Diogenes Laertius, Vitae philosophorum, R. D. Hicks (Translator), 10.1.56

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[56] But to attribute any and every magnitude to the atoms does not help to explain the differences of quality in things; moreover, in that case atoms large enough to be seen ought to have reached us, which is never observed to occur; nor can we conceive how its occurrence should be possible, i.e. that an atom should become visible.¹

Besides, you must not suppose that there are parts unlimited in number, be they ever so small, in any finite body. Hence not only must we reject as impossible subdivision ad infinitum into smaller and smaller parts, lest we make all things too weak and, in our conceptions of the aggregates, be driven to pulverize the things that exist, i.e. the atoms, and annihilate² them; but in dealing with finite things we must also reject as impossible the progression ad infinitum by less and less increments.

Vitae philosophorum. Diogenes Laertius. R. D. Hicks (Translator). Cambridge, MA. 1925.

Funding provided by National Endowment for the Humanities Division of Preservation and Access.

Current edition Perseus

Lives of Eminent Philosophers (English) (Diogenes Laertius. Hicks, R. D., editor. Cambridge, MA.: Harvard University Press; London: William Heinemann Ltd., 1925.)

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Βίοι καὶ γνῶμαι τῶν ἐν φιλοσοφίᾳ εὐδοκιμησάντων Perseus (Diogenes Laertius. Hicks, R. D., editor. Cambridge, MA.: Harvard University Press; London: William Heinemann Ltd., 1925.) — 10.1.56 focus

[56] πᾶν δὲ μέγεθος ὑπάρχειν οὔτε χρήσιμόν ἐστι πρὸς τὰς τῶν ποιοτήτων διαφοράς, ἀφῖχθαί τε ἅμʼ ἔδει¹ καὶ πρὸς ἡμᾶς ὁρατὰς ἀτόμους· ὃ οὐ θεωρεῖται γινόμενον οὔθʼ ὅπως ἂν γένοιτο ὁρατὴ ἄτομος ἔστιν ἐπινοῆσαι.

“Πρὸς δὲ τούτοις οὐ δεῖ νομίζειν ἐν τῷ ὡρισμένῳ σώματι ἀπείρους ὄγκους εἶναι οὐδʼ ὁπηλίκους οὖν. ὥστε οὐ μόνον τὴν εἰς ἄπειρον τομὴν ἐπὶ τοὔλαττον ἀναιρετέον, ἵνα μὴ πάντα ἀσθενῆ ποιῶμεν κἀν ταῖς περιλήψεσι τῶν ἀθρόων εἰς τὸ μὴ ὂν ἀναγκαζώμεθα τὰ ὄντα θλίβοντες καταναλίσκειν, ἀλλὰ καὶ τὴν μετάβασιν μὴ νομιστέον γίνεσθαι ἐν τοῖς ὡρισμένοις εἰς ἄπειρον μηδʼ ἐπὶ τοὔλαττον.

Notes on the current edition

Lives of Eminent Philosophers

1. Cf. Lucr. iv. 110-128, i. 599-627, ii. 478-521. The first of these passages states that the atom is far below the ken of our senses and much smaller than the things which our eyes begin to be able to see.

2. Admitting indivisible atoms, hard solid bodies can be explained; whereas, if atoms were soft and thus divisible ad infinitum, all things would be deprived of solidity (Lucr. i. 565-576). Just before Lucretius has argued that, if atoms did not set a limit to the division of things, production or reproduction would be impossible, since destruction is wrought more quickly than it is repaired, and endless future time could not undo the waste of endless past time. Possibly, however, Epicurus is thinking of an argument similar to that used by Lucretius in ii. 522-568—that a finite number of shapes implies and requires an infinity of atoms of each shape.

Diogenes Laertius Vitae philosophorum 10.1.56

R. D. Hicks (Translator)

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