Thucydides History of the Peloponnesian War 7.14

[1] "To you I write, who know how small a time any fleet continueth in the height of vigour, and how few of the mariners are skilful both how to hasten the course of a galley and how to contain the oar.

[2] But of all, my greatest trouble is this: that being general, I can neither make them do better (for your natures are hard to be governed) nor get mariners in any other place (which the enemy can do from many places), and must of necessity have them from whence we brought both those we have and those we have lost. For our now confederate cities, Naxos and Catana, are not able to supply us.

[3] Had the enemy but that one thing more, that the towns of Italy that now send us provision, seeing what estate we are now in and you not helping us, would turn to them, the war were at an end and we expugned without another stroke.

[4] "I could have written to you other things more pleasing than these, but not more profitable, seeing it is necessary for you to know certainly the affairs here when you go to council upon them. Withal, because I know your natures to be such as though you love to hear the best, yet afterwards when things fall not out accordingly you will call in question them that write it, I thought best to write the truth for my own safety's sake.

[1] Now I need not remind you that the time during which a crew is in its prime is short, and that the number of sailors who can start a ship on her way and keep the rowing in time is small.

[2] But by far my greatest trouble is, that holding the post which I do, I am prevented by the natural indocility of the Athenian seaman from putting a stop to these evils; and that meanwhile we have no source from which to recruit our crews, which the enemy can do from many quarters, but are compelled to depend both for supplying the crews in service and for making good our losses upon the men whom we brought with us. For our present confederates, Naxos and Catana , are incapable of supplying us.

[3] There is only one thing more wanting to our opponents, I mean the defection of our Italian markets. If they were to see you neglect to relieve us from our present condition, and were to go over to the enemy, famine would compel us to evacuate, and Syracuse would finish the war without a blow.

[4] I might, it is true, have written to you something different and more agreeable than this, but nothing certainly more useful, if it is desirable for you to know the real state of things here before taking your measures. Besides I know that it is your nature to love to be told the best side of things, and then to blame the teller if the expectations which he has raised in your minds are not answered by the result; and I therefore thought it safest to declare to you the truth.

„Ich wiederhole es euch, obgleich ihr eS selbst schon wisset,
daß der treffliche Zustand der Flottenmannschaft nicht von langer
Dauer war, und es find jetzt nur Wenige unter der Bemannung, die
es verstehen, ein Fahrzeug in Bewegung zu setzen und das Rudern
in Ordnung zu halten. Von dem Allem aber das Schlimmste ist,
daß ich, der Feldherr, kein Mittel habe, dem zu wehren, und daß
wir keine Quellen haben, um unsere Schiffsbemannung zu ergänzen,
wozu unsern Feinden viele Wege offen stehen; sondern nothgedrungen
muß das, was wir mitgebracht haben, sowohl die Erfordernisse des
Augenblicks bestreiten, als auch zur Ergänzung der Verluste dienen;
denn die jetzt mit uns verbündeten Städte, Naxos und Katana,
haben keine Mittel. Sollte sich aber auch noch das Eine zu Gunsten
unserer Gegner wenden, daß die Gegenden Italiens, welche uns
nähren, — wenn sie sehen, wie es um uns steht, und daß ihr keine Hülfe
schicket — zu jenen übertreten, so find wir durch Einschließung zur
Uebergabe gezwungen, und der Krieg ist ohne weiteren
Schwertstreich aus."

„Ich hätte euch zwar angenehmere Dinge, als diese, melden
können, nützlichere jedoch nicht, sosern ihr bei genauer Kenntniß der
hiesigen Lage eure Entschlüsse fassen wollt. Und da ich eure Art
und Weise recht gut kenne, daß ihr nämlich immer das Angenehmste
hören wollt, hinterdrein aber mit Anklagen kommt, wenn die Sache
nicht nach Erwarten ausgeht, so hielt ich es für gerathener, die
Wahrheit darzulegen."

XIV. « Vous savez, même sans que je vous l’écrive, que de bons équipages sont rares, et qu’il est peu de matelots qui sachent et appareiHer et manier la rame en cadence. Le plus embarrassant, c’est que, tout général que je suis, je n’ai pas le pouvoir d’empêcher ces désordres (car votre naturel est difficile à gouverner), et que nous ne trouvons d’aucun côté à nous refaire. L’ennemi au contraire trouve de toutes parts des facilités; tandis que nous, tout ce que nous avons encore, tout ce que nous dépensons en hommes, est nécessairement pris sur ce que nous avions en arrivant. Caries villes que nous avons maintenant pour alliées, Naxos et Catane, ne peuvent rien pour nous. Qu’à tous ces avantages nos ennemis en joignent un autre, que les villes d’ltalie qui nous font vivre, voyant où nous en sommes, l’abandon où vous nous laissez, se rangent de leur côté, la guerre se terminera sans combat; car nous serons forcés à nous rendre. J’aurais pu vous mander des choses plus agréables, mais je n’en vois pas de plus utiles, puisqu’il faut que vous sachiez exactement quelle est ici la situation, pour en délibérer. Je connais d’ailleurs votre caractère; vous aimez à entendre les nouvelles les plus flatteuses; mais comme vous rejetez ensuite la responsabilité sur qui vous les donne, si l’événement n’y répond pas, j’ai cru plus sûr de vous faire connaître la vérité.

« Vous le. savez r sans qu’il soit nécessaire de vous l’écrirç, un équipage n’est pas longtemps en parfait état; ils sont rares les matelots qui donnent l’impulsion au navire et le branle aux rameurs. Mais le pire de tout, c’est qu’il ne m’est pas possible, à moi général, d’empêcher ces désordres; car vous êtes d’un caractère malaisé à gouverner. Nous ne savons pas où recruter nos équipages, tandis que rien n’est plus facile aux ennemis. Pour satisfaire au service journalier et pour combler nos vides, nous somjnes réduits aux seules ressources que nous avions en arrivant; car les villes alliées, Naxos et Catane, ne nous sont d’aucun appui. Pour peu que les ennemis aient encore un seul avantage, si par exemple les villes d’Italie qui nous alimentent, voyant la situation où nous sommes et l’absence de vos secours, passent de leur côté, nous ne pourrons plus soutenir le siège, et la guerre se terminera pour eux sans coup férir.

« J’aurais pu vous mander des choses plus agréables, mais non plus utiles, Si vous tenez à être exactement renseignés snr l'état de nos affaires pour en délibérer. D’ailleurs il est dans vos habitudes de n’écouter que ce qui vous plaît, sauf à vous irriter ensuite si l’événement ne répond pas à votre attente. J’ai donç cru qu’il était plus sûr de vous dire toute la vérité.

[1] "You to whom I write understand that a crew only keeps at its prime for a short space, ¹ and that it is only a few of the sailors who can both set a ship in motion and keep the oar-strokes in time.

[2] But of all these difficulties, that which causes me most distress is that I, the general, cannot prevent these abuses—for the temper of you Athenians is hard to control—and that we have no source from which to get recruits for manning our ships, while the enemy has many sources of supply; on the contrary, the resources that we brought with us must suffice for our present needs as well as make up for our constant losses; ² for the only cities that are now in alliance with us, Naxos and Catana, cannot help us in this.

[3] And if but one advantage more shall be gained by the enemy—that the regions of Italy which supply us with food, seeing in what plight we are and that you are not sending reinforcements, should go over to the enemy—the war will be all over for them without a battle, for we shall be besieged into surrender.
  "I could have written you things more pleasant than these, but certainly not more useful, if you are to have full knowledge of the situation here before deciding upon your course;

[4] and, besides, knowing as I do your tempers—that you do indeed prefer to hear what is most pleasant, but afterwards find fault if the results are in any respect disappointing—I have thought it safer to reveal the truth.

[1] "For you, to whom I am writing, know that ¹ the flower of a crew is limited in number, and that there are but few seamen who will get a ship under weigh, or keep the rowing in time.

[2] But the most distressing of all these things is, that I, their general, have no power to put a stop to these abuses, (for your tempers are difficult to command,) and that we have no means of recruiting our ships' crews, (which the enemy can do from many quarters,) but both what is kept, and what is expended, must be taken from what we brought with us. For the cities which are at present in alliance with us, namely, Naxos and Catana, are powerless.

[3] If, indeed, one additional advantage be still gained by the enemy, I mean, that the places in Italy which supply us with food, seeing the condition we are in, and in case of your not reinforcing us, go over to the enemy, the war will be brought to a conclusion by them without a single battle, through our being ² starved out.

[4] I might, it is true, have had more agreeable things than these to write to you, but none more useful, if it is necessary for you to deliberate with a clear knowledge of affairs here. And besides, knowing as I do your temper, that you wish, indeed, to receive the most pleasing statements, but find fault afterwards, should any thing in consequence of them turn out different to what you expected, I thought it safer to lay the truth before you.

[1] « Vobis autem, qui hoc probe nostis, scribo, rarum esse classiariae multitudinis vigorem, paucosque nautas reperiri, qui et navem agere et remigium moderari norint.

[2] Sed horum omnium incommodorum Iioc est maximum, tum quod eso imperator Iure prohibere non possum (nam vestra ingenia non facile reguntur), tum etiam quod non habemus, unde navium supplementum parare possimus, id quod Itosti inultis e\ locis facere licet, sed necesse e*l, et ea,quibus utimur adhuc, et ea, quae absumuntur, ex illis esse, quae huc venientes habuimus; quae enim civitate* nunc nobis sunt sociae, Naxus et Catana, parum valkiae sunt.

[3] Quod si hoc unum prapterea hostibus accessenl, ut Italiae loca, quae nos alunt, cognito rerum statu, in quo sumus, vobisque nullum auxilium ad nos mittentibus, se illis adjungant, piofeclo nobis obsidione expugnatis cinc praelio bellum ab ipsis confectum eriL

[4] « His autem ego jucundiora quidem scribere potuissem, non tamen utiliora, siquidem necesse est, vos manifeste cognoscere rerum harum statum, ut de iis consultetis. Simul etiam quia vestra ingenia probe nota habeo, qui jucundissima quidem audire vultis, sed imputatis, si quid postea vobis contigerit, quod jucunditati illi minus respondeat , tutius esse duxi, declarare, quod verum esi.

« E vi scrivo cosa che ben sapete , cioè, che il vigor delle ciurme è di breve durata, e pochi sono tra i marinari che mossa una volta la nave continovino il remeggio. Ed il peggio è, che io con tutta la mia capitaneria non valgo ad impedir tali disordini, perchè i vostri ualurali son difficili ad esser comandati, e perchè non abbiamo onde riempire le navi ( lo che posson fare i nemici da molti luoghi); ma è giuocoforza che quel che ci resta e quel che si va spendendo, tutto esca dall’apparecchio con cui qua venimmo ; avvegnaché le città ora nostre alleate, Nasso e Catana, non possono sovvenirci. E se i nemici potranno ancora ottener quest’uno, che le terre d’Italia le quali ci nutricano, vedendo lo stato nostro e non soccorrendoci voi, si aggiungano a loro , avranno essi vinta la guerra senza trar colpo , perchè noi resteremo espugnati come per assedio. Certo avrei potuto scrivervi cose più gradite, non già più utili, se pure è vero che dovete deliberare colla piena cognizione delle cose di qua. Inoltre siccome io conosco qual sia la natura di voi, che volete sentire ragguagli piacevolissimi, ma che poi da ultimo , se dissimile ne segue l' effetto, ce l' apponete a delitto, cosi ho credulo più sicuro il mostrarvi la verità.