Soc.
Or what do you call it in the case of a doctor who, when his son or anyone else is suffering from inflammation of the lungs and begs for something to drink or eat, inflexibly and enduringly refuses?
Lach.
That is no case of it, in any sense, either.
Soc.
Well now, when a man endures in war, and is willing to fight, on a wise calculation whereby he knows that others will come to his aid, and that the forces against him will be fewer and feebler than those who are with him, and when he has besides the advantage of position,—would you say of this man, if he endures with such wisdom and preparation, that he, or a man in the opposing army who is willing to stand up against him and endure, is the more courageous?
193b
Lach.
The man opposed to him, I should say, Socrates.
Soc.
But yet his endurance is more foolish than that of the first man.
Lach.
That is true.
Soc.
So you would say that he who in a cavalry fight endures with a knowledge of horsemanship is less courageous than he who endures without it.
Lach.
Yes, I think so.
193c
Soc.
And he who endures with a skill in slinging or shooting or other such art.
Lach.
To be sure.
Soc.
And anyone who agrees to descend into a well, and to dive, and to endure in this or other such action, without being an adept in these things, you would say is more courageous than the adepts.
Lach.
Yes, for what else can one say, Socrates?
Soc.
Nothing, provided one thinks so.
Lach.
But I do think it.
Soc.
And you observe, I suppose, Laches, that persons of this sort are more foolish in their risks and endurances than those who do it with proper skill.
Lach.
Evidently.
193d
Soc.
Now, we found before that foolish boldness and endurance are base and hurtful?
Lach.
Quite so.
Soc.
But courage was admitted to be something noble.
Lach.
Yes, it was.
Soc.
Whereas now, on the contrary, we say that this base thing—foolish endurance—is courage.
Lach.
Apparently.
Soc.
Then do you think our statement is correct?
Lach.
On my word, Socrates, not I.
Soc.
Hence I presume that, on your showing, you and I, Laches,
193e
are not tuned to the Dorian harmony: for our deeds do not accord with our words. By our deeds, most likely, the world might judge us to have our share of courage, but not by our words, I fancy, if they should hear the way we are talking now.
Lach.
That is very true.
Soc.
Well now, does it seem right that we should be in such a condition?
Lach.
Not by any means.
Soc.
Then do you mind if we accept our statement to a certain point?
Lach.
To what point do you mean, and what statement?
Laches. Plato. Walter Rangeley Maitland Lamb (Translator). Cambridge, MA. 1924.
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