If any hold the opinion expressed in some written and spoken criticisms of Socrates that are based on inference, and think, that though he was consummate in exhorting men to virtue, he was an incompetent guide to it, let them consider not only the searching cross-examination with which he chastised those who thought themselves omniscient, 1 but his daily talks with his familiar friends, and then judge whether he was capable of improving his companions.
I will first state what I once heard him say about the godhead in conversation with Aristodemus the dwarf, as he was called. On learning that he was not known to sacrifice or pray or use divination, and actually made a mock of those who did so, he said: Tell me, Aristodemus, do you admire any human beings for wisdom?
I do, he answered.
Tell us their names.
In epic poetry Homer comes first, in my opinion; in dithyramb, Melanippides; in tragedy, Sophocles; in sculpture, Polycleitus; in painting, Zeuxis.
Which, think you, deserve the greater admiration, the creators of phantoms without sense and motion, or the creators of living, intelligent, and active beings?
Oh, of living beings, by far, provided only they are created by design and not mere chance.
Suppose that it is impossible to guess the purpose of one creature’s existence, and obvious that another’s serves a useful end, which, in your judgment, is the work of chance, and which of design?
Presumably the creature that serves some useful end is the work of design.
Do you not think then that he who created man from the beginning had some useful end in view when he endowed him with his several senses, giving eyes to see visible objects, ears to hear sounds? Would odours again be of any use to us had we not been endowed with nostrils? What perception should we have of sweet and bitter and all things pleasant to the palate had we no tongue in our mouth to discriminate between them?
No, of course not.
What of the natural desire to beget children, the mother’s desire to rear her babe, the child’s strong will to live and strong fear of death?
Undoubtedly these, too, look like the contrivances of one who deliberately willed the existence of living creatures.
Do you think you have any wisdom yourself?
Oh! Ask me a question and judge from my answer.
And do you suppose that wisdom is nowhere else to be found, although you know that you have a mere speck of all the earth in your body and a mere drop of all the water, and that of all the other mighty elements you received, I suppose, just a scrap towards the fashioning of your body? But as for mind, which alone, it seems, is without mass, do you think that you snapped it up by a lucky accident, and that the orderly ranks of all these huge masses, infinite in number, are due, forsooth, to a sort of absurdity?
Yes; for I don’t see the master hand, whereas I see the makers of things in this world.
Neither do you see your own soul, 2 which has the mastery of the body; so that, as far as that goes, you may say that you do nothing by design, but everything by chance.
Here Aristodemus exclaimed:
Then the greater the power that deigns to serve you, the more honour it demands of you.
I assure you, that if I believed that the gods pay any heed to man, I would not neglect them.
Then do you think them unheeding? In the first place, man is the only living creature that they have caused to stand upright; and the upright position gives him a wider range of vision in front and a better view of things above, and exposes him less to injury. Secondly, to grovelling creatures they have given feet that afford only the power of moving, whereas they have endowed man with hands, which are the instruments to which we chiefly owe our greater happiness.
Nor was the deity content to care for man’s body. What is of yet higher moment, he has implanted in him the noblest type of soul. For in the first place what other creature’s soul has apprehended the existence of gods who set in order the universe, greatest and fairest of things? And what race of living things other than man worships gods? And what soul is more apt than man’s to make provision against hunger and thirst, cold and heat, to relieve sickness and promote health, to acquire knowledge by toil, and to remember accurately all that is heard, seen, or learned?
I will believe when they send counsellors, as you declare they do, saying, Do this, avoid that.
But when the Athenians inquire of them by divination and they reply, do you not suppose that to you, too, the answer is given? Or when they send portents for warning to the Greeks, or to all the world? Are you their one exception, the only one consigned to neglect?
To me at least it seemed that by these sayings he kept his companions from impiety, injustice, and baseness, and that not only when they were seen by men, but even in solitude; since they ever felt that no deed of theirs could at any time escape the gods.
Memorabilia. Xenophon. Edgar Carew Marchant (Translator). Cambridge, MA. 1923.
Sponsored by Perseus Project, Tufts University.
Funding provided by The Annenberg CPB/Project.