Plato, Protagoras, ed. John Burnet, 332

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[332]

ΣΩ.

οὐ πάνυ, 332 332a ἔφη, οὕτως, οὐ μέντοι οὐδὲ αὖ ὡς σύ μοι δοκεῖς οἴεσθαι.—ἀλλὰ μήν, ἔφην ἐγώ, ἐπειδὴ δυσχερῶς δοκεῖς μοι ἔχειν πρὸς τοῦτο, τοῦτο μὲν ἐάσωμεν, τόδε δὲ ἄλλο ὧν ἔλεγες ἐπισκεψώμεθα. ἀφροσύνην τι καλεῖς;—ἔφη.—τούτῳ τῷ πράγματι οὐ πᾶν τοὐναντίον ἐστὶν ἡ σοφία;— ἔμοιγε δοκεῖ, ἔφη.—πότερον δὲ ὅταν πράττωσιν ἅνθρωποι ὀρθῶς τε καὶ ὠφελίμως, τότε σωφρονεῖν σοι δοκοῦσιν οὕτω πράττοντες, ἢ εἰ τοὐναντίον ἔπραττον;— σωφρονεῖν, ἔφη.—οὐκοῦν 332b σωφροσύνῃ σωφρονοῦσιν;— ἀνάγκη.—οὐκοῦν οἱ μὴ ὀρθῶς πράττοντες ἀφρόνως πράττουσιν καὶ οὐ σωφρονοῦσιν οὕτω πράττοντες;— συνδοκεῖ μοι, ἔφη.—τοὐναντίον ἄρα ἐστὶν τὸ ἀφρόνως πράττειν τῷ σωφρόνως;—ἔφη.—οὐκοῦν τὰ μὲν ἀφρόνως πραττόμενα ἀφροσύνῃ πράττεται, τὰ δὲ σωφρόνως σωφροσύνῃ;—ὡμολόγει.—οὐκοῦν εἴ τι ἰσχύϊ πράττεται, ἰσχυρῶς πράττεται, καὶ εἴ τι ἀσθενείᾳ, ἀσθενῶς;—ἐδόκει.—καὶ εἴ τι μετὰ τάχους, ταχέως, καὶ εἴ τι μετὰ βραδυτῆτος, 332c βραδέως;—ἔφη.—καὶ εἴ τι δὴ ὡσαύτως πράττεται, ὑπὸ τοῦ αὐτοῦ πράττεται, καὶ εἴ τι ἐναντίως, ὑπὸ τοῦ ἐναντίου;—συνέφη.—φέρε δή, ἦν δʼ ἐγώ, ἔστιν τι καλόν;—συνεχώρει.—τούτῳ ἔστιν τι ἐναντίον πλὴν τὸ αἰσχρόν;— οὐκ ἔστιν.—τί δέ; ἔστιν τι ἀγαθόν;— ἔστιν.—τούτῳ ἔστιν τι ἐναντίον πλὴν τὸ κακόν;— οὐκ ἔστιν.—τί δέ; ἔστιν τι ὀξὺ ἐν φωνῇ;—ἔφη.—τούτῳ μὴ ἔστιν τι ἐναντίον ἄλλο πλὴν τὸ βαρύ;—οὐκ ἔφη.—οὐκοῦν, ἦν δʼ ἐγώ, ἑνὶ ἑκάστῳ τῶν ἐναντίων ἓν μόνον ἐστὶν ἐναντίον καὶ οὐ πολλά;—συνωμολόγει. 332d
ἴθι δή, ἦν δʼ ἐγώ, ἀναλογισώμεθα τὰ ὡμολογημένα ἡμῖν. ὡμολογήκαμεν ἓν ἑνὶ μόνον ἐναντίον εἶναι, πλείω δὲ μή;— ὡμολογήκαμεν.—τὸ δὲ ἐναντίως πραττόμενον ὑπὸ ἐναντίων πράττεσθαι;—ἔφη.—ὡμολογήκαμεν δὲ ἐναντίως πράττεσθαι ὃ ἂν ἀφρόνως πράττηται τῷ σωφρόνως πραττομένῳ;—ἔφη.—τὸ δὲ σωφρόνως πραττόμενον ὑπὸ σωφροσύνης πράττεσθαι, τὸ δὲ ἀφρόνως ὑπὸ ἀφροσύνης; 332e —συνεχώρει.—οὐκοῦν εἴπερ ἐναντίως πράττεται, ὑπὸ ἐναντίου πράττοιτʼ ἄν;— ναί.—πράττεται δὲ τὸ μὲν ὑπὸ σωφροσύνης, τὸ δὲ ὑπὸ ἀφροσύνης;—ναί.—ἐναντίως;—πάνυ γε.—οὐκοῦν ὑπὸ ἐναντίων ὄντων;— ναί.—ἐναντίον ἄρʼ ἐστὶν ἀφροσύνη σωφροσύνης;— φαίνεται.—μέμνησαι οὖν ὅτι ἐν τοῖς ἔμπροσθεν ὡμολόγηται ἡμῖν ἀφροσύνη σοφίᾳ ἐναντίον εἶναι;—συνωμολόγει.—

Protagoras. Plato. ed. John Burnet. Oxford. 1903.

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Current edition Perseus

Πρωταγόρας (Greek) (Platonis Opera, Tomus III: Tetralogia V-VII. Burnet, John, editor. Oxford: Clarendon Press, 1903.)

Translations (1)

Protagoras Perseus (Plato in Twelve Volumes, Vol. 2. Lamb, W.R.M., translator. Cambridge, MA, Harvard University Press; London, William Heinemann Ltd. 1924 (printing).) — 332 focus

Soc.

Not so, he replied, at all, nor yet, 332a on the other hand, as I believe you regard them.
Well then, I said, since I find you chafe at this suggestion, we will let it pass, and consider another instance that you gave. Is there a thing you call folly?
Yes, he said.
Is not the direct opposite to that thing wisdom?
I think so, he said.
And when men behave rightly and usefully, do you consider them temperate in so behaving, or the opposite?
Temperate, he said. 332b
Then is it by temperance that they are temperate?
Necessarily.
Now those who do not behave rightly behave foolishly, and are not temperate in so behaving?
I agree, he said.
And behaving foolishly is the opposite to behaving temperately?
Yes, he said.
Now foolish behavior is due to folly, and temperate behavior to temperance?
He assented.
And whatever is done by strength is done strongly, and whatever by weakness, weakly?
He agreed.
And whatever with swiftness, swiftly, and whatever with slowness, slowly ?
And so whatever is done in a certain way is done by that kind of faculty, and whatever in an opposite way, by the opposite kind?
He agreed.
Pray now, I proceeded, is there such a thing as the beautiful?
He granted it.
Has this any opposite except the ugly?
None.
Well, is there such a thing as the good?
There is.
Has it any opposite but the evil?
None.
Tell me, is there such a thing as shrill in the voice?
Yes, he said.
Has it any other opposite than deep.
No, he said.
Now, I went on, each single opposite has but one opposite, 332d not many?
He admitted this.
Come now, I said, let us reckon up our points of agreement. We have agreed that one thing has but one opposite, and no more?
We have.
And that what is done in an opposite way is done by opposites?
Yes, he said.
And we have agreed that what is done foolishly is done in an opposite way to what is done temperately?
Yes, he said.
And that what is done temperately is done by temperance, and what foolishly by folly? 332e
He assented.
Now if it is done in an opposite way, it must be done by an opposite?
Yes?
And one is done by temperance, and the other by folly?
Yes.
In an opposite way?
Certainly.
And by opposite faculties?
Yes.
Then folly is opposite to temperance
Apparently.
Now do you recollect that in the previous stage we have agreed that folly is opposite to wisdom?
He admitted this.

Commentary

Commentary on Plato, Protagoras (Plato. Platonis Protagoras. Adam, James; Adam, Adela Marion, editors. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1921.) focus

ἀφροσύνην τι καλεῖς . See above on 330C

πότερον δὲ ὅταν . Here begins the proof that σωφροσύνη is ἐναντίον ἀφροσύνῃ . (1) τὸ ὀρθῶς and ὠφελίμως πράττειν is σωφρονεῖν , and σωφροσύνη is that by which one σωφρονεῖ ; (2) τὸ μὴ ὀρθῶς πράττειν is ἀφρόνως πράττειν and οὐ σωφρονεῖν : from which it is inferred that ἀφρόνως πράττειν is the opposite of σωφρόνως πράττειν , or (as is worked out at inordinate length) that ἀφροσύνη is the opposite of σωφροσύνη . In equating μὴ ὀρθῶς with ἀφρόνως πράττειν in (2) Socrates again confounds contradictory and contrary: see on 331A

ἢ τοὐναντίον . So Stallbaum, after Heindorf's ἢ τοὐναντίον πράττειν : the MSS. have ἢ εἰ τοὐναντίον ἔπραττον , which is faulty both because it in no way corresponds to the answer σωφρονεῖν and because εἰ with the imperfect is here unsuitable. In ἢ τοὐναντίον it will be observed that Socrates already allows no middle position between σωφρονεῖν and its opposite: see above on l. 3.

φέρε δή . From here to l. 24 Socrates tries to prove that a thing can have but one ἐναντίον . This is true only if we confine ἐναντίον to the meaning of ‘contradictorily opposite’ throughout, e.g. if we are always content merely to assert that the ἐναντίον of καλόν is μὴ καλόν : as soon as we say that its ἐναντίον is αἰσχρόν we have given to the thing two opposites (one of them multiform)—since μὴ καλόν is not αἰσχρόν but may be anything in the whole world except καλόν . This part of the argument is therefore also vitiated by neglecting the difference between contrary and contradictory terms.

ἀναλογισώμεθα : of reckoning up and reflecting as in Rep. I. 330E X. 618C.

ἔμπροσθεν : 332A

τό does not belong to ἕν but to the clause ἓν ἑνὶ μόνον ἐναντίον εἶναι : cf. τὸ εἰ βούλει τοῦτο in 331C ἐκεῖνον refers to ch. XVIII.

Plato Protagoras 332

ed. John Burnet

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