Thucydides History of the Peloponnesian War 5.14

[1] Presently after the battle of Amphipolis and return of Ramphias out of Thessaly, it fell out that neither side did any act of war but were inclined rather to a peace; the Athenians for the blow they had received at Delium, and this other a little after at Amphipolis, and because they had no longer that confident hope in their strength on which they relied when formerly they refused the peace, as having conceived upon their present success that they should have had the upper hand;

[2] also they stood in fear of their own confederates, lest emboldened by these losses of theirs they should more and more revolt; and repented that they made not the peace after their happy success at Pylus, when occasion was offered to have done it honourably;

[3] and the Lacedaemonians on the other side did desire peace because the war had not proceeded as they expected; for they had thought they should in a few years have warred down the power of Athens by wasting their territory; and because they were fallen into that calamity in the island, the like whereof had never happened unto Sparta before; because also their country was continually ravaged by those of Pylus and Cythera, and their Helotes continually fled to the enemy; and because they feared lest those which remained, trusting in them that were run away, should in this estate of theirs raise some innovation, as at other times before they had done.

[4] Withal it happened that the thirty years' peace with the Argives was now upon the point of expiring; and the Argives would not renew it without restitution made them of Cynuria; so that to war against the Argives and the Athenians, both at once, seemed impossible. They suspected also that some of the cities of Peloponnesus would revolt to the Argives, as indeed it came afterwards to pass.

[1] Indeed it so happened that directly after the battle of Amphipolis and the retreat of Ramphias from Thessaly , both sides ceased to prosecute the war and turned their attention to peace. Athens had suffered severely at Delium , and again shortly afterwards at Amphipolis , and had no longer that confidence in her strength which had made her before refuse to treat, in the belief of ultimate victory which her success at the moment had inspired;

[2] besides, she was afraid of her allies being tempted by her reverses to rebel more generally, and repented having let go the splendid opportunity for peace which the affair of Pylos had offered.

[3] Lacedaemon , on the other hand, found the event of the war falsify her notion that a few years would suffice for the overthrow of the power of the Athenians by the devastation of their land. She had suffered on the island a disaster hitherto unknown at Sparta ; she saw her country plundered from Pylos and Cythera ; the Helots were deserting, and she was in constant apprehension that those who remained in Peloponnese would rely upon those outside and take advantage of the situation to renew their old attempts at revolution.

[4] Besides this, as chance would have it, her thirty years' truce with the Argives was upon the point of expiring; and they refused to renew it unless Cynuria were restored to them; so that it seemed impossible to fight Argos and Athens at once. She also suspected some of the cities in Peloponnese of intending to go over to the enemy, as was indeed the case.

Es geschah aber sogleich nach der Schlacht bei Amphipolis
und dem Rückzüge des Ramphias aus Thessalien, daß keiner von
beiden Theilen mehr sich an Kriegsunternehmungen wagen wollte,
sondern beide ihre Gedanken mehr auf Frieden wendeten; die Athener, ¹
weil sie bei Delion und bald danach wieder bei Amphipolis hart
getroffen worden waren und nicht mehr das zuversichtliche Vertrauen ²
auf ihre Macht hatten, mit welchem sie früher den Vertrag von sich
gewiesen, weil sie bei ihrem damaligen Glücke die entschiedene
Oberhand zu behalten geglaubt. Dann fürchteten sie auch, daß die
Bundesgenossen durch ihre Niederlagen noch weiter zum Abfall
angespornt würden, und es reute sie jetzt, daß sie nach den Ereignissen in
Pylos, wo sich ein ehrenvoller Anlaß bot, nicht in die dargereichte
Hand eingeschlagen hatten. Den Lakedämoniern auf der andern
Seite kam der Verlauf des Krieges ganz wider Erwarten, denn sie
hatten geglaubt, die Macht der Athener in wenigen Jahren zu Boden
zu werfen, wenn sie nur ihr Land verwüsteten; nun aber hatte sie
das Unglück auf der Insel (Sphakteria) betroffen, wie ein ähnliches
der Stadt Sparta niemals zugestoßen war, und von Pylos und
Kythera aus wurde ihnen das Land verwüstet. Auch die Heloten liefen
über, und sie mußten immer erwarten, daß auch die
Zurückgebliebenen, auf den Beistand der auswärts Befindlichen bauend, ihnen, wie
schon früher geschehen IV, Unruhen erregen würden. Dazu kam noch,
daß auch der dreißigjährige Friedensvertrag mit den Argivern seinem
Ende nahe war, und einen neuen wollten die Argiver nicht eingehen,
außer wenn man ihnen die Landschaft Kynuria wieder zurückgebe.
Und unter solchen Umständen schien es unmöglich, gegen Argiver und
Athener zugleich Krieg zu führen. Auch von den peloponneisschen
Städten hatten sie einige im Verdacht, daß sie aus Seite der Argiver
treten würden, waS denn auch wirklich eingetroffen ist.

XIV. A partir du combat d’Amphipolis et du départ de Rhamphias de la Thessalie, il y eut des deux côtés cessation de toute hostilité, et les pensées inclinèrent plus fortement vers la paix. Les Athéniens, maltraités à Délium et peu après à Amphipolis, n’avaient plus cette ferme confiance dans leurs forces qui leur avait fait précédemment repousser tout accommodement, lorsque leur fortune présente semblait leur promettre une supériorité plus grande encore. Ils craignaient aussi que leurs alliés, enhardis par ces revers, ne fussent plus disposés à la défection, et ils regrettaient de n’avoir pas traité après l’aifaire de Pylos, quand ils pouvaient le faire avec avantage. Les Lacédémoniens, de leur côté, avaient vu la guerre prendre une tournure contraire à l’espoir qu’ils avaient conçu d’abattre, en quelques années, la puissance des Athéniens par le ravage de leur territoire : ils avaient éprouvé à Sphactérie un désastre tel que Sparte n’en avait encore jamais essuyé; Pylos, Cythère portaient le pillage dans leurs campagnes; les Hilotes désertaient; on était toujours dans l’appréhension que ceux de l’intérieur, comptant sur les fugitifs, ne profitassent des circonstances pour se soulever ¹ comme autrefois. A cela se joignait l’expiration prochaine de la trêve ² de trente ans qu’ils avaient conclue avec les Argiens, ceux-ci ne voulant pas la renouveler qu’on ne leur eût rendu la Cynurie ³ , les Lacédémoniens se sentaient dans l’impossibilité de faire face en même temps à Argos et à Athènes. Enfin, ils prévoyaient la défection en faveur d’Argos de quelques villes du Péloponnèse; ce qui arriva en effet ⁴ .

Aussitôt après la bataille d’Amphipolis et . la retraite de Raraphias de Thessalie, les deux partis se montrèrent également las de la guerre et désireux de la paix. Les Athéniens, qui venaient d’essuyeT coup sur coup deux défaites, à Délion et à Amphipolis, n’avaient plus dans leurs forces cette confiance .absolue qui naguère leur avait fait Tepousser les ouvertures de conciliation et les avait persuadés de la stabilité de leur fortune actuelle. Ils craignaient que leurs alliés, enhardis paT ces revers, ne fussent toùjours plus enclins à la défection, et ils regrettaient de n’avoir pas profité des événements de Pylas pour traiter avec avantage. De leur côté , les Lacédémoniens voyaient la guerre prendre une tournure tout autre qu’ils n’avaient espéTé. Ils avaient cru n’avoir qu’à ravager l’Attique pour abattre en peu d’années la puissance des Athéniens. Au lien de cela, ils avaient éprouvé à Sphactérie un désastre sans exemple dans les annales de Sparte ; leurs campagnes étaient pillées par les garnisons de Pylos et de Cythère ; leurs Hilotes désertaient, et il était à craindre queceux de l’intérieur, donnant la main à ceux du dehors, ne saisissent la première occasion pour renouveler leur révolte. De plus, la trêve de trente ans conclue avecles Argiens était sur le point d'expirer, et ceux-ci refusaient de la proroger à moins qu’on ne leur Tendît la Cynu-rie ¹ . Or, il paraissait impossible de soutenir à la fois la guerre contre Athènes et contre Argos. Enfin ils soupçonnaient avec raison certaines villes du Péloponèse d’incliner vers les Argiens.

[1] It so happened, too, that directly after the battle at Amphipolis and the withdrawal of Rhamphias from Thessaly neither side undertook any further military operations, and both were more inclined to peace. The Athenians were so inclined because they had been beaten at Delium, ¹ and again at Amphipolis a little later, and consequently had no longer that confidence in their strength in reliance upon which they had earlier refused to accept the truce, as they then thought that with their existing good luck they would prove superior.

[2] They were afraid, too, of their allies, lest, elated over these failures of theirs, the revolt among them might spread, and they repented that they had not come to terms when a good opportunity offered after the affair at Pylos.

[3] The Lacedaemonians, on the other hand, favoured peace because the war was turning out contrary to their hopes. They had expected that in a few years, if they should ravage their territory, they could pull down the power of the Athenians; whereas they had met with the calamity on the island of Sphacteria, such an one as had never before befallen Sparta; their territory was ravaged from Pylos and Cythera; the Helots were deserting, and always there was apprehension that those who remained, relying on those beyond the border, ² might revolt in the present state of affairs, just as they had done before. ³

[4] It happened also that the thirty years' truce with the Argives was on the point of expiring, ⁴ and the Argives were unwilling to make another treaty unless the territory of Cynuria ⁵ were restored to them; and it seemed impossible to carry on the war with the Argives and the Athenians at the same time. Besides, they suspected that some of the cities in the Peloponnesus would revolt to the Argives, as indeed did happen.

[1] It happened too, immediately after the battle of Amphipolis and the retreat of Ramphias from Thessaly, that neither party any longer applied themselves at all to the war, but they were rather inclined for peace. The Athenians were so, as having received a severe blow at Delium, and again shortly after at Amphipolis; and as no longer having that confident hope in their strength, through which they would not before accept the offered treaty, thinking, in consequence of their present success, that they should come off victorious in the struggle.

[2] Besides, they were also afraid of their allies, lest they should be encouraged by their reverses to revolt on a larger scale; and they repented not having come to an arrangement, when they had a fine opportunity, after the events at Pylus.

[3] The Lacedaemonians, on the other hand, wished for peace, because they found protracted beyond their expectation those hostilities by which they imagined that in a few years they should reduce the power of the Athenians, if they ravaged their land; and because they had met with the disaster on the island—such as had never yet befallen Sparta: and in consequence of their country being plundered from Pylus and Cythera; while their helots also were deserting, and there was a constant apprehension lest even those that remained in the country, trusting in the support of those who were out of it, should, on the strength of the present state of things, adopt some revolutionary designs against them, as on a former occasion.

[4] It happened, too, that their thirty years' truce with the Argives was on the point of expiring, and the Argives would not renew it, unless the Cynurian territory were restored to them; so that it appeared impossible for them to carry on war at once with the Argives and Athenians. Besides, they suspected that some of the states in the Peloponnese would revolt from them to the Argives; as was really the case.

[1] Accidit etiam, ut statim post proelium ad Amphipolin commissum et Rhamphiae ex Thessalia reversionem neutri ullam belli pariem amplius attingerent, sed animos ad pacem potius propensos haberent, Athenienses quidem, quod et apud Delium et paulo post rursus ad Amphipolin cladem accepissent, nec certam virium spem amplius haberent, qua freti foedera prius admittere noluerant, existimantes , se propter praesentem felicitatem superiores evasuros;

[2] et simul socios suos reformidabant, ne propter belli offensiones elati magis a se deficerent, eosque poenite-bat, quod post res ad Pylum gestas idoneam occasionem nacti compositionem non fecissent;

[3] Lacedaemonios vero vicissim, quod bellum ipsis prrnter opinionem eveniret, in quo intra paucos annos Atheniensium potentiam se eversuros putarant, si eorum agrum vastarent, et quod contra in illam calamitatem incidissent, quam in insula acceperant, qualis nunquam ante Spartae contigerat, quum simul et ager latrociniis infestaretur ab illis, qui e Pylo et Cytheris prodibant, et Helotes ad hostes transfugerent, et suspicio semper esset, nc et illi, qui domi remanebant, confisi iis, qui extra erant, pro praesenti rerum suarum statu, sicut et prius, aliquas res novas molirentur.

[4] Huc accedebat ( quod tricennale foedus cum Argivis ictum jam exibat, nec aliud Argivi inire volebant, nisi ager Cynosririiis sibi restitueretur; itaque putabant, se non posse simul bellum cum Argivis et Atheniensibus gerere. Quinetiam nonnullas Peloponnesi civitates a se ad Argivos defectionem facturas suspicabantur; id quod etiam accidit.

Ed infatti subito dopo il combattimento ad Amfipoli e la ritirata di Ramfia dalla Tessaglia accadde che ambe le parti non più si movevano ad alcuna fazione, ed avevano l’animo volto piuttosto alla pace. Gli Ateniesi, perchè sconfìtti a Deio e nuovamente poco dopo ad Amfipoli, non avevano più nelle loro forze quella ferma speranza per la quale aveano rifiutato la tregua , stimando per la presente loro felicità di dover restar superiori. Senza di che temevano che gli alleati inanimiti dalle loro sconfitte non s’invogliassero maggiormente di ribellare; e si pentivano di non aver fatto accomodamento in quella bella congiuntura , dopo i fatti di Pilo. I Lacedemoni poi perchè non riusciva al loro scopo questa guerra, nella quale si erano messi in capo di abbattere in pochi anni la potenza d'Atene col guastarne le terre ; e perchè alla Sfatteria erano incorsi in tale sciagura che Sparta non aveva mai avuta una simile. Era inoltre il loro territorio guastato dalle scorrerie di Pilo e di Citerà, ove disertavano gli Eloti ; e vi era sempre da aspettarsi che i rimanenti, preso animo dai fuggiti , non cogliessero la presente occasione per tentar novità , siccome era accaduto anco di prima. Si dava altresì il caso che erano in sulFuscita le tregue de’ trenta anni con gli Argivi, i quali non solevano rinnovarle se non riavessero il territorio cinurio. Cosicché pareva loro impossibile di combattere a un tempo stesso contro gli Argivi e gli Ateniesi ; mentre anche si sospettava che alcune delle città del Peloponneso non volessero passare alla parte degli Argivi ; come poi accadde.