Thucydides, History of the Peloponnesian War, Theodor Braun (Translator), 4.126

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„Wenn ich nicht besorgen müßte, es könnte euch doch
schwül werden, wo ihr euch von euren Bundesgenossen im
Stich gelassen und den Angriffen einer solchen Masse von
Barbaren ausgesetzt seht, so würde mir nicht einfallen, indem
ich euch zum Kampf anfeuere, euch zugleich belehren zu wollen.
Da aber unsere Bundesgenossen davongelaufen und unserer
Feinde so viele sind, möchte ich euch doch mit wenig Worten
einige gute Lehren geben. Nicht, weil ihr grade in dem
Augenblick Bundesgenossen zur Seite habt, ziemt eS euch,
mutig in den Kampf zu gehen, sondern weil euch die Tapfer
keit im Blute liegt. Ihr dürft euch vor keinen Feinden
fürchten, seien ihrer auch noch so viele; denn das ist bei euch
des Landes nicht der Brauch, herrschen ja dort auch nicht
viele über wenige, sondern wenige über viele, und diese ver
danken ihre Herrschaft eben ihrer Überlegenheit aus dem
Schlachtfelde. Diese Barbaren, die ihr jetzt aus Unkunde
fürchtet, solltet ihr doch kennen. Nach dem, was ihr von ihnen
in den Kämpfen mit den Makedonien! gesehen, und was ich
selbst von ihnen weiß oder von anderen gehört habe, braucht
ihr vor ihnen nicht bange zu sein. Sobald man sich überzeugt,
daß scheinbare Stärken des Feindes in Wahrheit Schwächen
sind, nimmt man es um so mutiger mit ihm auf, wie man ja
auch einem wirklich tapferen Feinde dreister zu Leibe geht, ehe
man ihn aus Erfahrung kennt. Diese wilden Völker machen
auf den, der sie noch nicht kennt, von weitem einen furchtbaren
Eindruck. Schon der Anblick der Menge ist schreckhaft, das
laute Kriegsgeschrei entsetzlich, und bei dem unsinnigen Waffen
schwenken kann einem angst und bange werden. Hält man
aber^ stand, so sind sie so schlimm nicht. Sie fechten nicht in
Reih und Glied und halten eS nicht für schimpflich, vor der
Übermacht wegzulaufen; Flucht und Angriff gelten bei ihnen
für gleich ehrenvoll, und man weiß nie, wie es mit ihrer
Tapferkeit steht. Bei ihrer Fechtweise, bei der jeder sein eigener
Führer ist, findet der einzelne leicht Gelegenheit, sich mit An
stand aus dem Staube zu machen. Statt unS ernstlich zu Leibe
zu gehen, halten sie es für rätlicher, uns nur von weitem zu
schrecken; denn sonst würden sie auch dazu übergehen. Offenbar
also hat es mit dem ersten Schrecken nicht viel auf sich, er ist
eben nur für Augen und Ohren berechnet, und wenn ihr euch
daraus nichts macht und zur rechten Zeit euren Rückzug in
guter Ordnung fortsetzt, so werdet ihr bald in Sicherheit sein.
Für die Zukunft aber werdet ihr euch merken, daß solche wilde
Horden, wenn der Gegner ihren ersten Anlauf aushält, nur
von weitem mit ihrer Tapferkeit prahlen, ihm aber, wenn er
weicht, beständig auf den Fersen bleiben und ohne sich in
Gefahr zu begeben, ihren Heldenmut zur Schau tragen."

History of the Peloponnesian War. Thucydides. Theodor Braun (Translator). Leipzig. 1917.

Current edition First1KGreek

Geschichte des Peloponnesischen Kriegs (German) (Thucydides. Geschichte des Peloponnesischen Kriegs. Braun, Theodor, translator. Leipzig: Insel-Verlag, 1917.)

Editions (1)

Ἱστορίαι Perseus (Thucydides. Historiae, Vol 1-2. Jones, Henry Stuart, editor. Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1910. (1942 printing).) — 4.126.1 focus

[1] ‘εἰ μὲν μὴ ὑπώπτευον, ἄνδρες Πελοποννήσιοι, ὑμᾶς τῷ τε μεμονῶσθαι καὶ ὅτι βάρβαροι οἱ ἐπιόντες καὶ πολλοὶ ἔκπληξιν ἔχειν, οὐκ ἂν ὁμοίως διδαχὴν ἅμα τῇ παρακελεύσει ἐποιούμην· νῦν δὲ πρὸς μὲν τὴν ἀπόλειψιν τῶν ἡμετέρων καὶ τὸ πλῆθος τῶν ἐναντίων βραχεῖ ὑπομνήματι καὶ παραινέσει τὰ μέγιστα πειράσομαι πείθειν.

[2] ἀγαθοῖς γὰρ εἶναι ὑμῖν προσήκει τὰ πολέμια οὐ διὰ ξυμμάχων παρουσίαν ἑκάστοτε, ἀλλὰ δι’ οἰκείαν ἀρετήν, καὶ μηδὲν πλῆθος πεφοβῆσθαι ἑτέρων, οἵ γε μηδὲ ἀπὸ πολιτειῶν τοιούτων ἥκετε, ἐν αἷς οὐ πολλοὶ ὀλίγων ἄρχουσιν, ἀλλὰ πλεόνων μᾶλλον ἐλάσσους, οὐκ ἄλλῳ τινὶ κτησάμενοι τὴν δυναστείαν ἢ τῷ μαχόμενοι κρατεῖν.

[3] βαρβάρους δὲ οὓς νῦν ἀπειρίᾳ δέδιτε μαθεῖν χρή, ἐξ ὧν τε προηγώνισθε τοῖς Μακεδόσιν αὐτῶν καὶ ἀφ’ ὧν ἐγὼ εἰκάζω τε καὶ ἄλλων ἀκοῇ ἐπίσταμαι, οὐ δεινοὺς ἐσομένους.

[4] καὶ γὰρ ὅσα μὲν τῷ ὄντι ἀσθενῆ ὄντα τῶν πολεμίων δόκησιν ἔχει ἰσχύος, διδαχὴ ἀληθὴς προσγενομένη περὶ αὐτῶν ἐθάρσυνε μᾶλλον τοὺς ἀμυνομένους· οἷς δὲ βεβαίως τι πρόσεστιν ἀγαθόν, μὴ προειδώς τις ἂν αὐτοῖς τολμηρότερον προσφέροιτο.

[5] οὗτοι δὲ τὴν μέλλησιν μὲν ἔχουσι τοῖς ἀπείροις φοβεράν· καὶ γὰρ πλήθει ὄψεως δεινοὶ καὶ βοῆς μεγέθει ἀφόρητοι, ἥ τε διὰ κενῆς ἐπανάσεισις τῶν ὅπλων ἔχει τινὰ δήλωσιν ἀπειλῆς. προσμεῖξαι δὲ τοῖς ὑπομένουσιν αὐτὰ οὐχ ὁμοῖοι· οὔτε γὰρ τάξιν ἔχοντες αἰσχυνθεῖεν ἂν λιπεῖν τινὰ χώραν βιαζόμενοι ἥ τε φυγὴ καὶ ἡ ἔφοδος αὐτῶν ἴσην ἔχουσα δόξαν τοῦ καλοῦ ἀνεξέλεγκτον καὶ τὸ ἀνδρεῖον ἔχει (αὐτοκράτωρ δὲ μάχη μάλιστ’ ἂν καὶ πρόφασιν τοῦ σῴζεσθαί τινι πρεπόντως πορίσειε), τοῦ τε ἐς χεῖρας ἐλθεῖν πιστότερον τὸ ἐκφοβῆσαι ὑμᾶς ἀκινδύνως ἡγοῦνται· ἐκείνῳ γὰρ ἂν πρὸ τούτου ἐχρῶντο.

[6] σαφῶς τε πᾶν τὸ προϋπάρχον δεινὸν ἀπ’ αὐτῶν ὁρᾶτε ἔργῳ μὲν βραχὺ ὄν, ὄψει δὲ καὶ ἀκοῇ κατασπέρχον. ὃ ὑπομείναντες ἐπιφερόμενον καί, ὅταν καιρὸς ᾖ, κόσμῳ καὶ τάξει αὖθις ὑπαγαγόντες, ἔς τε τὸ ἀσφαλὲς θᾶσσον ἀφίζεσθε καὶ γνώσεσθε τὸ λοιπὸν ὅτι οἱ τοιοῦτοι ὄχλοι τοῖς μὲν τὴν πρώτην ἔφοδον δεξαμένοις ἄπωθεν ἀπειλαῖς τὸ ἀνδρεῖον μελλήσει ἐπικομποῦσιν, οἳ δ’ ἂν εἴξωσιν αὐτοῖς, κατὰ πόδας τὸ εὔψυχον ἐν τῷ ἀσφαλεῖ ὀξεῖς ἐνδείκνυνται.’

Translations (9)

The History of the Grecian War Perseus (Thucydides. The English works of Thomas Hobbes of Malmesbury. Hobbes, Thomas. translator. London: John Bohn, 1843.) — 4.126.1 focus

[1] Men of Peloponnesus, if I did not mistrust, in respect you are thus abandoned by the Macedonians and that the barbarians which come upon you are many, that you were afraid, I should not [at this time] instruct you and encourage you as I do. But now, against this desertion of your companions and the multitude of your enemies, I will endeavour with a short instruction and hortative to give you encouragement to the full.

[2] For to be good soldiers is unto you natural, not by the presence of any confederates, but by your own valour; and not to fear others for the number, seeing you are not come from a city where the many bear rule over the few, but the few over the many; and have gotten this for power by no other means than by overcoming in fight.

[3] And as to these barbarians, whom through ignorance you fear, you may take notice, both by the former battles fought by us against them before, in favour of the Macedonians, and also by what I myself conjecture and have heard by others, that they have no great danger in them.

[4] For when any enemy whatsoever maketh show of strength, being indeed weak, the truth once known doth rather serve to embolden the other side; whereas, against such as have valour indeed, a man will be the boldest when he knoweth the least. These men here, to such as have not tried them, do indeed make terrible offers;

[5] for the sight of their number is fearful, the greatness of their cry intolerable, and the vain shaking of their weapons on high is not without signification of menacing. But they are not answerable to this when with such as stand them they come to blows. For fighting without order they will quit their place without shame if they be once pressed; and seeing it is with them honourable alike to fight or run away, their valours are never called in question; and a battle wherein every one may do as he lists, affords them a more handsome excuse to save themselves. But they trust rather in their standing out of danger and terrifying us afar off than in coming to hands with us; for else they would rather have taken that course than this.

[6] And you see manifestly that all that was before terrible in them is in effect little, and serves only to urge you to be going with their show and noise. Which if you sustain at their first coming on, and again withdraw yourselves still, as you shall have leisure, in your order and places, you shall not only come the sooner to a place of safety, but shall learn also against hereafter that such a rabble as this, to men prepared to endure their first charge, do but make a flourish of valour with threats from afar before the battle; but to such as give them ground, they are eager enough to seem courageous where they may do it safely.

History of the Peloponnesian War Perseus (Thucydides. History of the Peloponnesian War. Crawley, Richard, translator. London and Toronto: J. M. Dent and Sons Ltd.; New York: E. P. Dutton and Co., 1914.) — 4.126.1 focus

[1] ‘Peloponnesians, if I did not suspect you of being dismayed at being left alone to sustain the attack of a numerous and barbarian enemy, I should just have said a few words to you as usual without further explanation. As it is, in the face of the desertion of our friends and the numbers of the enemy, I have some advice and information to offer, which, brief as they must be, will, I hope, suffice for the more important points.

[2] The bravery that you habitually display in war does not depend on your having allies at your side in this or that encounter, but on your native courage; nor have numbers any terrors for citizens of states like yours, in which the many do not rule the few, but rather the few the many, owing their position to nothing else than to superiority in the field.

[3] Inexperience now makes you afraid of barbarians; and yet the trial of strength which you had with the Macedonians among them, and my own judgment, confirmed by what I hear from others, should be enough to satisfy you that they will not prove formidable.

[4] Where an enemy seems strong but is really weak, a true knowledge of the facts makes his adversary the bolder, just as a serious antagonist is encountered most confidently by those who do not know him. Thus the present enemy might terrify an inexperienced imagination, they are formidable in outward bulk, their loud yelling is unbearable, and the brandishing of their weapons in the air has a threatening appearance.

[5] But when it comes to real fighting with an opponent who stands his ground, they are not what they seemed; they have no regular order that they should be ashamed of deserting their positions when hard pressed; flight and attack are with them equally honourable, and afford no test of courage; their independent mode of fighting never leaving any one who wants to run away without a fair excuse for so doing. In short, they think frightening you at a secure distance a surer game than meeting you hand to hand; otherwise they would have done the one and not the other.

[6] You can thus plainly see that the terrors with which they were at first invested are in fact trifling enough, though to the eye and ear very prominent. Stand your ground therefore when they advance, and again wait your opportunity to retire in good order, and you will reach a place of safety all the sooner, and will know for ever afterwards that rabble such as these, to those who sustain their first attack, do but show off their courage by threats of the terrible things that they are going to do, at a distance, but with those who give way to them are quick enough to display their heroism in pursuit when they can do so without danger.’

Geschichte des Peloponnesischen Kriegs First1KGreek (Thucydides. Geschichte des Peloponnesischen Kriegs. Wahrmund, Adolf, translator. Stuttgart: Krais and Hoffmann, 1864.) — 4.126 focus

„Wenn ich nicht vermuthen müßte, ihr peloponnesilchen
Männer, daß ihr in Bestürzung seid, weil die Bundesgenossen euch
im Stich gelassen haben und die Angreifer Barbaren und sehr
zahlreich sind, so würde ich nicht, indem ich euch Muth einspreche, euch
auch zugleich zu belehren suchen. So aber will ich in Anbetracht,
daß unsere Beistände aufgerissen sind und die Menge der Feinde groß ¹
ist,'in kurzer Erinnerung und Ermunterung das Wichtigste euch vor-l
zuhalten suchen. Tapfer zu sein im Kampfe, geziemt euch.nicht wegen
jeweiliger Anwesenheit von Bundesgenossen, sondern wegen der
angestammten Mannhaftigkeit; und ihr'dürst euch vor keiner Menge
Fremder fürchten, denn ihr kommt ja auch nicht auS solchen Staaten
wie diese, vielmehr aus solchen, in denen nicht Viele über Wenige
herrshcen, sondern Wenige über Viele, und, auf keine andere Weise
haben diese- Wenigen solche Herrschaft erlangt, als durch Sieg in
der Schlacht."

„Was aber diese Barbaren betrifft, die ihr jetzt aus Unkunde
fürchtet, so solltet ihr aus den Kämpfen, die ihr bereits mit
barbarischen Makedoniern bestanden habt, wissen? daß sie unS nicht furchtbar
werden können, und ich habe auch sonst Ursachen dieß zu schließen
und weiß es auch von Ändern. Und wenn ein.Feind in der That
Schwächen besitzt, welche den Anschein der Stärke haben, so wird
Belehrung, welche über ihn die Wahrheit mittheilt, den Muth derer
erhöhen, welche sich seiner erwehren sollen; ist aber der Feind in der
That tapfer, so geht man ihm wohl kühner zu Leibe, wenn man es
nicht vorher weiß. Bei diesen nun ist ihre Erscheinung vor dem
Angriff den Unkundigen furchtbar. Denn schon ihre Zahl ist dem Auge
schreckhaft, und das Getöse ihres Schlachtgeschrei's ist entsetzlich, und
das eitle Schwenken ihrer Waffen hat etwas furchtbar Drohendes.
Im Handgemenge aber mit denen, welche jenes Alles aushalten, sind
sie nicht mehr dieselben; denn sie halten keine Linie ein und finden
keine Schande darin, gegenüber der Gewalt vom Platz zu weichen,
und da Flucht und Angriff bei ihnen gleicherweise rühmlich sind, so
bleibt ihre Mannhaftigkeit unerwicsen. Eine Kampfweise, wobei
Jeder auf eigene Faust handelt, bietet wohl leicht einen ehrenhaften
Vorwand, sich durch Flucht zu retten. Und sie halten es für sicherer,
euch aus gefahrloser Entfernung Furcht einzujagen, als mit euch
handgemein zu werden; denn sonst würden sie wohl dieses vor jenem
thun: So seht ihr denn klar, daß der Schrecken, der vor ihnen
hergeht, in der That nur kurze Zeit taueit und nur Aug und Ohr trifft.
Wenn ihr aber den Anprall dieser furchtbaren Dinge aushaltet und
dann wieder zu rechter Zeit.euch in fester Ordnung langsam zurück ²
zieht, , daß dergleichen ungeordnete Haufen denen, welche
den ersten Anprall aushalten, anstatt sie anzugreifen, nur durch
prahlerische Drohungen aus der Ferne ihre Tapferkeit zeigen, denen aber,
welche vor ihnen weichen, auf den Fersen hitzig folgend ihren Muth
beweisen, indem sie selbst in Sicherheit ifnd."

Histoire de la Guerre du Péloponèse First1KGreek (Thucydides. Histoire de la Guerre du Péloponnése, Vol. 1-2. Zévort, Marie Charles, translator. Paris: Charpentier, 1852.) — 4.126 focus

CXXVI. « Péloponnésiens, si je ne vous supposais inquiets de votre isolement, de l’approche des Barbares et de leur nombre, je me serais contenté de vous exhorter, sans entrer dans aucun autre détail¹ ; mais, en présence de l’abandon où nous laissent nos alliés et de la multitude de nos ennemis, je veux joindre à mes exhortations quelques rapides enseignements², pour vous inspirer les plus héroïques résolutions. La bravoure dont il convient que vous fassiez preuve au combat doit reposer, non sur la présence de tels ou tels alliés, mais sur votre valeur propre ; et jamais ennemi, quelque nombreux qu’il soit, ne doit vous inspirer de crainte. Votre patrie, en effet, n’est pas de celles où la multitude commande au petit nombre ; c’est le petit nombre, au contraire, qui y gouverne la multitude, et il ne doit sa puissance qu’à sa supériorité dans les combats.

« Quant aux Barbares, que vous redoutez en ce moment, faute de les connaître, votre propre expérience contre les Barbares de la Macédonie, mes conjectures, et des renseignements certains, tout vous montre qu’ils n’ont rien de redoutable. Toutes les fois qu’un ennemi faible en réalité se présente avec une apparence de force, la connaissance exacte de qu’il vaut inspire plus de confiance pour le combattre ; tandis qu’avec des adversaires d’une valeur réelle on peut, faute de connaître, se laisser emporter trop témérairement. Ces Barbares, quand on ne les connaît pas, sont effrayants à l’approche du combat ; leur multitude trouble le regard ; leurs horribles clameurs jettent l’épouvante ; ce vain brandissement des armes a quelque chose de menaçant ; mais dans l’action, contre un ennemi qui tient ferme, tout cela s’évanouit. Comme ils ne gardent pas de rangs, ils ne rougissent pas de céder dans un moment pressant ; avancer et fuir étant choses également méritoires pour eux, le courage même ne saurait être constaté. Dans un combat où chacun ne suit que son caprice, on trouve aisément un prétexte spécieux pour se sauver. Ils trouvent plus sûr de nous épouvanter sans danger pour eux, que d’en venir aux mains ; car, autrement, c’est par là qu’ils auraient commencé. Vous voyez clairement que ce qui, au premier abord, vous paraît si terrible chez eux, est peu de chose en réalité ; tout cela ne frappe que la vue et les oreilles. Tenez ferme contre cette première impression ; puis, quand il en sera temps, opérez votre retraite avec ordre et discipline, et vous ne tarderez pas à être en sûreté. Vous saurez désormais ce que vaut une pareille tourbe, lorsqu’on soutient leur premier choc : ils ne savent que faire parade de courage, à distance, avant l’action, et par de vaines menaces ; mais si on cède devant eux, leur valeur éclate alors, quand il n’y a plus rien à craindre, par l’agilité de leurs pieds et la rapidité de la poursuite. »

Histoire de la Guerre du Péloponnése First1KGreek (Thucydides. Histoire de la Guerre du Péloponnése. Bétant, Élie-Ami, translator. Paris: Librairie de L. Hachette, 1863.) — 4.126 focus

«r Soldats péloponésiens, si je ne vous croyais intimidés par la pensée de votre isolement et de la foule des Barbares qui s’approchent, je me bornerais à vous encourager sans autre explication; mais le départ de nos alliés et la multitude de nos ennemis me font un devoir de vous adresser en peu de mots les exhortations et les conseils les plus indispensables.

« Votre fermeté dans les batailles ne tient pas à la présence constante de vos alliés, mais à votre bravoure personnelle et à votre habitude de ne pas compter vos ennemis. Les États d’où vous venez ne sont pas de ceux où la multitude commande au petit nombre ; elle est soumise au contraire à la minorité, qui ne doit ses privilèges qu’à sa valeur guerrière.

« Ces Barbares que vous appréhendez faute de les connaître, l’expérience que vous avez faite de ceux de Macédoine, mes propres conjectures et mes informations, tout me prouve qu’ils sont peu redoutables. Lorsqu’un ennemi, faible en réalité, se présente avec une apparence de force, il suffit de savoir ce qu’il vaut effectivement pour se défendre avec plus de confiance; tandis qu’en .face d’adversaires d’un mérite réel, l’ignorance inspire une témérité déplacée.

« Pour qui ne les connaît pas, l’approche de ces Barbares est effrayante. L’aspect de leur multitude épouvante ; leurs cris assourdissent ; la vaine agitation de leurs armes produit me impression de terreur. Mais, une fois aux prises arveo un ennemi qui ne s’effraye pas de ces démonstrations, ce ne sont plus'les mêmes hommes. N’ayant point d’ordne de bataille, ils ne rougissent pas d’abandonner leur poste dès qu’ils sont pressés. Pour eux, la fuite ou l’attaque, aussi honorables l’une que l’autre, ne prouvent ni lâcheté ni valeur. Chacun, n’obéissant qu’à son impulsion personnelle, trouve dans son indépendance un prétexte plausible pour se sauver. Au lieu de joindre l’ennemi corps à corps, ils jugent plus prudent de Γintimider de loin; autrement ils auraient déjà fondu sur nous. Vous vuyez donc que tout cet épouvantail, peu dangereux au fond, ntet saisissant que pour les yeux et les oreilles.

« Soutenez leur abord; et, le moment venu, repliez-vues avec ordre et bonne contenance. Bientôt vous arriverez en Heu sûr; et vous saurez désormais que ces bordes tumultueuses, quand on reçoit leur premier choc, se contentent d’étaler de loin leur valeur par des bravades impuissantes; mais que, si on leur cède, elles font briller sans danger leur courage.per l'agilité de leurs pieds. »

History of the Peloponnesian War First1KGreek (Thucydides, Vol. 1-4. Smith, Charles Foster, translator. London and Cambridge, MA: Heinemann and Harvard University Press, 1919-1923.) — 4.126.1 focus

[1] “Did I not suspect, men of Peloponnesus, that you are in a state of panic because you have been left alone, and because your assailants are barbarous and numerous, I should not offer you instruction combined with encouragement. But as it is, in view of our abandonment by our allies and of the multitude of our opponents, I shall try by a brief reminder and by advice to impress upon you the most important considerations.

[2] For it is proper that vou should be brave in war, not because of the presence of allies each and every time, but because of innate valour; nor should you be afraid of any number of aliens, you who do not come from states like theirs, but states in which, not the many rule the few, but rather the minority rule the majority, having acquired their power by no other means but superiority in fighting.

[3] And as for the barbarians, whom now in your inexperience you fear, you ought to know, both from the contest you have already had with the Macedonians among them,¹ and may gather from the knowledge I gain by inference and from reports of others, that they will not be formidable.

[4] For whenever the enemy's power conveys an impression of strength, but is in reality weak, correct information about them, when once it has been gained, tends rather to embolden their opponents; whereas, when the enemy possesses some solid advantage, if one has no previous knowledge of it, one would be only too bold in attacking them.

[5] Now as for these Illyrians, for those who have had no experience of them, the menace of their attack has terror; for their number is indeed dreadful to behold and the loudness of their battle-cry is intolerable, and the idle brandishing of their arms has a threatening effect. But for hand to hand fighting, if their opponents but endure such threats, they are not the men they seem; for having no regular order, they would not be ashamed to abandon any position when hard pressed; and since flight and attack are considered equally honourable with them, their courage cannot be put to the test. Besides, a mode of fighting in which everyone is his own master will provide a man the best excuse for saving himself becomingly. They think, too, that it is a less risky game to try to frighten you from a safe distance than to meet you hand to hand;

[6] otherwise they would not have taken this course in preference to that. And so you clearly see that all that was at first formidable about them is but little in reality, startling merely to eye and ear. If you withstand all this in the first onrush, and then, whenever opportunity offers, withdraw again in orderly array, you will the sooner reach safety, and will hereafter know that mobs like these, if an adversary but sustain their first onset, merely make a flourish of valour with threats from afar in menace² of attack, but if one yields to them, they are right upon his heels, quick enough to display their courage when all is safe.”

History of the Peloponnesian War First1KGreek (Thucydides. The history of the Peloponnesian War, Volume 1-2. Dale, Henry, translator. London: Heinemann and Henry G. Bohn, 1851-1852.) — 4.126.1 focus

[1]

Men of the Peloponnese, if I did not suspect that in consequence of your being left alone, and because your assailants are barbarians, and there are many of them, you were thrown into consternation, I should not have given you, as I do, information at the same time as encouragement. But as it is, with respect to the desertion of our friends, and the superior numbers of our adversaries, I will endeavour, by a brief admonition and advice, to convince you of what is most important for you.

[2]

For it is your proper characterr to be brave in warlike operations, not from the presence of allies in each case, but from your own native valour; and to fear no number of your enemies whatever: ¹ since neither are the governments from which you come of such a character—governments in which the many do not rule the few, but rather the smaller number the greater, having acquired their power by no other means than by being victorious in battle.

[3]

But with regard to barbarians, of whom you are now afraid through inexperience, you ought to know, both from the contest you have already had with those of them who are Macedonians, and from what I myself conjecture, and indeed have ascertained from hearsay, that they will not prove formidable.

[4]

For with regard to such points in an enemy as have an appearance of strength, while they are in reality weak, when correct information is gained respecting them, it rather gives confidence to those who resist them: whereas in the case of those who have any solid advantage, men would meet them the more boldly from having no previous acquaintance with them.

[5]

Now these men present indeed a demonstration fearful to such as are unacquainted with them: for they are formidable in their numbers which meet the eye, and intolerable from the loudness of their shouting; and the brandishing of their weapons in the air has a look of threatening. But to those who stand their ground against them, they are not what they seemed; for they have no definite order, so as to be ashamed of leaving any particular position, when hard pressed; and their retreat and attack being considered equally honourable puts their courage also beyond the reach of proof; while their independent mode of fighting would most frequently afford a man a pretext for saving himself with a fair show. And so they consider the probability of their frightening you without any danger to themselves a surer game than meeting you hand to hand; else they would have adopted that method instead of their present one.

[6]

And in this way you clearly see, that all that was previously terrible in them, is but little in reality, though to the eye and to the ear very urgent. If, therefore, you stand firm against its approach, and when you have an opportunity, again retire in good order, and in your ranks, you will the sooner reach a place of safety; and will know in future, that to those who sustain their first attack, such rabbles only make a vaunting demonstration, by threatening at a distance; but in the case of those who yield to them, they are quick in displaying their courage in pursuit, when they can do it with security.

Historia Belli Peloponnesiaci First1KGreek (Historia Belli Peloponnesiaci. Haase, Friedrich, translator. Paris: Firmin Didot, 1869.) — 4.126.1 focus

[1] « Nisi ego suspicarer, viri Peloponnesii, terrore vos esse perculsos, tum quod soli derelicti simus, tum etiam quod barbari sunt iique magno numero, qui contra dos veniunt, non item vos docerem pariter in adhortando; nunc vero quod ad nostrorum desertionem et ad hostium multitudinem attinet, vobis, quae maxima sunt, brevi admonitione et adhortatione persuadere conabor.

[2] Strenuos enim vos esse in rebus bellicis convenit non propter socios, quoties adsunt, sed propter propriam virtutem, nec ullam aliorum multitudinem extimescere, quippe qui venitis ex ejusmodi rebuspublicis, in quibus non multi paucis, sed , potius pauciores pluribus imperant, nulla illi alia ratione principatum adepti, quam proeliando superantes.

[3] Barba- , ros autem, quos nunc propter ignorationem formidatis,quum ex certaminibus, quae antea cum iis inter illos, qui Macedo- | nes sunt, habuistis, tum ex iis, quae ego partim conjectura, partim fama intelligo, scire debetis non fore formidabiles.

[4]

Etenim quaecumque in hostibus quum re vera infirma sint, roboris tamen speciem habent, si vera de iliis experientia ac· cedat, adversarios magis confirmant; quibus vero aliqua fortitudo constanter adest, si quis eam ante non noverit, in eos audacius feratur.

[5] Isti vero quamdiu nondum proelium ineunt, illis sunt formidabiles, qui eos non sunt experti; nam et ipso multitudinis aspectu sunt terribiles, et vociferationis magnitudine sunt intolerabiles, et inanis illa armorum concussio quandam minarum significationem habet. Sed in ipso conflictu adversus eos, qui res istas fortiter sustinent, haud tales se praestant; quum enim nullum ordinem habeant, haudquaquam eos pudebit locum deserere, si premantur, et quum fuga aeque honesta et gloriosa ipsis videatur atque aggressio., etiam fortitudinem relinquit incertam. Pugna autem, in qua unusquisque rem arbitratu suo gerit, cuivis etiam salutis sub decora specie quaerendae occasionem facillime praebeat. Tuliusque existimant, nos sine periculo suo terrefacere, quam nobiscum ad manus venire ; alioquin enim hac potius quam illa ratione uterentur.

[6] Denique quicquid terroris hactenus vobis ab iis incussum est, manifeste videtis re quidem ipsa leve esse, sed aspectu tantum et auditu incessere. Quod ingruens si sustinueritis, et quum tempus fuerit, militari disciplina ordinibusque servatis, retro vos subduxeritis, et in loca tuta citius pervenietis, et cognoscetis in posterum, hujusmodi turbas illis quidem, qui primum impetum susti nuerint, inani minarum strepitu fortitudinem ante conflictum eminus ostentare, illis vero, qui ipsis cesserint, animi strenuitatem non nisi insequentes citra periculum acres exhibere. »

La storia di Tucidide First1KGreek (Thucydides. Della storia di Tucidide volgarizzata libri otto. Anonymous translator. Florence: Tipografia Galileiana, 1835.) — 4.126 focus

« Soldati Peloponnesi, se io non sospettassi esser voi costernati perchè i Macedoni ci abbandonarono, e perchè uno sciame di barbari viene ad assalirci, non mi sarei proposto di ammaestrarvi insieme ed in coraggi rvi. Ed è però che quanto all’ abbandonamelo de’nostri ed alla moltitudine de’ nemici, voglio ora far di tutto per convincervi di cosa importantissima con breve ricordo ed esortazione. E vaglia il vero , a voi è richiesto esser sempre prodi in guerra non per la presenza degli alleati, ma pel vostro proprio valore ; nè deve intimorirvi la moltitudine altrui, siccome quelli che venite da repubbliche, ove non i molti su i pochi, ma piuttosto i meno hanno comando su i più , comando non in altra guisa acquistato che con le vittorie fra Tarmi. Quanto poi ai barbari che per inesperienza temete , dovete imparare che e9 non saranno formidabili, si dai combattimenti avuti contro loro in grazia dei Macedoni, sì da quello ch’io ne so per congettura e per udita. Imperciocché quando il nemico è debole di fatto, ma induce opinione di fortezza, il procacciare una verace istruzione intorno ad esso, rinfranca maggiormente chi vuol resistergli : ed all’opposto è temerario colui che assale un nemico veramente valoroso, senza prima brigarsi di conoscerlo. Or sono costoro spaventosi agli inesperti mentre s’indugia ad attaccarli, perchè ti atterrisce la vista di lor moltitudine , ti sgomenta la grandezza delle grida , e perchè quel vano crollar dell’ armi ba in sè non so qual minacciosa significane. Ma ove tu regga a queste apparenze , dessi non son più i medesimi. Avvegnaché non serbando nissun ordine , ove sieno forzati non si fanno caso di abbandonare il suo posto ; fuggire od assalire è per loro decoroso egualmente , onde al valore non resta modo a distinguersi ; e poi quel battagliare a capriccio deve procacciare a ciascuno colorata occasione di salvarsi. Stimano più sicuro lo spaventarci da lungi senza pericolo , che venir con noi alle mani ; altrimenti piuttostochè di quello, avrebbero usato di questo modo. Voi vedete chiaro adunque che quel terrore che li precede , è ben piccola cosa nel fatto , e che solo confonde la vista e l’udito. Le quali cose sostenendo quando costoro vi vengano addosso , e dando addietro posatamente e con ordine, arriverete ben presto a salvamento , e conoscerete pel del conflitto ; con chi poi ceda , sopraggiungendo essa alle spalle, e cosi trovandosi al sicuro, fa mostra di valore coll’ inseguir velocemente ».

Thucydides History of the Peloponnesian War 4.126

Theodor Braun (Translator)

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