Soc.
Well then, proceeded the other, each thing that is has its own description?
Certainly.
Then do you mean, 286a as each is, or as it is not?
As it is.
Yes, he said, for if you recollect, Ctesippus, we showed just now that no one speaks of a thing as it is not; since we saw that no one speaks what is not.
Well, what of that? asked Ctesippus: are you and I contradicting any the less?
Now tell me, he said, could we contradict if we both spoke the description of the same thing? In this case should we not surely speak the same words?
He agreed.
But when neither of us speaks the description of the thing, he asked, 286b then we should contradict? Or in this case shall we say that neither of us touched on the matter at all?
This also he admitted.
Well now, when I for my part speak the description of the thing, while you give another of another thing, do we contradict then? Or do I describe the thing, while you do not describe it at all? How can he who does not describe contradict him who does? 1
At this Ctesippus was silent; but I, wondering at the argument, said: How do you mean, Dionysodorus? 286c For, to be plain with you, this argument, though I have heard it from many people on various occasions, never fails to set me wondering—you know the followers of Protagoras made great use of it, as did others even before his time, but to me it always seems to have a wonderful way of upsetting not merely other views but itself also—and I believe I shall learn the truth of it from you far better than from anyone else. There is no such thing as speaking false—that is the substance of your statement, is it not? Either one must speak and speak the truth, or else not speak?
He agreed. 286d
Then shall we say that speaking false is not, but thinking false is?
No, it is the same with thinking, he said.
So neither is there any false opinion, I said, at all.
No, he said.
Nor ignorance, nor ignorant men; or must not ignorance occur, if it ever can, when we put things falsely?
Certainly, he said.
But there is no such thing as this, I said.
No, he said.
Is it merely to save your statement, Dionysodorus, that you state it so—just to say something startling—or is it really and truly your view that there is no such thing as an ignorant man? 286e
But you, he replied, are to refute me.
Well, does your argument allow of such a thing as refutation, if there is nobody to speak false?
There is no such thing, said Euthydemus.
So neither did Dionysodorus just now bid me refute him? I asked.
No, for how can one bid something that is not? Do you bid such a thing?
Well, Euthydemus, I said, it is because I do not at all understand these clever devices and palpable hits: I am only a dull sort of thinker. And so I may perhaps be going to say something rather clownish; but you must forgive me.
Euthydemus. Plato. Walter Rangeley Maitland Lamb (Translator). Cambridge, MA. 1924.
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