Plutarch, De Fato, ed. Grēgorios N. Vernardakēs, 7

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[7] περὶ δὲ τῆς; τύχης καὶ τοῦ αὐτομάτου καὶ εἴ τι παρὰ ταῦτα θεωρεῖται, νῦν ἡμῖν λεκτέον. αἴτιον 25 μὲν δή τι ἡ τύχη. τῶν δʼ αἰτίων τὰ μὲν καθʼ αὑτά, τὰ δὲ κατὰ συμβεβηκός· οἷον οἰκίας ἢ νεὼς καθʼ αὑτὸ μὲν αἴτιον τὸ οἰκοδομικὸν καὶ τὸ ναυπηγικόν, 571f κατὰ συμβεβηκὸς δὲ τὸ μουσικὸν ἢ γεωμετρικόν, καὶ πᾶν ὅ τι ἂν τῷ οἰκοδομικῷ ἢ ναυπηγικῷ εἴδει συμβεβήκῃ, εἴτε κατὰ σῶμα εἴτε κατὰ ψυχὴν εἴτε κατὰ 5 τὰ ἐκτός. ὅθεν καὶ δῆλον, ὡς τὸ καθʼ αὑτὸ ὡρισμένον καὶ ἕν, τὸ δὲ κατὰ συμβεβηκὸς οὐχ ἕν τε 572a καὶ ἀόριστον πολλὰ γὰρ καὶ ἄπειρα τῷ ἑνὶ ὑπάρχει παντάπασιν ἀλλήλων διαφέροντα.¹ τὸ μέντοι κατὰ συμβεβηκός, ὅταν μὴ μόνον ἐν τοῖς ἕνεκά του γίγνηται, 10 ἀλλὰ καὶ ἐν οἷς ἡ προαίρεσις, τότε δὴ καὶ τὸ ἀπὸ τύχης προσαγορεύεται· οἷον τὸ εὑρεῖν χρυσίον σκάπτονθʼ ἵνα φυτεύσῃ, ἢ παθεῖν τι ἢ δρᾶσαι τῶν παρὰ τὸ ἔθος φεύγοντʼ ἢ διώκοντʼ ἢ ἄλλως βαδίζοντʼ ἢ αὐτὸ μόνον ἐπιστραφέντʼ οὐ τούτου ἕνεκα, 15 ὅπερ συνέπεσεν, ἀλλʼ ἑτέρου τινὸς χάριν. διὸ καὶ ἀπρονόητον αἰτίαν καὶ ἄδηλον ἀνθρωπίνῳ λογισμῷ τὴν τύχην ἀπέδοσαν · τῶν παλαιῶν ἔνιοι. κατὰ δὲ 572b τοὺς ἀπὸ Πλάτωνος ἔγγιον ἔτι προσιόντας αὐτῇ² τῷ λόγῳ, οὕτως ἀφώρισται ἡ τύχη, αἰτία κατὰ συμβεβηκὸς 20 τῶν ἕνεκά του ἐν τοῖς κατὰ προαίρεσιν ἔπειτʼ ἤδη καὶ τὸ ἀπρονόητον καὶ τὸ ἄδηλον ἀνθρωπίνῳ λογισμῷ προστιθέασι· καίτοι γε κατὰ ταὐτὰ³ καὶ τὸ σπάνιον καὶ παράλογον ἐμφαίνεται τῷ κατὰ συμβεβηκός· οἷον δʼ ἐστὶ τοῦτο, εἰ καὶ μὴ ἐκ τῶν 25 ἄρτι ῥηθέντων,⁴ ἀλλʼ ἔκ γε τῶν ἐν τῷ Φαίδωνι⁵ γεγραμμένων, σαφέστατα προσπίπτει. γέγραπται δʼ ὧδε· οὐδὲ τὰ περὶ τῆς δίκης ἆρα ἐπύθοντο⁶ ὃν τρόπον ἐγένετο; ναί· ταῦτα μὲν ἡμῖν ἤγγειλέ τις· καὶ ἐθαυμάζομέν γε, ὅτι πάλαι γενομένης; αὐτῆς⁷ ὕστερον 572c φαίνεται ἀποθανών τί ἦν⁸ τοῦτο, ὦ Φαίδων; 5 τύχη τις αὐτῷ, ὦ Ἐχέκρατες, συνέβη· ἔτυχε γὰρ τῇ προτεραίᾳ τῆς δίκης ἡ πρύμνα ἐστεμμένη τοῦ πλοίου, ὃ εἰς Δῆλον Ἀθηναῖοι πέμπουσιν ἐν γὰρ τούτοις τὸ συνέβη οὐκ ἀντὶ τοῦ γέγονεν ἀκουστέον, ἀλλὰ πολὺ μᾶλλον ἐκ συνδρομῆς τινος αἰτίων ἀπέβη, 10 ἄλλου πρὸς ἄλλο γεγονότος. ὁ μὲν γὰρ ἱερεὺς ἔστεφε τὸ πλοῖον ἄλλου χάριν ἀλλʼ οὐ Σωκράτους· οἱ δὲ διʼ ἕτερον κατεψηφίσαντʼ αὐτοῦ· αὐτὸ δὲ τὸ ἀποβὰν παράλογον καὶ τοιοῦτον⁹ ἀπέβη, οἷον κἂν ἐκ προνοίας ἐγεγόνει ἤτοι ἀνθρωπίνου τινὸς ἢ τῶν ἔτι 15 572d κρειττόνων. καὶ περὶ μὲν τῆς τύχης; ταῦθʼ ἱκανὰ ¹⁰ ὡς συνυφίστασθαι ἀνάγκη, τὸ μὲν ἀπʼ αὐτοῦ παρωνύμως; καὶ τοῦ ἐφʼ ἡμῖν προϋποκεῖσθαι ἐλέχθη.¹¹ τὸ δʼ αὐτόματον ἐπὶ πλεῖον τῆς τύχης· εἰ¹² γὰρ καὶ αὐτὴν περιλαβὸν ἔχει καὶ πολλὰ τῶν ἄλλοτʼ ἄλλως 20 συμπίπτειν πεφυκότων. ἔστι δὲ κατʼ ὄνομα, ὅπερ αὐτόματον λέγεται τὸ πεφυκὸς ἄλλου ἕνεκα, ὅταν μὴ ἐκεῖνο παρʼ ¹³ ἐπεφύκει· οἷον δοκεῖ τὸ ὑπὸ κύνα 572e ψῦχος. ποτὲ γὰρ ψῦχος οὐ μάτην, οὐδὲ ¹⁴ τὸ δʼ ὅλον, ὡς τὸ ἐφʼ ἡμῖν μέρος τοῦ ἐνδεχομένου, οὕτως ἡ τύχη τοῦ αὐτομάτου. ἔστι δʼ ἑκατέρου ἑκατέρου σύμπτωμα, τὸ μὲν αὐτόματον τοῦ ἐνδεχομένου· ἡ δὲ τύχη τοῦ ἐφʼ ἡμῖν, καὶ τούτου οὐχ ἅπαντος, ἀλλʼ ὅπερ 5 ἂν καὶ κατὰ προαίρεσιν ᾖ, ὡς προείρηται. διὸ καὶ τὸ μὲν αὐτόματον κοινὸν ἐμψύχων τε καὶ ἀψύχων· ἡ δὲ τύχη ἀνθρώπου ἴδιον ἤδη πράττειν δυναμένου. τεκμήριον δέ, ὅτι τὸ εὐτυχεῖν καὶ εὐδαιμονεῖν ταὐτὰ εἶναι δοξάζεται· ἡ δὲ εὐδαιμονία εὐπραξία τις ἡ δʼ 10 εὐπραξία περὶ μόνον καὶ τέλειον ἄνθρωπον.

De Fato. Plutarch. ed. Grēgorios N. Vernardakēs. Leipzig. 1891.

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Current edition Perseus

Περὶ εἱμαρμένης (Greek) (Plutarch. Plutarchi Chaeronensis Moralia, Vol. III. Vernardakēs, Grēgorios N., editor. Leipzig: Teubner, 1891.)

Translations (1)

Of Fate. Perseus (Plutarch. Plutarch's Morals, Vol. V. Goodwin, William W., editor; A.G., translator. Boston: Little, Brown, and Company; Cambridge: Press of John Wilson and Son, 1874.) — 7 focus

[7] It now remains, that we treat of Fortune and casual adventure, and whatever else is to be considered with them. It is therefore certain that Fortune is a cause. Now of causes, some are causes by themselves, and others by accident. Thus for example, the proper cause by itself of an house or a ship is the art of the mason, the carpenter, or the shipwright; but causes by accident are music, geometry, and whatever else may happen to be joined with the art of building houses or ships, in respect either of the body, the soul, or any exterior thing. Whence it appears, that the cause by itself must needs be determinate and one; but the causes by accident are never one and the same, but infinite and undetermined. For many — nay, infinite — accidents, wholly different one from the other, may be in one and the same subject. Now the cause by accident, when it is found in a thing which not merely is done for some end but has in it free will and election, is then called Fortune; as is the finding a treasure while one is digging a hole to plant a tree, or the doing or suffering some extraordinary thing whilst one is flying, following, or otherwise walking, or only turning about, provided it be not for the sake of that which happens, but for some other intention. Hence it is, that some of the ancients have declared Fortune to be a cause unknown, that cannot be foreseen by the human reason. But according to the Platonics, who have approached yet nearer to the true reason of it, it is thus defined: Fortune is a cause by accident, in those things which are done for some end, and which are of our election. And afterwards they add, that it is unforeseen and unknown to the human reason; although that which is rare and strange appears also by the same means to be in this kind of cause by accident. But what this is, if it is not sufficiently evidenced by the oppositions and disputations made against it, will at least most clearly be seen by what is written in Plato’s Phaedo, where you will find these words:

PHAED. Have you not heard how and in what manner the judgment passed? ECH. Yes indeed; for there came one and told us of it. At which we wondered very much that, the judgment having been given long before, it seems that he died a great while after. And what, Phaedo, might be the cause of it? PHAED. It was a fortune which happened to him, Echecrates. For it chanced that, the day before the judgment, the stern of the galley which the Athenians send every year to the isle of Delos was crowned.¹

In which discourse it is to be observed, that the expression happened to him is not simply to be understood by was done or came to pass, but it much rather regards what befell him through the concurrence of many causes together, one being done with regard to another. For the priest crowned the ship and adorned it with garlands for another end and intention, and not for the sake of Socrates; and the judges also had for some other cause condemned him. But the event was strange, and of such a nature that it might seem to have been effected by the providence of some human creature, or rather of some superior powers. And so much may suffice to show with what Fortune must of necessity subsist, and that there must be first some subject of such things as are in our free will: its effect is, moreover, like itself called Fortune.

But chance or casual adventure is of a larger extent than Fortune; which it comprehends, and also several other things which may of their own nature happen sometimes one way, sometimes another. And this, as it appears by the derivation of its name, which is in Greek αὐτόματον, chance, is that which happens of itself, when that which is ordinary happens not, but another thing in its place; such as cold in the dog-days seems to be; for it is sometimes then cold.... Once for all, as that which is in our power is a part of the contingent, so Fortune is a part of chance or casual adventure; and both the two events are conjoined and dependent on the one and the other, to wit, chance on contingent, and Fortune on that which is in our power, — and yet not on all, but on what is in our election, as we have already said. Wherefore chance is common to things inanimate, as well as to those which are animated; whereas Fortune is proper to man only, who has his actions voluntary. And an argument of this is, that to be fortunate and to be happy are thought to be one and the same thing. Now happiness is a certain well-doing, and well-doing is proper only to man, and to him perfect.

Notes on the current edition

Περὶ εἱμαρμένης

1. sqq. cf. Aristot. p. 1065, 30 sqq.

2. αὐτῇ *: αὐτῆς

3. ταὐτὰ *: τὰ αὐτὰ

4. ἄρτι ῥηθέντων W: ἀντιρρηθέντων

5. Φαίδωνι] p. 58 sqq.

6. ἐπύθοντο] ἐπύθεσθε Plato

7. γενομένης αὐτῆς idem: αὐτῆς γενομένης

8. ἦν] οὖν ἦν Plato

9. τοιοῦτον *: τοιοῦτο

10. lacuna 14 fere litt. in V²

11. ὡς συνυφίστασθαι - ἐλέχθη] οἶς τε συνυφίστασθαι αὐτὴν ἀνάγκη καὶ τοῦ ἐφ’ ἡμῖν προüποκεῖσθαι· τὸ δὲ ἀπ’ αὐτῆς παρωνύμως ἐλέχθη supplet W

12. εἰ] καὶ?

13. lac. 11 fere litt. V²

14. lac. 24 fere litt. V². utramque ex Aristot. Phys. 2, 6 supplet W hunc in modum: ἔστι δὲ κατ’ ὄνομα ὅπερ αὐτὸ μάτην γένηται· ὅταν τὸ πεφυκὸς ἄλλου ἕνεκα μὴ ἐκεῖνο περαίνῃ, οὖ ἕνεκα ἧν καὶ ἐπεφύκει· οἷον δοκεῖ τὸ ὑπὸ κύνα ψῦχος· τότε γὰρ τὸ ψῦχος μάτην οὐδὲ ὅτε πέφυκε γέγονεν. τὸ δὲ ὅλον cett. Malim ἔστι δὲ κατ’ ὄνομα, ὅταν αὐτὸ μάτην γένηται· ὅταν τὸ πεφυκὸς ἄλλου ἕνεκα μὴ ἐκεῖνο περαίνῃ, οὗ ἕνεκα ἐπεφύκει cetera ut W

Plutarch De Fato 7

ed. Grēgorios N. Vernardakēs

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