Thucydides History of the Peloponnesian War 8.51

[1] But Phrynichus having had notice betimes how he abused him, and that letters of this from Alcibiades were in a manner come, he anticipates the news himself, and tells the army that whereas Samos was unwalled and the galleys rid not all within, the enemy meant to come and assault the harbour; that he had sure intelligence hereof, and that they ought therefore with all speed to raise a wall about the city and to put garrisons into other places thereabouts. Now Phrynichus was general himself, and it was in his own power to see it done.

[2] They then fell to walling, whereby Samos (which they meant to have done howsoever) was so much the sooner walled in. Not long after came letters from Alcibiades that the army was betrayed by Phrynichus, and that the enemy purposed to invade the harbour where they lay.

[3] But now they thought not Alcibiades worthy to be believed, but rather that having foreseen the design of the enemy, he went about, out of malice, to fasten it upon Phrynichus as conscious of it likewise. So that he did him no hurt by telling it, but bare witness rather of that which Phrynichus had told them of before.

[1] Meanwhile Phrynichus having had timely notice that he was playing him false, and that a letter on the subject was on the point of arriving from Alcibiades, himself anticipated the news, and told the army that the enemy, seeing that Samos was unfortified and the fleet not all stationed within the harbour, meant to attack the camp; that he could be certain of this intelligence, and that they must fortify Samos as quickly as possible, and generally look to their defences. It will be remembered that he was general, and had himself authority to carry out these measures.

[2] Accordingly they addressed themselves to the work of fortification, and Samos was thus fortified sooner than it would otherwise have been. Not long afterwards came the letter from Alcibiades, saying that the army was betrayed by Phrynichus, and the enemy about to attack it.

[3] Alcibiades, however, gained no credit, it being thought that he was in the secret of the enemy's designs, and had tried to fasten them upon Phrynichus, and to make out that he was their accomplice, out of hatred; and consequently far from hurting him he rather bore witness to what he had said by this intelligence.

St. Araber.Phrynichos noch vorher Wind bekam, daß jener
sein Verderben bereite,,und daß jeden Augenblick ein Schreiben des
Alkibiades über:diese Dinge eii^aufen könne, so kam er ihm selbst
zuvor und zeigte dem Heere an, daß die Feinde im Begriffe seien, einen
Angriff, auf ihr Lager, zu machen, weil Samos unbefestigt und auch
nicht? sämmtliche Schiffe gegenwärtig seien; er habe darüber ganz
genaue.Kundschaft, und man müsse Samos so rasch als, möglich
befestigen .und auch alles Uebrige.der.Sicherheit gemäß vorkehren. -Er
war-nämlich Feldherr und bevollmächtigt, dieß zu thun. Man begann
demnach, die Befestigung, und aus diesem Anlaß kam Samos um, so
rascher.HU.festen Werken, die eSiohnedieß hatte erhalten sollen.. Der ^{1 2}
Brief des Alkibiades kam denn auch bald an und meldete, das Heer
sei von Phrynichos verrathen, und die Feinde würden es überfallen.
Weil man aber von der Zuverlässigkeit des Alkibiades eine schlechte
Meinung hatte, so glaubte man, daß er, in Kenntniß vom Plan der
Feinde, aus Feindschaft gegen den Phrynichos, diesem ein
Einverständniß mit dem Feinde fälschlich zur Last lege, und so hatte dieser
keinen Schaden davon, vielmehr gereichte die Meldung des
AlkibiadeS seiner Aussage zur Bestätigung. - '

LI. Phrynicos, se sachant trahi par lui, et prévoyant que d’un moment à l’autre il arriverait une lettre d’Alcibiade à ce sujet, résolut de prévenir ce coup. Il annonça à son armée que les ennemis, profitant de ce que Samos était sans murailles et la flotte dans l’impossibilité de mouiller tout entière dans le port, allaient attaquer le camp, qu’il le savait de source certaine, qu’il était donc indispensable de fortifier Samos sans délai et de se tenir d’ailleurs sur ses gardes. Comme général il avait le pouvoir d’exécuter lui-même ces mesures : les Athéniens se mirent donc à l’oeuvre, et de cette façon Samos, qui devait d’ailleurs être fortifiée, le fut plus promptement. Peu après arrivèrent les lettres d’Alcibiade, annonçant que Phrynicos trahissait l’armée et que les ennemis allaient attaquer : mais on jugea qu’il ne méritait aucune confiance, et que, prévenu des desseins de l’ennemi, il en avait, par un sentiment de haine, rejeté la responsabilité sur Phrynicos. Loin de lui nuire par cette dénonciation, il déposa plutôt en sa faveur.

Phrynichos, qui s’attendait à cet acte de perfidie, de même qu’à un nouveau message d’Alcibiade, prit les devants. Il avertit l’armée que, Samos étant ouverte et les vaisseaux ne mouillant pas tous dans l’intérieur du port, il tenait de bonne source que les ennemis se disposaient à Tattaque du camp ; qu’il fallait donc fortifier la ville au plus tôt et faire soigneuse garde. Comme général, l’exécution dépendait de lui. On se mit donc à l’œuvre ; voilà pourquoi Samos, destinée d’ailleurs à être fortifiée, le fut plus promptement. Bientôt vint la lettre d’Alcibiade annonçant que l'armée était trahie et les ennemis sur le point de l’attaquer ; mais on ne donna aucune attention à ises paroles. On pensa qu’instruit des projets de l’ennemi, illen avait, par motif de haine, rejeté la complicité sur Phrynichos. Loin de rendre celui-ci suspect, cet avertissement ne fit que confirmer son témoignage.

[1] And when Phrynichus learned betimes that Astyochus was working to injure him and that a letter from Alcibiades about these matters had all but come, he anticipated it by himself informing the army that the enemy intended, seeing that Samos had no walls and that not all the ships were anchored inside the harbour, to attack the camp; he said that he had certain information of this, and that they ought to fortify Samos as quickly as possible and keep a watch upon everything. Now he was general, and was within his powers in acting thus on his own authority.

[2] So they set about preparing the fortifications, and in consequence of this Samos, which in any case would soon have been ready, was more quickly fortified. Not long afterward came the letter from Alcibiades, saying that the army was being betrayed by Phrynichus and that the enemy would soon attack.

[3] But since Alcibiades was not regarded as a trustworthy man, but was believed, as he knew beforehand the plans of the enemy, to be actuated by personal enmity in attributing to Phrynichus a guilty knowledge of them, the accusation did Phrynichus no harm, but rather confirmed his statement by giving the same information.

[1] Now when Phrynichus had discovered beforehand that he was doing him injury, and that a letter from Alcibiades on the subject was on the point of arriving, he himself anticipated it by announcing to the army, that as Samos was unfortified, and all the ships were not stationed within the harbour, the enemy intended to attack the camp: that he had certain intelligence of this, and that they ought as quickly as possible to fortify Samos and put every thing else in a state of defence. Now he was himself general, and so had full authority to carry out these measures. Accordingly they prepared for the work of fortification;

[2] and owing to this Samos was the more quickly walled, though it would have been so under any circumstances. Not long after came the letters from Alcibiades, saying that the army was going to be betrayed by Phrynichus, and that the enemy were on the point of attacking them.

[3] As, however, Alcibiades was not thought to be worthy of credit, but to have had a previous acquaintance with the plans of the enemy, and through personal dislike to have attributed them to Phrynichus, as though he were privy to them, he did him no harm, but rather bore witness to his statement by sending this intelligence.

[1] Et quum praesensisset Phrynichus, eum improbe agere et de rebus istis epistolam ab Alcibiade jam jamque adfuturam, ipse eam praevertens indicium ad exercitum defert, hostes in animo habere, quod Samus nullis munitionibus esset munita, et simul non omnis classis intus stationem haberet impetum in castra facere et se luee comperta liabere, et quam celerrime Samum muniendam esse, et celera praesidiis tuenda; ipse autem dux erat, harumque rerum administrandarum potestatem habebat.

[2] Et bi quidem munitionem parabant, et tali modo Samus, quam vel sic munituri erant, celerius munita est; literae autem ab Alcibiade non multo post aderant, exercitum a Phrynicbo prodi, et hostes eum invasuros.

[3] Ita quum visus esset Alcibiades non fide dignus esse, sed hostium consilia jam aiite comperta Phrynrcho, ut conscio, pei inimicitias attribuere, nihil huic nocuit, imo vero, quod haec indicasset, suo testimonio eum potius adjuvit.

Ma Frinico presentito il tradimento di Aslioco, e conoscendo che in breve verrebbero lettere da Alcibiade concernenli queste cose, si fece innanzi dichiarando egli stesso all’esercito che essendo Samo senza mura e le navi non tutte dentro il porto, i nemici avean risoluta di assalirli, e che egli sapeva ciò di sicuro ; e però bisognava fortificar Samo prestissimamente, e stare ben guardati su tutto il resto. E poiché egli era il capitano ed aveva autorità di operar cosi, i soldati si accingevano a fabbricar quelle fortificazioni : talché tra per questo stratagemma , e per esser già preparati i materiali, le condussero prestamente a fine. Non molto dopo venne la lettera di Alcibiade che Frinico tradiva l’esercito, e che i nemici erano per assalirlo ; ma fu creduto che Alcibiade non meritasse fede , e che essendo egli iuformato delle intenzioni de’Peloponnesi volesse per inimicizia dar colpa a Frinico che s’intendesse con loro. Onde questa dmunzia non pregiudicò punto al generale ateniese, ma gli servì piuttosto di bella testimonianza.