Plato Protagoras 356

καὶ τίς ἄλλη ἀναξία . This—the MSS. reading—is undoubtedly right. Plato coins the word ἀναξία for ‘unworthiness’ to complete the parallel with D above: cf. ll. 17-21 οὐκ ἀξίων ὄντων νικᾶν—κατὰ τί δὲ—ἀνάξιά ἐστιν τἀγαθὰ τῶν κακῶν κτλ. Similarly in Phaedo, 105E , Plato coins ἀνάρτιος , in 106A ἄθερμος (rightly accepted, in spite of MS. authority, by editors) and ἄψυκτος (see MSS., but Wyttenbach's ἄψυχρος is—we think rightly—accepted by some editors) as pointed and convenient negatives to ἄρτιος, θερμός, ψυχρός . Cicero's translation ‘quae igitur potest esse indignitas voluptatis ad molestiam, nisi in magnitudine aut in longitudine alterius utrius posita?’ (Nobbe's Cicero, p. 1313) shows that ἀναξία was read in his time: so in Ficinus' ‘quae vero alia inest ad dolorem indignitas voluptati quam excessus inter se atque defectus?’ The word ἀναξία hardly took root in Greek, though occasionally found in the writings of the Stoics, whose regular word for this notion is ἀπαξία. ἡδονῇ (now found to be the reading of some MSS.) for ἡδονή is due to Heindorf.

ταῦτα δ’ ἐστί : as Sauppe remarks, we should expect ταῦτα δ’ ἐστὶ τὸ μείζω—γίγνεσθαι , but the words are said as if for καὶ τίς ἄλλη ἀναξία κτλ. had been written καὶ πῶς ἄλλως ἀνάξια τὰ ἡδέα ρπὸς τὰ λυρηπά, ἀλλ’ ἢ ὑρεπβάλλοντα ἀλλήλων καὶ ἐλλείποντα ;

μᾶλλον καὶ ἧττον : this case is not given above (D-E) because the notion of intensity is more applicable to pleasure (and pain) than to good (and evil): cf. Phileb. 24A ff. with 27E ἡδονὴ καὶ λύπη πέρας ἔχετον, ἢ τῶν τὸ μᾶλλόν τε καὶ ἧττον δεχομένων ἐοτόν; ναί, τῶν τὸ μᾶλλον, ὦ Σώκρατες .

εἰ γάρ τις λέγοι . So far we have reached this point. To be overcome by pleasure is to choose in place of lesser pleasures greater pains and the like. But here the element of time comes in: a man might fairly say—yes, but the pleasures are now, the pains remote. Socrates tries to show that this makes no real difference.

τὸ παραχρῆμα ἡδύ . When we are overcome by pleasure, we do the pleasant, not the painful: therefore the contrast is between the present pleasure and the remote consequences, whether pleasure or pain. For this reason it would be wrong to supply καὶ λυπηρόν after ἡδύ .

ἀλλ’ ὥσπερ ἀγαθὸς ἱστάναι κτλ. Cf. Rep. X. 602D ἆρ’ οὖν οὐ τὸ μετρεῖν καὶ ἀριθμεῖν καὶ ἱστάναι βοήθειαι χαριέσταται ρπὸς αὐτὰ ἐφάνησαν, ὥστε μὴ ἄπχειν ἐν ἡμῖν τὸ φαινόμενον μεῖζον ἢ ἔλαττον ἢ πλέον ἢ βαρύτερον κτλ. ;

καὶ τὸ ἐλλὺς κτλ. : in order that a near pleasure might count for more than a remote.

ἐὰν μὲν γὰρ ἡδέα κτλ. Cf. Laws, v. 733B ἡδονὴν βουλόμεθα ἡμῖν εἶναι, λύρην δὲ οὔθ’ αἱπούμεθα οὔτε βουλόμεθα, τὸ δὲ μηδέτεπον ἀντὶ μὲν ἡδονῆς οὐ βουλόμεθα, λύρης δὲ ἀλλάττεσθαι βουλόμεθα· λύρην δὲ ἐλάττω μετὰ μείζονος ἡδονῆς βουλόμεθα, ἡδονὴν δὲ ἐλάττω μετὰ μείζονος λύπης οὐ βουλόμεθα κτλ.

ἐάν τε τὰ ἐγγὺς κτλ. When once you have equated ‘near’ and ‘far’ (see above), then (but not till then) your final choice is not affected by the question of proximity in time. Theoretically, no doubt, this is right; but no man is so ἀγαθὸς ἱστάναι as to weigh ἐγγύς and πόρρω correctly; whence the saying ‘Let us eat and drink; for tomorrow we die’. ‘Near’ and ‘far’ can only be weighed aright on the supposition that man is immortal and will live hereafter under the same moral laws as rule us here: but of immortality there is no hint in this dialogue.

ταῦτα : i.e. τὰ ἡδέα .

ὅτε : the notion of time readily passes into that of cause, as in quoniam and cum.

φαίνεται ὑμῖν κτλ. Two examples are given: (1) size— of which παχέα and φωναὶ μεγάλαι (according to the Greek and Roman way of viewing sound) are special varieties, (2) number, i.e. τὰ πολλά . The specific varieties παχέα and φωναὶ μεγάλαι are not dealt with in the sequel. With what follows compare (besides Rep. X. 602D cited above) Euthyphr. 7B ff. and Alc. I, 126C ff., and with the present passage Phileb. 42A and Rep. VII. 523C 524C. The resolution by the intellect of such contradictory sense-perceptions is made the basis of Plato's scheme of higher education in the Republic.

αἱ ἴσαι is Heindorf's correction for ἴσαι .

μήκη—πράττειν : as we ἡδέα πράττομεν. πράττειν (with μήκη ) is explained by λαμβάνειν : see above on 314A

ἡ μετρητικὴ τέχνη . See Introduction, p. xxix.

ἢ ἡ τοῦ φαινομένου δύναμις. ἤis omitted in B and T. ‘The power of that which appears’ is its power to affect us.

ἐπλάνα καὶ ἐποίει κτλ. ἄνis not to be supplied. Plato is reverting to the illustration in C. The imperfect is idiomatic for ‘causes us, as we saw, to wander’, etc. (viz. because τὰ αὐτὰ μεγέθη seem to us both μείζω and ἐλάττω ): it is what Goodwin calls the ‘philosophic imperfect’: cf. Crito, 47D διαφθεροῦμεν ἐκεῖνο καὶ λωβησόμεθα, ὃ τῷ μὲν δικαίῳ βέλτιον ἐγίγνετο(becomes as we saw), τῶ? δὲ ἀδίκω? ἀπώλλυτο . By adding καὶ ἐν ταῖς πράξεσιν —σμικρῶν Plato treats his hypothesis that εὖ πράττειν is to select μεγάλα μήκη as a fact; he does so also in ἂν ἐποίησε κτλ. i.e. ‘would have made’, viz. if we had made use of it, but we did not. If the hypothesis were still treated as a hypothesis, we should have had ἂν ἐποίει (and not ἂν ἐποίησε ) to correspond to what would then have been ἂν (expressed or understood) ἐπλάνα καὶ ἐποίει .

ἄνω τε καὶ κάτω. ἄνω κάτω( Theaet. 195C ) and ἄνω καὶ κάτω ( Gorg. 495A ) are other forms of this proverbial phrase.