Soc.
Just what I say; for I am afraid to speak plainly to you, because you are vexed with me, when you think you are talking sensibly;
302a
however, tell me further: Is not each of us one and affected in such a way as to be one?
Hipp.
Certainly.
Soc.
Then each of us, if one, would be an odd number; or do you not consider one an odd number?
Hipp.
I do.
Soc.
Then are we both an odd number, being two?
Hipp.
That could not be, Socrates.
Soc.
But we are both an even number, are we not?
Hipp.
Certainly.
Soc.
Then because we are both even, is each of us on that account even?
Hipp.
No, surely not.
Soc.
Then it is not absolutely inevitable, as you said just now, that what both are, each is, and what each is, both are.
Hipp.
Not things of this sort, but such as I mentioned before.
Soc.
That suffices, Hippias; for even this is welcome, since it appears that some things are so and some are not so. For I said, if you remember the beginning of this discussion,
302c
that pleasure through sight and through hearing were beautiful, not by that by which each of them was so affected as to be beautiful, but not both, nor both but not each, but by that by which both and each were so affected, because you conceded that both and each were beautiful. For this reason I thought that if both are beautiful they must be beautiful by that essence which belongs to both, but not by that which is lacking in each; and I still think so. But tell me, as in the beginning: If pleasure through sight and pleasure through hearing are both and each beautiful,
302e
does not that which makes them beautiful belong to both and to each?
Hipp.
Certainly.
Soc.
Is it, then, for this reason, because each is a pleasure and both are pleasures, that they would be beautiful? Or would all other pleasures be for this reason no less beautiful than they? For we saw, if you remember, that they were no less pleasures.
Hipp.
Yes,I remember.
Soc.
But for this reason, because these pleasures were through sight and hearing, it was said that they are beautiful.
Hipp.
Yes, that is what was said.
Soc.
See if what I say is true. For it was said, if my memory serves me, that this
pleasant was beautiful, not all
pleasant, but that which is through sight and hearing.
Hipp.
True.
Soc.
Now this quality belongs to both, but not to each, does it not? For surely each of them, as was said before, is not through both senses, but both are through both, and each is not. Is that true?
Hipp.
It is.
Hippias Major. Plato. Harold North Fowler (Translator), ed. Walter Rangeley Maitland Lamb. Cambridge, MA. 1926.
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