[415]
Socrates.
And I, too, Hermogenes. 415a But do not, my friend, demand too much precision, lest youenfeeble me of my sight.
Hom. Il. 6.265
For now that
τέχνη (art) is disposed of, I am nearing the loftiest height of my subject, when once we have investigated
μηχανή(contrivance). For I think
μηχανή signifies
ἄνειν ἐπὶ πολύ (much accomplishment); for
μῆκος (length) has about the same meaning as
τὸ πολύ (much), and the name
μηχανή is composed of these two,
μῆκος and
ἄνειν. But, as I was just saying, we must go on to the loftiest height of our subject; we must search for the meaning of the words
ἀρετή (virtue) and
κακία (wickedness). Now one of them I cannot yet see;
415b
but the other seems to be quite clear, since it agrees with everything we have said before. For inasmuch as all things are in motion, everything that moves badly (
κακῶς ἰόν) would be evil (
κακία); and when this evil motion in relation to its environment exists in the soul, it receives the general name
κακία (evil) in the special sense of wickedness. But the nature of evil motion (
κακῶς ἰέναι) is made clear, I think, also in the word
δειλία (cowardice), which we have not yet discussed. We passed it by,
415c
when we ought to have examined it after
ἀνδρεία (courage); and I fancy we passed over a good many other words. Now the meaning of
δειλία is
a strong bond of the soul; for
λίαν (excessively) is, in a way, expressive of strength; so
δειλία would be the excessive or greatest bond (
δεσμός, δεῖν) of the soul; and so, too,
ἀπορία (perplexity) is an evil, as is everything, apparently, which hinders motion and progress (
πορεύεσθαι). This, then, seems to be the meaning of evil motion (
κακῶς ἰέναι), that advance is halting and impeded; and the soul that is infected by it becomes filled with wickedness (
κακία). If these are the reasons for the name of wickedness, virtue (
ἀρετή) would be the opposite of this; it would signify first ease of motion,
415d
and secondly that the flow of the good soul is always unimpeded, and therefore it has received this name, which designates that which always flows (
ἀεὶ ῥέον) without let or hindrance. It is properly called
ἀειρειτή, or perhaps also
αἱρετή, indicating that this condition is especially to be chosen; but it has been compressed and is pronounced
ἀρετή. Perhaps you will say this is another invention of mine; but I say if what I said just now about
κακία is right,
415e
this about the name of
ἀρετή is right too. Cratylus. Plato. Harold North Fowler (Translator), ed. Walter Rangeley Maitland Lamb. Cambridge, MA. 1926.
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