[161]
And it will possess unlikeness in relation to other things for the things which are other than one, being different, will be of a different kind. Yes. And are not things which are of a different kind also of another kind? Of course. And things which are of another kind are unlike, are they not? 161b Yes, they are unlike. Then if they are unlike the one, the one is evidently unlike the things which are unlike it. Evidently. Then the one possesses unlikeness in relation to which the others are unlike. So it appears. But if it possesses unlikeness to the others, must it not possess likeness to itself? How is that? If the one possesses unlikeness to the one, our argument will not be concerned with that which is of the nature of the one, and our hypothesis will not relate to the one, but to something other than one. 161c Certainly. But that is inadmissible. It certainly is. Then the one must possess likeness to itself. It must.
And neither is the one equal to the others; for if it were equal, then it would both be and be like them in respect to equality, both of which are impossible, if one does not exist. Yes, they are impossible. And since it is not equal to the others, they cannot be equal to it, can they? Certainly not. And things which are not equal are unequal, are they not? Yes. And things which are unequal are unequal to something which is unequal to them? Of course. Then the one partakes of inequality, in respect to which the others are unequal to it? 161d Yes, it does. But greatness and smallness are constituents of inequality. Yes. Then the one, such as we are discussing, possesses greatness and smallness? So it appears. Now surely greatness and smallness always keep apart from one another. Certainly. Then there is always something between them. There is. Can you think of anything between them except equality? No, only equality. Then anything which has greatness and smallness has also equality, which is between the two. That is clear. 161e Then the non-existent one, it appears, partakes of equality and greatness and smallness. So it appears.
And it must also, in a way, partake of existence. How is that? It must be in such conditions as we have been saying; for if it were not, we should not be speaking the truth in saying that the one is not. And if we speak the truth, it is clear that we say that which is. Am I not right? You are.
Ceph.
It is impossible for the one to be, if it does not exist, 161a but nothing prevents its partaking of many things; indeed it must do so, if that one of which we are speaking, and not something else, is not. But if neither the one, nor that, is not, but we are speaking of something else, there is no use in saying anything at all; 1 but if non-existence is the property of that one, and not of something else, then the one must partake of that and of many other attributes. Yes, certainly.And it will possess unlikeness in relation to other things for the things which are other than one, being different, will be of a different kind. Yes. And are not things which are of a different kind also of another kind? Of course. And things which are of another kind are unlike, are they not? 161b Yes, they are unlike. Then if they are unlike the one, the one is evidently unlike the things which are unlike it. Evidently. Then the one possesses unlikeness in relation to which the others are unlike. So it appears. But if it possesses unlikeness to the others, must it not possess likeness to itself? How is that? If the one possesses unlikeness to the one, our argument will not be concerned with that which is of the nature of the one, and our hypothesis will not relate to the one, but to something other than one. 161c Certainly. But that is inadmissible. It certainly is. Then the one must possess likeness to itself. It must.
And neither is the one equal to the others; for if it were equal, then it would both be and be like them in respect to equality, both of which are impossible, if one does not exist. Yes, they are impossible. And since it is not equal to the others, they cannot be equal to it, can they? Certainly not. And things which are not equal are unequal, are they not? Yes. And things which are unequal are unequal to something which is unequal to them? Of course. Then the one partakes of inequality, in respect to which the others are unequal to it? 161d Yes, it does. But greatness and smallness are constituents of inequality. Yes. Then the one, such as we are discussing, possesses greatness and smallness? So it appears. Now surely greatness and smallness always keep apart from one another. Certainly. Then there is always something between them. There is. Can you think of anything between them except equality? No, only equality. Then anything which has greatness and smallness has also equality, which is between the two. That is clear. 161e Then the non-existent one, it appears, partakes of equality and greatness and smallness. So it appears.
And it must also, in a way, partake of existence. How is that? It must be in such conditions as we have been saying; for if it were not, we should not be speaking the truth in saying that the one is not. And if we speak the truth, it is clear that we say that which is. Am I not right? You are.
Parmenides. Plato. Harold North Fowler (Translator), ed. Walter Rangeley Maitland Lamb. Cambridge, MA. 1926.
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