Plutarch, De Virtute Morali, William Clark Helmbold (Translator), 2

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[2] In the first place, Menedemus of Eretria deprived the virtues of both plurality and differences by asserting that virtue is but one, though it goes under many names: the same thing is meant by temperance and courage and justice, as is the case with mortal and man. And Ariston of Chios ¹ himself also made virtue but one in its essential nature and called it health; but in its relative aspect he made certain distinctions and multiplied virtues, just as though one should wish to call our sight white-sight when it is applied to white objects, or black-sightwhen applied to black objects, or anything else of the sort. For instance virtue, when it considers what we must do or avoid, is called prudence²; when it controls our desires and lays down for them the limitations of moderation and seasonableness in our pleasures, it is called temperance; when it has to do with men’s relations to one another and their commercial dealings, it is called justice - just as a knife is one and the same knife, though it cuts now one thing, now another, or as a fire retains its single nature though it operates upon different substances. Moreover it appears likely that Zeno³ of Citium also inclines in some measure to this opinion, for he defines prudence as justice when it is concerned with what must be rendered to others as their due, as temperance when concerned with what must be chosen or avoided, as fortitude when concerned with what must be endured; and those who defend Zeno postulate that in these definitions he uses the word prudence in the sense of knowledge. Chrysippus,⁴ however, by his opinion that corresponding to each several quality a virtue is formed by its own distinctive attribute of quality, unwittingly stirred up a swarm of virtues, as Plato⁵ has it, which were not familiar nor even known; for as from the adjective brave he derived bravery, from mild mildness, and justice from just, so from charming he derived charmingnesses, from virtuous virtuousnesses, from great greatnesses, from honourable honourablenesses, postulating also the other qualities of the same sort, dexterousnesses, approachablenesses, adroitnesses, as virtues, and thus filled philosophy, which needed nothing of the sort, with many uncouth names.

De Virtute Morali. Plutarch. William Clark Helmbold (Translator). Cambridge, MA. 1939.

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Current edition Perseus

On Moral Virtue (English) (Plutarch. Moralia, Vol. VI. Helmbold, William Clark, translator. Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press; London: William Heinemann Ltd., 1939 (printing).)

Editions (1)

Περὶ τῆς ἠθικῆς ἀρετῆς Perseus (Plutarch. Plutarchi Chaeronensis Moralia, Vol IΙI. Vernardakēs, Grēgorios N., editor. Leipzig: Teubner, 1891.) — 2 focus

[2] Μενέδημος μὲν ὁ ἐξ Ἐρετρίας ἀνῄρει τῶν ἀρετῶν καὶ τὸ πλῆθος καὶ τὰς διαφοράς, ὡς μιᾶς οὔσης καὶ χρωμένης πολλοῖς ὀνόμασι· τὸ γὰρ αὐτὸ 440f σωφροσύνην καὶ ἀνδρείαν καὶ δικαιοσύνην λέγεσθαι, 20 καθάπερ βροτὸν καὶ ἄνθρωπον. ἀρίστων δʼ ὁ Χῖος τῇ μὲν οὐσίᾳ μίαν καὶ αὐτὸς ἀρετὴν ἐποίει καὶ ὑγίειαν¹ ὠνόμαζε· τῷ δὲ πρὸς τί πως διαφόρους καὶ πλείονας, ὡς εἴ τις ἐθέλοι τὴν ὅρασιν ἡμῶν λευκῶν μὲν ἀντιλαμβανομένην λευκοθέαν καλεῖν, μελάνων δὲ μελανθέαν ἤ τι τοιοῦτον ἕτερον. καὶ γὰρ ἡ ἀρετὴ 5 ποιητέα μὲν ἐπισκοποῦσα καὶ μὴ ποιητέα κέκληται 441a φρόνησις, ἐπιθυμίαν δὲ κοσμοῦσα καὶ τὸ μέτριον καὶ τὸ εὔκαιρον ἐν ἡδοναῖς ὁρίζουσα σωφροσύνη, κοινωνήμασι δὲ καὶ συμβολαίοις ὁμιλοῦσα τοῖς πρὸς ἑτέρους δικαιοσύνη· καθάπερ τὸ μαχαίριον ἓν μὲν 10 ἐστιν ἄλλοτε δʼ ἄλλο διαιρεῖ, καὶ τὸ πῦρ ἐνεργεῖ περὶ ὕλας διαφόρους μιᾷ φύσει χρώμενον. ἔοικε δὲ καὶ Ζήνων εἰς τοῦτό πως ὑποφέρεσθαι ὁ Κιτιεύς, ὁριζόμενος τὴν φρόνησιν ἐν μὲν ἀπονεμητέοις δικαιοσύνην ἐν δʼ αἱρετέοις² σωφροσύνην ἐν δʼ ὑπομενετέοις 15 ἀνδρείαν· ἀπολογούμενοι δʼ ἀξιοῦσιν ἐν 441b τούτοις τὴν ἐπιστήμην φρόνησιν ὑπὸ τοῦ Ζήνωνος ὠνομάσθαι. Χρύσιππος δὲ κατὰ τὸ ποιὸν ἀρετὴν ἰδίαν ποιότητι συνίστασθαι νομίζων, ἔλαθεν ἑαυτὸν κατὰ τὸν Πλάτωνα³ σμῆνος ἀρετῶν οὐ σύνηθες οὐδὲ 20 γνώριμον ἐγείρας ὡς γὰρ παρὰ τὸν ἀνδρεῖον ἀνδρείαν καὶ παρὰ τὸν πρᾶον πραότητα καὶ δικαιοσύνην παρὰ τὸν δίκαιον,⁴ οὕτω παρὰ τὸν χαρίεντα χαριεντότητας καὶ παρὰ τὸν ἐσθλὸν ἐσθλότητας καὶ παρὰ τὸν μέγαν μεγαλότητας καὶ παρὰ τὸν καλὸν 25 καλότητας, ἑτέρας τε τοιαύτας ἐπιδεξιότητας εὐαπαντησίας εὐτραπελίας ἀρετὰς τιθέμενος, πολλῶν καὶ ἀτόπων 441c ὀνομάτων οὐδὲν δεομένην ἐμπέπληκε φιλοσοφίαν.

Translations (1)

Of Moral Virtue Perseus (Plutarch. Plutarch's Morals, Vol. III. Goodwin, William W., editor; Matthew, Morgan translator. Boston: Little, Brown, and Company; Cambridge: Press of John Wilson and Son, 1874.) — 2 focus

[2] To begin then with Menedemus of Eretria, he took away both the number and the differences of virtue, by asserting it to be but one, although distinguished by several names; holding that, in the same manner as a mortal and a man are all one, so what we call temperance, fortitude, and justice are but one and the same thing. As for Ariston of Chios, he likewise made virtue to be but one in substance, and called it sanity, which, as it had respect to this or that, was to be variously multiplied and distinguished; just after the same manner as if any one should call our sight, when applied to any white object, by the name of white-look; when to one that is black, by the name of black-look; and so in other matters. For according to him, virtue, when it considers such things as we ought to do or not to do, is called prudence; when it moderates our desires, and prescribes the measure and season for our pleasures, temperance; and when it governs the commerce and mutual contracts of mankind, justice;—in the same manner, for instance, as a knife is one and the same knife still, notwithstanding sometimes it cuts one thing, sometimes another, and just as fire does operate upon different matter, and yet retain the very same nature. Unto which opinion it seems also as if Zeno the Citian did in some measure incline; he defining prudence, while it distributes to every man his own, to be justice; when it teaches what we are to choose and what to reject or avoid, temperance; and with respect to what is to be borne or suffered, fortitude. But it is to be observed, that they who take upon them the defence of Zeno’s notions do suppose him to mean science by what he calls prudence. But then Chrysippus, whilst he imagined from every distinct quality a several and peculiar virtue to be formed, before he was aware, raised (as Plato hath it) a whole swarm of virtues never before known or used among the philosophers. For as from brave he derived bravery; from mild, mildness; and from just, justice; so from pleasant he fetched pleasantness; from good, goodness; from grand, grandeur; and from honest, honesty; placing these and all kind of dexterous application of discourse, all kind of facetiousness of conversation, and all witty turns of expression in the number of virtues, thereby over-running philosophy, which requires nothing less, with a multitude of uncouth, absurd, and barbarous terms.

Notes on the current edition

On Moral Virtue

1. Von Arnim, Stoic. Vet. Frag., i. p. 86.

2. Cf. for example, Aristotle, Ethica Nicomachea, vi. 6. 1: prudence is concerned only with things which admit of variation.

3. Von Arnim, Stoic. Vet. Frag., i. p. 48; Cf. also Moralia, 97 e and 1034 c.

4. Von Arnim, Stoic. Vet. Frag., iii. p. 59.

5. Meno, 72 a; cf. Moralia, 93 b.

Plutarch De Virtute Morali 2

William Clark Helmbold (Translator)

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