Plutarch Praecepta gerendae reipublicae 16

[16] But since there is in every democracy a spirit of malice and fault-finding directed against men in public life, and they suspect that many desirable measures, if there is no party opposition and no expression of dissent, are done by conspiracy, and this subjects a man’s associations and friends to calumny, statesmen ought not to let any real enmity or disagreement against themselves subsist, as Onomademus the popular leader of the Chians did when, after his victory in the factional strife, he refused to have all his opponents banished from the city, that we may not, he said begin to quarrel with our friends when we have altogether got rid of our enemies. Now that was silly; but when the populace are suspicious about some important and salutary measure, the statesmen when they come to the assembly ought not all to express the same opinion, as if by previous agreement, but two or three of the friends should dissent and quietly speak on the other side, then change their position as if they had been convinced; for in this way they draw the people along with them, since they appear to be influenced only by the public advantage. In small matters, however, which do not amount to much, it is not a bad thing to let one’s friends really disagree, each following his own reasoning, that in matters of the highest importance their agreement upon the best policy may not seem to be prearranged.

[16] But since it is incident to every populacy to be malicious and desirous to find fault with their governors, and since they are apt to suspect that many, even useful things, if they pass without being opposed or contradicted, are done by conspiracy, and since this principally brings societies and friendships into obloquy; they must not indeed leave any real enmity or dissension against themselves, as did Onomademus, a demagogue of the Chians, who, having mastered a sedition, suffered not all his adversaries to be expelled the city; lest, said he, we should begin to differ with our friends, when we are wholly freed from our enemies; for this would be indeed a folly. But when the multitude shall have conceived a suspicion against any important beneficial project, they must not, as if it were by confederacy, all deliver the same opinion; but two or three of them must dissent, and mildly oppose their friend, and afterwards, as if they were convinced by reason, change their sentiments; for by this means they draw along with them the people, who think them moved by the beneficialness of the thing. But in small matters, and such as are of no great consequence, it is not amiss to suffer his friends really to differ, every one following his own private reason; that so in the principal and greatest concerns, they may not seem to act upon design, when they shall unanimously agree to what is best.