analysis of Apollo’s anger at Diomedes

analysis of Apollo’s anger at Diomedes

analysis of Apollo’s anger at Diomedes

The momentum of the war is spirited, and the fighting mood of the warriors verges on overreaching. An outstanding example is Diomedes, who already owns a glorious past as a conquering hero in the epic tradition known as the Sons of the Seven against Thebes or Epigonoi. Now in the epic present of the Iliad he has a chance to outdo himself, performing deeds so glorious that they would outshine perhaps even the deeds of Achilles, who is now out of the picture. The successes of Diomedes reach the point where he is capable of feats that are superhuman, as when he lifts a rock that even two humans today could not budge—or as when he wounds the god of war himself, Ares, and then, shortly thereafter, the goddess of love and sexuality, Aphrodite. But such momentum is not to last, and the antagonism of Diomedes toward divinities will have its consequences.

“Aeneas and Diomedes.” Wenceslaus Hollar (Bohemian, 1607–1677). Image via Wikimedia Commons.

The adjective thoós ‘running, swift’ is derived from the verb theein ‘run’. The god Ares is traditionally pictured as thoós ‘running, swift’; by implication, he is as swift as a violent wind.

Apollo is engaged here with Diomedes in a deadly form of antagonism between immortal and mortal.

“The Combat of Diomedes” (1776). Jacques-Louis David (French, 1748–1825). Image via Wikimedia Commons.

Diomedes is daimoni īsos ‘equal to a superhuman force [daimōn]’ when this hero dares to attack the god Apollo. Ultimately, he backs off. The use of this expression daimoni īsos ‘equal to a superhuman force [daimōn]’ here at I.05.438, and also again at I.05.459, goes to the core of the central idea of ritualized antagonism between immortal and mortal.

These verses show the fatally serious difficulties encountered in differentiating between mortals and immortals, in the context of similes comparing mortals to immortals by way of words like hoios ‘such as’ and enalinkios ‘looking like’; of special relevance are these two words: īsos ‘equal to’ and atalantos ‘equal to’. The idea of being īsos ‘equal to’ a divinity, as expressed already at I.05.338, is made parallel here at I.05.440–442 with the idea of thinking ‘in ways that are equal’, īsa, to divine ways of thinking, as expressed at I.05.441. These ideas are part of the larger idea, centering on a basic pattern of antagonism between immortal and mortal.

As the god Apollo says at I.05.441–442, the immortals as a ‘grouping’, phūlon, are different from mortals as a ‘grouping’, phūlon. So, he goes on to say, immortals and mortals are not the same. In the Greek, the ‘grouping’ of immortals and mortals is not homoio-, I.05.441. In terms of this negative context, then, the meaning of homoio- can be interpreted to be ‘the same as’. Meanwhile, the meaning of this same word homoio- in non-negative contexts can be interpreted to be ‘similar to’. In non-negative or let us say positive contexts, homoio- exemplifies the making of comparisons in the form of metaphors and similes.

In the case of metaphors, Aristotle himself actually uses the word homoio- in his own definition of metaphor, Poetics 1459a5–8:

πολὺ δὲ μέγιστον τὸ μεταφορικὸν εἶναι. μόνον γὰρ τοῦτο οὔτε παρ’ ἄλλου ἔστι λαβεῖν εὐφυΐας τε σημεῖόν ἐστι· τὸ γὰρ εὖ μεταφέρειν τὸ τὸ ὅμοιον θεωρεῖν ἐστιν

But the greatest use of words is the use of metaphor [tò metaphorikon ‘that which is transferable’]. This is the only thing that cannot be learned from someone else; and it is also a sign [sēmeion] of a-good-quality-that-is-inborn [euphuia], since the making of good metaphors [eu metapherein ‘good transference’] is the same thing as the contemplation [theōreîn] of what is similar [homoion] to what.

What follows is epitomized from MoM 2§§6–7. Now we turn to similes. This term simile is derived from the neuter form of the Latin adjective similis meaning ‘similar’, from which the English word similar is in turn derived. In English, a simile is signaled by expressions such as like or as or similar to. As for Greek, the primary word for signaling a simile is homoio- in the sense of ‘similar to’. But the etymology of homoio- shows that the meaning ‘similar’ derives from a more basic meaning, ‘same as’. From the standpoint of Indo-European linguistics, the Greek adjective homoio- (ὁμοῖο-) derives from homó- (ὁμό-) ‘same as’, which in turn derives from a prototypical form somo-, meaning ‘same as’. The English adjective same is derived from this same prototypical form. Another derivative is the Latin adjective similis, meaning ‘same as’ or ‘similar to’. In the usage of both Latin similis and Greek homoio*- (ὁμοῖο-), the same semantic principle applies: for A2 to be similar to A1, it has to be the same as A1 in some respect, which is X. Further, for A2 to be the same as A1, it has to be one with A1 in respect to X. That is because the Indo-European root som- of somo- ‘same as’ means ‘one’, as we see in such forms as the Latin adverb semel ‘one time’. And the idea of ‘one’ in words like English same has to do with an act of comparing. When we compare things, what is the ‘same as’ something else in some respect becomes ‘one with’ that something in that respect. That is how a word like Latin similis, deriving from the concept of ‘one’, means ‘similar to’ in the sense of ‘one with’. What is similis ‘similar’ to something else in some respect is ‘one with’ that something in that respect. Similarly in the case of the Greek adjective homoio- (ὁμοῖο-), it refers to something that is ‘one with’ and therefore ‘the same as’ something else in some respect. And, as we will see in the comment on O.16.172–212, if something else is not the same, then it is alloio- (ἀλλοῖο-) ‘a different kind’, which is the opposite of homoio- (ὁμοῖο-) or ‘the same kind’. As we will also see in that same comment, the extension -io- (-ιο-) of the two adjectives homoio- (ὁμοῖο-) ‘the same kind’ and alloio- (ἀλλοῖο-) ‘a different kind’ is parallel to the extension -io- (-ιο-) of the adjectives hoio- (oἷο-) ‘what kind’ and toio- (τοῖο-) ‘that kind’.

Here we loop back to what the god Apollo says at I.05.441–442: in a negative sense, immortals cannot be the same as mortals. Still, in a special positive sense, mortals can momentarily become the same as immortals when their identities merge in contexts of ritual. Such a special positive sense applies in situations of ritualized antagonism between immortal and mortal. In such situations, the mortal becomes one with the immortal—and can die as a consequence. That is what almost happens to Diomedes, but then he backs off.

The word phūlon marks a given group as distinct from another group. In this case, the grouping of mortals is marked as distinct from the grouping of immortals as superhumans. Comparable is the word phūlē, which I have translated as ‘subdivision’ in the contexts of I.02.655–656 and I.02.668.

analysis of the Diomedes-Ares identification/antagonism [MRBTP: 'ff']

analysis of the Diomedes-Ares identification/antagonism and Diomedes’ shunning Apollo’s mēnis

comment on tutthon as a distance retreated by Diomedes and its relation to his respect for the boundary the transgression of which would incur mēnis (in contrast to Patroklos)

in the list of offenses that (threaten to) incur mēnis