Soc.
To possess one of his works which is let loose does not count for much in value; it will not stay with you any more than a runaway slave: but when fastened up it is worth a great deal, for his productions are very fine things And to what am I referring in all this? To true opinion. For these, so long as they stay with us, are a fine possession,
98a
and effect all that is good; but they do not care to stay for long, and run away out of the human soul, and thus are of no great value until one makes them fast with causal reasoning. And this process, friend Meno, is recollection, as in our previous talk we have agreed. But when once they are fastened, in the first place they turn into knowledge, and in the second, are abiding. And this is why knowledge is more prized than right opinion: the one transcends the other by its trammels.
Men.
Upon my word, Socrates, it seems to be very much as you say.
Soc.
And indeed I too speak as one who does not know but only conjectures: yet that there is a difference between right opinion and knowledge is not at all a conjecture with me but something I would particularly assert that I knew: there are not many things of which I would say that, but this one, at any rate, I will include among those that I know.
Men.
Yes, and you are right, Socrates, in so saying.
Soc.
Well, then, am I not right also in saying that true opinion leading the way renders the effect of each action as good as knowledge does?
Men.
There again, Socrates, I think you speak the truth.
Soc.
So that right opinion will be no whit inferior to knowledge in worth or usefulness as regards our actions, nor will the man who has right opinion be inferior to him who has knowledge.
Men.
That is so.
Soc.
And you know that the good man has been admitted by us to be useful.
Men.
Yes.
Soc.
Since then it is not only because of knowledge that men will be good and useful to their country, where such men are to be found, but also on account of right opinion; and since neither of these two things—knowledge
98d
and true opinion—is a natural property of mankind, being acquired—or do you think that either of them is natural?
Men.
Not I.
Soc.
Then if they are not natural, good people cannot be good by nature either.
Men.
Of course not.
Soc.
And since they are not an effect of nature, we next considered whether virtue can be taught.
Men.
Yes.
Soc.
And we thought it teachable if virtue is wisdom?
Men.
Yes.
Soc.
And if teachable, it must be wisdom?
Men.
Certainly.
Soc.
And if there were teachers, it could be taught,
98e
but if there were none, it could not?
Men.
Quite so.
Soc.
But surely we acknowledged that it had no teachers?
Men.
That is true.
Soc.
Then we acknowledged it neither was taught nor was wisdom?
Men.
Certainly.
Soc.
But yet we admitted it was a good?
Men.
Yes.
Soc.
And that which guides rightly is useful and good?
Men.
Certainly.
Meno. Plato. Walter Rangeley Maitland Lamb (Translator). Cambridge, MA. 1924.
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