the circumstances of the case. See on 608 C.

πρὸς ἐκείνοις : sc. τοῖς ἀγαθοῖς οἷς αὐτὴ παρείχετο ἡ δικαιοσύνη, as it is more fully expressed in 614 A.

ἡγεῖσθε ‐‐ κριθείη represents the general substance, though not the precise form, of the demands put forward by Glauco and Adimantus in II 361 A—D, 367 E. The reference is not more inexact than other cross-references in the Republic (see on 502 D al.), and Siebeck is hardly justified in suggesting that Plato's recollection of Book II had grown faint by the time he wrote Book X ( Untersuch. zur Phil. d. Griechen p. 144). The reading ᾐτεῖσθε (see cr. n.) has some little support from the inferior MSS as well as from A. It is defensible in itself, and (as Campbell observes) “agrees better with ἔδωκα and δοτέον and with ἀπαιτῶ in the following sentence.” But ἡγεῖσθε is on the whole more natural with δοτέον εἶναι and ought probably to be retained. An unfortunate misprint in my edition of the Text of the Republic (1897) assigns to II the reading ᾐγεῖσθε ( sic), and the error is repeated by Burnet in his apparatus criticus. In reality Π has ἡγεῖσθε.

κἂν εἰ . See on III 408 B.

ταῦτα : viz. Justice and Injustice.

ἐπειδὴ τοίνυν κτλ. See cr. n. The reading in the text has the approval of Schneider and others. It involves less departure from Π and A^{1} than either a ἐπειδὴ τοίνυν κεκριμέναι εἰσίν, ἦν δ’ ἐγώ, πάλιν ἀπαιτῶ κτλ. (Hermann), or b ἐπειδὴ τοίνυν, ἦν δ’ ἐγώ, κεκριμέναι εἰσίν, ἐγὼ πάλιν (Ast, Stallbaum), or c ἐπειδὴ τοίνυν, ἦν δ’ ἐγώ, κεκριμέναι εἰσί, πάλιν ἀπαιτῶ κτλ. (Baiter, J. and C., Burnet). There is no authority for c except a marginal annotation in A, although Burnet erroneously attributes this reading to Vind. F and Stobaeus. See (for Vind. F) Schneider's note and (for Stobaeus) Flor. I p. 402. 22 f. Hense. To a and c it may also be objected that the contrast between Socrates on the one hand, and Glauco and Adimantus on the other, requires the presence of ἐγώ as the subject to ἀπαιτῶ: and in b the jingle ἦν δ’ ἐγώ—ἐγὼ πάλιν “valde insuave est” (Schneider).

ἡμᾶς . The reading ὑμᾶς, which Stallbaum adopts, has little authority, and is a needless change, for “Socrates ipse adhuc una cum reliquis iustitiam male audire et deos hominesque secus de ea statuere τοῦ λόγου ἕνεκα posuerat” (Schneider).

δοκεῖσθαι . Cf. VI 490 A.

κατ’ ἀρχὰς ὡμολογοῦμεν . I 352 B.