Plutarch, De recta ratione audiendi, ed. Grēgorios N. Vernardakēs, 13

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[13] δεῖται δὲ καὶ τὸ περὶ τοὺς ἐπαίνους καθῆκον 20 εὐλαβείας τινὸς καὶ μετριότητος διὰ τὸ μήτε τὴν ἔλλειψιν αὐτοῦ μήτε τὴν ὑπερβολὴν ἐλευθέριον εἶναι. βαρὺς μὲν γὰρ ἀκροατὴς καὶ φορτικὸς ὁ πρὸς 25 πᾶν ἄτεγκτος καὶ ἀτενὴς τὸ λεγόμενον, οἰήματος ὑπούλου καὶ περιαυτολογίας ἐνδιαθέτου μεστός, ὡς ἔχων τι τῶν λεγομένων βέλτιον εἰπεῖν, μήτʼ ὀφρῦν¹ κατὰ σχῆμα κινῶν μήτε φωνὴν εὐγνώμονος μάρτυρα 44b φιληκοΐας προϊέμενος, ἀλλὰ σιγῇ καὶ βαρύτητι καταπλάστῳ καὶ σχηματισμῷ θηρώμενος δόξαν εὐσταθοῦς καὶ βάθος ἔχοντος ἀνδρός, ὥσπερ χρημάτων τῶν ἐπαίνων ὅσον ἄλλῳ μεταδίδωσιν αὑτοῦ δοκῶν ἀφαιρεῖσθαι. πολλοὶ γάρ εἰσιν οἱ κακῶς καὶ παρὰ μέλος τὴν Πυθαγόρου φωνὴν ὑπολαμβάνοντες. 5 ἐκεῖνος μὲν γὰρ ἐκ φιλοσοφίας ἔφησεν αὑτῷ περιγεγονέναι τὸ μηδὲν θαυμάζειν· οὗτοι δὲ τὸ μηδὲν ἐπαινεῖν μηδὲ τιμᾶν, ἐν τῷ καταφρονεῖν τιθέμενοι τὸ σεμνὸν καὶ² ὑπεροψίᾳ διώκοντες. ὁ γὰρ φιλόσοφος λόγος τὸ μὲν ἐξ ἀπειρίας³ καὶ ἀγνοίας θαῦμα 10 44c καὶ θάμβος ἐξαιρεῖ⁴ γνώσει καὶ ἱστορίᾳ τῆς περὶ ἕκαστον αἰτίας, τὸ δʼ εὔκολον καὶ μέτριον⁵ καὶ φιλάνθρωπον οὐκ ἀπόλλυσι. τοῖς γὰρ ἀληθινῶς καὶ βεβαίως ἀγαθοῖς τιμή τε καλλίστη τὸ τιμῆσαί τινα τῶν ἀξίων, καὶ κόσμος εὐπρεπέστατος τὸ ἐπικοσμῆσαι, 15 περιουσίᾳ δόξης καὶ ἀφθονίᾳ γιγνόμενον.⁶ οἱ δὲ γλίσχροι περὶ τοὺς ἑτέρων ἐπαίνους ἔτι πένεσθαι καὶ πεινῆν ἐοίκασι τῶν ἰδίων. ὁ δʼ ἐναντίος αὖ πάλιν τούτων, μηδὲν ἐπικρίνων ἀλλὰ κατὰ ῥῆμα καὶ συλλαβὴν ἐφιστάμενος⁷ καὶ κεκραγώς , ἐλαφρός 20 44d τις ὢν καὶ ὀρνεώδης, πολλάκις μὲν οὐδʼ αὐτοῖς ἀρέσκει τοῖς ἀγωνιζομένοις, ἀεὶ δὲ λυπεῖ τοὺς ἀκροωμένους, ἀνασοβῶν καὶ συνεξανιστὰς παρὰ γνώμην, οἷον ἑλκομένους βίᾳ διʼ αἰδῶ καὶ συνεπηχοῦντας. οὐδὲν δʼ ὠφεληθεὶς διὰ τὸ ταραχώδη καὶ 25 πολυπτόητον αὐτῷ περὶ τοὺς ἐπαίνους γεγονέναι τὴν ἀκρόασιν ἀπέρχεται τῶν τριῶν ἓν φερόμενος εἴρων γὰρ ἢ κόλαξ ἢ περὶ λόγους ἀπειρόκαλος ἔδοξεν εἶναι. δίκην μὲν οὖν δικάζοντα δεῖ μήτε πρὸς 44e ἔχθραν τινὰ μήτε πρὸς χάριν ἀκούειν ἀλλʼ ἀπὸ γνώμης πρὸς τὸ δίκαιον· ἐν δὲ ταῖς φιλολόγοις 5 ἀκροάσεσιν οὔτε νόμος οὐδεὶς οὔτε ὅρκος ἡμᾶς ἀπείργει μὴ μετʼ εὐνοίας ἀποδέχεσθαι τὸν διαλεγόμενον. ἀλλὰ καὶ τὸν Ἑρμῆν ταῖς Χάρισιν οἱ παλαιοὶ 10 συγκαθίδρυσαν, ὡς μάλιστα τοῦ λόγου τὸ κεχαρισμένον καὶ προσφιλὲς ἀπαιτοῦντος. οὐδὲ γὰρ οἷόν τε παντελῶς οὕτως ἐκβόλιμον εἶναι τὸν λέγοντα καὶ διημαρτημένον, ὥστε μήτε νοῦν τινα παρασχεῖν ἄξιον ἐπαίνου μήτʼ ἀπομνημόνευσιν ἑτέρων μήτʼ αὐτὴν τὴν ὑπόθεσιν τοῦ λόγου καὶ προαίρεσιν, ἀλλὰ μηδὲ λέξιν ἢ διάθεσιν τῶν λεγομένων, 15

ὡς ἀνʼ ἐχινόποδας καὶ ἀνὰ τρηχεῖαν ὄνωνιν 44f

φύονται μαλακῶν ἄνθεα λευκοΐων

ὅπου γὰρ ἐμέτου τινὲς ἐγκώμια καὶ πυρετοῦ καὶ νὴ Δία χύτρας ἐπιδεικνύμενοι, πιθανότητος οὐκ ἀμοιροῦσιν, ἦ που λόγος ὑπʼ ἀνδρὸς ἁμωσγέπως⁸ δοκοῦντος 20 ἢ καλουμένου φιλοσόφου περαινόμενος οὐκ ἂν ὅλως ἀναπνοήν τινα καὶ καιρὸν ἀκροαταῖς εὐμενέσι καὶ φιλανθρώποις παράσχοι πρὸς ἔπαινον; οἱ γοῦν ἐν ὥρᾳ πάντες, ὥς φησιν ὁ Πλάτων,⁹ ἁμηγέπη δάκνουσι τὸν ἐρωτικόν, καὶ λευκοὺς μὲν θεῶν παῖδας 25 45a ἀνακαλῶν μέλανας δʼ ἀνδρικούς, καὶ τὸν γρυπὸν βασιλικὸν καὶ τὸν σιμὸν ἐπίχαριν τὸν δʼ ὠχρὸν μελίχρουν ὑποκοριζόμενος ἀσπάζεται καὶ ἀγαπᾷ· δεινὸς γάρ ἐστιν ὁ ἔρως ὥσπερ κιττὸς αὑτὸν ἐκ πάσης ἀναδῆσαι προφάσεως. πολὺ δὴ μᾶλλον ὁ φιλήκοος καὶ φιλόλογος ἀεί τινος αἰτίας εὑρετικὸς ἔσται, διʼ ἣν οὐκ ἀπὸ τρόπου τῶν λεγόντων ἕκαστον 5 ἐπαινῶν φανεῖται. καὶ γὰρ ὁ Πλάτων¹⁰ τὸν Λυσίου λόγον οὔτε κατὰ τὴν εὕρεσιν ἐπαινῶν καὶ τῆς ἀταξίας αἰτιώμενος ὅμως αὐτοῦ τὴν ἀπαγγελίαν ἐπαινεῖ, καὶ ὅτι τῶν ὀνομάτων σαφῶς καὶ στρογγύλως ἕκαστον 45b ἀποτετόρνευται. μέμψαιτο δʼ ἄν τις Ἀρχιλόχου 10 μὲν τὴν ὑπόθεσιν, Παρμενίδου δὲ τὴν στιχοποιίαν, Φωκυλίδου δὲ τὴν εὐτέλειαν, Εὐριπίδου δὲ τὴν λαλιάν, Σοφοκλέους δὲ τὴν ἀνωμαλίαν, ὥσπερ ἀμέλει καὶ τῶν ῥητόρων ἐστὶν ὁ μὲν οὐκ ἔχων ἦθος, ὁ δὲ πρὸς πάθος ἀργός, ὁ δʼ ἐνδεὴς χαρίτων ἕκαστός 15 γε μὴν ἐπαινεῖται κατὰ τὸ ἴδιον τῆς δυνάμεως, ᾧ κινεῖν καὶ ἄγειν πέφυκεν. ὥστε καὶ τοῖς ἀκούουσιν εὐπορίαν εἶναι καὶ ἀφθονίαν τοῦ φιλοφρονεῖσθαι τοὺς λέγοντας. ἐνίοις γὰρ ἐξαρκεῖ, κἂν μὴ διὰ φωνῆς ἐπιμαρτυρῶμεν, ὄμματος πραότητα καὶ 20 γαλήνην προσώπου καὶ διάθεσιν εὐμενῆ καὶ ἄλυπον ἐμπαρασχεῖν. ἐκεῖνα μὲν γὰρ ἤδη καὶ πρὸς τοὺς 45c ὅλως ἀποτυγχάνοντας ὥσπερ ἐγκύκλια καὶ κοινὰ πάσης ἀκροάσεώς ἐστι, καθέδρα τέ τις ἄθρυπτος καὶ ἀκλινὴς ἐν ὀρθῷ σχήματι καὶ πρόσβλεψις αὐτῷ τῷ 25 λέγοντι καὶ τάξις ἐνεργοῦ προσοχῆς, καὶ προσώπου κατάστασις καθαρὰ καὶ ἀνέμφαντος οὐχ ὕβρεως οὐδὲ δυσκολίας μόνον ἀλλὰ καὶ φροντίδων ἄλλων καὶ ἀσχολιῶν· ὡς ἐν¹¹ ἔργῳ γε παντὶ τὸ μὲν καλὸν ἐκ πολλῶν οἷον ἀριθμῶν εἰς ἕνα καιρὸν ἡκόντων ὑπὸ συμμετρίας τινὸς καὶ ἁρμονίας ἐπιτελεῖται, τὸ δʼ αἰσχρὸν ἐξ ἑνὸς τοῦ τυχόντος ἐλλείποντος ἢ προσόντος ἀτόπως εὐθὺς ἑτοίμην ἔχει τὴν γένεσιν, ὥσπερ 5 45d ἐπʼ αὐτῆς τῆς ἀκροάσεως οὐ μόνον βαρύτης ἐπισκυνίου καὶ ἀηδία προσώπου καὶ βλέμμα ῥεμβῶδες καὶ περίκλασις σώματος καὶ μηρῶν ἐπάλλαξις ἀπρεπὴς ἀλλὰ καὶ νεῦμα καὶ ψιθυρισμὸς πρὸς ἕτερον καὶ μειδίαμα χάσμαι τε ὑπνώδεις καὶ κατήφειαι καὶ 10 πᾶν εἴ τι τούτοις ἔοικεν ὑπεύθυνόν ἐστι καὶ δεῖται πολλῆς εὐλαβείας.

De recta ratione audiendi. Plutarch. ed. Grēgorios N. Vernardakēs. Leipzig. 1888.

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Funding provided by The National Endowment for the Humanities.

Current edition Perseus

Περὶ τοῦ ἀκούειν. (Greek) (Plutarch. Plutarchi Chaeronensis Moralia, Vol I. Vernardakēs, Grēgorios N., editor. Leipzig: Teubner, 1888.)

Translations (2)

On Listening to Lectures Perseus (Plutarch. Moralia, Vol. I. Babbitt, Frank Cole, translator. Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press. London: William Heinemann Ltd., 1927 (printing).) — 13 focus

[13] The proprieties in regard to bestowing commendation also require some caution and moderation, for the reason that neither deficiency nor excess therein befits the free man. An offensive and tiresome listener is the man who is not to be touched or moved by anything that is said, full of festering presumption and ingrained self-assertion, as though convinced that he could say something better than what is being said, who neither moves his brow nor utters a single word to bear witness that he is glad to listen, but by means of silence and an affected gravity and pose, seeks to gain a reputation for poise and profundity; as though commendation were money, he feels that he is robbing himself of every bit that he bestows on another. For there are many who take that saying of Pythagoras wrongly and out of harmony with his meaning. He declared that he had gained this advantage from philosophy, to wonder at nothing;¹ but these men think that their advantage gained is to commend nothing, to show respect for nothing, holding that immunity from wonder lies in disdain, and seeking to attain to dignity by means of contempt. Now it is true that philosophic reasoning, through knowledge and acquaintance with the cause in every case, does away with the wonder and amazement that spring from blindness and ignorance, but at the same time it does not destroy our serenity, moderation, or human interest. For to persons who are truly and consistently good it is the highest credit to bestow credit upon someone deserving of credit, and the most conspicuous honour to honour such a man, since this argues a superabundant and generous store of repute; whereas those who are niggardly in their commendation of others give the impression of being pinched and starving for their own.

On the other hand, however, the opposite type of person, light-minded and flighty, who uses no judgement, but hangs intent on every word and syllable with an ejaculation ready on his lips, is frequently no satisfaction to the disputants themselves, and is always a painful affliction for the audience, startling them as he does and exciting them to join him contrary to their judgement, as though they for shame could not help being dragged into the applause. He gets no benefit from the lecture because for him it has been made full of confusion and fluttering excitement by his continual applaudings, and he departs with the name of being one of three things: a dissembler, a flatterer, or a boor in all that relates to discourse.

Now a man sitting as a judge in court is bound to listen without regard either to enmity or favour, but in sober judgement with regard to justice; but at scholarly lectures no law and no oath prohibits us from receiving the lecturer with goodwill. Indeed, the ancients gave Hermes a place beside the Graces from a feeling that discourse demands, above all, graciousness and friendliness. For it is not possible for a speaker to be a failure so abject and complete that he does not afford something meriting commendation, an original thought, a reminiscence from others, the very subject and purpose of his discourse, or at least the style and arrangement of his remarks,

Just as amid urchin’s foot and the rough rest-harrow Flowering snowdrops grow, delicate in their bloom.²

For when some have declaimed a panegyric upon vomiting or fever, nay I vow, even upon a kitchenpot, not without a certain amount of plausibility, how could it be that a discourse delivered by a man who in some sort bears the repute and name of philosopher, should not offer, at some point, to benevolent and humane hearers some respite and opportunity for commendation ? We know, at any rate, that all persons in the bloom of youth do somehow or other, as Plato ³ says, act as a stimulus upon the man inclined to love; the fair ones he names children of the gods, the dark manly, while the hook-nosed he endearingly terms kingly, the snub-nosed fetching, the sallow honey-hued, and so welcomes and likes them all; for love, like ivy, is clever in attaching itself to any support. Much more, then, will the scholar and diligent hearer always be ready to discover some cause for which he may openly bestow on every speaker some commendation not inappropriate. So Plato,⁴ although he cannot commend Lysias’s speech for invention, and although he condemns its arrangement as disorderly, nevertheless commends the style, and that each word was clearly and roundly turned. One might find fault with Archilochus for his subject matter, Parmenides for his versification, Phocylides as commonplace, Euripides for his loquacity, and Sophocles for his unevenness; and it is equally true of the orators that one of them has no power to portray character, another is slow to rouse emotion, another is lacking in grace; yet it is a fact that each one of them is commended for the special faculty with which Nature has taught him to move us and draw us on. It follows, then, that there is ample and abundant opportunity for hearers to show friendliness toward those who are speaking. For some it is quite enough, even if we do not attest this by the voice, that we vouchsafe to them a gentleness of glance, a serenity of countenance, and a disposition kindly and free from annoyance.

Finally, the following matters, even with speakers who make a complete failure, are, as it were, general and common requirements at every lecture: to sit upright without any lounging or sprawling, to look directly at the speaker, to maintain a pose of active attention, and a sedateness of countenance free from any expression, not merely of arrogance or displeasure, but even of other thoughts and preoccupations. Now in every piece of work, beauty is achieved through the congruence of numerous factors, so to speak, brought into union under the rule of a certain due proportion and harmony, whereas ugliness is ready to spring into being if only a single chance element be omitted or added out of place. And so in the particular case of a lecture, not only frowning, a sour face, a roving glance, twisting the body about, and crossing the legs, are unbecoming, but even nodding, whispering to another, smiling, sleepy yawns, bowing down the head, and all like actions, are culpable and need to be carefully avoided.

Of Hearing Perseus (Plutarch. Plutarch's Morals, Vol. I. Goodwin, William W., editor; Hoy, Thomas, translator. Boston: Little, Brown, and Company, 1874.) — 13 focus

[13]

Directions concerning Praising.

As for commendation, some caution and mean is to be observed in it; because to be either deficient or excessive in that particular shows a base spirit. He is but a morose and rigid hearer whom no part of an oration can work upon or move, one who is full of a secret presumptuous opinion of himself, and of an inbred conceit that he could do better things himself; one who dares not alter his countenance as occasion requires, or let fall the least word to testify his good wishes, but with silence and affected gravity hunts after the reputation of a sagacious and profound person, and thinks that all the praise is lost to himself which he bestows on others, as if it were money. For many wrest that sentence of Pythagoras, who used to say that he had learned by philosophy to admire nothing; but these men think that to admire nobody and to honor nobody consists in despising everybody, and they aim at seeming grave by being contemptuous. Philosophy indeed removes that foolish admiration and surprise which proceeds from doubt or ignorance, by laying open to us the causes of things, but endeavors not to destroy all good-nature and humanity. And those who are truly good take it, for their greatest honor and commendation to be just in paying honor and commendation where it is due to others; and for a man to adorn another is a most glorious ornament, proceeding from a generous abundance of glory and honor in himself; while those who are niggardly in praising others only betray how poor and bare they are of praises at home.

Not to be too prone to commend.

Yet to use no consideration at all, but to stand up and make a clamor at every word or syllable, is to offend in the other extreme. Such fluttering fellows for the most part oblige not the speakers themselves, and are always a plague and common grievance to the hearers, exciting them many times against their inclination, and forcing them for very shame to join in the tumult. In the end, he that raised the disturbance receives no benefit by the discourse, but goes away with the character of a scoffer or flatterer or novice. A judge, it is true, ought to hear and determine without favor or ill-will, regarding only what is just and equitable; but in philosophical proceedings the case is altered, where neither law nor oaths tie us up from being favorable to the speaker. And the ancients in their temples were wont to place the statue of Mercury among the Graces, intimating that orators ought to find a propitious and good-natured audience. For they thought it passed all belief, that any man could prove so much a blockhead or come so wide of the purpose, that, though he should make no remarks of his own and quote none of others worthy taking notice of, or though the argument and de sign of his discourse might not be commendable, yet at least the order and disposition or the style should not deserve some applause; —

As oft amidst the furze and thorny brakes

The tender violets more securely peep.

For if some have undertaken successfully to speak in commendation of vomiting or a fever, and have even made an encomium on a porridge-pot not without some acceptance, certainly a discourse from one that has the least pre tence to philosophy cannot but afford some opportunity, though it be a slight one, for commendation to a welldisposed auditory. Plato says that all who are in their bloom in some way excite the amorous man; — the fair are the children of the Gods, the black are manly, the hooknosed have a look of majesty, the flat-nose gives a graceful air, even the sallow complexion is complimented for looking like honey; in spite of all their defects, he cherishes and loves them all.¹ Thus love, like ivy, must needs find something or other to lay hold on. But much more will a studious hearer and scholar be sure to find some not unworthy reason for praising every speaker. For Plato in an oration of Lysias, disliking the invention and utterly condemning the disposition as confused, yet praised the style and elocution, because every word was wrought off cleverly and cleanly turned. Thus a man may see cause enough to disapprove the argument of Archilochus, the verse of Parmenides, the poverty of Phocylides, the eternal talk of Euripides, and inequality of style in Sophocles; and among the orators, one has no manner, another is not moving, a third has nothing of ornament; yet every one has his peculiar power of moving and exciting, for which he is praised. Some again do not require of us to testify our acceptance by the voice; a pleasing eye or cheerful look, or a behavior without any thing of pain or uneasiness, is all that they desire. For the following favors are nowadays bestowed of course upon every oration, though the speaker may speak to no purpose at all, — sitting modestly without lolling from one side to the other, looking earnestly on the speaker, in the posture of an attentive listener, and with a countenance which betrays not only no contempt or illwill but not even a mind otherwise employed. For as the beauty and excellence of every thing consists in the concurrence of many different accidents, which contribute to the symmetry and harmony of the whole, so that, if but one inconsiderable part be away or absurdly added, deformity immediately follows; in like manner, not only a supercilious look or forbidding mien or roving eyes or waving the body to and fro or indecent crossing of the legs, but even a nod, a whisper to another, a scornful smile, a sleepy yawn, hanging of the head, or the like, are all likewise great indecorums and to be avoided with particular care.

Notes on the current edition

Περὶ τοῦ ἀκούειν

1. ὀφρῦν κατὰ σχῆμα] ὀφρύος κατάστημα Lobeckius

2. τό σεμνὸν καὶ scripsi: καὶ τὸ σεμνὸν

3. ἀπειρίας Xylander: ἀπορίας

4. ἐξαιρεῖ W: ἐξαίρει

5. μέτριον scripsi: μέγα

6. γιγνόμενον = ὁ γίγνεται. Cf. p. 40 d

7. ἐξιστάμενος Emperius

8. ἀμωσγέπως R: ἄλλως γέ πως

9. Πλάτων] Rep. p. 474 e

10. Πλάτων] Phaedr. p. 234 e

11. ὡς ἐν] ἐν W

Plutarch De recta ratione audiendi 13

ed. Grēgorios N. Vernardakēs

Search the Perseus Catalog for:

Current edition Perseus

Directions concerning Praising.

Not to be too prone to commend.

Notes on the current edition

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