Thucydides, History of the Peloponnesian War, Theodor Braun (Translator), 7.62

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„Alle Vorkehrungen, von denen wir uns überzeugt, daß
sie uns in dem bei der Enge des Hafens unvermeidlichen Ge
dränge der Schiffe und gegenüber den uns früher gefährlich ge
wordenen Einrichtungen auf den Verdecken der Feinde von Nutzen
sein würden, haben auch wir jetzt, soweit möglich, nach Beratung
mit den Steuerleuten getroffen. Wir werden zahlreiche Speer-
und Bogenschützen und sonstige Mannschaft in Menge an Bord
nehmen. Wollten wir in offener See schlagen, so würden wir
das allerdings nicht dürfen, weil die schwere Belastung der
Schiffe ihrer Geschicklichkeit Abbruch tun könnte, hier aber,
wo wir auf unseren Schiffen gewissermaßen eine Landschlacht
zu liefern gezwungen sind, wird es uns zum Vorteil gereichen.
Wir haben uns alles ausgedacht, was erforderlich war, um
die Leistungsfähigkeit unserer Schiffe zu erhöhen, so gegen ihre
uns besonders gefährlich gewordenen schweren Sturmbalken
Griffe mit eisernen Händen, welche das feindliche Schiff hindern
werden, nach dem Zusammenstoß rückwärts zu rudern, falls die
Mannschaft auf dem Verdeck ihre Schuldigkeit tut. Denn so
weit ist es ja jetzt mit uns gekommen, daß wir auf den Schiffen
wie zu Lande fechten müssen, und deshalb ist es offenbar für
uns vorteilhaft, weder selbst rückwärts zu rudern, noch es den
Feinden zu gestatten, zumal der Strand bis auf einen kleinen,
von unseren Truppen besetzten Fleck in Feindes Hand ist.

History of the Peloponnesian War. Thucydides. Theodor Braun (Translator). Leipzig. 1917.

Current edition First1KGreek

Geschichte des Peloponnesischen Kriegs (German) (Thucydides. Geschichte des Peloponnesischen Kriegs. Braun, Theodor, translator. Leipzig: Insel-Verlag, 1917.)

Editions (1)

Ἱστορίαι Perseus (Thucydides. Historiae, Vol 1-2. Jones, Henry Stuart, editor. Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1910. (1942 printing).) — 7.62.1 focus

[1] ‘ἃ δὲ ἀρωγὰ ἐνείδομεν ἐπὶ τῇ τοῦ λιμένος στενότητι πρὸς τὸν μέλλοντα ὄχλον τῶν νεῶν ἔσεσθαι καὶ πρὸς τὴν ἐκείνων ἐπὶ τῶν καταστρωμάτων παρασκευήν, οἷς πρότερον ἐβλαπτόμεθα, πάντα καὶ ἡμῖν νῦν ἐκ τῶν παρόντων μετὰ τῶν κυβερνητῶν ἐσκεμμένα ἡτοίμασται.

[2] καὶ γὰρ τοξόται πολλοὶ καὶ ἀκοντισταὶ ἐπιβήσονται καὶ ὄχλος, ᾧ ναυμαχίαν μὲν ποιούμενοι ἐν πελάγει οὐκ ἂν ἐχρώμεθα διὰ τὸ βλάπτειν ἂν τὸ τῆς ἐπιστήμης τῇ βαρύτητι τῶν νεῶν, ἐν δὲ τῇ ἐνθάδε ἠναγκασμένῃ ἀπὸ τῶν νεῶν πεζομαχίᾳ πρόσφορα ἔσται.

[3] ηὕρηται δ’ ἡμῖν ὅσα χρὴ ἀντιναυπηγῆσαι, καὶ πρὸς τὰς τῶν ἐπωτίδων αὐτοῖς παχύτητας, ᾧπερ δὴ μάλιστα ἐβλαπτόμεθα, χειρῶν σιδηρῶν ἐπιβολαί, αἳ σχήσουσι τὴν πάλιν ἀνάκρουσιν τῆς προσπεσούσης νεώς, ἢν τὰ ἐπὶ τούτοις οἱ ἐπιβάται ὑπουργῶσιν.

[4] ἐς τοῦτο γὰρ δὴ ἠναγκάσμεθα ὥστε πεζομαχεῖν ἀπὸ τῶν νεῶν, καὶ τὸ μήτε αὐτοὺς ἀνακρούεσθαι μήτ’ ἐκείνους ἐᾶν ὠφέλιμον φαίνεται, ἄλλως τε καὶ τῆς γῆς, πλὴν ὅσον ἂν ὁ πεζὸς ἡμῶν ἐπέχῃ, πολεμίας οὔσης.

Translations (9)

The History of the Grecian War Perseus (Thucydides. The English works of Thomas Hobbes of Malmesbury. Hobbes, Thomas. translator. London: John Bohn, 1843.) — 7.62.1 focus

[1] "What we thought would be helps in the narrowness of the haven, against such a multitude of galleys as will be there and against the provision of the enemy upon their decks, whereby we were formerly annoyed, we have with the masters now considered them all, and as well as our present means will permit, made them ready.

[2] For many archers and darters shall go aboard: and that multitude, which if we had been to fight in the main sea we would not have used, because by slugging the galleys it would take away the use of skill, will nevertheless be useful here, where we are forced to make a landfight from our galleys.

[3] We have also devised, instead of what should have been provided for in the building of our galleys, against the thickness of the beaks of theirs, which did most hurt us, to lash their galleys unto ours with iron grapnels, whereby (if the men of arms do their part) we may keep the galleys which once come close up from falling back again.

[4] For we are brought to a necessity now of making it a land-fight upon the water; and it will be the best for us neither to fall back ourselves nor to suffer the enemy to do so, especially when, except what our men on land shall make good, the shore is altogether hostile.

History of the Peloponnesian War Perseus (Thucydides. History of the Peloponnesian War. Crawley, Richard, translator. London and Toronto: J. M. Dent and Sons Ltd.; New York: E. P. Dutton and Co., 1914.) — 7.62.1 focus

[1] Now, whatever we thought would be of service against the crush of vessels in such a narrow harbor, and against the force upon the decks of the enemy, from which we suffered before, has all been considered with the helmsmen, and, as far as our means allowed, provided.

[2] A number of archers and darters will go on board, and a multitude that we should not have employed in an action in the open sea, where our science would be crippled by the weight of the vessels; but in the present land-fight that we are forced to make from shipboard all this will be useful.

[3] We have also discovered the changes in construction that we must make to meet theirs; and against the thickness of their cheeks, which did us the greatest mischief, we have provided grappling-irons, which will prevent an assailant backing water after charging, if the soldiers on deck here do their duty;

[4] since we are absolutely compelled to fight a land battle from the fleet, and it seems to be our interest neither to back water ourselves, nor to let the enemy do so, especially as the shore, except so much of it as may be held by our troops, is hostile ground.

Geschichte des Peloponnesischen Kriegs First1KGreek (Thucydides. Geschichte des Peloponnesischen Kriegs. Wahrmund, Adolf, translator. Stuttgart: Krais and Hoffmann, 1864.) — 7.62 focus

„Alle Vorkehrungen, von denen wir bei der Enge des
Hasens und bei dem bevorstehenden Gedränge der Schiffe, sowie
gegen die Anstalten der Feinde auf ihren Schiffsverdecken, durch die
wir früher zu Schaden gekommen sind, Abhilfe erwarten konnten,
haben wir im Einvernehmen mit den Steuerleuten unserer Lage
gemäß in'S Auge gefaßt und in's Werk gesetzt. Denn sowohl zahlreiche
Bogenschützen und Speerträger werden die Schiffe besteigen, als auch
sonst viel Volk, welches wir bei einer Schiffsschlacht im offenen Meer
wohl nicht zugezogen hätten, weil sie durch Belastung der Schiffe die
Naschheit der geschickten Bewegung hemmen könnten; in diesem
Schiffskampfe aber, der nothgedrungen zu einer Landschlacht werden
muß, sind sie von Vortheil. Was Alles an unseren Schiffen
vorgekehrt werden mußte, zumal auch gegen die dicken Sturmbalken der
Feinde, durch die wir am meisten in Nachtheil kamen, das haben wir
ausfindig gemacht, nämlich eiserne Greifarme, welche das.anprallende
Schiff verhindern werden, sich wieder zurückzuziehen, sofern unsere
Bemannung sich dabei nur geschickt erweist. Denn dazu find wir
gezwungen, daß wir von den Schiffen , gleichsam eine Landschlacht
liefern, und es scheint unser Vortheil, daß wir weder selbst zurück^
weichen, noch auch jene es thun lassen, zumal uns ja auch das Ufer ¹
feindlich ist, außer was davon unser Landheer besetzt hält."

Histoire de la Guerre du Péloponèse First1KGreek (Thucydides. Histoire de la Guerre du Péloponnése, Vol. 1-2. Zévort, Marie Charles, translator. Paris: Charpentier, 1852.) — 7.62 focus

LXII. « Toutes les mesures qui nous ont semblé utiles dans les circonstances actuelles, soit en raison du peu d’étendue du port et de la multitude des vaisseaux, soit pour parer au mal que nous ont fait précédemment les troupes ennemies disposées sur les ponts, nous les avons étudiées et adoptées de concert avec les pilotes. Nous embarquons quantité d’archers et de gens de trait, une foule d’hommes que nous nous fussions bien gardés d’employer dans un combat au large, où la pesanteur des bâtiments aurait nui à la science de la manoeuvre, mais qui, dans la nécessité où nous sommes ici de livrer du haut de nos vaisseaux un combat de terre, nous seront utiles. Quant aux bâtiments, nous opposons de nouvelles dispositions à celles de l’ennemi; contre leurs antennes massives nous aurons des mains de fer qui, une fois jetées sur eux, ne laisseront pas à leurs bâtiments, pourvu que les équipages fassent ensuite leur devoir, la liberté de reculer après un premier choc pour revenir à la charge. Car, telle est la nécessité à laquelle nous sommes réduits : il nous faut, sur nos vaisseaux, engager un combat de terre ferme, et par suite ne pas rétrograder, ne pas permettre à l’ennemi de le faire, si nous trouvons avantage à cela; d’autant plus que toute la côte, à l’exception de l’espace occupé par notre armée de terre, est au pouvoir de l’ennemi.

Histoire de la Guerre du Péloponnése First1KGreek (Thucydides. Histoire de la Guerre du Péloponnése. Bétant, Élie-Ami, translator. Paris: Librairie de L. Hachette, 1863.) — 7.62 focus

« Toutes les mesures qui peuvent obvier à l’entassement des navires dans un port si resserré et à la disposition des tillacs ennemis, nous les avons étudiées de notre mieux et arrêtées de concert avec les pilotes. Nous embarquerons un grand nombre d’archers et de gens de trait ; cette foule, nous n’aurions garde de l’employer dans un combat au large, où la pesanteur des bâtiments entraverait la manœuvre ; mais elle ne laissera pas de nous être utile dans la nécessité où nous sommes de combattre de pied ferme du haut de nos vaisseaux. Nous avons trouvé les combinaisons les plus propres à neutraliser celles de l’ennemi. A ces massives épotides qui nous ont si fort incommodés, nous opposerons des mains de fer¹, qui, une fois lancées sur un navire , l’empêcheront de reculer, pourvu que sur le pont chacun fasse son devoir. Nous sommes réduits à une lutte d’abordage ; par conséquent il nous importe de ne pas reculer nous-mêmes et de ne pas permettre à l’ennemi de reculer ; d’autant plus que, à part l’espace occupé par nos troupes de terre, tout le rivage nous est hostile.

History of the Peloponnesian War First1KGreek (Thucydides, Vol. 1-4. Smith, Charles Foster, translator. London and Cambridge, MA: Heinemann and Harvard University Press, 1919-1923.) — 7.62.1 focus

[1] "But as regards anything that could be helpful to us, in view of the narrowness of the harbour, in combating such a throng of ships as will fill it and the forces which the enemy has placed on their decks—conditions which injured us before —all this has now been made ready by us also, as far as our circumstances permit, after consultation with our pilots.

[2] Indeed, many bowmen and javelin-men will go on board, and a multitude such as we should not use if we were making a fight in the open sea, because they would hamper our skill by increasing the weight of our ships, whereas in the land-battle that we are forced to fight here from the decks of our ships they will be of advantage.

[3] And we have contrived whatever counter-devices were necessary in the construction of our ships, and especially to combat the thickness of the enemy's catheads, a device from which we suffered most injury, we have provided grappling-irons, which will prevent the ship that has rammed us from backing off again, if the marines perform the service that will then devolve upon them.¹

[4] For we have been forced to the extremity of having to fight a land-battle on shipboard, and it is manifestly to our interest neither to back water ourselves nor to suffer them to do so, especially since the whole shore, except the small part of it that our land-force holds, is hostile.

History of the Peloponnesian War First1KGreek (Thucydides. The history of the Peloponnesian War, Volume 1-2. Dale, Henry, translator. London: Heinemann and Henry G. Bohn, 1851-1852.) — 7.62.1 focus

[1] "Now whatever we saw likely to be serviceable against the confined space of the harbour, with reference to the crowd of ships that there will be, and the enemy's troops upon their decks, from which we suffered before, every thing has now been looked to and prepared by us also, as far as present circumstances would allow, with the co-operation of the masters of our vessels.

[2] For great numbers of bow-men and dart-men will go on board, and a multitude such as we should not have used, had we been fighting in the open sea, as it would have interfered with the display of our skill through the weight of our ships; but in the present land-fight which we are compelled to make on board our ships, these things will be of service.

[3] We have also ascertained the different ways in which we must adapt the structure of our vessels for opposing theirs, and especially, against the stoutness of their cheeks, from which we received most damage, we have provided grappling irons, which will prevent the ship's retiring ¹ again after it has once charged, if the soldiers on board then do their duty.

[4] For to this necessity are we reduced, that we must maintain a land-fight on board our fleet; and it seems to be our interest neither to retire ourselves, nor to suffer them to do it; especially as the shore, except so far as our troops occupy it, is in possession of the enemy.

Historia Belli Peloponnesiaci First1KGreek (Historia Belli Peloponnesiaci. Haase, Friedrich, translator. Paris: Firmin Didot, 1869.) — 7.62.1 focus

[1] « Quae autem in his portus angustiis nobis profo* tura cognovimus adversus futuram navium turbam et adversus illorum apparatum in navium tabulatis instructum, unde prius damno afficiebamur, omnia ea nobis quoque nunc pro praesenti rerum facultate cum gubernatoribus prospecta et parata sunt.

[2] Nam sagittarii multi et jaculatores in tabulata adscendent, et multitudo, qua, si navale proelium in alto committeremus, non uteremur, quia navium onus rei nauticae disciplinam impediret; sed hic in pedestri proelio, quod ex navibus committere cogimur, utilis erit

[3] Pra-terea excogitavimus etiam, quae adversus hostes in navium structura erant paranda, et adversus epotidum crassitudi- nem, quae res praecipue nobis damno erat, ferrearum manuum injectiones, quae navem hostilem, quum invaserit, retinebunt, ne retro se recipiat, si modo vectores ea, qua; praeterea opus sunt, exsequantur.

[4] Ineam enim necessitatem jam adducti sumus, ut pedestre proelium ex navibus committamus; atque ut neque ipsi ab hostili classe resiliamus, neque illos resilire permittamus, utile esse apparet, praesertim quum terra sit hostilis, praeter eam, quam nosler peditatus obtinuerit. .

La storia di Tucidide First1KGreek (Thucydides. Della storia di Tucidide volgarizzata libri otto. Anonymous translator. Florence: Tipografia Galileiana, 1835.) — 7.62 focus

« Quelli argomenti poi che nella strettezza del porto abbiam visto doverci essere utili contro la moltitudine delle navi che ci verranno addosso, e contro i loro soldati di sovraccoperta, donde prima fummo danneggiati ; tutti questi li abbiamo ora anche noi considerati coi piloti , ed allestiti secondoché il permettevano le cose presenti. Imperocché saliranno sulle navi molti arcieri e lancintori, e tutta quella turba di che non useremmo se avessimo a combattere in mare aperto, perchè la gravezza delle navi nuoce alla perizia del governarle : le quali cose nondimeno ci saranno utili ora che saremo costretti a far battaglia terrestre di sulla flotta. Abbiamo anche trovato di che contrarmare le navi nostre ; ed a difenderle dai grossi orecchioni delle nemiche (dai quali avemmo grandissimo danno), scaglieremo delle branche di ferro, le quali i soldati adoperando a quell’uopo a che sono state fatte, atterreranno la nave assai itrice sì che non possa retrocedere ; giacche a tal necessità siam venuti da dover far battaglia terrestre di sulle navi. E ci si mostra utile il non dar uoi indietro, e il non permetterlo a loro, tanto più che abbiam nemica la spiaggia, salvo quel tratto che occupano i nostri fanti.

Thucydides History of the Peloponnesian War 7.62

Theodor Braun (Translator)

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