Thucydides History of the Peloponnesian War 8.2

[1] The winter following, upon the great overthrow of the Athenians in Sicily, all the Grecians were presently up against them. Those who before were confederates of neither side thought fit no longer, though uncalled, to abstain from the war, but to go against the Athenians of their own accord, as having not only every one severally this thought, that had the Athenians prospered in Sicily they would afterwards have come upon them also, but imagined withal that the rest of the war would be but short, whereof it would be an honour to participate. And such of them as were confederates of the Lacedaemonians longed now more than ever to be freed as soon as might be of their great toil.

[2] But above all, the cities subject to the Athenians were ready, even beyond their ability, to revolt; as they that judged according to their passion, without admitting reason in the matter, that the next summer they were to remain with victory.

[3] But the Lacedaemonians themselves took heart, not only from all this, but also principally from that, that their confederates in Sicily with great power, having another navy now necessarily added to their own, would in all likelihood be with them in the beginning of the spring.

[4] And being every way full of hopes, they purposed without delay to fall close to the war, making account, if this were well ended, both to be free hereafter from any more such dangers as the Athenians, if they had gotten Sicily, would have put them into, and also, having pulled them down, to have the principality of all Greece now secure unto themselves.

[1] Summer was now over. The winter ensuing saw all Hellas stirring under the impression of the great Athenian disaster in Sicily . Neutrals now felt that even if uninvited they ought no longer to stand aloof from the war, but should volunteer to march against the Athenians, who, as they severally reflected, would probably have come against them if the Sicilian campaign had succeeded. Besides, they considered that the war would now be short, and that it would be creditable for them to take part in it. Meanwhile the allies of the Lacedaemonians felt all more anxious than ever to see a speedy end to their heavy labours.

[2] But above all, the subjects of the Athenians showed a readiness to revolt even beyond their ability, judging the circumstances with passion, and refusing even to hear of the Athenians being able to last out the coming summer.

[3] Beyond all this, Lacedaemon was encouraged by the near prospect of being joined in great force in the spring by her allies in Sicily , lately forced by events to acquire their navy.

[4] With these reasons for confidence in every quarter, the Lacedaemonians now resolved to throw themselves without reserve into the war considering that, once it was happily terminated, they would be finally delivered from such dangers as that which would have threatened them from Athens , if she had become mistress of Sicily , and that the overthrow of the Athenians would leave them in quiet enjoyment of the supremacy over all Hellas .

In dem nun folgenden Winter waren durch das große
Unglück der Athener in Sicilien alle Hellenen sofort in große Erregung
versetzt worden. Diejenigen von ihnen, welche sich bis dahin keiner
Partei angeschlossen hatten, glaubten sich nicht länger mehr des
Krieges enthalten zu dürfen, auch wenn Niemand sie dazu auffordere,
sondern aus eigenem Antrieb müsse man gegen die Athener losgehen.
Denn sie glaubten, wenn die Athener nur in Sicilien gesiegt hätten,
so würden sie dann auch über jeden von ihnen ohne Ausnahme
hergefallen sein, und jetzt, dachten sie, könne der Krieg nur mehr kurze
Zeit dauern, und gleichwohl sei es ehrenvoll, sich noch daran zu
betheiligen. Die Genossen der Lakedämonier ihrerseits zeigten jetzt
noch größeren BundeSeiser als früher, um sich so rasch als.möglich
von so großer Bedrängniß zu befreien; vor Allem aber waren die
Unterthanen der Athener selber bereit, abzufallen, ohne Berechnung
ihrer eigenen Mittel, da sie Alles nur nach ihrer Leidenschaft
beurtheilten und nicht einmal so viel Ueberlegung behielten, um daran
zu.denken, wie sie auch nur für den folgenden Sommer sich zu halten
im Stande wären. Der Staat der Lakedämonier aber gewann auS
all diesen Umständen neuen Muth, zumal da auch wohl die
Bundesgenossen aus Sicilien, nachdem ihnen die Noth zu einer Flotte
verholfen, bei Frühlingsanbruch mit großer Macht zu ihnen stoßen
würden. Da sie so von allen Seiten in zuversichtlicher Hoffnung
waren, so gedachten sie, sich ganz rücksichtslos dem Krieg zu widmen,
indem sie überlegten, daß sie nach dessen glücklicher Beendigung für
die Zukunft auS einer so großen Gefahr befreit sein würden, wie
Seitens der Athener sie ihnen gedroht hätte, wenn diese die Sikelische
Macht zu der ihrigen gewönnen hätten, und daß sie, wenn jene erst
gestürzt seien, die Obmacht über ganz Hellas ganz sicher in der ¹
Hand haben wurden.

II. L’hiver suivant ¹ , le grand désastre des Athéniens en Sicile mit en fermentation toute la Grèce : ceux qui n’avaient d’alliance avec aucun des deux partis ne croyaient plus pouvoir rester en dehors de la guerre, même sans y être appelés; chacun se disait que les Athéniens n’auraient pas manque de l’attaquer à son tour, s’ils eussent réussi en Sicile, et que d’ailleurs, la guerre ne devant plus maintenant durer bien ² longtemps, il était bon d’y prendre part. Les alliés de Lacédémone redoublaient en commun d’efforts et d’ardeur, dans l’espoir d’être bientôt délivrés de tant de souffrances; les sujets d’Athènes surtout étaient disposés à se soulever, sans même consulter leurs forces; car, jugeant la situation avec passion et colère, ils n’avaient plus le loisir de calculer que, l'été suivant, sinon maintenant, les Athéniens seraient en mesure de les vaincre. Chez les Lacédémoniens, les dispositions guerrières s’étaient fortifiées de toutes ces circonstances et surtout de l’idée que leurs alliés de Sicile, maintenant à la tête d’une marine que les événements avaient forcé de créer, viendraient sans doute au printemps les rejoindre avec des forces considérables. De toutes parts apparaissaient des motifs d’espérance; aussi résolurent-ils de pousser résolûment les hostilités, dans la pensée qu’une fois la guerre terminée à leur avantage ils seraient désormais délivrés de dangers comme ceux dont les eût enveloppés la puissance athénienne, si elle se fût accrue de la Sicile; et que, cette puissance anéantie, leur domination sur la Grèce entière se trouverait sûrement établie.

L’hiver suivant, le désastre des Athéniens en Sicile excita parmi les Grecs une fermentation générale. Ceux qui jusqu’alors étaient demeurés neutres ne croyaient pas pouvoir s'abstenir plus longtemps de se mêler à la guerre, même sans y être invités. Ils se disaient que, si les Athéniens eussent triomphé en Sicile, ils n'auraient pas manqué de les attaquer; d’ailleurs il leur semblait que cette guerre serait bientôt finie et qu’il était honorable d’y prendre part. Les alliés de Lacédémone redoublaient de zèle, dans l’espoir d’être bientôt délivrés de leurs longues souffrances. Mais rien n’égalait l’empressement des sujets d’Athènes à se révolter ; sans consulter leurs forces, sans écouter d’autres voix que celle de la passion, ils soutenaient que les Athéniens seraient hors d’état de se maintenir même l’été suivant. Chez les Lacédémoniens, la confiance était surtout accrue par la certitude que les alliés de Sicile, ne pouvant plus leur refuser le concours de leur marine, arriveraient en forces dès le printemps. Pour tous ces motifs, ils se préparaient à pousser les hostilités à outrance, convaincus que la guerre une fois terminée à leur avantage, ils n’auraient plus à redouter les dangers dont les eussent menacés les Athéniens et les Siciliens réunis ; et que, Athènes abattue, leur propre domination sur toute la Grèce serait irrévocablement assurée.

[1] The following winter, in view of the great disaster that had befallen the Athenians in Sicily, ¹ there was at once excitement among all the Hellenes. Some, who were allies of neither party, thought that, even if they were not called upon for aid, they should no longer hold aloof from the war, but should go of their own accord against the Athenians; for they believed, one and all, that the Athenians would have come against them if they had succeeded in Sicily; they also believed that the rest of the war would be short and that it would be glorious to have a part in it. The allies of the Lacedaemonians, on the other hand, were more than ever animated by a common eagerness quickly to be relieved of

[2] their great hardships. But most of all the subjects of the Athenians were ready, even beyond their power, to revolt from them, because they judged of the situation under the influence of passion and would not even leave them the plea that they would be able to hold out through

[3] the following summer. The Lacedaemonian state was encouraged by all these things, and especially because their allies in Sicily would in all probability be present to help them with a large force as soon as spring came, since necessity had now compelled them to

[4] acquire a navy. Being hopeful, then, in every way, they determined to set their hands to the war wholeheartedly, reckoning that when it should have ended successfully they would thereafter be free from such dangers as would have beset them from the side of the Athenians if these had acquired the resources of Sicily in addition to their own; and that, having overthrown them, they would themselves now hold securely the hegemony of all Hellas.

[1] The following winter, all the Greeks were immediately excited by the great misfortune of the Athenians in Sicily. Those who were not in alliance with either side thought, that even f no one called on them for aid, they ought not any longer to keep aloof from the war, but should volunteer to march against the Athenians, when they reflected, severally, that they might have attacked them also, if they had succeeded in their measures at Syracuse; and, moreover, that the remainder of the war would be but brief, and that it was creditable for them to take their share in it. The allies of the Lacedaemonians, on the other hand, felt to a greater degree than before a common anxiety to have done speedily with their heavy labours.

[2] But, above all, the subjects of the Athenians were ready, even beyond their power, to revolt from them; because they judged of affairs under the influence of strong feeling, and did not so much as leave them a chance of being able to hold out the following summer.

[3] The Lacedaemonian state was encouraged by all these things, and most of all, because their allies in Sicily, since their navy had now of necessity been added to their resources, would in all probability be with them in great force with the spring.

[4] And thus being on every account full of hope, they determined to devote themselves unflinchingly to the war, reckoning that by its successful termination they would both be released in future from all dangers, like that which would have encompassed them from the Athenians, if they had won Sicily in addition to their other dominion; and that, after subduing them, they would themselves then enjoy n safety the supremacy over the whole of Greece.

[1] Insequente autem hieme propter magnam calamitatem ab Atbenicnsibus in Sicilia acceptam protinus universi Graeci animis erecti erant, illi quidem, qui neutrorum erant socii, quod, etiam si nemo eos advocaret, a bello nequaquam amplius abstinendum esse, sed ultro adversus Athenienses eundum censerent, rati pro se quique, etiam adversos se venturos fuisse illos, si rem in Sicilia feliciter gessissent, et simul reliquum bellum breve futurum, cujus socios fuisse gloriosum esse; qui vero Lacedaemoniorum erant socii, quod conjuncto studio longe magis, quam ante, multis aerumnis celeriter liberari cuperent.

[2] Praecipue vero Atheniensium imperio subjecti parati erant vel supra vires ab iis deficere, quod animi impetu de rebus judicarent, et ne hoc quidem , iis in ratione subducenda relinquerent, flori posse, ut proxima certe aestate hostes sustinerent.

[3] Lacedaemoniorum vero civitas, quum propter haec omnia fiduciam concipiebat, tum vero praecipue, quod Siculi socii jam necessario cum magnis copiis, classis accessione facta, ineunte statim vere, ut erat verisimile, sibi praesto futuri essent.

[4] Itaque, quum undique bonam spem haberent, abjecta omni cunctatione bellum capessere statuebant, reputantes secum, si hoc bellum felicem exitum habuisset, scin posterum et hujusmodi periculis liberatos fore, cujusmodi fuisset et illud, quod sibi ab Atheniensibus creatum fuisset, si res Siculas in suam potestatem redegissent; et illis eversis futurum, ut ipsi totius Graeciae imperium tuto jam obtinerent.

Nel seguente inverno al gran tracollo degli Ateniesi in Sicilia, sollevarono subito l’animo i Greci tutti : quelli che stavano neutrali, perchè pensavano (anche non invitati ) non doversi più tener fuori di quella guerra, ma esser tempo di andare volontariamente contro gli Ateniesi , avvisando ognuno che questi sarebbero venuti contro di loro, se l’impresa siciliana fosse riuscita prosperamente , e reputando che breve avrebbe dovuto essere il rimanente della guerra, il pigliar parte alla quale sarebbe onorevole : quelli poi che erano in lega con Sparta, perchè tutti studiavarisi più di prima a liberarsi prontamente dai molli loro travagli. Ma principalmente i vassalli degli Ateniesi erano pronti, anche al di là delle proprie forze, a ribellarsi, perchè giudicavano delle cose nel bollor della passione, e non davano luogo al pensiero che gli Ateniesi potessero sostenersi almeno per l’estate futura. Per tutte queste cagioni inanimivasi la città degli Spartani ; e soprattutto perchè gli alleati di Sicilia, astretti già a fornirsi anche e di flotta , verrebbero a primavera (com’era verisimile) ad unirsi a loro con grandi forze. Laonde trovando da per tutto cagione a bene sperare, intendevano di ripigliar la guerra a viso aperto ; considerando che andando ella a finir bene, sarebbero in avvenire disciolti da pericoli cotanto gravi, come quello in che li avrebbero avvolti gli Ateniesi se si fossero aggiunti la Sicilia ; e che domati questi , essi avrebbero ornai sicuramente il principato su tutta la Grecia.