Thucydides History of the Peloponnesian War 8.27

[1] According to this, they concluded to go the next morning and relieve it. Phrynichus, when he had certain word from Derus of the arrival of those galleys, his colleagues advising to stay and fight it out with their fleet, said that he would neither do it himself nor suffer them to do it, or any other, as long as he could hinder it.

[2] For seeing he might fight with them hereafter, when they should know against how many galleys of the enemy and with what additions to their own, sufficiently and at leisure made ready, they might do it, he would never, he said, for fear of being upbraided with baseness (for it was no baseness for the Athenians to let their navy give way upon occasion;

[3] but by what means soever it should fall out, it would be a great baseness to be beaten), be swayed to hazard battle against reason and not only to dishonour the state but also to cast it into extreme danger, seeing that since their late losses it hath scarce been fit with their strongest preparation, willingly, no nor urged by precedent necessity, to undertake, how then without constraint to seek out voluntary, dangers?

[4] Therefore he commanded them with all speed to take aboard those that were wounded and their landmen and whatsoever utensils they brought with them; but to leave behind whatsoever they had taken in the territory of the enemy to the end that their galleys might be the lighter;

[5] and to put off for Samos, and thence, when they had all their fleet together, to make out against the enemy as occasion should be offered. As Phrynichus advised this, so he put it in execution, and was esteemed a wise man, not then only, but afterwards, nor in this only, but in whatsoever else he had the ordering of.

[6] Thus the Athenians presently in the evening, with their victory unperfect, dislodged from before Miletus. From Samos the Argives, in haste and in anger for their overthrow, went home.

[1] Accordingly they resolved to relieve it the next morning. Meanwhile Phrynichus, the Athenian commander, had received precise intelligence of the fleet from Leros , and when his colleagues expressed a wish to keep the sea and fight it out, flatly refused either to stay himself or to let them or any one else do so if he could help it.

[2] Where they could hereafter contend, after full and undisturbed preparation, with an exact knowledge of the number of the enemy's fleet and of the force which they could oppose to him, he would never allow the reproach of disgrace to drive him into a risk that was unreasonable.

[3] It was no disgrace for an Athenian fleet to retreat when it suited them: put it as they would, it would be more disgraceful to be beaten, and to expose the city not only to disgrace, but to the most serious danger. After its late misfortunes it could hardly be justified in voluntarily taking the offensive even with the strongest force, except in a case of absolute necessity: much less then without compulsion could it rush upon peril of its own seeking.

[4] He told them to take up their wounded as quickly as they could and the troops and stores which they had brought with them, and leaving behind what they had taken from the enemy's country, in order to lighten the ships, to sail off to Samos , and there concentrating all their ships to attack as opportunity served.

[5] As he spoke so he acted; and thus not now more than afterwards, nor in this alone but in all that he had to do with, did Phrynichus show himself a man of sense.

[6] In this way that very evening the Athenians broke up from before Miletus , leaving their victory unfinished, and the Argives, mortified at their disaster, promptly sailed off home from Samos .

Sie faßten also den Entschluß > mit dem nächsten Morgen
den Milesiern zu Hilfe zu kommen. PhrynichoS aber, der Athenische
Feldherr, als er von Leros aus über die Flotte genaue Nachricht er.
halten hatte und seine Mitfeldherrn wünschten, man solle bleiben und
eine Seeschlacht entscheiden lassen, erklärte, er aus seine
Verantwortung werde das nicht thun, und auch weder ihnen, noch irgend einem
Andern die Erlaubniß dazu geben. Denn wo die Möglichkeit
vorhanden sei, nachdem man genaue Erkundigungen darüber eingezogen,
mit wie vielen feindlichen Schiffen man es zu thun habe^ und auch ¹
wisse, wie viele eigene man ihnen entgegenstellen könne, sich genügend
und in aller Ruhe-zu rüsten Und den Kampf ersd später entscheiden
zu lassen 7 da werde er niemals aus bloßer Furcht vor dens Vorwurf
schimpflicher Feigheit blindlings Alles aufs Spiel setzen. Es sei
keineswegs schimpflich, wenn Athenische Schiffe sich zurückziehen; wo
es ihrVortheil gebiete, vielmehr sei es viel schimpflicher, wenn sie
den Kampf annähmen und geschlagen würden , möchten die
Verhältnisse nun sein, wie sie wollten. Ihre Stadt würde sich dadurch nicht
nur .Schimpf und Schande zuziehen, sondern-auch in die größte
Gefahr gerathen, welcher sie nach den erlittenen Unglücksfällen kaum im
Besitze ganz sicherstellender Rüstung sich freiwillig unterziehen dürfte,
oder doch.höchstens im Fall der dringendsten Noth es wagen könnte,
zuerst anzugreifen; wie sollte man also jetzt ohne Drang und Zwang
sich in selbstgewählte Gefahren stürzen? Er befahl daher; so schnell
als möglich die Verwundeten, sowie die Landtruppen und? was sie
anGeräthschasten mitgebracht hatten, auf die Schiffe zunehmen, alle
Beute aus dem feindlichen Land aber zurückzulassen^ um so die Schiffe
zu erleichtern und dann nach Samos zu fahren. Dort könne man
sämmtliche Schiffe zusammenziehen und dann bei günstiger
Gelegenheit zu neuen Angriffen aussegeln. Mit dieser Ansicht drang er durch
und brachte auch Alles so zur Ausführung; und nicht nur jetzt und
in diesem Falle, sondern auch später und bei allen andern
Gelegenheiten zeigte sich Phrynichos als ein verständiger Mann. Gegen
Abend also segelten die Athener nach unvollendetem Siege von
Milet ab, die Argiver aber fuhren von Samos aus schnell und in
schlechter Laune nach Hans zurück. ' .1 ^ .....

XXVII. Il fut résolu que la ville serait secourue au point du jour. Cependant les Athéniens avaient eu, de Léros, des nouvelles positives de la flotte ennemie. Phrynicos, un de leurs généraux, voyant ses collègues décidés à l’attendre et à livrer un combat naval, déclara qu’il n’en ferait rien, et qu’autant qu’il serait en lui il ne permettrait ni à eux ni à personne d’en rien faire; que, puisqu’on pouvait ajourner, se renseigner exactement sur le nombre des vaisseaux ennemis et sur ceux qu’on pourrait leur opposer, en un mot se préparer au combat mûrement et à loisir, il ne consentirait jamais, par une fausse honte, à se risquer sans raison; qu’il n’y avait rien d’humiliant pour la marine athénienne à céder à propos, et que, dans tous les cas, il serait plus honteux d’éprouver une défaite, suivie non-seulement du déshonneur, mais du plus extrême péril pour la république; qu’après les désastres précédents, c’était tout au plus s’il était permis d’aller volontairement au-devant d’une action, même avec des armements qui inspireraient toute confiance, ou sous le coup d’une nécessité absolue : qu’à plus forte raison il ne serait point pardonnable d’aller soi-même chercher le danger sans aucune nécessité. Il conseillait donc d’embarquer au plus vite les blessés, l’armée de terre et le matériel qu’ils avaient apporté, d’abandonner le butin fait sur l’ennemi, pour ne pas surcharger les vaisseaux, et de faire voile pour Samos, d’où on pourrait, une fois toute la flotte réunie, faire des courses de côté et d’autre, si l’occasion s’en présentait. Il fit goûter ce projet et le mit à exécution. Du reste, plus tard comme en cette circonstance, dans toutes les affaires auxquelles ils se trouva mêlé comme dans celle-ci, Phrynicos montra la même rectitude de vues. Les Athéniens quittèrent ainsi Milet dès le même soir, laissant leur victoire incomplète. Les Argiens, irrités de leur échec, firent voile tout aussitôt de Samos pour rentrer chez eux.

Il fut donc résolu qu’on s'y porterait sitôt qu’il ferait jour. Cependant les Athéniens avaient reçu de Léros des nour velles précises de la flotte ennemie. Phrynichos, un de leurs généraux, voyant ses collègues disposés à l’attendre et h livrer une bataille navale, déclara que, pour lui, il n’en ferait rien, et qu’il s’opposerait de tout son pouvoir à une pareille imprudence. « Puisqu’on peut, disait-il, connaître plus tard le nombre exact des vaisseaux ennemis et préparer à loisir les moyens de défense, ce serait folie que de se mettre en danger par fausse honte ; il n’y a point de déshonneur pour la marine athénienne à reculer à propos ; il y en aurait bien davantage à être vaincue ; c'est alors que la république serait exposée, non pas seulement à la honte, mais à un danger imminent; après les revers antérieurs, à peine était-il permis, avec des forces éprouvées, de prendre l’offensive sans y être absolument contraint; à plus forte raison, comment serait-il pardonnable de se jeter de gaieté de cœur dans des périls volontaires? » Il conseillait d’embarquer au plus tôt les blessés, les troupes de terre et le matériel de siège, d’abandonner, pour alléger les navires, tout le butin fait sur le territoire ennemi, et de cingler vers Samos, d'où l’on pourrait, une fois la flotte réunie, faire des courses à l'occasion.

Cet avis ayant prévalu, on l’exécuta sur-le-champ. Ce ne fat pas seulement alors, mais dans la suite et dans tout le reste de sa carrière, que Phrynichos fit preuve de sagacité. Les Athéniens s’éloignèrent donc de Milet dès le soir même, laissant leur victoire incomplète. Les Argiens, furieux de leur échec, partirent immédiatement de Samos pour retourner chez eux.

[1] Accordingly they were proposing to go to its aid at daybreak; but Phrynichus, the Athenian general, when he received from Leros accurate information about the enemy's fleet, though his colleagues wished to wait and fight a decisive battle, refused either to do this himself or to permit them or anybody else to do it, so far as he had power to prevent it.

[2] For in a case where it would be possible to fight at a later time, after leisurely and adequate preparation and possessing full information as to the number of the enemy's ships they must meet and how many of their own they would have, he would never, he declared, yielding to the consideration of disgrace, hazard a decisive battle unreasonably.

[3] It was not disgraceful, he said, for Athenians to give way before a hostile navy upon occasion, but it would be more disgraceful if under any circumstances whatever they should be defeated and have to make terms. The state would incur, not only disgrace, but also the greatest danger; for, after their past misfortunes, it was scarcely permissible for it when securely prepared of free will, or ¹ through absolute necessity, to take the offensive in any direction, much less was it permissible, when there was no pressure, to rush into self-chosen dangers.

[4] He urged them, therefore, as speedily as possible to take up their wounded and their forces on land and whatever stores they had brought with them, leaving behind, however, the spoils they had taken from the enemy's country, in order that the ships might be light, and sail back to Samos;

[5] then, making that their base, after bringing all their ships together, they might sally forth for attacks if opportunity should offer anywhere. As he advised, so he also acted;

[6] and consequently, though not on the present occasion more than afterwards, nor as regards this decision only, but in general in whatever circumstances he found himself, Phrynichus won the reputation of being a man of sagacity. Thus the Athenians, their victory incomplete, retired from Miletus immediately after nightfall; and the Argives, in all haste and indignant at what had happened, sailed home from Samos.

[1] They, then, intended to relieve it in the morning. Phrynichus, the commander of the Athenians, on the other hand, when he had heard from Lerus a correct account of their fleet, and when his colleagues wished to await its arrival and give it battle, said that he would neither do so himself, nor, to the best of his power, allow them or any one else to do it.

[2] For when they might meet them hereafter with an accurate knowledge of the number of ships on the enemy's side, and with how many of their own opposed to them they would, after adequate and calm preparations, be able to give them battle, he would never run an unreasonable hazard through yielding to the disgrace of reproach.

[3] For it was no disgrace for the Athenians to retreat with a navy at a proper time; but in any way whatever, the result would be more disgraceful should they be defeated, and for the state to incur not only disgrace, but also the greatest danger. For after its late misfortunes, it was hardly expedient voluntarily for it to act on the offensive in any quarter, even with a force that could be relied upon, or even in a case of absolute necessity:

[4] how then could it without any such compulsion rush into self-chosen dangers? He ordered them therefore as quickly as possible to take up their wounded, and their land forces, with such stores as they had brought with them; but to leave behind what they had taken from the enemy's country, that their ships might be the lighter, and to sail away to Samos, and thence, when they had Collected all their ships, to make their attacks upon them, whenever they had an opportunity.

[5] Having given this advice, he acted accordingly; and so Phrynichus, not on that immediate occasion more than on subsequent ones, nor in that business only, but in all that he had any thing to do with. proved himself to be a man of sound judgment.

[6] In this way, with an incomplete victory, the Athenians immediately broke up their camp, and retired from Miletus; and the Argives, in mortification at their defeat, sailed off home from Samos as quickly as they could.

[1] Atque illi quidem prima luce auxilio venturi erant; Phrynichus vero, Atheniensium dux, ubi ex Loro de classe hostili nuncios accepit, quum ejus collegae remanere et navale proelium committere vellent, negavit aut se hoc facturum, aut, quoad posset, illis aut alii cuiquam hoc facere permissurum.

[2] Quando enim liceret aliquanto post, plane cognito, adversus quot hostiles naves, et quot suis pugnarent, et rebus omnibus satis et per otium paratis certamen subire, nunquam se turpi probro tantam tributurum, ut temere belli fortunam periclitaretur.

[3] Nec enim turpe esse, Athenienses cum daese in tempore cedere, sed longe turpius fore, si, quomodocumque res contingeret, vincerentur; et rempuhlicam non solam in dedecus, sed etiam in maximum periculum incidere, quippe cui post clades acceptas vix liceat cum firmo apparatu saa sponte, aut etiam in magna necessitate prius usquam aggredi , nedum, si non ccgeretur, pericula sua sponte suscipere.

[4] Itaque jubebat illos assumptis sauciis et peditatn omnique instrumento, quod secum attulerant, ceteris vero rebus, quas ex hostico cepissent, relictis, quo naves expeditae essent, in Samum quam velocissime navigare, et illinc jam navibus in unum contractis impetus facere, sicubi tempus opportunum foret.

[5] Ut autem Phrynichus haec suis persuasit, ita etiam fecit, et visus est non magis in praesentia, quam postea, nec in hoc tantum, sed etiam in omnibus aliis negotiis, quae ei delegata sunt,'non im* prudens esse.

[6] Hunc igitur in modum Athenienses statim sub vesperam imperfecta victoria a Mileto discesserunt; et Argivi propter cladem acceptam irati ex Samo domum celeriter abierunt;

Però fermarono di portarvi soccorso in sul far dell’alba. Ma Frinico capitano degli Ateniesi , il quale da Lero aveva avuto la nuova dell’arrivo di quella flotta, sentendo che i suoi colleghi volevano al postutto aspettarla per venire a battaglia , protestò che non arebbe fatto ciò, e che per quanto in lui stesse non lo permetterebbe nè a loro nè a nissun altro. Perciocché, diceva, quando si può, indugiando, combattere preparati convenevolmente ed a bell’agio, colla piena certezza del numero delle navi nemiche e delle proprie contro quelle, egli non si indurrebbe per vergognoso rimprovero a porsi nel rischio temerariamente. Non esser vergogua agli Ateniesi il cedere a tempo colla flotta , ma ia qualunque modo più vergogna risulterebbe loro da una sconfitta ; e allora la Repubblica caderebbe non solo in vergogua, ma eziandio in pericolo grandissimo. Che se ella per le passate sciagure è appena in grado, pur con vigoroso apparecchio, di mover la prima contro il nemico spontaneamente, non che per espressa necessità, perchè ora mettersi volontariamente nel rischio senza esservi astretta ? Laonde ordinava di navigar subito a Samo , pigliando seco i feriti e le genti da piè e tutti gli attrazzi co’ quali eran venuti, e lasciando tutta la preda cavata dal paese nemico, affinchè le navi fossero leggere : e poi da Samo con tutte le navi riunite assalire il nemico quando si presentasse l’occasione. Avendoli Frinico persuasi di queste cose, le mise ad esecuzione ; e non tanto allora quanto auche in seguito ehbe reputazione di capitano prudente, non in questo solo caso, ma aucora in tutte le altre imprese a lui affidate. Così gli Ateniesi la sera subito si ritirarono da Mileto colla vittoria imperfetta ; e gli Argivi stizziti della rotta sofferta sciolsero prestamente da Samo per ritornare a casa.