Plato, Parmenides, ed. John Burnet, 166

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[166] οὐδέ 166 166a γε φαίνεται ἓν οὐδὲ πολλά. τί δή; ὅτι τἆλλα τῶν μὴ ὄντων οὐδενὶ οὐδαμῇ οὐδαμῶς οὐδεμίαν κοινωνίαν ἔχει, οὐδέ τι τῶν μὴ ὄντων παρὰ τῶν ἄλλων τῴ ἐστιν· οὐδὲν γὰρ μέρος ἐστὶ τοῖς μὴ οὖσιν. ἀληθῆ. οὐδʼ ἄρα δόξα τοῦ μὴ ὄντος παρὰ τοῖς ἄλλοις ἐστὶν οὐδέ τι φάντασμα, οὐδὲ δοξάζεται οὐδαμῇ οὐδαμῶς τὸ μὴ ὂν ἐπὶ τῶν ἄλλων. οὐ γὰρ οὖν. ἓν ἄρα εἰ μὴ ἔστιν, οὐδὲ δοξάζεταί τι τῶν 166b ἄλλων ἓν εἶναι οὐδὲ πολλά· ἄνευ γὰρ ἑνὸς πολλὰ δοξάσαι ἀδύνατον. ἀδύνατον γάρ. ἓν ἄρα εἰ μὴ ἔστι, τἆλλα οὔτε ἔστιν οὔτε δοξάζεται ἓν οὐδὲ πολλά. οὐκ ἔοικεν. οὐδʼ ἄρα ὅμοια οὐδὲ ἀνόμοια. οὐ γάρ. οὐδὲ μὴν τὰ αὐτά γε οὐδʼ ἕτερα, οὐδὲ ἁπτόμενα οὐδὲ χωρίς, οὐδὲ ἄλλα ὅσα ἐν τοῖς πρόσθεν διήλθομεν ὡς φαινόμενα αὐτά, τούτων οὔτε τι ἔστιν οὔτε φαίνεται τἆλλα, ἓν εἰ μὴ ἔστιν. ἀληθῆ. οὐκοῦν καὶ 166c συλλήβδην εἰ εἴποιμεν, ἓν εἰ μὴ ἔστιν, οὐδέν ἐστιν, ὀρθῶς ἂν εἴποιμεν; παντάπασι μὲν οὖν. εἰρήσθω τοίνυν τοῦτό τε καὶ ὅτι, ὡς ἔοικεν, ἓν εἴτʼ ἔστιν εἴτε μὴ ἔστιν, αὐτό τε καὶ τἆλλα καὶ πρὸς αὑτὰ καὶ πρὸς ἄλληλα πάντα πάντως ἐστί τε καὶ οὐκ ἔστι καὶ φαίνεταί τε καὶ οὐ φαίνεται. ἀληθέστατα.

Parmenides. Plato. ed. John Burnet. Oxford. 1910.

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Παρμενίδης (Greek) (Platonis Opera, Tomus II: Tetralogia III-IV. Burnet, John, editor. Oxford: Clarendon Press, 1910.)

Translations (1)

Parmenides Perseus (Plato in Twelve Volumes, Vol. 4. Fowler, Harold North, translator. Lamb, W.R.M, editor. Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press; London: William Heinemann Ltd. 1926 (printing).) — 166 focus

[166]

Ceph.

And they do not even appear to be one or many. Why is that? Because the others have no communion in any way whatsoever with anything which is non-existent, and nothing that is non-existent pertains to any of the others, for things that are non-existent have no parts. True. Nor is there any opinion or appearance of the non-existent in connection with the others, nor is the non-existent conceived of in any way whatsoever as related to the others. No. Then if one does not exist, 166b none of the others will be conceived of as being one or as being many, either; for it is impossible to conceive of many without one. True, it is impossible. Then if one does not exist, the others neither are nor are conceived to be either one or many. No so it seems. Nor like nor unlike. No. Nor the same nor different, nor in contact nor separate, nor any of the other things which we were saying they appeared to be. The others neither are nor appear to be any of these, if the one does not exist. 166c True. Then if we were to say in a word, if the one is not, nothing is, should we be right? Most assuredly. Then let us say that, and we may add, as it appears, that whether the one is or is not, the one and the others in relation to themselves and to each other all in every way are and are not and appear and do not appear. Very true.

Plato Parmenides 166

ed. John Burnet

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