Plato, Protagoras, ed. John Burnet, 357

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[357]

ΣΩ.

τί δʼ εἰ ἐν τῇ τοῦ περιττοῦ καὶ ἀρτίου αἱρέσει ἡμῖν ἦν ἡ σωτηρία τοῦ βίου, ὁπότε τὸ πλέον ὀρθῶς ἔδει ἑλέσθαι καὶ ὁπότε τὸ ἔλαττον, ἢ αὐτὸ πρὸς ἑαυτὸ ἢ τὸ ἕτερον πρὸς τὸ ἕτερον, εἴτʼ ἐγγὺς εἴτε πόρρω εἴη;τί ἂν ἔσῳζεν ἡμῖν τὸν 357 357a βίον; ἆρʼ ἂν οὐκ ἐπιστήμη; καὶ ἆρʼ ἂν οὐ μετρητική τις, ἐπειδήπερ ὑπερβολῆς τε καὶ ἐνδείας ἐστὶν ἡ τέχνη; ἐπειδὴ δὲ περιττοῦ τε καὶ ἀρτίου, ἆρα ἄλλη τις ἢ ἀριθμητική; Ὁμολογοῖεν ἂν ἡμῖν οἱ ἄνθρωποι ἢ οὔ;—ἐδόκουν ἂν καὶ τῷ Πρωταγόρᾳ ὁμολογεῖν.—εἶεν, ὦ ἄνθρωποι· ἐπεὶ δὲ δὴ ἡδονῆς τε καὶ λύπης ἐν ὀρθῇ τῇ αἱρέσει ἐφάνη ἡμῖν ἡ σωτηρία τοῦ βίου οὖσα, τοῦ τε πλέονος καὶ ἐλάττονος καὶ 357b μείζονος καὶ σμικροτέρου καὶ πορρωτέρω καὶ ἐγγυτέρω, ἆρα πρῶτον μὲν οὐ μετρητικὴ φαίνεται, ὑπερβολῆς τε καὶ ἐνδείας οὖσα καὶ ἰσότητος πρὸς ἀλλήλας σκέψις;— ἀλλʼ ἀνάγκη.—ἐπεὶ δὲ μετρητική, ἀνάγκῃ δήπου τέχνη καὶ ἐπιστήμη.— συμφήσουσιν.—ἥτις μὲν τοίνυν τέχνη καὶ ἐπιστήμη ἐστὶν αὕτη, εἰς αὖθις σκεψόμεθα· ὅτι δὲ ἐπιστήμη ἐστίν, τοσοῦτον ἐξαρκεῖ πρὸς τὴν ἀπόδειξιν ἣν ἐμὲ δεῖ καὶ Πρωταγόραν 357c ἀποδεῖξαι περὶ ὧν ἤρεσθʼ ἡμᾶς. ἤρεσθε δέ, εἰ μέμνησθε, ἡνίκα ἡμεῖς ἀλλήλοις ὡμολογοῦμεν ἐπιστήμης μηδὲν εἶναι κρεῖττον, ἀλλὰ τοῦτο ἀεὶ κρατεῖν, ὅπου ἂν ἐνῇ, καὶ ἡδονῆς καὶ τῶν ἄλλων ἁπάντων· ὑμεῖς δὲ δὴ ἔφατε τὴν ἡδονὴν πολλάκις κρατεῖν καὶ τοῦ εἰδότος ἀνθρώπου, ἐπειδὴ δὲ ὑμῖν οὐχ ὡμολογοῦμεν, μετὰ τοῦτο ἤρεσθε ἡμᾶς· ὦ Πρωταγόρα τε καὶ Σώκρατες, εἰ μὴ ἔστι τοῦτο τὸ πάθημα ἡδονῆς ἡττᾶσθαι, ἀλλὰ τί ποτʼ ἐστὶν καὶ τί ὑμεῖς αὐτό φατε εἶναι; εἴπατε 357d ἡμῖν. εἰ μὲν οὖν τότε εὐθὺς ὑμῖν εἴπομεν ὅτι ἀμαθία, κατεγελᾶτε ἂν ἡμῶν· νῦν δὲ ἂν ἡμῶν καταγελᾶτε, καὶ ὑμῶν αὐτῶν καταγελάσεσθε. καὶ γὰρ ὑμεῖς ὡμολογήκατε ἐπιστήμης ἐνδείᾳ ἐξαμαρτάνειν περὶ τὴν τῶν ἡδονῶν αἵρεσιν καὶ λυπῶν τοὺς ἐξαμαρτάνοντας—ταῦτα δέ ἐστιν ἀγαθά τε καὶ κακά—καὶ οὐ μόνον ἐπιστήμης, ἀλλὰ καὶ ἧς τὸ πρόσθεν ἔτι ὡμολογήκατε ὅτι μετρητικῆς· ἡ δὲ ἐξαμαρτανομένη πρᾶξις 357e ἄνευ ἐπιστήμης ἴστε που καὶ αὐτοὶ ὅτι ἀμαθίᾳ πράττεται. ὥστε τοῦτʼ ἐστὶν τὸ ἡδονῆς ἥττω εἶναι, ἀμαθία ἡ μεγίστη, ἧς Πρωταγόρας ὅδε φησὶν ἰατρὸς εἶναι καὶ Πρόδικος καὶ Ἱππίας· ὑμεῖς δὲ διὰ τὸ οἴεσθαι ἄλλο τι ἢ ἀμαθίαν εἶναι οὔτε αὐτοὶ οὔτε τοὺς ὑμετέρους παῖδας παρὰ τοὺς τούτων διδασκάλους τούσδε τοὺς σοφιστὰς πέμπετε, ὡς οὐ διδακτοῦ ὄντος, ἀλλὰ κηδόμενοι τοῦ ἀργυρίου καὶ οὐ διδόντες τούτοις κακῶς πράττετε καὶ ἰδίᾳ καὶ δημοσίᾳ.

Protagoras. Plato. ed. John Burnet. Oxford. 1903.

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Current edition Perseus

Πρωταγόρας (Greek) (Platonis Opera, Tomus III: Tetralogia V-VII. Burnet, John, editor. Oxford: Clarendon Press, 1903.)

Translations (1)

Protagoras Perseus (Plato in Twelve Volumes, Vol. 2. Lamb, W.R.M., translator. Cambridge, MA, Harvard University Press; London, William Heinemann Ltd. 1924 (printing).) — 357 focus

Soc.

Well now, if the saving of our life depended on the choice of odd or even, and on knowing when to make a right choice of the greater and when of the less—taking each by itself or comparing it with the other, and whether near 357a or distant—what would save our life? Would it not be knowledge; a knowledge of measurement, since the art here is concerned with excess and defect, and of numeration, as it has to do with odd and even? People would admit this, would they not?
Protagoras agreed that they would.
Well then, my friends, since we have found that the salvation of our life depends on making a right choice of pleasure and pain—of the more and the fewer, 357b the greater and the smaller, and the nearer and the remoter—is it not evident, in the first place, that measurement is a study of their excess and defect and equality in relation to each other?
This must needs be so.
And being measurement, I presume it must be an art or science?
They will assent to this.
Well, the nature of this art or science we shall consider some other time¹; but the mere fact of its being a science will suffice for the proof which Protagoras and I 357c are required to give in answer to the question you have put to us. You asked it, if you remember, when we were agreeing² that there is nothing stronger than knowledge, and that knowledge, wherever it may be found, has always the upper hand of pleasure or anything else; and then you said that pleasure often masters even the man of knowledge, and on our refusing to agree with you, you went on to ask us: Protagoras and Socrates, if this experience is not being overcome by pleasure, 357d whatever can it be, and what do you call it? Tell us. If on the spur of the moment we had replied, Ignorance, you would have laughed us to scorn: but now if you laugh at us you will be laughing at yourselves as well. For you have admitted that it is from defect of knowledge that men err, when they do err, in their choice of pleasures and pains—that is, in the choice of good and evil; and from defect not merely of knowledge but of the knowledge which you have now admitted also to be that of measurement. And surely you know well enough for yourselves 357e that the erring act committed without knowledge is done through ignorance. Accordingly to be overcome by pleasure means just this—ignorance in the highest degree, which Protagoras here and Prodicus and Hippias profess to cure. But you, through supposing it to be something else than ignorance, will neither go yourselves nor send your children to these sophists, who are the teachers of those things—you say it cannot be taught; you are chary of your money and will give them none, 358a and so you fare badly both in private and in public life.

Commentary

Commentary on Plato, Protagoras (Plato. Platonis Protagoras. Adam, James; Adam, Adela Marion, editors. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1921.) focus

ἀριθμητική . In Gorg. 451B ff. ἀριθμητική is said to be a science concerned with τὸ ἄρτιόν τε καὶ περιττόν, ὅσα ἑκάτερα τυγχάνει ὄντα , whereas the function which is here assigned to ἀριθμητική is there given to λογιστική : τὰ μὲν ἄλλα καθάπερ ἡ ἀπιθμητικὴ ἡ λογιστικὴ ἔχει· ρεπὶ τὸ αὐτὸ γάπ ἐστιν τό τε ἄπτιον καὶ τὸ ρεπιττόν· διαφέπει δὲ τοσοῦτον, ὅτι καὶ ρπὸς αὑτὰ καὶ ρπὸς ἄλληλα πῶς ἔχει πλήθονς (cf. ll. 71 ff. τὸ πλέον—τὸ ἔλαττον ἢ αὐτὸ πρὸς ἑαυτὸ ἢ τὸ ἕτερον πρὸς τὸ ἕτερον ) ἐπισκοπεῖ τὸ περιττὸν καὶ τὸ ἄρτιον ἡ λογιστική .

εἶεν—ἐπεὶ δὲ δή . The MSS. read ἐπειδὴ δέ , but after εἶεν Plato regularly uses δὲ δή in coming to the application of a train of reasoning or illustrations: cf. 312E εἶεν· ὁ δὲ δὴ σοφιστὴς περὶ τίνος δεινὸν ποιεῖ λέγειν ; and 311C εἶεν—παρὰ δὲ δὴ Πρωταγόραν κτλ.

εἰσαῦθις σκεψόμεθα . Siebeck, who asserts ( Zur Chronologie der Platonischen Dialogen, pp. 121 ff.) that this and similar formulas were intended by Plato to be a distinct promise of future dialogues (if not a reference to a later part of the same dialogue), finds here a reference to Politicus, 283D ff., where the ‘measuring art’ is discussed and described as the βασιλικὴ τέχνη .

ἡνίκα ἡμεῖς—ὡμολογοῦμεν : 352B ff.

ἔφατε : in 352D The original ἤρεσθε has to be repeated in consequence of the introduction of this independent clause.

ἤρεσθε : in 353A

εἴπατε : but εἴπατον in 353A otherwise there is no change in the quotation. B and T have εἴπετε , but Stobaeus (who cites from τοσοῦτον in 357B to μεγίστη 357E in his Florilegium ) reads εἴπατε . According to Rutherford ( New Phrynichus, p. 219) εἴπετε is not Attic, but this is doubtful, if any faith can be placed in MS. authority.

ἧς τὸ πρόσθεν . This—the reading of the best MSS.— has been unjustly rejected in favour of εἰς τὸ πρόσθεν ; but εἰς τὸ πρόσθεν can hardly be justified here. Sauppe refers to 339D ὀλίγον δὲ τοῦ ποιήματος εἰς τὸ πρόσθεν προελθών , where, however, εἰς τὸ πρόσθεν goes with προελθών , and in all the cases which he quotes there is a verb containing the idea of progress to go with the phrase, and so in Ar. Knights. 751 ἀλλ’ ἐς τὸ πρόσθε χρὴ παρεῖν’ ἐς τὴν πύκνα(where probably we should read παριέν’ for παρεῖν’ as in Ach. 43 πάριτ’ ἐς τὸ πρόσθεν ). Where there is no such verb (which is very rarely the case), the phrase means ‘with a view to what lies in front’, e.g. Alcib. I, 132B οὐκοῦν τοσοῦτον μὲν ἡμῖν εἰς τὸ πρόσθεν πεπέρανται . It need hardly be said that the phrase cannot mean simply ἔμπροσθεν . On the other hand ἧς seems to be just what is needed: the construction in full would be καὶ οὐ μόνον ἐπιστήμης ( ἐνδείᾳ ), ἀλλὰ καὶ ( ταύτης τῆς ἐπιστήμης ἐνδείᾳ ) ἣν τὸ πρόσθεν ἔτι ὡμολογήκατε ὅτι μετρητική (sc. ἐστι : for the omission of ἐστί after ὅτι cf. below 359D ἀπεδείχθη ἄρτι ὅτι ἀδύνατον ): ‘and from lack, not merely of knowledge, but of the knowledge which you have further admitted above to be measuring knowledge’. The attraction of the relative extends to μετρητική also in spite of ὅτι : cf. Apol. 37B ὧν εὖ οἶδ’ ὅτι κακῶν ὄντωνfor τούτων ἃ εὖ οἶδ’ ὅτι κακὰ ὄντα ( ὅτι being used with the participle as in Gorg. 481E : see note on Apol. loc. cit. ).

ἀμαθία ἡ μεγίστη : cf. Laws, III. 689A τίς οὖν ἡ μεγίστη δικαίως ἂν λέγοιτο ἀμαθία;—ταύτην τὴν διαφωνίαν λύρης τε καὶ ἡδονῆς ρπὸς τὴν κατὰ λόγον δόξαν ἀμαθίαν φημὶ εἶναι τὴν ἐσχάτην, μεγίστην δέ, ὅτι τοῦ πλήθους ἐστὶ τῆς ψυχῆς.

οὔτε αὐτοί : the verb hangs fire: we should expect Plato to continue οὔτε οἱ ὑμέτεροι παῖδες ἔρχονται κτλ. Stephanus thought προσέρχεσθε had fallen out after αὐτοί , Madvig ἴτε , while Kroschel suggests οὔτ’ ἐφοιτᾶτε αὐτοί . It seems probable that the text is corrupt; at all events no parallel has yet been adduced. The two cases quoted by Sauppe (Dem. πρὸς Ἄφοβον , § 54, and pseudo-Dem. πρὸς Τιμόθεον , § 52) are more than doubtful in respect of their text, which (as Sauppe quotes it) is not according to the MSS. Madvig's ἴτε is simplest, but the future seems out of place: perhaps ᾖτε should be read.

ὡς οὐ διδακτοῦ ὄντος : i.e. τοῦ μὴ ἡδονῆς ἡττᾶσθαι .

Plato Protagoras 357

ed. John Burnet

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