Thucydides, History of the Peloponnesian War, Theodor Braun (Translator), 6.86

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„Wer das nicht glauben will, wird durch Schaden klug
werden. Als ihr uns das erste Mal zu Hilfe rieft, machtet
ihr uns grade damit bange, wie gefährlich es auch für uns
sein würde, wenn wir euch unter die Herrschaft der Syrakuser
kommen ließen. Es wäre unrecht, euren eigenen Worten,
womit ihr uns damals bereden wolltet, nicht mehr zu trauen
und Verdacht gegen uns zu hegen, weil wir hier jetzt den
Syrakusern gegenüber mit unverhältnismäßig großer Macht
auftreten. Vor ihnen habt ihr euch ja weit mehr zu hüten.
Wir sind ohne euch nicht imstande, uns hier zu halten, und
wenn wir wirklich schlecht genug wären, euch unterdrücken zu
wollen, so würden wir uns bei der weiten Fahrt über See
und der Schwierigkeit, so große, mit allen Mitteln für den
Landkrieg versehene Städte zu besetzen, hier doch auf die Dauer
nicht behaupten können. Sie aber sitzen euch auf dem Nacken,
nicht mit einem Feldlager, sondern mit einer Stadt, die weit
größer ist als die Streitkräfte, mit denen wir hier austreten.
Sie führen immer Böses gegen euch im Schilde und lassen
sich keine Gelegenheit entgehen, euch Abbruch zu tun, wie sie
das ja auch anderswo schon, namentlich den Leontinern gegen
über, bewiesen haben. Und jetzt wagen sie es gar, euch gegen
uns, die wir ihnen dabei im Wege sind und Sizilien bisher
vor ihren Übergriffen bewahrt haben, zu Hilfe zu rufen, als
ob ihr mit Blindheit geschlagen wärt. Wir dagegen rufen
euch grade zu eurem wahren Besten um Hilfe an und bitten
euch, die Vorteile, die wir uns gegenseitig gewähren, nicht
von der Hand zu weisen. Bedenkt, daß ihnen bei ihrer Über
zahl auch ohne Bundesgenossen der Weg zu euch jederzeit
offen steht, ihr aber nicht immer Gelegenheit haben werdet,
euch ihrer mit so mächtigen Bundesgenossen zu erwehren. Laßt
ihr diese jetzt aus Mißtrauen unverrichteter Sache oder gar
nach einer Niederlage wieder abziehen, so werdet ihr später
noch wünschen, daß es euch vergönnt wäre, auch nur einen
kleinen Teil davon an eurer Seite zu sehen, wenn euch von
drüben keine Hilfe mehr kommt.

History of the Peloponnesian War. Thucydides. Theodor Braun (Translator). Leipzig. 1917.

Current edition First1KGreek

Geschichte des Peloponnesischen Kriegs (German) (Thucydides. Geschichte des Peloponnesischen Kriegs. Braun, Theodor, translator. Leipzig: Insel-Verlag, 1917.)

Editions (1)

Ἱστορίαι Perseus (Thucydides. Historiae, Vol 1-2. Jones, Henry Stuart, editor. Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1910. (1942 printing).) — 6.86.1 focus

[1] καὶ ὅτῳ ταῦτα μὴ δοκεῖ, αὐτὸ τὸ ἔργον ἐλέγχει. τὸ γὰρ πρότερον ἡμᾶς ἐπηγάγεσθε οὐκ ἄλλον τινὰ προσείοντες φόβον ἤ, εἰ περιοψόμεθα ὑμᾶς ὑπὸ Συρακοσίοις γενέσθαι, ὅτι καὶ αὐτοὶ κινδυνεύσομεν.

[2] καὶ νῦν οὐ δίκαιον, ᾧπερ καὶ ἡμᾶς ἠξιοῦτε λόγῳ πείθειν, τῷ αὐτῷ ἀπιστεῖν, οὐδ’ ὅτι δυνάμει μείζονι πρὸς τὴν τῶνδε ἰσχὺν πάρεσμεν ὑποπτεύεσθαι, πολὺ δὲ μᾶλλον τοῖσδε ἀπιστεῖν.

[3] ἡμεῖς μέν γε οὔτε ἐμμεῖναι δυνατοὶ μὴ μεθ’ ὑμῶν, εἴ τε καὶ γενόμενοι κακοὶ κατεργασαίμεθα, ἀδύνατοι κατασχεῖν διὰ μῆκός τε πλοῦ καὶ ἀπορίᾳ φυλακῆς πόλεων μεγάλων καὶ τῇ παρασκευῇ ἠπειρωτίδων· οἵδε δὲ οὐ στρατοπέδῳ, πόλει δὲ μείζονι τῆς ἡμετέρας παρουσίας ἐποικοῦντες ὑμῖν αἰεί τε ἐπιβουλεύουσι καὶ ὅταν καιρὸν λάβωσιν ἑκάστου,

[4] οὐκ ἀνιᾶσιν (ἔδειξαν δὲ καὶ ἄλλα ἤδη καὶ τὰ ἐς Λεοντίνους), καὶ νῦν τολμῶσιν ἐπὶ τοὺς ταῦτα κωλύοντας καὶ ἀνέχοντας τὴν Σικελίαν μέχρι τοῦδε μὴ ὑπ’ αὐτοὺς εἶναι παρακαλεῖν ὑμᾶς ὡς ἀναισθήτους.

[5] πολὺ δὲ ἐπὶ ἀληθεστέραν γε σωτηρίαν ἡμεῖς ἀντιπαρακαλοῦμεν, δεόμενοι τὴν ὑπάρχουσαν ἀπ’ ἀλλήλων ἀμφοτέροις μὴ προδιδόναι, νομίσαι δὲ τοῖσδε μὲν καὶ ἄνευ ξυμμάχων αἰεὶ ἐφ᾽ ὑμᾶς ἑτοίμην διὰ τὸ πλῆθος εἶναι ὁδόν, ὑμῖν δ’ οὐ πολλάκις παρασχήσειν μετὰ τοσῆσδε ἐπικουρίας ἀμύνασθαι· ἣν εἰ τῷ ὑπόπτῳ ἢ ἄπρακτον ἐάσετε ἀπελθεῖν ἢ καὶ σφαλεῖσαν, ἔτι βουλήσεσθε καὶ πολλοστὸν μόριον αὐτῆς ἰδεῖν, ὅτε οὐδὲν ἔτι περανεῖ παραγενόμενον ὑμῖν.

Translations (9)

The History of the Grecian War Perseus (Thucydides. The English works of Thomas Hobbes of Malmesbury. Hobbes, Thomas. translator. London: John Bohn, 1843.) — 6.86.1 focus

[1] "For when you called us in to aid you at the first, the fear you pretended was only this: that if we neglected you, the Syracusians would subdue you, and we thereby should participate of the danger.

[2] And it were unjust that the argument you would needs have to prevail then with us should now have no effect with yourselves, or that you should be jealous of the much strength we bring against the power of the Syracusians when much rather you should give the less ear unto them. We cannot so much as stay here without you;

[3] and if becoming perfidious we should subdue these states, yet we are unable to hold them, both in respect of the length of the voyage and for want of means of guarding them, because they be great and provided after the manner of the continent. Whereas they, not lodged near you in a camp, but inhabiting near you in a city of greater power than this of ours, will be always watching their advantages against you;

[4] and when an opportunity shall be offered against any of your cities, will be sure not to let it slip. This they have already made to appear, both in their proceedings against the Leontines, and also otherwise. And yet have these the face to move you against us that hinder this, and that have hitherto kept Sicily from falling into their hands.

[5] But we, on the other side, invite you to a far more real safety, and pray you not to betray that safety which we both of us hold from one another at this present, but to consider that they by their own number have way to you always, though without confederates, whereas you shall seldom have so great an aid again to resist them. Which if through your jealousy you suffer to go away without effect, or if it miscarry, you will hereafter wish for the least part of the same, when their coming can no more do you good.

History of the Peloponnesian War Perseus (Thucydides. History of the Peloponnesian War. Crawley, Richard, translator. London and Toronto: J. M. Dent and Sons Ltd.; New York: E. P. Dutton and Co., 1914.) — 6.86.1 focus

[1] Any other view of the case is condemned by the facts. When you first asked us over, the fear which you held out was that of danger to Athens if we let you come under the dominion of Syracuse ;

[2] and it is not right now to mistrust the very same argument by which you claimed to convince us, or to give way to suspicion because we are come with a larger force against the power of that city. Those whom you should really distrust are the Syracusans.

[3] We are not able to stay here without you, and if we proved perfidious enough to bring you into subjection, we should be unable to keep you in bondage, owing to the length of the voyage and the difficulty of guarding large, and in a military sense continental, towns: they, the Syracusans, live close to you, not in a camp, but in a city greater than the force we have with us, plot always against you, never let slip an opportunity once offered,

[4] as they have shown in the case of the Leontines and others, and now have the face, just as if you were fools, to invite you to aid them against the power that hinders this, and that has thus far maintained Sicily independent.

[5] We, as against them, invite you to a much more real safety, when we beg you not to betray that common safety which we each have in the other, and to reflect that they, even without allies, will, by their numbers, have always the way open to you, while you will not often have the opportunity of defending yourselves with such numerous auxiliaries; if, through your suspicions, you once let these go away unsuccessful or defeated, you will wish to see if only a handful of them back again, when the day is past in which their presence could do anything for you.

Geschichte des Peloponnesischen Kriegs First1KGreek (Thucydides. Geschichte des Peloponnesischen Kriegs. Wahrmund, Adolf, translator. Stuttgart: Krais and Hoffmann, 1864.) — 6.86 focus

„Wem aber dieß nicht also zu sein scheint, den überführt ¹
die That selbst. Denn als ihr uns das erste Mal") herbnneset,
habt ihr uns nur das eine Schreckbild vorgehalten, daß wir selber
in große Gefahr gerathen würden, wenn wir ruhig zusähen,.wie ihr
von den Syrakusanern unterjocht würdet. ES wäre also nicht recht,
wenn .ihr jetzt nicht denselben Grund für glaubwürdig hieltet, durch
den ihr uns zu überreden suchtet, oder wenn ihr uns deßhalb mit
Argwohn betrachten wolltet, weil wir mit überlegener Macht gegen
diese hieher gekommen find; vielmehr müßt ihr diesen mißtrauen.
Sind wir doch nicht einmal im Stand, ohne eure Hilfe uns hier zu
behaupten; und selbst wenn wir zu Verräthern an euch würden und
euch unterjochten, so wäre es uns ja doch wegen der weiten Schiff-
fahrt und wegen Mangels an Besatzungstruppen unmöglich, uns gegen
so große Städte zu halten, die eine Kriegsmacht besitzen, wie die
Städte des Festlandes. Diese fitzen euch aber dahier auf dem Nacken,
und zwar nicht mit einem Feldlager, sondern mit ihrer Stadt, die
größere Kriegsmittel besitzt, als wir solche mit uns gebracht haben;
und stets schmieden sie verderbliche Pläne gegen euch, und wo immer
sie die Gelegenheit erfassen können, lassen sie dieselbe nicht unbenützt
— davon haben sie schon Beweise gegeben, und so auch gegen die
Leontiner. Und nun wagen sie es gegen die, welche fie daran hindern
wollen und bis jetzt die Unabhängigkeit Siciliens gegen sie
vertheidigt haben, euch zu Hilfe zu rufen, gleich als ob ihr ohne allen
Verstand wäret. Zu viel gewisserer Rettung rufen wir euch dagegen auf,
indem wir euch bitten, die Sicherstellung, welche beide Theile, ihr
und. wir, uns gegenseitig gewährleisten, nicht auf's Spiel zu setzen,
sondern überzeugt zu sein, daß diesen dahier ihrer großen Zahl wegen
auch ohne Bundesgenossen der Weg zu eurer Stadt offen steht, daß
sich euch aber die Gelegenheit nicht oft bieten werde, euch ihrer mit
so bedeutender Hilfsmacht zu erwehren. Laßt ihr dieselbe aus irgend
einem Argwohn entweder unverrichteter Dinge wieder abziehen, oder
gar eine Schlappe erleiden, so werdet ihr später schon in die Lage
kommen, auch nur einen geringen Theil derselben herbei zu wünshcen, ²³⁴
dann nämlich, wenn Nichts mehr über die See zu euch herüber
kommen wird."

Histoire de la Guerre du Péloponèse First1KGreek (Thucydides. Histoire de la Guerre du Péloponnése, Vol. 1-2. Zévort, Marie Charles, translator. Paris: Charpentier, 1852.) — 6.86 focus

LXXXVI. « Si quelqu’un pense autrement, les faits eux-mêmes le démentent : lorsque vous nous avez appelés à l’origine, quel stimulant nous avez-vous proposé? La crainte qu’en vous laissant tomber sous le joug de Syracuse, il n’y eût danger pour nous-mêmes. Il n’est donc pas juste maintenant de suspecter les motifs mêmes au nom desquels vous vouliez nous persuader, ni d’être avec nous dans la défiance, parce que nous sommes venus avec des forces plus considérables que celles des Syracusains. C’est d’eux que vous devez bien plutôt vous défier : nous, du moins, nous sommes dans l’impossibilité de rester ici sans votre concours; et quand bien même, traîtres à nos promesses, nous soumettrions la Sicile, il nous serait impossible de la conserver, vu la longueur de la traversée et la difficulté de garder des villes aussi grandes et munies de toutes les ressources continentales. Les Syracusains, au contraire, ne sont pas dans un camp; ils sont là, au milieu d’une ville plus puissante que toutes nos forces ici présentes, menaçant vos frontières; ils conspirent contre vous sans relâche et ne laisseront échapper aucune des occasions qu’ils pourront saisir. Ils l’ont prouvé dans bien des circonstances, et dernièrement au sujet des Léontins. Et maintenant ils osent, comme si vous étiez entièrement dépourvus de sens, invoquer votre secours contre ceux qui entravent leurs desseins et qui ont préservé jusqu’à présent la Sicile de tomber sous leur joug. Nous vous convions, nous aussi, et avec bien plus de sincérité, à votre propre salut; nous vous prions de ne pas renoncer à la sécurité que nous nous procurons mutuellement, de songer enfin que contre vous la voie sera toujours ouverte aux Syracusains, même sans alliés, grâce à leur nombre, et que vous n’aurez pas souvent la chance de vous défendre avec d’aussi nombreux secours. Si, par défiance, vous laissez ces secours partir sans avoir rien fait, peut-être même après un échec, un jour viendra où vous désirerez voir auprès de vous ne fût-ce qu’une faible partie de ces forces, alors que toute assistance vous sera devenue inutile.

Histoire de la Guerre du Péloponnése First1KGreek (Thucydides. Histoire de la Guerre du Péloponnése. Bétant, Élie-Ami, translator. Paris: Librairie de L. Hachette, 1863.) — 6.86 focus

« Si quelqu’un est d’une opinion contraire, les faits se chargeront de le détromper. Quand vous nous appelâtes la première fois, vous cherchâtes à nous effrayer par la perspective du danger qu’il y aurait pour nous à vous laisser en proie aux Syraousains. Or il n’est pas juste de repousser aujourd’hui l’argument par lequel vous prétendiez alors nous convaincre, ou de prendre ombrage de ce que nos forces actuelles paraissent trop considérables pour que nous n’ayons en vue que les Syracusains. C’est à eux que vous devez réserver vos défiances. Pour nous, il nous est impossible de rester ici sans votre coopération ; et, quand nous pousserions la perfidie jusqu’à soumettre la Sicile, nous serions hors d’état de la garder, vu la distance et la grandeur de ses villes, aussi puissantes que des places du continent. Au contraire, le voisinage des Syracusains, établis non pas comme nous dans un camp, mais dans une ville fortifiée, est pour vous une menace permanente. Offrez-leur une occasion favorable, et ils la saisiront avidement. Ils l’ont bien fait voir par leur conduite envers les Léontins et dans mille autres circonstances. Aujourd’hui encore, comme si leur finesse n’était pas percée à jour, iis ont l’audace de vous indisposer contre ceux-là mêmes qui contrecarrent leurs projets, et qui, jusqu’à ce moment, ont empêché la Sicile de tomber entre leurs mains.

« Écoutez donc des exhortations dictées par un intérêt sincère pour votre salut. Ne renoncez pas aux avantages de notre alliance. Songez que les Syracusains, forts comme ils le sont, n’ont pas besoin d’aide pour vous attaquer, que la route leur est toujours ouverte , tandis que vous n’aurez pas souvent de si puissants auxiliaires. Si, dans vos injustes suspicions, vous nous laissez repartir sans résultat, ou même après une défaite, il viendra un temps où vous souhaiterez de revoir ne fût-ce quune fraction de notre armée , alors que toute assistance vous serait inutile.

History of the Peloponnesian War First1KGreek (Thucydides, Vol. 1-4. Smith, Charles Foster, translator. London and Cambridge, MA: Heinemann and Harvard University Press, 1919-1923.) — 6.86.1 focus

[1] "And if there be anyone who does not accept this view, that which has taken place will itself prove his error. For you brought us over before,¹ flaunting in our faces no other terror but this, that we ourselves should be in danger if we should permit you to come under the power of the Syracusans.

[2] And it is not right for you now to distrust the very argument by which you thought it right to persuade us then, nor to be suspicious because we are present with a force out of all proportion to the strength of the Syracusans; far more should you distrust them.

[3] We certainly are not able to maintain ourselves in Sicily without you; and even if we should prove false and subdue Sicily, we should be unable to hold it on account of the length of the voyage and the difficulty of guarding cities that are as large and well equipped as continental cities²; whereas these Syracusans, in hostile proximity to you, not with a mere army in the field, but a city greater than our present force, are always plotting against you, and whenever they get an opportunity against you singly, do not let it slip, as they have shown several times already and especially in their dealings with the Leontines;

[4] and now they make bold to urge you to oppose those who seek to prevent these things and who up to this time have kept Sicily from being under their dominion, as though you were without sense.

[5] But it is to a safety far more real that we in our turn invite you, begging you not to throw away that safety which we both derive from one another; and to consider that for them, even without allies, the way is always open against you because of their numbers, whereas for you the opportunity will not often present itself to defend yourselves with the help of so great an auxiliary force. But if through your suspicions you suffer this force to depart with its object unaccomplished, or, worse still, defeated, you will hereafter wish that you could see even the merest fraction of it when its presence will no longer avail you aught.

History of the Peloponnesian War First1KGreek (Thucydides. The history of the Peloponnesian War, Volume 1-2. Dale, Henry, translator. London: Heinemann and Henry G. Bohn, 1851-1852.) — 6.86.1 focus

[1] "And whoever does not think this to be the case, the very fact itself convicts him of being wrong. For on a former occasion you called us to your aid by holding out to us no other fear, than that, if we permitted you to fall under the Syracusans, we ourselves also should be exposed to danger.

[2] It is not right therefore now, that you should refuse to be persuaded by that self-same argument by which you wished to persuade us; or that, because we are come with a larger armament, you should be suspicious of us; but much rather, that you should mistrust these men.

[3] We, at least, have no power to remain amongst you without your support; and even if we should show ourselves base, and bring you into subjection, we should be unable to keep you under our dominion, both on account of the length of the voyage, and the difficulty of keeping guard over cities so great in extent, and of an inland character, as regards their resources. These men, on the other hand, living near you as they do, not in a camp, but in a city far stronger than our force here present, are constantly plotting against you;

[4] and when, in each particular case, they have got an opportunity, they do not let it slip, (as they have shown both in other instances, and in that of the Leontines,) and at the present time they have the hardihood to urge you, as though you were void of sense, against those who are preventing this, and who have held up Sicily hitherto from sinking under them.

[5] But we, in opposition to them, urge you to a far more real safety, begging you not to betray that which is secured to both of us by each other; and to consider, that while for them, even without any allies, the way to you is always open, you will not often have a chance of defending yourselves in conjunction with so large a force of auxiliaries; of which, if through your suspicions you allow it to depart, either unsuccessful, or, perhaps, even defeated, you will wish yet to see even a very small portion, when its presence will no longer accomplish any thing for you.

Historia Belli Peloponnesiaci First1KGreek (Historia Belli Peloponnesiaci. Haase, Friedrich, translator. Paris: Firmin Didot, 1869.) — 6.86.1 focus

[1] « Cui autem haec non ita videntur, eum ipsa res arguit. Prius enim nos aveessistis nullum alium metum nobis inculientes, nisi quod, si per nostram negligeotiam vos in Syracusanorum potestatem venire emeremus, dos quoque pericula subituri essemus.

[2] Et nunc noo est aequum vos eidem rationi fidem habere nolle, qua nobis persuadere volebatis, neque in suspicionem venire, quod cum majoribus copiis adversus istorum potentiam huc veoe-rimus, imo potius istis nullam habere fidem.

[3] Nos enim neque consistere hic possumus, nisi vobiscum, et si etiam perfidia inducti vos subigeremus, retinere tamen non posse-mus propter navigationis longitudinem et difficultatem cn-! stodiendi urbes magnas et quarum potentia est terrestris; isti vero non castris, sed in urbe majore his nostris copiis adducticiis accolunt vobis, et assidue insidiantur, et utinquemqoe occasionem nacli erunt, eam non omittent

[4] (id quod quum in aliis, tum etiam in Leontinis jam declararunt), et tamen nunc audent adversus eos, qui haec impediunt, et qui ab hunc usque diem Siciliam sustinent, ne in ipsorum potestatem redigatur, voe ut ingenio tardos provocare.

[5] Nos vero contra ad salutem longe certiorem vos provocamus, orantes, ne eam, quae utrisque nostrum ope mutua parata est, prodatis, sed existimetis, istis quidem vel sine sociorum auxiliis propter multitudinem viam adversus vos semper expeditam esee, vobis vero non saepe futuram facultatem cum tot auxiliaribus copiis eos propulsandi; quas si ob su· spicionem infecto negotio discedere sinatis, vel etiam calamitate affectas, aliquando optabitis profecto vel minimam earum partem videre, quum ejus ad vos adventus nihil amplius vobis prodesse poterit.

La storia di Tucidide First1KGreek (Thucydides. Della storia di Tucidide volgarizzata libri otto. Anonymous translator. Florence: Tipografia Galileiana, 1835.) — 6.86 focus

« Chi poi non pensa così, il fatto stesso lo convince. Voi infatti da prima ci invitaste minacciandoci solo del pericolo a che noi pure ci troveremmo , se trascuras-

Orìginal from simo che foste assoggettali dai Siracusani. Però ora non è giusto che neghiate fede a quella ragione, della quale credevate importante persuader noi colle vostre parole; nè chè vi adombriate perchè siamo qua con armata maggiore di quella che ci vorrebbe contro i Siracusani, dei quali iuvece dovete molto più diffidare. Noi di sicuro non potremmo senza di voi neppur fermarci in Sicilia , e quand’anche per dislealtà la soggiogassimo, saremmo insufficienti a ritenerla, attesa la lunghezza del tragitto e la difficoltà di presidiare città grandi, per le quali si richieggono apparecchi terrestri. I Siracusani all’opposto che vi stanno quasi a ridosso, non con un campo militare, ma con città più potente di questo nostro esercito, son sempre alle vedette contro di voi ; e quand’abbian colta l’occasione di qualche colpo, non se la lasceranno scappare. E ciò, per tacere delle altre cose, hanno dimostrato verso i Leoniini; e adesso osano di incitar voi, quasi foste insensati, contro quelli che attraversano tali loro disegni, e clic (inora sostengono la Sicilia perchè non cada sotto di essi. Ma noi d’altronde vi invitiamo ad assai più vera salvezza, pregandovi a non tradir quella che amendue abbiamo mercè del mutuo soccorso, ed a persuadervi che a costoro anche senza allenii, stante il gran numero, è sempre spianata la strada contro di voi ; e che a voi raramente si presenterà il modo di respingerli con soccorsi sì grandi. I quali se per sospetto lascerete partire o senza effetto o vinti, bramerete dipoi rivederne anche una menomissima parte, allora quando sebben venga tra voi non potrà più in nulla giovarvi.

Commentary

Commentary on Thucydides: Book 6 (Thucydides, Book VI. Marchant, Edgar C., editor. London: Macmillan and Company, 1909.) focus

ἀνάγκη δέ —sc. αὐτοὺς ἄρξαι τῆς Σικελίας. (H. Kleist points out that this ehapter is an example of the ἐπιχείρημα, or conclusion based on a major and a minor premiss: ( a) major premiss — propositio— ἀνδρὶ δὲ τυράννῳ . . γίγνεσθαι: ( b) minor premiss — assumptio— καὶ ἡμᾶς τοῦτο ὠφελεῖ. This is supported by a proof— assumptionis probatio—in ἀπιστεῖν δὲ . . Πελοποννησίοις: ( c) conclusion— complexio— ὤστε καὶ τἀνθάδε . . καθίστασθαι. The ἐπιχείρημα differs from the syllogism essentially in that neither of the premisses need be true.)

τὸ ἔργον — i.e. the fact mentioned immediately afterwards.

τὸ γὰρ πρότερον —in 427.

προσείοντες φόβον —the metaphor is from shaking swords or spears at an enemy to alarm him (Bloomfield). Cf. Eur. Her. Fur. 1189 τί μοι προσείων χεῖρα σημαίνεις φόβον; and V. 17 ἤδη παρασκευή τε προεπανεσείσθη ἀπὸ τῶν Λακεδαιμονίων. (The other meaning of προσείειν, ‘to entice animals’ with food, is not in keeping with the present passage)

μείζονι πρὸς τὴν τῶνδε ἰσχύν —most edd. render ‘with a force larger (than necessary) in comparison with the strength of S.’ But in the note in Jowett it is pointed out that the speaker's objeet is to minimise the power of Athens in Sieily. Henee μείζονι=‘greater’ than before, viz. in 427, and πρός=‘with a view to,’ ‘so as to cope with.’

ὑποπτεύεσθαι —sc. ἡμᾶς. ἀπιστεῖν —sc. ὑμᾶς.

ἡμεῖς μέν γε —‘we at least’ are powerless in any case to keep possession of Sieily, or even to obtain a footing in it without your aid.

οὔτε is answered by τε. μὴ μεθ) ὑμῶν= ἄνευ ὑμῶν.

κατεργασαίμεθα —sc. ὑμᾶς. This is an answer to the argument of cc. 76, 77.

ἀπορίᾳ φυλακῆς πόλεων κτλ —‘through the difficulty of garrisoning large eities that possess the forces of a continental power’— i.e. cavalry and infantry as opposed to a fleet.

οὐ στρατοπέδῳ —sc. ὥσπερ ἡμεῖς.

τῆς ἡμετέρας παρουσίας —‘than the force we have here.’

ἐποικοῦντες —the proximity of Syr. is as bad as a permanent hostile settlement.

καιρὸν . . ἑκάστου —‘an opportunity for any particular attempt.’ ἑκάστου is best taken as nent., and not as masc., ‘an opportunity for attacking each of you.’

ἄλλα —internal accns., ‘in other cases.’

τολμῶσιν κτλ —‘they have the boldness to ask for your aid against the men who try to prevent this and hitherto have saved Sicily from falling into their power—as though you were blind’ and could not see through their design. From Athens really proceeds the opposition ( κωλύοντας) that saves Sicily from being subject to Syracuse.

τὴν ὑπάρχουσαν κτλ —‘the safety that we and you alike gain from each other.’ ἀμφοτέροις belongs to ὑπάρχουσαν. ‘Nous ne pouvons sauver les uns sans les autres’ (Tanaquil Faber).

παρασχήσειν —impersonal, commonest in the form παρασχόν: an Ionic use of παρέχει.

τῷ ὑπόπτῳ —‘through suspicion.’ ἔτι βουλήσεσθε—ἔτι is often so used in threats and prophecies.

ὅτε —‘at a time when.’ ὅτε is the regular particle for introducing a reference to a date.

Thucydides History of the Peloponnesian War 6.86

Theodor Braun (Translator)

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