Plutarch, De Tranquillitate Animi, William Clark Helmbold (Translator), 17

Search the Perseus Catalog for:

← Previous Next →

[17] And, to speak generally, although some of the things which happen against our will do by their very nature bring pain and distress, yet since it is through false opinion that we learn and become accustomed to be disgruntled with the greatest part of them, it is not unprofitable to have the verse of Menander¹ ever ready against the latter:

No harm’s been done you, if you none admit

(for what, he means, if they touch neither body nor soul, are such things to you as the low birth of your father, or the adultery of your wife, or the deprivation of a crown or of front seats,² since when these misfortunes are present a man is not prevented from having both body and soul in the best of condition?); and against those things which seem to pain us by their very nature, as sicknesses, anxieties, and the death of friends and children, we should have ready that famous verse of Euripides³:

Alas! - Yet why alas? Our sufferings

Are but what we mortals must endure.

For no reasoning so effectively engages the emotional part of us, when it is being borne down and is slipping, as that which reminds us of the common and natural necessity to which man is exposed through his composite and corporeal nature: it is the only hold he gives to Fortune, while in his most vital and important parts he stands secure.

When Demetrius took the Megarians’ city, he asked Stilpo if any of his possessions had been plundered. And Stilpo said, I saw no one carrying off my property.⁴ And therefore when Fortune plunders and strips us of everything else, we have something within ourselves of the sort that

Achaeans could never harry or plunder.⁵

Therefore⁶ we should not altogether debase and depreciate Nature in the belief that she has nothing strong, stable, and beyond the reach of Fortune, but, on the contrary, since we know that the corrupt and perishable part of man wherein he lies open to Fortune is small, and that we ourselves are masters of the better part, in which the greatest of our blessings are situated - right opinions and knowledge and the exercise of reason terminating in the acquisition of virtue, all of which have their being inalienable and indestructible - knowing all this, we should face the future undaunted and confident and say to Fortune what Socrates,⁷ when he was supposed to be replying to his accusers, was really saying to the jury, Anytus and Meletus are able to take away my life, but they cannot hurt me. Fortune, in fact, can encompass us with sickness, take away our possessions, slander us to people or despot; but she cannot make the good and valiant and high-souled man base or cowardly, mean, ignoble, or envious, nor can she deprive us of that disposition, the constant presence of which is of more help in facing life than is a pilot in facing the sea. For a pilot cannot calm a savage wave or a wind, nor can he find a harbour wherever he wishes at need, nor can he await the event confidently and without trembling; as long as he has not despaired, making use of his skill,

With the mainsail dropped to the lower mast

He flees from the murky sea,⁸

whereas when the sea towers over him, he sits there quaking and trembling. But the disposition of the wise man yields the highest degree of calm to his bodily affections, destroying by means of self-control, temperate diet, and moderate exertion the conditions leading to disease; even if the beginning of some evil comes from without, he rides it out with light and well-furled sail, as Asclepiades⁹ has it, just as one passes through a storm. But if some great unforeseen disaster comes upon him and masters him, the harbour is close at hand and he may swim away from his body, as from a leaky boat.¹⁰

De Tranquillitate Animi. Plutarch. William Clark Helmbold (Translator). Cambridge, MA. 1939.

Sponsored by Perseus Project, Tufts University.

Funding provided by The National Endowment for the Humanities.

Current edition Perseus

On Tranquillity of Mind (English) (Plutarch. Moralia, Vol. VI. Helmbold, William Clark, translator. Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press; London: William Heinemann Ltd., 1939 (printing).)

Editions (1)

Περὶ εὐθυμίας Perseus (Plutarch. Plutarchi Chaeronensis Moralia, Vol III. Vernardakēs, Grēgorios N., editor. Leipzig: Teubner, 1891.) — 17 focus

[17] καθόλου δʼ ἐπεὶ τῶν ἀβουλήτων τὰ μὲν 10 φύσει τὸ λυποῦν καὶ βαρῦνον ἐπιφέρει, τὰ δὲ πλεῖστα δόξῃ δυσχεραίνειν ἐθιζόμεθα καὶ μανθάνομεν, οὐκ¹ ἄχρηστόν ἐστι πρὸς ταῦτα μὲν ἔχειν ἀεὶ τὸ τοῦ Μενάνδρου² πρόχειρον

οὐδὲν πέπονθας δεινὸν ἂν μὴ προσποιῇ· 15

τί γὰρ πρὸς σέ ἐστι, φησίν,³ ἂν μήτε σαρκὸς ἅπτηται μήτε ψυχῆς, οἷόν ἐστι δυσγένεια πατρὸς ἢ μοιχεία γυναικὸς ἢ στεφάνου τινὸς ἢ προεδρίας ἀφαίρεσις, ὧν οὐ κωλύεται καὶ μὴ παρόντων ἄνθρωπος καὶ τὸ σῶμα βέλτιστα διακείμενον ἔχειν καὶ τὴν ψυχήν; 20 πρὸς δὲ τὰ φύσει δοκοῦντα λυπεῖν, οἷα νόσοι καὶ 475c πόνοι καὶ θάνατοι φίλων καὶ τέκνων, ἐκεῖνο τὸ Εὐριπίδειον⁴

οἴμοι· τί δʼ οἴμοι; θνητά τοι πεπόνθαμεν.

οὐδεὶς; γὰρ οὕτω τοῦ παθητικοῦ καταφερομένου καὶ ὀλισθάνοντος ἀντιλαμβάνεται λόγος, ὡς ὁ τῆς κοινῆς καὶ φυσικῆς ἀνάμνησιν ποιῶν ἀνάγκης, ᾗ διὰ τὸ σῶμα μεμειγμένος ὁ ἄνθρωπος μόνην ταύτην τῇ τύχῃ 5 λαβὴν δίδωσιν, ἐν δὲ τοῖς κυριωτάτοις καὶ μεγίστοις ἀσφαλὴς ἕστηκεν. ὁ Δημήτριος τὴν Μεγαρέων πόλιν καταλαβὼν ἠρώτησε τὸν Στίλπωνα, μή τι τῶν ἐκείνου διήρπασται καὶ ὁ Στίλπων ἔφη μηδένʼ ἰδεῖν 475d τἀμά⁵ φέροντα. καὶ τοίνυν τῆς τύχης πάντα τἄλλα 10 λεηλατούσης καὶ περιαιρουμένης, ἔχομέν τι τοιοῦτον. ἐν ἑαυτοῖς

οἷόν κʼ οὔτε⁶ φέροιεν Ἀχαιοὶ οὔτε ἂν⁷ ἄγοιεν.

⁸ ὅθεν οὐ δεῖ παντάπασιν ἐκταπεινοῦν⁹ οὐδὲ καταβάλλειν τὴν φύσιν, ὡς μηδὲν ἰσχυρὸν μηδὲ μόνιμον 15 μηδʼ ὑπὲρ τὴν τύχην ἔχουσαν· ἀλλὰ τοὐναντίον εἰδότας, ὅτι μικρόν ἐστι μέρος τοῦ ἀνθρώπου τὸ σαθρὸν καὶ¹⁰ τὸ ἐπίκηρον, ὃ¹¹ δέχεται τὴν τύχην, τῆς δὲ βελτίονος μερίδος αὐτοὶ κρατοῦμεν, ἐν ᾗ τὰ μέγιστα τῶν ἀγαθῶν ἱδρυθέντα,¹² δόξαι τε χρησταὶ καὶ μαθήματα 20 475e καὶ λόγοι τελευτῶντες εἰς ἀρετήν, ἀναφαίρετον ἔχουσι τὴν οὐσίαν καὶ ἀδιάφθορον, ἀηττήτους¹³ πρὸς τὸ μέλλον εἶναι καὶ θαρραλέους, πρὸς τὴν τύχην λέγοντας, ἃ Σωκράτης δοκῶν πρὸς τοὺς κατηγόρους¹⁴ λέγειν πρὸς τοὺς δικαστὰς ἔλεγεν, ὡς ἀποκτεῖναι μὲν Ἄνυτος καὶ Μέλητος δύνανται, βλάψαι δʼ οὐ δύνανται. καὶ γὰρ ἡ τύχη δύναται νόσῳ περιβαλεῖν, ἀφελέσθαι χρήματα, διαβαλεῖν πρὸς δῆμον ἢ τύραννον 5 κακὸν δὲ καὶ δειλὸν καὶ ταπεινόφρονα καὶ ἀγεννῆ καὶ φθονερὸν οὐ δύναται ποιῆσαι τὸν ἀγαθὸν 475f καὶ ἀνδρώδη καὶ μεγαλόψυχον καὶ γενναῖον καὶ ἐλευθέριον¹⁵ οὐδὲ παρελέσθαι τὴν διάθεσιν, ἧς ἀεὶ παρούσης, πλέον ἢ κυβερνήτου πρὸς θάλατταν ὄφελὸς 10 ἐστι πρὸς τὸν βίον. κυβερνήτῃ γὰρ οὔτε κῦμα πραῧναι τραχὺ καὶ πνεῦμα δυνατόν ἐστιν, οὔτε ὅποι βούλεται δεομένῳ λιμένος· τυχεῖν οὔτε θαρραλέως καὶ ἀτρόμως ὑπομεῖναι τὸ συμβαῖνον ἀλλʼ ἓως οὐκ ἀπέγνωκε τῇ τέχνῃ χρώμενος φεύγει μέγα λαῖφος 15 ὑποστολίσας,¹⁶ ἓως¹⁷ ἐνέρτερον ἱστὸν, ἐρεβώδεος ἐκ θαλάσσης ὑπέρσχῃ, τρέμων κάθηται καὶ παλλόμενος, 476a ἡ δὲ τοῦ φρονίμου διάθεσις τοῖς τε σωματικοῖς παρέχει γαλήνην, ἐπὶ πλεῖστον ἐκλύουσα τὰς τῶν νόσων κατασκευὰς ἐγκρατείᾳ καὶ διαίτῃ σώφρονι καὶ 20 μετρίοις πόνοις· κἄν τις ἔξωθεν ἀρχὴ πάθους ὥσπερ διαδρομὴ γένηται σπιλάδος, εὐσταλεῖ καὶ κούφῃ κεραίᾳ παρήνεγκεν ὥς φησιν Ἀσκληπιάδης¹⁸ παραλόγου δέ τινος καὶ μεγάλου καταλαβόντος καὶ κρατήσαντος, ἐγγὺς ὁ λιμὴν καὶ πάρεστιν ἀπονήξασθαι 25 τοῦ σώματος ὥσπερ ἐφολκίου μὴ στέγοντος

Translations (1)

Of the Tranquillity of the Mind. Perseus (Plutarch. Plutarch's Morals, Vol. I. Goodwin, William W., editor; Morgan, Matthew, translator. Boston: Little, Brown, and Company; Cambridge: Press of John Wilson and Son, 1874.) — 17 focus

[17] Generally speaking, those things which happen to us against our will afflict us partly by a pungency that is in their nature, and partly custom and opinion so effeminate us that we are impatient under them. But against all contingencies we should have that of Menander in readiness: —

Afflictions to thyself thou dost create,

Thy fancy only is unfortunate.

For what are afflictions to thee, if they touch neither thy body nor thy soul? Of this sort is the low extraction of thy father, the adultery of thy wife, the loss of a garland, or being deprived of the upper seat in an assembly. And with all these crosses thou mayest have ease of mind and strength of body. But to those things which in their own nature excite our grief, — such as sickness, pains of the body, and the death of our friends and children, — we ought to apply that of Euripides: —

Alas! alas! and well-a-day!

But why alas and well away?

Naught else to us hath yet been dealt,

But that which daily men have felt.

There is no reasoning more effectual to restrain our passions and hinder our minds from falling into despair; than that which sets before us a physical necessity and the common lot of nature. And it is our bodies only that lie exposed to this destiny, and which we offer (as it were) as a handle to Fortune; but the fort-royal is still secure, where our strength lies and our most precious things are treasured up. When Demetrius took Megara, he asked Stilpo whether he had not suffered particular damage in the plundering; to which he made this answer, that he saw nobody that could rob him. So when Fate hath made all the depredations upon us it possibly can and hath left us naked, yet there is something still within us which is out of the reach of the pirate, — Which conquering Greece could never force away.¹

Therefore we ought not so to vilify and depress our nature as if it could not get the ascendant over Fortune, and had nothing of firmness and stability in it. But we ought rather to consider that, if any part of us is obnoxious to this, it is only that which is the smallest, and the most impure and sickly too; whilst the better and more generous we have the most absolute dominion of, and our chiefest goods are placed in it, such as true discipline, a right notion of things, and reasonings which in their last results bring us unto virtue; which are so far from being abolished, that they cannot be corrupted. We ought likewise, with an invincible spirit and a bold security as regards futurity, to answer Fortune in those words which Socrates retorted upon his judges: Anytus and Meletus may kill, but they cannot hurt me. So she can afflict me with a disease, can spoil me of my riches, disgrace me with my prince, and bring me under a popular odium; but she cannot make a good man wicked, or the brave man a mean and degenerate coward; she cannot cast envy upon a generous temper, or destroy any of those habits of the mind which are more useful to us in the conduct of our lives, when they are within the command of our wills, than the skill of a pilot in a storm. For the pilot cannot mitigate the billows or calm the winds; he cannot sail into the haven as often as he has occasion, or without fear and trembling abide any danger that may befall him; but after having used all his efforts, he at last recommits himself to the fury of the storm, pulls down all his sails by the board, whilst the lower mast is within an inch of the abyss, and sits trembling at the approaching ruin. But the affections of the mind in a wise man procure tranquillity even to the body. For he prevents the beginnings of disease by temperance, a spare diet, and moderate exercise; but if an evil begin more visibly to show itself, as we sometimes steer our ship by rocks which lie in the water, he must then furl in his sails and pass by it, as Asclepiades expresseth it; but if the waves grow turbulent and the sea rougher, the port is at hand, and he may leave this body, as he would a leaky vessel, and swim ashore.

Notes on the current edition

On Tranquillity of Mind

1. Kock, Com. Att. Frag., iii. p. 52, Frag. 179, from the Epitrepontes; Allinson, p. 127. The translation is that of A. M. Harmon.

2. The προεδρία was the privilege of sitting in the front seats at public games, or the theatre, or public assemblies, granted to distinguished citizens, foreigners, or magistrates.

3. Nauck, Trag. Graec. Frag. ², p. 449, Frag. 300, from the Bellerophon; Cf. Boswell’s Life of Johnson, aetat. 45 (vol. i. p. 277 ed. Hill).

4. Virtue according to Moralia, 5 f; knowledge in the Life of Demetrius, ix. (893 a): οὐδένα γὰρ εἶδον ἐπιστάμαν ἀποφέροντα.

5. Adapted from Homer, Il., v. 484.

6. The following passage is citd in Stobaeus, vol. ii. p. 161 ed. Wachsmuth, as from Πλουτάρχου Περὶ φιλίας; but Patzig ( Quaest. Plutarch., p. 34) is doubtless right in thinking that φιλίας is a scribal error for εὐθυμίας.

7. Cf. Plato, Apology, 30 c-d; the same form of this statement with almost the same differences from Plato’s words is found in Epictetus, i. 29. 18, and the Encheiridion, liii. 4.

8. Cf. Bergk, Poet. Lyr. Graec. ², iii. p. 730, Edmonds, Lyra Graeca, iii. p. 474, or Nauck, Trag. Graec. Frag. ², p. 910, ades. 377. The text is quite uncertain, though Pohlenz’s interpretation seems better than any earlier one. Cf. also Moralia, 169 b, where the fragment is quoted in another form.

9. Asclepiades of Samos; Cf. Knox, Choliambica, p. 270, who rewrites the line.

10. Apparently by suicide: Cf. the admiration Plutarch expresses for Demosthenes’ suicide ( Comp. Cic. and Dem., v. 888 c); but his position is quite different in the polemic against Epicurus, Moralia, 1103 e.

Plutarch De Tranquillitate Animi 17

William Clark Helmbold (Translator)

Search the Perseus Catalog for:

Current edition Perseus

Notes on the current edition

Stable identifiers