[335]
That the man who both seems and is good is the friend, but that he who seems
335a
but is not really so seems but is not really the friend. And there will be the same assumption about the enemy.
Then on this view it appears the friend will be the good man and the bad the enemy.
Yes.
So you would have us qualify our former notion of the just man by an addition. We then said it was just to do good to a friend and evil to an enemy, but now we are to add that it is just to benefit the friend if he is good and harm the enemy if he is bad?
335b
By all means, he said,
that, I think, would be the right way to put it.
Is it then, said I, the part of a good man to harm anybody whatsoever? 1 Certainly it is, he replied; a man ought to harm those who are both bad and his enemies. When horses 2 are harmed does it make them better or worse? Worse. In respect of the excellence or virtue of dogs or that of horses? Of horses. And do not also dogs when harmed become worse in respect of canine and not of equine virtue? Necessarily. 335c And men, my dear fellow, must we not say that when they are harmed it is in respect of the distinctive excellence or virtue of man that they become worse? Assuredly. And is not justice the specific virtue of man? 3 That too must be granted. Then it must also be admitted, my friend, that men who are harmed become more unjust. It seems so. Do musicians then make men unmusical by the art of music? Impossible. Well, do horsemen by horsemanship unfit men for dealing with horses? No. By justice then do the just make men unjust, 335d or in sum do the good by virtue make men bad? Nay, it is impossible. It is not, I take it, the function 4 of heat to chill but of its opposite. Yes. Nor of dryness to moisten but of its opposite. Assuredly. Nor yet of the good to harm but of its opposite. So it appears. But the just man is good? Certainly. It is not then the function of the just man, Polemarchus, to harm either friend or anyone else, but of his opposite. I think you are altogether right, 335e Socrates. If, then, anyone affirms that it is just to render to each his due and he means by this, that injury and harm is what is due to his enemies from the just man 5 and benefits to his friends, he was no truly wise man who said it. For what he meant was not true. For it has been made clear to us that in no case is it just to harm anyone. I concede it, he said. We will take up arms against him, then, said I, you and I together, if anyone affirms that either Simonides or Bias 6 or Pittacus or any other of the wise and blessed said such a thing. I, for my part, he said, am ready to join in the battle with you.
Is it then, said I, the part of a good man to harm anybody whatsoever? 1 Certainly it is, he replied; a man ought to harm those who are both bad and his enemies. When horses 2 are harmed does it make them better or worse? Worse. In respect of the excellence or virtue of dogs or that of horses? Of horses. And do not also dogs when harmed become worse in respect of canine and not of equine virtue? Necessarily. 335c And men, my dear fellow, must we not say that when they are harmed it is in respect of the distinctive excellence or virtue of man that they become worse? Assuredly. And is not justice the specific virtue of man? 3 That too must be granted. Then it must also be admitted, my friend, that men who are harmed become more unjust. It seems so. Do musicians then make men unmusical by the art of music? Impossible. Well, do horsemen by horsemanship unfit men for dealing with horses? No. By justice then do the just make men unjust, 335d or in sum do the good by virtue make men bad? Nay, it is impossible. It is not, I take it, the function 4 of heat to chill but of its opposite. Yes. Nor of dryness to moisten but of its opposite. Assuredly. Nor yet of the good to harm but of its opposite. So it appears. But the just man is good? Certainly. It is not then the function of the just man, Polemarchus, to harm either friend or anyone else, but of his opposite. I think you are altogether right, 335e Socrates. If, then, anyone affirms that it is just to render to each his due and he means by this, that injury and harm is what is due to his enemies from the just man 5 and benefits to his friends, he was no truly wise man who said it. For what he meant was not true. For it has been made clear to us that in no case is it just to harm anyone. I concede it, he said. We will take up arms against him, then, said I, you and I together, if anyone affirms that either Simonides or Bias 6 or Pittacus or any other of the wise and blessed said such a thing. I, for my part, he said, am ready to join in the battle with you.
Republic. Plato. Paul Shorey (Translator). Cambridge, MA. 1935-37.
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