Plato, Protagoras, ed. John Burnet, 344

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[344]

ΣΩ.

ἀλλʼ ὑπερβατὸν δεῖ θεῖναι ἐν τῷ ᾁσματι τὸ ἀλαθέως, οὑτωσί πως ὑπειπόντα τὸ τοῦ Πιττακοῦ, ὥσπερ ἂν εἰ θεῖμεν αὐτὸν λέγοντα τὸν Πιττακὸν καὶ Σιμωνίδην ἀποκρινόμενον εἰπόντα· ὦ ἄνθρωποι,

χαλεπὸν ἐσθλὸν ἔμμεναι

, τὸν δὲ 344 344a ἀποκρινόμενον ὅτι ὦ Πιττακέ, οὐκ ἀληθῆ λέγεις· οὐ γὰρ εἶναι ἀλλὰ γενέσθαι μέν ἐστιν ἄνδρα

ἀγαθὸν χερσί τε καὶ ποσὶ καὶ νόῳ τετράγωνον, ἄνευ ψόγου τετυγμένον, χαλεπὸν ἀλαθέως

. οὕτω φαίνεται τὸ πρὸς λόγον τὸ μέν ἐμβεβλημένον καὶ τὸ ἀλαθέως ὀρθῶς ἐπʼ ἐσχάτῳ κείμενον· καὶ τὰ ἐπιόντα πάντα τούτῳ μαρτυρεῖ, ὅτι οὕτως εἴρηται. πολλὰ μὲν γὰρ ἔστι καὶ περὶ ἑκάστου τῶν 344b ἐν τῷ ᾁσματι εἰρημένων ἀποδεῖξαι ὡς εὖ πεποίηται—πάνυ γὰρ χαριέντως καὶ μεμελημένως ἔχει—ἀλλὰ μακρὸν ἂν εἴη αὐτὸ οὕτω διελθεῖν· ἀλλὰ τὸν τύπον αὐτοῦ τὸν ὅλον διεξέλθωμεν καὶ τὴν βούλησιν, ὅτι παντὸς μᾶλλον ἔλεγχός ἐστιν τοῦ Πιττακείου ῥήματος διὰ παντὸς τοῦ ᾄσματος.
λέγει γὰρ μετὰ τοῦτο ὀλίγα διελθών, ὡς ἂν εἰ λέγοι λόγον, ὅτι γενέσθαι μὲν ἄνδρα ἀγαθὸν χαλεπὸν ἀλαθέως, οἷόν τε μέντοι ἐπί γε χρόνον τινά· γενόμενον δὲ διαμένειν 344c ἐν ταύτῃ τῇ ἕξει καὶ εἶναι ἄνδρα ἀγαθόν, ὡς σὺ λέγεις, ὦ Πιττακέ, ἀδύνατον καὶ οὐκ ἀνθρώπειον, ἀλλὰ θεὸς ἂν μόνος τοῦτο ἔχοι τὸ γέρας,

ἄνδρα δʼ οὐκ

ἔστι μὴ οὐ κακὸν ἔμμεναι,

ὃν ἂν ἀμήχανος συμφορὰ καθέλῃ.

Simonides 37.1.14-16 τίνα οὖν ἀμήχανος συμφορὰ καθαιρεῖ ἐν πλοίου ἀρχῇ; δῆλον ὅτι οὐ τὸν ἰδιώτην· ὁ μὲν γὰρ ἰδιώτης ἀεὶ καθῄρηται. ὥσπερ οὖν οὐ τὸν κείμενόν τις ἂν καταβάλοι, ἀλλὰ τὸν μὲν ἑστῶτά ποτε καταβάλοι ἄν τις ὥστε κείμενον ποιῆσαι, τὸν δὲ κείμενον 344d οὔ, οὕτω καὶ τὸν εὐμήχανον ὄντα ποτὲ ἀμήχανος ἂν συμφορὰ καθέλοι, τὸν δὲ ἀεὶ ἀμήχανον ὄντα οὔ, καὶ τὸν κυβερνήτην μέγας χειμὼν ἐπιπεσὼν ἀμήχανον ἂν ποιήσειεν, καὶ γεωργὸν χαλεπὴ ὥρα ἐπελθοῦσα ἀμήχανον ἂν θείη, καὶ ἰατρὸν ταὐτὰ ταῦτα. τῷ μὲν γὰρ ἐσθλῷ ἐγχωρεῖ κακῷ γενέσθαι, ὥσπερ καὶ παρʼ ἄλλου ποιητοῦ μαρτυρεῖται τοῦ εἰπόντος—

αὐτὰρ ἀνὴρ ἀγαθὸς τοτὲ μὲν κακός, ἄλλοτε δʼ ἐσθλός·

Unknown 344e τῷ δὲ κακῷ οὐκ ἐγχωρεῖ γενέσθαι, ἀλλʼ ἀεὶ εἶναι ἀνάγκη. ὥστε τὸν μὲν εὐμήχανον καὶ σοφὸν καὶ ἀγαθὸν ἐπειδὰν ἀμήχανος συμφορὰ καθέλῃ,

οὐκ ἔστι μὴ οὐ κακὸν ἔμμεναι

· σὺ δὲ φῄς, ὦ Πιττακέ,

χαλεπὸν ἐσθλὸν ἔμμεναι

· τὸ δʼ ἐστὶ γενέσθαι μὲν χαλεπόν, δυνατὸν δέ, ἐσθλόν, ἔμμεναι δὲ ἀδύνατον·

πράξας μὲν γὰρ εὖ πᾶς ἀνὴρ ἀγαθός,

κακὸς δʼ εἰ κακῶς.

Simonides Fr. 37.1.17

Protagoras. Plato. ed. John Burnet. Oxford. 1903.

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Current edition Perseus

Πρωταγόρας (Greek) (Platonis Opera, Tomus III: Tetralogia V-VII. Burnet, John, editor. Oxford: Clarendon Press, 1903.)

Translations (1)

Protagoras Perseus (Plato in Twelve Volumes, Vol. 2. Lamb, W.R.M., translator. Cambridge, MA, Harvard University Press; London, William Heinemann Ltd. 1924 (printing).) — 344 focus

Soc.

We must rather take the truly as a poetical transposition, and first quote the saying of Pittacus in some such way as this: let us suppose Pittacus himself to be speaking and Simonides replying, as thus—Good people, he says, it is hard to be good; and the poet answers—Pittacus, 344a what you say is not true, for it is not being but becoming good, indeed—in hands and feet and mind foursquare, fashioned without reproach—that is truly hard. In this way we see a purpose in the insertion of indeed, and that the truly is correctly placed at the end; and all that comes after corroborates this view of his meaning. There are many points in the various expressions of the poem 344b which might be instanced to show its fine composition, for it is a work of very elegant and elaborate art; but it would take too long to detail all its beauties. However, let us go over its general outline and intention, which is assuredly to refute Pittacus’ saying, throughout the ode.
Proceeding a little way on from our passage, just as though he were making a speech, he says to become, indeed, a good man is truly hard (not but what it is possible for a certain space of time); but to continue in this state of what one has become, 344c and to be a good man is, as you say, Pittacus, impossible, superhuman: God alone can have this privilege—

For that man cannot help but be bad

Whom irresistible mischance has overthrown.

Simonides 37.1.14-16 Now who is it that an irresistible mischance overthrows in the command of a ship? Clearly not the ordinary man, for he may be overcome at any time; just as you cannot knock over one who is lying down, but one who is standing; you might knock over a standing man so as to make him lie down, 344d not one who is lying down already. So it is a man apt to resist that an irresistible mischance would overthrow, and not one who could never resist anything. A great storm breaking over a steersman will render him helpless, and a severe season will leave a farmer helpless, and a doctor will be in the same case. For the good has the capacity of becoming bad, as we have witness in another poet¹ who said—

Nay more, the virtuous man is at one time bad, at another good.

unknown whereas the bad man has no capacity for becoming, but must ever be, what he is; 344e so that when an irresistible mischance overthrows him who is resourceful, wise, and good, he cannot but be bad; and you say, Pittacus, that it is hard to be good—that is, to become good, indeed, is hard, though possible, but to be good is impossible: for—²

If he hath fared well, every man is good;

Bad, if ill.

Simonides Fr. 37.1.17

Commentary

Commentary on Plato, Protagoras (Plato. Platonis Protagoras. Adam, James; Adam, Adela Marion, editors. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1921.) focus

οὐ γὰρ εἶναι ἀλλὰ γενέσθαι μέν . Cf. Crito , 43D οὔτοι δὴ ἀφῖκται ἀλλὰ δοκεῖ μέν μοι ἤξειν κτλ. μέν without following δέ is frequent in a clause introduced by ἀλλά , the antithesis being contained in the preceding negative clause.

οὕτω φαίνεται . After φαίνεται the MSS. have τό : ‘vel expungendum vel in τοι mutandum hoc τό ’ says Heindorf. For πρὸς λόγον see on 351E

τὰ ἐπιόντα : see Appendix I, p. 214.

τύπον . Socrates' criticism of the poem so far has been δῑ ἀκριβείας : cf. Rep. II. 414A ὡς ἐν τύπῳ, μὴ δῑ ἀκριβείας εἰρῆσθαι. See also note on ὑπογράψαντες γραμμὰς τῇ γραφίδι in 326D above.

παντὸς μᾶλλον is frequent in Plato for ‘assuredly’: cf. Crito , 49B.

ἀλλὰ θεὸς ἂν μόνος—γέρας . Plato, Symp. 204A θεῶν οὐδεὶς φιλοσοφεῖ οὐδ’ ἐπιθυμεῖ σοφὸς γενέσθαι· ἔστι γάρ.

ἄνδρα δ’ οὐκ ἔστι—καθέλῃ : see below on 344E l. 30.

ὄντα ποτὲ—καθέλοι. ποτέgoes with καθέλοι as with καταβάλοι in l. 13.

καὶ ἰατρὸν ταὐτὰ ταῦτα. ταὐτὰ ταῦταis virtually adverbial as in Meno , 90D οὐκοῦν καὶ περὶ αὐλήσεως καὶ τῶν ἄλλων τὰ αὐτὰ ταῦτα ;

ἐγχωρεῖ κακῶ? γενέσθαι . Socrates says γενέσθαι , although Simonides said ἔμμεναι ; see on E (l. 26) below.

παρ’ ἄλλου ποιητοῦ . Xen. Mem. 1. 2. 20 μαρτυρεῖ δὲ καὶ τῶν ποιητῶν ὅ τε λέγων ‘ ἐσθλῶν μὲν γὰρ ἀπ’ ἐσθλὰ διδάξεαι· ἢν δὲ κακοῖσι συμμίσγῃς, ἀπολεῖς καὶ τὸν ἐόντα νόον ’, καὶ ὁ λέγων ‘ αὐτὰρ ἀνὴρ ἀγαθὸς τοτὲ μὲν κακός, ἄλλοτε δ’ ἐσθλός ’. The first of these quotations is known (see Meno , 95D) to be from Theognis, so that it seems clear that the second must be from some other poet. It is difficult to resist the impression that the author of this line intended ἀγαθός, κακός , and ἐσθλός to have a political sense, and was alluding to the ups and downs of an aristocrat's life in times of civil dissension: cf. Theognis, 1109-10 Κύρν’, οἱ πρόσθ’ ἀγαθοὶ νῦν αὖ κακοί, οἱ δὲ κακοὶ ρπὶν νῦν ἀγαθοί· τίς κεν ταῦτ’ ἀνέχοιτ’ ἐσορῶν ; Euripides, Hecuba , 595 ff. (quoted by Cron) pointedly contradicts the sentiment of this line (as interpreted by Socrates): ἄνθ ρωποι δ’ ἀεὶ ὁ μὲν πονηρὸς οὐδὲν ἄλλο πλὴν κακός, ὁ δ’ ἐσθλὸς ἐσθλός, οὐδὲ συμφορᾶς ὕπο (alluding to Simonides' poem) φύσιν διέφθειρ’, ἀλλὰ χρηστός ἐστ’ ἀεί .

εὐμήχανον καὶ σοφὸν καὶ ἀγαθόν. εὐμήχανοςis identified with ἀγαθός by means of the middle step σοφός, σοφία being ἀγαθόν because it is one of the virtues. See on τῷ ἐπιστάτῃ καὶ ἐπαἳοντι in Crito , 47B.

οὐκ ἔστι μὴ οὐ κακὸν ἔμμεναι . If Simonides had consistently carried out the distinction between γένεσις and οὐσία attributed to him (in part rightly: see on 344B l. 4), he would have used γενέσθαι , not ἔμμεναι here. Socrates throughout interprets ἔμμεναι as equivalent to γενέσθαι in this part of the poem, in spite of his previous distinction: but so (apparently) did Simonides: see on 344B

τὸ δ’ ἐστίν κτλ. τὸ δέ‘whereas in point of fact’ is very frequent in Plato: see on Apol. 23A . Notice how Socrates reverts to the beginning of the poem: see note on 346D and Appendix I, p. 214.

(δυνατὸν δἒ ἐσθλόν . There is not sufficient ground for rejecting (with most of the editors) ἐσθλόν : its position is a trifle awkward, but not more, since δυνατὸν δέ is parenthetical, the μέν after γενέσθαι being balanced by δέ in ἔμμεναι δέ . Heindorf reads δυνατὸν δέ, ἐσθλὸν δ’ ἔμμεναι with slight MS. authority.

πράξας μὲν γὰρ εὖ κτλ. γάρis probably due to Plato, who represents this sentence as adducing a reason for ἔμμεναι δὲ ἀδύνατον : see Appendix I, p. 217. πράξας εὖ is ‘if he has prospered’: the whole sentiment is the converse of ἄνδρα δ’ οὐκ ἔστι μὴ οὐ κακὸν ἔμμεναι and is characteristic of the ordinary Greek moral code: cf. Hom. Od. XVIII. 136-7 τοῖος γὰρ νόος ἐστὶν ἐπιχθονίων ἀνθρώπων οἷον ἐπ’ ἦμαρ ἄγῃσι πατὴρ ἀνδρῶν τε θεῶν τε. The view that affliction involves moral degeneracy appears in the transition of meaning in πονηρός and μοχθηρός from ‘afflicted’ to ‘depraved’: the common view that ‘prosperity’ brings virtue is involved in the usual equivocation on εὖ πράττειν ‘fare well’ and ‘do well’; see on Crito , 47E and Euthyphr , 3A. After κακὸς δ’ εἰ κακῶς is to be understood ἔπραξεν .

Plato Protagoras 344

ed. John Burnet

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