Soc.
And in matters of war; I am sure you yourselves will bear me out when I say that here generalship makes the best forecasts on the whole, and particularly of future results, and is the mistress rather than the servant of the seer’s art, because it knows better what is happening or about to happen
199a
in the operations of war; whence the law ordains that the general shall give orders to the seer, and not the seer to the general. May we say this, Laches?
Lach.
We may.
Soc.
Well now, do you agree with us, Nicias, that the same knowledge has comprehension of the same things, whether future, present, or past?
Nic.
I do, for that is my own opinion, Socrates.
Soc.
And courage, my good friend, is knowledge of
199b
what is to be dreaded and dared, as you say, do you not?
Nic.
Yes.
Soc.
And things to be dreaded and things to be dared have been admitted to be either future goods or future evils?
Nic.
Certainly.
Soc.
And the same knowledge is concerned with the same things, whether in the future or in any particular stage?
Nic.
That is so.
Soc.
Then courage is knowledge not merely of what is to be dreaded and what dared, for it comprehends goods and evils not merely in the future, but also in the present
199c
and the past and in any stage, like the other kinds of knowledge.
Nic.
Apparently.
Soc.
So the answer that you gave us, Nicias, covers only about a third part of courage; whereas our question was of what courage is as a whole. And now it appears, on your own showing, that courage is knowledge not merely of what is to be dreaded and what dared, but practically a knowledge concerning all goods and evils at every stage;
199d
such is your present account of what courage must be. What do you say to this new version, Nicias?
Nic.
I accept it, Socrates.
Soc.
Now do you think, my excellent friend, there could be anything wanting to the virtue of a man who knew all good things, and all about their production in the present, the future, and the past, and all about evil things likewise? Do you suppose that such a man could be lacking in temperance, or justice, and holiness, when he alone has the gift of taking due precaution, in his dealings with gods and men,
199e
as regards what is to be dreaded and what is not, and of procuring good things, owing to his knowledge of the right behaviour towards them?
Nic.
I think, Socrates, there is something in what you say.
Soc.
Hence what you now describe, Nicias, will be not a part but the whole of virtue.
Nic.
Apparently.
Soc.
But, you know, we said that courage is one of the parts of virtue.
Nic.
Yes, we did.
Soc.
And what we now describe is seen to be different.
Nic.
So it seems.
Soc.
Thus we have failed to discover, Nicias, what courage really is.
Nic.
Evidently.
Laches. Plato. Walter Rangeley Maitland Lamb (Translator). Cambridge, MA. 1924.
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