Plato Euthydemus 288

If I was not, then you will not refute me, with all your skill, and you are at a loss how to deal with the argument; while if I was mistaken, you are in the wrong there, too, 288a for you assert that there is no such thing as making a mistake; and what I say is not aimed at what you said last year. But it seems, I went on, Dionysodorus and Euthydemus, that our argument remains just where it was, and still suffers from the old trouble of knocking others down and then falling itself, and even your art has not yet discovered a way of avoiding this failure—in spite, too, of the wonderful show it makes of accurate reasoning.
  Here Ctesippus exclaimed: Yes, your way of discussion is marvellous, 288b you men of Thurii or Chios ¹ or wherever or however it is you are pleased to get your names; for you have no scruple about babbling like fools.
  At this I was afraid we might hear some abuse, so I soothed Ctesippus down once more, saying: Ctesippus, I repeat to you what I said to Cleinias just now, that you do not perceive the wonderful nature of our visitors’ skill. Only they are unwilling to give us a display of it in real earnest, but treat us to jugglers’ tricks in the style of Proteus ² the Egyptian adept. 288c So let us take our cue from Menelaus, ³ and not leave hold of these gentlemen till they give us a sight of their own serious business. I believe something very fine will be found in them as soon as they begin to be serious. Come, let us beg and exhort and beseech them to let their light shine. For my part, then, I am minded to take the lead once more in showing what sort of persons I pray may be revealed in them: 288d starting from where I left off before, I shall try, as best I can, to describe what follows on from that, to see if I can rouse them to action and make them, in merciful commensuration of my earnest endeavor, be earnest themselves.
  Will you, Cleinias, I asked, please remind me of the point at which we left off? Now, as far as I can tell, it was something like this: we ended by agreeing that one ought to pursue wisdom, did we not? ⁴
  Yes, he said.
  And this pursuit—called philosophy—is an acquiring of knowledge. Is it not so? I asked.
  Yes, he said.
  Then what knowledge should we acquire if we acquired it rightly? 288e Is it not absolutely clear that it must be that knowledge which will profit us?
  Certainly, he said.
  Now will it profit us at all, if we know how to tell, as we go about, where the earth has most gold buried in it?
  Perhaps, he said.