Soc.
And by things neither good nor bad do you mean such things
468a
as sometimes partake of the good, sometimes of the bad, and sometimes of neither—for example, sitting, walking, running, and sailing, or again, stones and sticks and anything else of that sort? These are what you mean, are they not? Or are there other things that you describe as neither good nor bad?
Pol.
No, these are what I mean.
Soc.
Then do people do these intermediate things, when they do them, for the sake of the good things, or the good things for the intermediate?
Pol.
The intermediate, I presume, for the good.
Soc.
Thus it is in pursuit of the good that we walk, when we walk, conceiving it to be better; or on the contrary, stand, when we stand, for the sake of the same thing, the good: is it not so?
Pol.
Yes.
Soc.
And so we put a man to death, if we do put him to death, or expel him or deprive him of his property, because we think it better for us to do this than not?
Pol.
Certainly.
Soc.
So it is for the sake of the good that the doers of all these things do them?
Pol.
I agree.
Soc.
And we have admitted that when we do things for an object, we do not wish those things, but the object for which we do them?
Pol.
Quite so.
Soc.
Then we do not wish to slaughter people or expel them from our cities or deprive them of their property as an act in itself, but if these things are beneficial we wish to do them, while if they are harmful, we do not wish them. For we wish what is good, as you say; but what is neither good nor bad we do not wish, nor what is bad either, do we? Is what I say true in your opinion, Polus, or not? Why do you not answer?
Pol.
It is true.
Soc.
Then, as we agree on this, if a man puts anyone to death or expels him from a city or deprives him of his property, whether he does it as a despot or an orator, because he thinks it better for himself though it is really worse, that man, I take it, does what he thinks fit, does he not?
Pol.
Yes.
Soc.
Now is it also what he wishes, supposing it to be really bad? Why do you not answer?
Pol.
No, I do not think he does what he wishes.
Soc.
Can such a man then be said to have great power in that city, if to have great power is something good, according to your admission?
Pol.
He cannot.
Soc.
Then I spoke the truth when I said that it is possible for a man to do what he thinks fit in a city and yet not to have great power nor to do what he wishes.
Pol.
As if you, Socrates, would not accept the liberty of doing what you think fit in your city rather than not, and would not envy a man whom you observed to have put some one to death as he thought fit, or deprived him of his property or sent him to prison!
Soc.
Justly, do you mean, or unjustly?
Gorgias. Plato. Walter Rangeley Maitland Lamb (Translator). Cambridge, MA. 1925.
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