Hipp.
Decidedly. Now other things, Socrates,
296a
testify for us that this is so, but especially political affairs; for in political affairs and in one’s own state to be powerful is the most beautiful of all things, but to be powerless is the most disgraceful of all.
Soc.
Good! Then, for Heaven’s sake, Hippias, is wisdom also for this reason the most beautiful of all things and ignorance the most disgraceful of all things?
Hipp.
Well, what do you suppose, Socrates?
Soc.
Just keep quiet, my dear friend; I am so afraid and wondering what in the world we are saying again.
Hipp.
What are you afraid of again, Socrates, since now your discussion has gone ahead most beautifully?
Soc.
I wish that might be the case; but consider this point with me: could a person do what he did not know how and was utterly powerless to do?
Hipp.
By no means; for how could he do what he was powerless to do?
Soc.
Then those who commit errors and accomplish and do bad things involuntarily, if they were powerless to do those things, would not do them?
Hipp.
Evidently not.
Soc.
But yet it is by power that those are powerful who are powerful for surely it is not by powerlessness.
Hipp.
Certainly not.
Soc.
And all who do, have power to do what they do?
Hipp.
Yes.
Soc.
Men do many more bad things than good, from childhood up, and commit many errors involuntarily.
Hipp.
That is true.
Soc.
Well, then, this power and these useful things, which are useful for accomplishing something bad—shall we say that they are beautiful, or far from it?
Hipp.
Far from it, in my opinion, Socrates.
Soc.
Then, Hippias, the powerful and the useful are not, as it seems, our beautiful.
Hipp.
They are, Socrates, if they are powerful and useful for good.
Soc.
Then that assertion, that the powerful and useful are beautiful without qualification, is gone; but was this, Hippias, what our soul wished to say, that the useful and the powerful for doing something good is the beautiful?
Hipp.
Yes, in my opinion.
Soc.
But surely this is beneficial; or is it not?
Hipp.
Certainly.
Soc.
So by this argument the beautiful persons and beautiful customs and all that we mentioned just now are beautiful because they are beneficial.
Hipp.
Evidently.
Soc.
Then the beneficial seems to us to be the beautiful, Hippias.
Hipp.
Yes, certainly, Socrates.
Soc.
But the beneficial is that which creates good.
Hipp.
Yes, it is.
Soc.
But that which creates is nothing else than the cause; am I right?
Hipp.
It is so.
Hippias Major. Plato. Harold North Fowler (Translator), ed. Walter Rangeley Maitland Lamb. Cambridge, MA. 1926.
Sponsored by Perseus Project, Tufts University.
Funding provided by The Annenberg CPB/Project.