Thucydides, History of the Peloponnesian War, Theodor Braun (Translator), 7.42

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Eben jetzt kamen Demosthenes und Eurymedon mit den
Verstärkungen von Athen an, mit Einschluß der fremden etwa
dreiundsiebzig Schiffen, gegen fünftausend Hopliten, teils
Athenern, teils Bundesgenossen, und zahlreichen griechischen
und barbarischen Schleuderern, Speer- und Bogenschützen, auch
mit allem, was ein Heer im Felde bedarf, reichlich versehen.
Die Syrakuser und ihre Verbündeten erschraken zuerst nicht
wenig, daß der Krieg noch immer kein Ende nehmen wollte,
da sie sahen, wie die Athener trotz der Befestigung von Dekeleia
imstande waren, nochmal ein annähernd so starkes Heer wie
das erste ins Feld zu stellen und nach allen Seiten mit solcher
Macht aufzutreten. Das erste Heer der Athener aber bekam,
soweit dies nach der erlittenen Niederlage möglich war, wieder
Mut. Als Demosthenes sah, wie die Sachen tsanden, glaubte
er, keine Zeit verlieren zu dürfen, wenn es ihm nicht so gehen
sollte wie Nikias. Denn den hatte man bei seiner Ankunft
gefürchtet; weil er aber Syrakus nicht gleich angriff, sondern
in Katana überwinterte, kümmerte man sich nicht mehr um ihn,
und Gylippos kam aus dein Peloponnes noch rechtzeitig mit
seinem Heere an, das man gar nicht mehr hätte zu Hilfe rufen
können, wenn Nikias sogleich angegriffen hätte. Denn anfangs
hielten sich die Syrakuser allein für stark genug; wäre es aber
gleich zur Einschließung der Stadt gekommen, so würden sie
sich alsbald vom Gegenteil überzeugt haben, und eS hätte ihnen
nichts mehr genützt, noch Hilfe von drüben zu erbitten. Hier
von durchdrungen und überzeugt, daß auch er jetzt gleich im
ersten Augenblick den Feinden am furchtbarsten vorkommen
werde, wollte Demotshenes sich den ersten Schreck zunutze machen,
den ihnen sein Heer einflößte. Und da er sah, daß jene neue
Mauer, durch welche die Syrakuser die Athener verhindert
hatten, die Stadt völlig einzuschließen, nur eine einfache war,
und sobald man sich der Zugänge von Epipolai und dann auch
des Lagers dort wieder bemächtigt, leicht genommen werden
konnte, weil der Feind ihnen schwerlich standhalten würde, so
beschloß er es damit sofort zu versuchen. Auf diese Weise
dachte er dem Kriege auf kürzestem Wege ein Ende zu machen
und entweder, wenn die Sache gut ging, Syrakus zu nehmen,
widrigenfalls aber mit dem Heere abzuziehen, um die Athener,
die den Feldzug mitmachten, und die ganze Stadt davor zu
bewahren, ihre Kräfte unnütz aufzureiben. Zunächst verheerten
die Athener auf einem Streifzuge das Gebiet der Syrakuser
am Anapos, und ihre Streitkräfte waren wie anfangs zu Lande
und zur See den Gegnern überlegen. Denn die Syrakuser
kamen weder mit dem Heere noch mit der Flotte heraus,
höchstens daß sie sich zuweilen mit der Reiterei und den Speer
schützen vom Olympieion vorwagten.

History of the Peloponnesian War. Thucydides. Theodor Braun (Translator). Leipzig. 1917.

Current edition First1KGreek

Geschichte des Peloponnesischen Kriegs (German) (Thucydides. Geschichte des Peloponnesischen Kriegs. Braun, Theodor, translator. Leipzig: Insel-Verlag, 1917.)

Editions (1)

Ἱστορίαι Perseus (Thucydides. Historiae, Vol 1-2. Jones, Henry Stuart, editor. Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1910. (1942 printing).) — 7.42.1 focus

[1] καὶ οἱ μὲν ὡς ἐπιθησόμενοι κατ’ ἀμφότερα παρεσκευάζοντο αὖθις, ἐν τούτῳ δὲ Δημοσθένης καὶ Εὐρυμέδων ἔχοντες τὴν ἀπὸ τῶν Ἀθηνῶν βοήθειαν παραγίγνονται, ναῦς τε τρεῖς καὶ ἑβδομήκοντα μάλιστα ξὺν ταῖς ξενικαῖς καὶ ὁπλίτας περὶ πεντακισχιλίους ἑαυτῶν τε καὶ τῶν ξυμμάχων, ἀκοντιστάς τε βαρβάρους καὶ Ἕλληνας οὐκ ὀλίγους, καὶ σφενδονήτας καὶ τοξότας καὶ τὴν ἄλλην παρασκευὴν ἱκανήν.

[2] καὶ τοῖς μὲν Συρακοσίοις καὶ ξυμμάχοις κατάπληξις ἐν τῷ αὐτίκα οὐκ ὀλίγη ἐγένετο, εἰ πέρας μηδὲν ἔσται σφίσι τοῦ ἀπαλλαγῆναι τοῦ κινδύνου, ὁρῶντες οὔτε διὰ τὴν Δεκέλειαν τειχιζομένην οὐδὲν ἧσσον στρατὸν ἴσον καὶ παραπλήσιον τῷ προτέρῳ ἐπεληλυθότα τήν τε τῶν Ἀθηναίων δύναμιν πανταχόσε πολλὴν φαινομένην· τῷ δὲ προτέρῳ στρατεύματι τῶν Ἀθηναίων ὡς ἐκ κακῶν ῥώμη τις ἐγεγένητο.

[3] ὁ δὲ Δημοσθένης ἰδὼν ὡς εἶχε τὰ πράγματα καὶ νομίσας οὐχ οἷόν τε εἶναι διατρίβειν οὐδὲ παθεῖν ὅπερ ὁ Νικίας ἔπαθεν (ἀφικόμενος γὰρ τὸ πρῶτον ὁ Νικίας φοβερός, ὡς οὐκ εὐθὺς προσέκειτο ταῖς Συρακούσαις, ἀλλ’ ἐν Κατάνῃ διεχείμαζεν, ὑπερώφθη τε καὶ ἔφθασεν αὐτὸν ἐκ τῆς Πελοποννήσου στρατιᾷ ὁ Γύλιππος ἀφικόμενος, ἣν οὐδ’ ἂν μετέπεμψαν οἱ Συρακόσιοι, εἰ ἐκεῖνος εὐθὺς ἐπέκειτο· ἱκανοὶ γὰρ αὐτοὶ οἰόμενοι εἶναι ἅμα τ’ ἂν ἔμαθον ἥσσους ὄντες καὶ ἀποτετειχισμένοι ἂν ἦσαν, ὥστε μηδ’ εἰ μετέπεμψαν ἔτι ὁμοίως ἂν αὐτοὺς ὠφελεῖν), ταῦτα οὖν ἀνασκοπῶν ὁ Δημοσθένης, καὶ γιγνώσκων ὅτι καὶ αὐτὸς ἐν τῷ παρόντι τῇ πρώτῃ ἡμέρᾳ μάλιστα δεινότατός ἐστι τοῖς ἐναντίοις, ἐβούλετο ὅτι τάχος ἀποχρήσασθαι τῇ παρούσῃ τοῦ στρατεύματος ἐκπλήξει.

[4] καὶ ὁρῶν τὸ παρατείχισμα τῶν Συρακοσίων, ᾧ ἐκώλυσαν περιτειχίσαι σφᾶς τοὺς Ἀθηναίους, ἁπλοῦν ὂν καί, εἰ κρατήσειέ τις τῶν τε Ἐπιπολῶν τῆς ἀναβάσεως καὶ αὖθις τοῦ ἐν αὐταῖς στρατοπέδου, ῥᾳδίως ἂν αὐτὸ ληφθέν (οὐδὲ γὰρ ὑπομεῖναι ἂν σφᾶς οὐδένα),

[5] ἠπείγετο ἐπιθέσθαι τῇ πείρᾳ, καί οἱ ξυντομωτάτην ἡγεῖτο διαπολέμησιν· ἢ γὰρ κατορθώσας ἕξειν Συρακούσας, ἢ ἀπάξειν τὴν στρατιὰν καὶ οὐ τρίψεσθαι ἄλλως Ἀθηναίους τε τοὺς ξυστρατευομένους καὶ τὴν ξύμπασαν πόλιν.

[6] πρῶτον μὲν οὖν τήν τε γῆν ἐξελθόντες τῶν Συρακοσίων ἔτεμον οἱ Ἀθηναῖοι περὶ τὸν Ἄναπον, καὶ τῷ στρατεύματι ἐπεκράτουν ὥσπερ τὸ πρῶτον, τῷ τε πεζῷ καὶ ταῖς ναυσίν (οὐδὲ γὰρ καθ’ ἕτερα οἱ Συρακόσιοι ἀντεπεξῇσαν ὅτι μὴ τοῖς ἱππεῦσι καὶ ἀκοντισταῖς ἀπὸ τοῦ Ὀλυμπιείου)·

Translations (9)

The History of the Grecian War Perseus (Thucydides. The English works of Thomas Hobbes of Malmesbury. Hobbes, Thomas. translator. London: John Bohn, 1843.) — 7.42.1 focus

[1] In the meantime Demosthenes and Eurymedon arrived with the Athenian supply, being about seventy-three galleys, and men of arms, of their own and of their confederates, about five thousand, besides darters, as well barbarians as Greeks, not a few, and slingers and archers, and all other provision sufficient.

[2] For the present it not a little daunted the Syracusians and their confederates to see no end of their danger, and that, notwithstanding the fortifying in Deceleia, another army should come now equal and like unto their former, and that their power should be so great in every kind. And on the other side, it was a kind of strengthening after weakness to the Athenian army that was there before.

[3] Demosthenes, when he saw how things stood, and thinking it unfit to loiter and fall into Nicias' case-for Nicias, who was formidable at his first coming, when he set not presently upon Syracuse but wintered at Catana, both grew into contempt and was prevented also by the coming of Gylippus thither with an army out of Peloponnesus; the which, if Nicias had gone against Syracuse at first, had never been so much as sent for; for supposing themselves to have been strong enough alone, they had at once both found themselves too weak and the city been enclosed with a wall; whereby, though they had sent for it, it could not have helped them as it didDemosthenes, I say, considering this, and that he also even at the present and the same day was most terrible to the enemy, intended with all speed to make use of this present terribleness of the army.

[4] And having observed that the cross wall of the Syracusians, wherewith they hindered the Athenians from enclosing the city, was but single, and that if they could be masters of the ascent to Epipolae and again of the camp there, the same might easily be taken (for none would have stood against them), hasted to put it to trial, and thought it his shortest way to the dispatching of the war.

[5] For either he should have success, he thought, and so win Syracuse, or he would lead away the army and no longer without purpose consume both the Athenians there with him and the whole state.

[6] The Athenians therefore went out and first wasted the territory of the Syracusians about the river Anapus, and were the stronger, as at first, both by sea and land. For the Syracusians durst neither way go out against them, but only with their horsemen and darters from Olympieium.

History of the Peloponnesian War Perseus (Thucydides. History of the Peloponnesian War. Crawley, Richard, translator. London and Toronto: J. M. Dent and Sons Ltd.; New York: E. P. Dutton and Co., 1914.) — 7.42.1 focus

[1] In the meantime, while the Syracusans were preparing for a second attack upon both elements, Demosthenes and Eurymedon arrived with the succors from Athens , consisting of about seventy-three ships, including the foreigners; nearly five thousand heavy infantry, Athenian and allied; a large number of darters, Hellenic and barbarian, and slingers and archers and everything else upon a corresponding scale.

[2] The Syracusans and their allies were for the moment not a little dismayed at the idea that there was to be no term or ending to their dangers, seeing, in spite of the fortification of Decelea, a new army arrive nearly equal to the former, and the power of Athens proving so great in every quarter. On the other hand, the first Athenian armament regained a certain confidence in the midst of its misfortunes.

[3] Demosthenes, seeing how matters stood, felt that he could not drag on and fare as Nicias had done, who by wintering in Catana instead of at once attacking Syracuse had allowed the terror of his first arrival to evaporate in contempt, and had given time to Gylippus to arrive with a force from Peloponnese , which the Syracusans would never have sent for if he had attacked immediately; for they fancied that they were a match for him by themselves, and would not have discovered their inferiority until they were already invested, and even if they then sent for succors, they would no longer have been equally able to profit by their arrival. Recollecting this, and well aware that it was now on the first day after his arrival that he like Nicias was most formidable to the enemy, Demosthenes determined to lose no time in drawing the utmost profit from the consternation at the moment inspired by his army;

[4] and seeing that the counter wall of the Syracusans, which hindered the Athenians from investing them, was a single one, and that he who should become master of the way up to Epipolae, and afterwards of the camp there, would find no difficulty in taking it, as no one would even wait for his attack, made all haste to attempt the enterprise.

[5] This he took to be the shortest way of ending the war, as he would either succeed and take Syracuse , or would lead back the armament instead of frittering away the lives of the Athenians engaged in the expedition and the resources of the country at large.

[6] First therefore the Athenians went out and laid waste the lands of the Syracusans about the Anapus and carried all before them as at first by land and by sea, the Syracusans not offering to oppose them upon either element, unless it were with their cavalry and darters from the Olympieum.

Geschichte des Peloponnesischen Kriegs First1KGreek (Thucydides. Geschichte des Peloponnesischen Kriegs. Wahrmund, Adolf, translator. Stuttgart: Krais and Hoffmann, 1864.) — 7.42 focus

Da aber ershcienen Demotshenes und Eurymedon mit der
Athenischen Verstärkung. Auf ungefähr dreiundsiebenzig^) Schiffen,
eingerechnet die fremden, führten sie gegen fünftausend
Schwerbewaffnete von den Athenern und den Bundesgenossen und eine nicht
geringe Zahl von hellenischen und barbarischen Speerträgern und
Schleuderern und Bogenschützen und auch sonst hinreichende
Zurüstung. Die Syrakusaner nun und ihre Bundesgenossen erschracken
im ersten Augenblick nicht wenig, daß die gänzliche Befreiung aus
der Gefahr noch nicht gekommen sein sollte. Denn sie sahen, daß
trotz der Befestigung von Dekeleia nichts destoweniger ein fast gleich
starkes Heer, wie das erste, herangekommen sei, und wie stark die
athenische Macht sich nach allen Seiten hin zeige. Dem alten
athenischen Heer hatte sich der Muth wieder erhöht, soweit dies nach den
Unfällen möglich war. Demotshenes aber, als er sah, wie die Dinge
standen, dachte, er dürfe nicht lange zaudern, wie Nikias, und sich
nicht gleichen Schlägen aussetzen — denn bei seiner Ankunft hatte
Nikias zuerst Schrecken verbreitet, als er aber Syrakus nicht sogleich
angriff, sondern in Katana überwinterte, so fing man an ihn zu
verachten, und Gylippos mit dem Heer aus dem Peloponnes überraschte ¹²
ihn durch seine Ankunft, da doch.die Syrakusaner wohl nicht einmal ³
nach diesem geschickt hätten, wenn jener sie sogleich angriff; denn dal
sie sich für hinreichend stark hielten, so hätten sie wohl lernen müssen,
daß sie die Schwächeren seien, und wären eingeschlossen worden, so
daß ihnen jener nicht einmal mehr so hätte nützen können, selbst
wenn sie um ihn geschickt hätten; — diese Ueberlegungen nun machte
Demosthenes, und da er einsah, daß in der gegenwärtigen Lage der
Dinge auch er dem Gegner am ersten Tage am furchtbarsten sei, so
wollte er die augenblickliche Furcht vor seinem Heere so rasch als
möglich ausnützen. Nun sah er, daß die Gegenmauer der
Syrakusaner, durch welche sie die Athener an ihrer völligen Einschließung
gehindert hatten, nur einfach sei und leicht genommen wäre, wenn
man sich erst des Abhangs bemächtigt hätte, der nach Epipolä hinauf
führte^), und sodann des Lagers in diesem Orte selbst — denn
dann werde man nicht einmal ihren Angriff abwarten — demnahc
beeilte er sich, diesen Versuch zu unternehmen, der ihm den Krieg auf
die kürzeste Weise zu beendigen schien; denn entweder, im Fall des
Gelingens, werde er in den Besitz von Syrakus gelangen, oder werde
er das Heer nach Haus zurückführen und die mit zu Felde gezogenen
Athener und den ganzen Staat nicht vergeblich sich aufreiben lassen.

Histoire de la Guerre du Péloponèse First1KGreek (Thucydides. Histoire de la Guerre du Péloponnése, Vol. 1-2. Zévort, Marie Charles, translator. Paris: Charpentier, 1852.) — 7.42 focus

XLII. Cependant, Démosthènes et Eurymédon arrivèrent avec les renforts envoyés par les Athéniens. Ils amenaient soixante-treize vaisseaux, y compris ceux du dehors¹, environ cinq mille hoplites, athéniens ou alliés, un grand nombre d'hommes de trait, grecs et barbares, des frondeurs, des archers et le reste île l’équipement en proportion. Les Syracusains et leurs alliés furent tout d’abord dans une consternation profonde; il semblait qu’il ne dût y avoir aucun terme à leurs dangers, puisque même la fortification deDécélie n’empêchait pas l’arrivée d’une armée égale et comparable à la première, et que la puissance athénienne se montrait partout formidable. L’ancienne armée athénienne, au contraire, vit là son salut² et reprit quelque courage. Démosthènes, voyant l’état des affaires, jugea qu'il n’y avait point de temps à perdre et qu’il ne fallait pas tomber dans la même faute que Nicias : formidable d’abord à son arrivée, il avait, au lieu d’attaquer immédiatement Syracuse, pris ses quartiers d’hiver à Catane; par là, il avait perdu tout prestige et laissé à Gylippe le temps de le prévenir avec l’armée qu’il amenait du Péloponnèse. Cette armée, les Syracusains ³⁴ ne l’auraient même pas appelée, s'il les eût attaqués tout d’abord; car, se croyant en état de résister, ils n’auraient reconnu leur insuffisance que lorsqu’ils eussent été déjà investis d’une muraille; et, l’eussentils appelée alors, elle ne pouvait plus leur être de la même utilité. Guidé par ces considérations, et sentant bien que l’effroi qu’ilinspirait à l’ennemi ne pourrait que s’affaiblir le premier jour passé, Démosthènes résolut de profiter sans délai de la démoralisation que causait dans le moment l’arrivée de son armée. Voyant que le mur latéral par lequel les Syracusains avaient empêché l’entier investissement de la place était simple, et qu’une fois maître des pentes d’Épipolæ et du camp assis sur la hauteur, ons’empareraitaisémentde ce mur où personne dès lors n’oserait tenir, il se hâta de tenter l’entreprise. Par là il comptait abréger de beaucoup la guerre : s’il réussissait, il s’emparerait de Syracuse; sinon, il ramènerait les troupes, au lieu de laisser se consumer sans résultat l’armée expéditionnaire et la république entière. Les Athéniens firent d’abord une sortie et ravagèrent les campagnes syracusaines aux environs de l’Anapos. Leur supériorité se maintenait encore, comme auparavant, sur terre et sur mer; car ni d’un côté ni de l’autre les Syracusains ne vinrent à leur rencontre, à part la cavalerie et les gens de trait d’Olympiéon.

Histoire de la Guerre du Péloponnése First1KGreek (Thucydides. Histoire de la Guerre du Péloponnése. Bétant, Élie-Ami, translator. Paris: Librairie de L. Hachette, 1863.) — 7.42 focus

Peu de temps après arrivèrent Démosthène et Eury-médon, à la tête des renforts envoyés d'Athènes. Ils amenaient soixante-treize vaisseaux, y compris les bâtiments étrangers, environ cinq mille hoplites athéniens et alliés, un grand nombre de gens de trait grecs et barbares, en un mot un armement complet. Les Syracusains et leurs alliés eurent un moment de stupeur ; ils se demandaient si le péril n’aurait aucun terme, puisque l’occupation de Décélie n’empêchait pas les Athéniens d’expédier une armée égale à la première et de faire cet immense déploiement de forces. L’ancienne armée athénienne, au contraire, reprit courage après les maux qu’elle avait soufferts.

Démosthène, voyant l’état des choses, estima qu’il ne fallait pas perdre de temps ni tomber dans la même faute que Nicias. Celui-ci avait d’abord répandu l’épouvante ; mais, au lieu d’attaquer immédiatement Syracuse, il avait passé l’hiver à Catane ; son irrésolution avait provoqué le dédain de ses adversaires et donné à Gylippe le temps d’arriver avec les secours du Pélo-ponèse, secours que les Syracusains n’auraient pas même eu l’idée de réclamer si Nicias les eût assaillis d’emblée; dans leur sécurité présomptueuse, ils n’auraient reconnu l’insuffisance de leurs forces qu’en se voyant investis ; alors, eussent-ils demandé du secours, il ne leur eût plus été si utile. Démo-sthène faisait ces réflexions, et convaincu que jamais il n’inspirerait plus de terreur que dans ce premier jour, il voulut profiter aussitôt du prestige de ses armes. Quand il vit que le mur parallèle, opposé à la circonvallation parles Syracusains, était simple et que, pour faire tomber toute résistance, il suffirait d’enlever la montée des Ëpipoles et le camp placé en ce lieu, il se hâta de tenter une entreprise qu’il regardait comme décisive. En cas de succès, il était maître de Syracuse; autrement, il lèverait le siège, sans laisser les Athéniens, les alliés et la ville entière s'épuiser en efforts superflus.

En conséquence, les Athéniens sortirent d’abord, et dévastèrent le territoire voisin de l’Anapos. Leur armée reprit son ancien ascendant sur terre et sur mer. Les Syracusains ne lui opposèrent d’autres forces que les cavaliers et les gens de trait postés à l’Olympéion.

History of the Peloponnesian War First1KGreek (Thucydides, Vol. 1-4. Smith, Charles Foster, translator. London and Cambridge, MA: Heinemann and Harvard University Press, 1919-1923.) — 7.42.1 focus

[1] At this juncture, however, Demosthenes and Eurymedon arrived with the reinforcements from Athens, consisting of about seventy-three ships, including the foreign vessels, and nearly five thousand hoplites, both Athenian and allied, and not a few Barbarian and Hellenic javelin-men, slingers, and bowmen, together with an adequate supply of other equipment. The Syracusans and their allies were seized with no little consternation at the moment, wondering if they were never to have any final deliverance from their peril;

[2] for they saw that in spite of the fortification of Deceleia an army equal or nearly equal to the first one had come to reinforce it, and that the power of the Athenians was apparently great in all directions. The first Athenian army, on the other hand, had, considering their past misfortunes,¹ recovered a certain confidence. Demosthenes, seeing how matters stood, was of the opinion that it would not do to waste time and thus invite the same experience that Nicias had met with.

[3] For Nicias when he first came inspired terror; but as he did not immediately attack Syracuse but spent the winter at Catana, he came to be despised, and Gylippus forestalled him by coming from the Peloponnesus with an army. This force the Syracusans would not even have sent for if he had attacked without delay; for they would have supposed that they could cope with him unaided, and would not, therefore, have discovered that they were too weak until they had been completely walled in, so that, even if they had sent for reinforcements then, these would no longer have availed them to the same extent. Demosthenes, therefore, taking these facts into consideration and realizing that he also at the present time was most formidable to his opponents on the very first day after his arrival, wished at the earliest possible moment to reap the full benefit of their present consternation at his army.

[4] Accordingly, seeing that the Syracusan cross-wall, by which they had prevented the Athenians from completing their investment, was a single one, and that, if one should get control of the ascent to Epipolae and after that of the camp upon it, the wall itself could easily be taken—for the enemy would not then stand his ground against them—

[5] he was eager to make the attempt. He thought this to be the shortest way to end the war; for he would either be successful and take Syracuse, or else would lead his army home and not wear out to no purpose both the Athenians who took part in the expedition and the entire state.

[6]
In the first place, then, the Athenians went out and proceeded to ravage the land of the Syracusans in the region of the Anapus river, and at this time, as at first, they had the upper hand with their army both by land and by sea; for on neither element did the Syracusans come out to meet them except with their cavalry and javelin-men from the Olympieium.

History of the Peloponnesian War First1KGreek (Thucydides. The history of the Peloponnesian War, Volume 1-2. Dale, Henry, translator. London: Heinemann and Henry G. Bohn, 1851-1852.) — 7.42.1 focus

[1] At this time Demosthenes and Eurymedon arrived with the succours from Athens, consisting of above seventy-three ships (including the foreign ones) and about five thousand heavy-armed of their own and the allies, with dart-men, both Grecian and barbarian, not a few, slingers, bow-men, and the rest of the armament on a large scale.

[2] No slight consternation was produced at the moment amongst the Syracusans and their allies, at the thought that they were to have no final deliverance from their dangers, seeing that there was newly come, none the less for the fortification of Decelea, an armament equal, or nearly so, to the first, and that the power of the Athenians appeared great on all sides; while in the former Athenian forces fresh confidence (considering their late misfortunes) had now sprung up. Demosthenes, on the other hand, seeing how matters stood, thought that it was not possible for him to waste the time, and 'so to experience the fate which Nicias had done.

[3] For although that general spread terror on his first arrival, he was despised, through not immediately attacking Syracuse, but spending the winter at Catana, and Gylippus anticipated his success by arriving with forces from the Peloponnese, which the Syracusans would never have sent for at all if he had immediately attacked them; for while fancying themselves a match for him, they would at once have discovered their inferiority, and have been invested; so that, even if they had stat for them, they would not then have dune them the same service. Reviewing these things, then, and thinking that he himself too was decidedly most formidable to the adversary at the present time, even the very first day, Demosthenes wished, as quickly as possible, to avail himself to the utmost of the present dismay of their forces.

[4] And seeing that the counter-wall of the Syracusans, by which they had prevented the Athenians from circumvallating them, was but a single one, and that if any one had carried the ascent to Epipolae, and then the camp on it, the work might easily be taken, (for no one at all would so much as wait his attack,) he was in a hurry to make the attempt.

[5] And this he thought was his shortest way of bringing the war to a conclusion; for he would either gain possession of Syracuse by succeeding in his design, or lead back the armament, and not exhaust for no purpose both the Athenians who joined the expedition and the whole state.

[6] In the first place, then, the Athenians went out and ravaged a part of the Syracusan territory, about the Anapus, and were superior in force, as they had originally been, both by land and by sea: (for in neither way did the Syracusans come out against them, except with their cavalry and dart-men from the Olympieum.)

Historia Belli Peloponnesiaci First1KGreek (Historia Belli Peloponnesiaci. Haase, Friedrich, translator. Paris: Firmin Didot, 1869.) — 7.42.1 focus

[1] interea vero Demosthenes et Eurymedon cum auxilio, quod Athenis adducebant, adveniunt, navibus ferme tribus et septuaginta, una cum peregrinis, et fere cum quinque millibus gravis armaturae militum, tam ex suis popularibus, quam cx sociis, praeterea cum jaculatoribus barbaris et Graecis non paucis, et funditoribus et sagittariis, et reliquo apparatu, quanto opus erat.

[2] Atque Syracusanis quidem et sociis non exiguus pavor tunc incessit, si nullus periculi devitandi finis sibi futuros esset, quum viderent, quamvis Decelea esset munita, ideo tamen nihilo minus exercitum parem atque similem priori contra se venisse, et Atheniensium vires undique magnas apparere; priori vero Atheniensium exercitui, ut post mala, quoddam animi robur accesserat.

[3] Demosthenes autem quum vidisset, quo in statu res essent, et existimasset, nullo modo licere tempus terere, nec committendum, quod Nicias commiserat (Nicias enim quum initio formidabilis illuc appulisset, quia Syracusas non protinus adoriebatur, sed Catanae hibernabat, in contemptionem venit, eumque Gylippus cum copiis ex Peloponneso antevertit, quas ne arcessissentquidem Syracusani, si ille confestim invasisset; nam quum ipsi se satis virium habere putarent, uno eodemque tempore se inferiores esse cognovissent, et circumvallati essent; quare ne si arcessissent quidem, ipsos amplius aeque juvare potuisset), haec igitur quum consideraret Demosthenes, et sciret, se quoque in praesentia primo potissimum die maxime formidabilem hostibus esse, praesenti suarum copiarum terrore quam celerrime ab uti volebat.

[4] Et quum animadverteret, Syracusanorum murum secundum suas munitiones exstructum, quo se ab Atheniensibus circumvallari prohibuerant, simplicem esse, et si quis occupasset et Epipolarum aditum, et castra, quae in iis erant, illum facile captum iri, (nullum enim fore qui suorum impetum auderet sustinere), rem aggredi, periculumque facere properabat,

[5] brevissimamque hanc esse putabat debellandi rationem; aut enim re feliciter gesta Syracusis se potiturum aut copias abducturam et non attriturum frustra Athenienses tam eos, qui una militarent, quam universam civitatem.

[6] Primum igitur egressi Athenienses Syracusanorum agrum, qui circum Anapum erat, vastarunt, et pedestribus navalibusque copiis, ut ante, superiores erant (adversus neutras enim Syracusani prodibant, nisi cum equilibus et jaculatoribus ex Olympieo);

La storia di Tucidide First1KGreek (Thucydides. Della storia di Tucidide volgarizzata libri otto. Anonymous translator. Florence: Tipografia Galileiana, 1835.) — 7.42 focus

In questo arrivano Demostene ed Eurimedonte col rinforzo degli Ateniesi, cioè, settantatrè navi in circa contando anche quelle forestiere, e cinque migliaia o in quel torno di soldatesca grave, tra di loro e degli alleati, e non pochi lanciatori barbari e greci, e frombolieri e arcieri, e sufficiente apparecchio d’ogni mauiera. Grande fu di presente lo sbigottimento de’Siracusani, quasi che non avessero mai a venire a capo di liberarsi da quel pericolo, vedendo che sebbene Decelia fosse stata munita , era giunto un altro esercito poco men che eguale al precedente, e le forze ateniesi per ogni lato comparivano molte. Ma l’oste degli Ateniesi che ivi era di prima riprese un po’ coraggio, secondo che il permettevano le sue disgrazie. E Demostene visto lo stato delle cose credè non essere da indugiare, per non trovarsi al caso a che s’era trovato Nicia ; il quale in principio venuto colà formidabile ai nemici, poiché non assaltò subito Siracusa ma andò a svernare in Catana, era caduto in dispregio, ed era stato prevenuto da Gilippo arrivato colà colle forze del Peloponneso, le quali i Siracusani non avrebbero pur chiamate se egli tosto li avesse assaliti. Essendoché i Siracusani con tutta Topinione della propria sufficienza avrebbero imparato che eran da meno, e sarebbono stati riserrali dalle fortificazioni ; onde sebbene avessero fatto venire un rinforzo , non poteva più esser loro della medesima utilità. Demostene adunque considerando queste cose, e vedendo che anch’egli al presente era di grandissima paura ai nemici nel primo giorno, voleva al più presto valersi di quel loro sbigottimento. E però osservando che il muro trasversale de9 Siracusani, col quale aveano impedito agli Ateniesi di attorniarli, era scempio; e che potendo farsi padroni della montata d’Epipole e poi del campo che ivi era, facilmente si sarebbe espugnato (avvegnaché nissuno avrebbe fatto retta contr’essi), si affrettava di metter mano a quell’ impresa, e teneva che prestissimo arebbe fine la guerra. Perciocché, o riuscendo s’impadronirebbe di Siracusa, o altrimenti ritirerebbe l’esercito, e non si logorerebbero inutilmente gli Ateniesi, e con loro gli altri confederati, e tutta la Repubblica. Pertanto gli Ateniesi primieramente scesi dalle navi guastavano le circostanze dell’Anapo; ed il loro esercito, come la prima volta, fu vincitore in terra e in mare, stante che i Siracusani non uscirono contr’essi da veruna parte , salvo la cavalleria ed i lanciatori dall’Olimpico.

Thucydides History of the Peloponnesian War 7.42

Theodor Braun (Translator)

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