Nic.
I say, Laches, that it is this—the knowledge of what is to be dreaded or dared,
195a
either in war or in anything else.
Lach.
How strangely he talks, Socrates!
Soc.
What is it that makes you say that, Laches?
Lach.
What is it? Why, surely wisdom is distinct from courage.
Soc.
Well, Nicias denies that.
Lach.
He does indeed, to be sure: that is where he just babbles.
Soc.
Then let us instruct and not abuse him.
Nic.
No, it seems to me, Socrates, that Laches wants to have it proved that I am talking nonsense, because he was proved
195b
a moment ago to be in the same case himself.
Lach.
Quite so, Nicias, and I will try to make it evident. You are talking nonsense: for instance, do not doctors know what is to be dreaded in disease? Or do you suppose that the courageous know this? Or do you call doctors courageous
Nic.
No, not at all.
Lach.
Nor, I fancy, farmers either. And yet they, I presume, know what is to be dreaded in farming, and every other skilled worker knows what is to be dreaded and dared in his own craft; but they are none the more
195c
courageous for that.
Soc.
What is Laches saying, in your opinion, Nicias? There does seem to be something in it.
Nic.
Yes, there is something, only it is not true.
Soc.
How so?
Nic.
Because he thinks that doctors know something more, in treating sick persons, than how to tell what is healthy and what diseased. This, I imagine, is all that they know: but to tell whether health itself is to be dreaded by anyone rather than sickness, —do you suppose, Laches, that this is within a doctor’s knowledge? Do you not think that for many it is better
195d
that they should never arise from their bed of sickness? Pray tell me, do you say that in every case it is better to live? Is it not often preferable to be dead?
Lach.
I do think that is so.
Nic.
And do you think that the same things are to be dreaded by those who were better dead, as by those who had better live?
Lach.
No, I do not.
Nic.
Well, do you attribute the judgement of this matter to doctors or to any other skilled worker except him who has knowledge of what is to be dreaded and what is not—the man whom I call courageous?
Soc.
Do you comprehend his meaning, Laches?
195e
Lach.
I do: it seems to be the seers whom he calls the courageous: for who else can know for which of us it is better to be alive than dead? And yet, Nicias, do you avow yourself to be a seer, or to be neither a seer nor courageous?
Nic.
What! Is it now a seer, think you, who has the gift of judging what is to be dreaded and what to be dared?
Lach.
That is my view: who else could it be?
Laches. Plato. Walter Rangeley Maitland Lamb (Translator). Cambridge, MA. 1924.
Sponsored by Perseus Project, Tufts University.
Funding provided by The Annenberg CPB/Project.