Thucydides, History of the Peloponnesian War, Theodor Braun (Translator), 4.108

Search the Perseus Catalog for:

← Previous Next →

Der Fall von Amphipolis setzte die Athener sehr in
Schrecken, schon weil ihnen die Stadt für die Zufuhr von
Schiffsbauholz und der Steuern wegen von Wert war. Hatte
den Lakedämoniern auch bisher im Gebiet der Thessaler der
Weg zu ihren Bundesgenossen bis zum Strymon offen ge
standen, so konnten sie doch, solange sie nicht im Besitz der
Brücke waren, nickt weiter vorbringen; denn landeinwärts
bildete der Fluß auf eine weite Strecke einen großen See, und
auf der Seite nach Eion paßten ihnen die Kriegsschiffe auf;
jetzt aber würde ihnen daS ein leichtes sein. Auch fürchteten
sie, die Bundesgenossen würden von ihnen abfallen; denn
Brasidas trat in jeder Beziehung mit großer Mäßigung auf
und erklärte bei jeder Gelegenheit, daß er nur ausgesandt sei,
um Griechenland zu befreien. Und in der Tat wurden die
den Athenern untertänigen Städte, als sie von der Einnahme
von Amphipolis, den milden Bedingungen und seinem Wohl
wollen hörten, von einem wahren Freiheitstaumel ergriffen,
ließen ihn heimlich auffordern, zu ihnen zu kommen, und jede
wollte die erste sein, die sich von Athen lossagte. Sie hielten
das nämlich jetzt nicht weiter für gefährlich, wobei sie sich
freilich, wie sich später zeigen sollte, über die Macht der Athener
gewaltig täuschten. Aber so sind die Menschen, statt sich dir
Sache reiflich zu überlegen, lassen sie sich in der Regel von
unklaren Wünschen leiten, immer geneigt, bei dem, wonach
ihnen der Sinn steht, sich in blinden Hoffnungen zu wiegen,
während sie von Dingen, die ihnen unerwünscht sind, nichts
wissen wollen. Und da die Athener obendrein kürzlich in
Böotien geschlagen waren und Brasidas ihnen zwar wahrheits
widrig, aber doch sehr einleuchtend geschildert hatte, wie die
Athener es bei seinem Zuge nach Nisaia mit ihm allein nicht
aufzunehmen gewagt hätten, fühlten sie sich vollends sicher und
glaubten, niemand könne ihnen waS anhaben. Hauptsächlich
aber, weil ihnen die Sache in dem Augenblick angenehm war
und sie erst mal sehen wollten, was denn die Lakedämonier
könnten, scheuten sie sich nicht, leichtsinnig mit dem Feuer zu
spielen. Als die Athener davon hörten, sandten sie, soweit es
in der Eile und zur Winterszeit anging, Besatzungen in die
Städte; Brasidas aber schickte ebenfalls nach Lakedämon und
bat dringend um Verstärkungen, begann jedoch auch selbst am
Strymon mit dem Bau von Kriegsschiffen. Die Lakedämonier
aber taten ihm den Gefallen nicht, teils weil die ersten Männer
neidisch auf ihn waren, teils weil ihnen mehr daran tag, die
Gefangenen von der Insel wiederzubekommen und dem Kriege
ein Ende zu machen.

History of the Peloponnesian War. Thucydides. Theodor Braun (Translator). Leipzig. 1917.

Current edition First1KGreek

Geschichte des Peloponnesischen Kriegs (German) (Thucydides. Geschichte des Peloponnesischen Kriegs. Braun, Theodor, translator. Leipzig: Insel-Verlag, 1917.)

Editions (1)

Ἱστορίαι Perseus (Thucydides. Historiae, Vol 1-2. Jones, Henry Stuart, editor. Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1910. (1942 printing).) — 4.108.1 focus

[1] ἐχομένης δὲ τῆς Ἀμφιπόλεως οἱ Ἀθηναῖοι ἐς μέγα δέος κατέστησαν, ἄλλως τε καὶ ὅτι ἡ πόλις αὐτοῖς ἦν ὠφέλιμος ξύλων τε ναυπηγησίμων πομπῇ καὶ χρημάτων προσόδῳ, καὶ ὅτι μέχρι μὲν τοῦ Στρυμόνος ἦν πάροδος Θεσσαλῶν διαγόντων ἐπὶ τοὺς ξυμμάχους σφῶν τοῖς Λακεδαιμονίοις, τῆς δὲ γεφύρας μὴ κρατούντων, ἄνωθεν μὲν μεγάλης οὔσης ἐπὶ πολὺ λίμνης τοῦ ποταμοῦ, τὰ δὲ πρὸς Ἠιόνα τριήρεσι τηρουμένων, οὐκ ἂν δύνασθαι προελθεῖν· τότε δὲ ῥᾴδια ἤδη [ἐνόμιζεν] γεγενῆσθαι. καὶ τοὺς ξυμμάχους ἐφοβοῦντο μὴ ἀποστῶσιν.

[2] ὁ γὰρ Βρασίδας ἔν τε τοῖς ἄλλοις μέτριον ἑαυτὸν παρεῖχε, καὶ ἐν τοῖς λόγοις πανταχοῦ ἐδήλου ὡς ἐλευθερώσων τὴν Ἑλλάδα ἐκπεμφθείη.

[3] καὶ αἱ πόλεις πυνθανόμεναι αἱ τῶν Ἀθηναίων ὑπήκοοι τῆς τε Ἀμφιπόλεως τὴν ἅλωσιν καὶ ἃ παρέχεται, τήν τε ἐκείνου πραότητα, μάλιστα δὴ ἐπήρθησαν ἐς τὸ νεωτερίζειν, καὶ ἐπεκηρυκεύοντο πρὸς αὐτὸν κρύφα, ἐπιπαριέναι τε κελεύοντες καὶ βουλόμενοι αὐτοὶ ἕκαστοι πρῶτοι ἀποστῆναι.

[4] καὶ γὰρ καὶ ἄδεια ἐφαίνετο αὐτοῖς, ἐψευσμένοις μὲν τῆς Ἀθηναίων δυνάμεως ἐπὶ τοσοῦτον ὅση ὕστερον διεφάνη, τὸ δὲ πλέον βουλήσει κρίνοντες ἀσαφεῖ ἢ προνοίᾳ ἀσφαλεῖ, εἰωθότες οἱ ἄνθρωποι οὗ μὲν ἐπιθυμοῦσιν ἐλπίδι ἀπερισκέπτῳ διδόναι, ὃ δὲ μὴ προσίενται λογισμῷ αὐτοκράτορι διωθεῖσθαι.

[5] ἅμα δὲ τῶν Ἀθηναίων ἐν τοῖς Βοιωτοῖς νεωστὶ πεπληγμένων καὶ τοῦ Βρασίδου ἐφολκὰ καὶ οὐ τὰ ὄντα λέγοντος, ὡς αὐτῷ ἐπὶ Νίσαιαν τῇ ἑαυτοῦ μόνῃ στρατιᾷ οὐκ ἠθέλησαν οἱ Ἀθηναῖοι ξυμβαλεῖν, ἐθάρσουν καὶ ἐπίστευον μηδένα ἂν ἐπὶ σφᾶς βοηθῆσαι.

[6] τὸ δὲ μέγιστον, διὰ τὸ ἡδονὴν ἔχον ἐν τῷ αὐτίκα καὶ ὅτι τὸ πρῶτον Λακεδαιμονίων ὀργώντων ἔμελλον πειράσεσθαι, κινδυνεύειν παντὶ τρόπῳ ἑτοῖμοι ἦσαν. ὧν αἰσθανόμενοι οἱ μὲν Ἀθηναῖοι φυλακάς, ὡς ἐξ ὀλίγου καὶ ἐν χειμῶνι, διέπεμπον ἐς τὰς πόλεις, ὁ δὲ ἐς τὴν Λακεδαίμονα ἐφιέμενος στρατιάν τε προσαποστέλλειν ἐκέλευε καὶ αὐτὸς ἐν τῷ Στρυμόνι ναυπηγίαν τριήρων παρεσκευάζετο.

[7] οἱ δὲ Λακεδαιμόνιοι τὰ μὲν καὶ φθόνῳ ἀπὸ τῶν πρώτων ἀνδρῶν οὐχ ὑπηρέτησαν αὐτῷ, τὰ δὲ καὶ βουλόμενοι μᾶλλον τούς τε ἄνδρας τοὺς ἐκ τῆς νήσου κομίσασθαι καὶ τὸν πόλεμον καταλῦσαι.

Translations (9)

The History of the Grecian War Perseus (Thucydides. The English works of Thomas Hobbes of Malmesbury. Hobbes, Thomas. translator. London: John Bohn, 1843.) — 4.108.1 focus

[1] After Amphipolis was taken, the Athenians were brought into great fear, especially for that it was a city that yielded them much profit, both in timber which is sent them for the building of galleys and in revenue of money, and because also, though the Lacedaemonians had a passage open to come against their confederates, the Thessalians convoying them, as far as to Strymon, yet if they had not gotten that bridge, the river being upwards nothing but a vast fen, and towards Eion well guarded with their galleys, they could have gone no further; which now they thought they might easily do, and therefore feared lest their confederates should revolt.

[2] For Brasidas both showed himself otherwise very moderate, and also gave out in speech that he was sent forth to recover the liberty of Greece.

[3] And the cities which were subject to the Athenians, hearing of the taking of Amphipolis, and what assurance he brought with him, and of his gentleness besides, were extremely desirous of innovation, and sent messengers privily to bid him draw near, every one striving who should first revolt.

[4] For they thought they might do it boldly, falsely estimating the power of the Athenians to be less than afterwards it appeared, and making a judgment of it according to [blind] wilfulness rather than safe forecast; it being the fashion of men, what they wish to be true to admit even upon an ungrounded hope, and what they wish not, with a magistral kind of arguing to reject.

[5] Withal, because the Athenians had lately received a blow from the Boeotians, and because Brasidas had said (not as was the truth, but as served best to allure them) that when he was at Nisaea the Athenians durst not fight with those forces of his alone, they grew confident thereon, and believed not that any man would come against them.

[6] But the greatest cause of all was that for the delight they took at this time to innovate, and for that they were to make trial of the Lacedaemonians, not till now angry, they were content by any means to put it to the hazard. Which being perceived, the Athenians sent garrison soldiers into those cities, as many as the shortness of the time and the season of winter would permit. And Brasidas sent unto Lacedaemon to demand greater forces, and in the meantime prepared to build galleys on the river Strymon.

[7] But the Lacedaemonians, partly through envy of the principal men, and partly because they more affected the redemption of their men taken in the island and the ending of the war, refused to furnish him.

History of the Peloponnesian War Perseus (Thucydides. History of the Peloponnesian War. Crawley, Richard, translator. London and Toronto: J. M. Dent and Sons Ltd.; New York: E. P. Dutton and Co., 1914.) — 4.108.1 focus

[1] The news that Amphipolis was in the hands of the enemy caused great alarm at Athens . Not only was the town valuable for the timber it afforded for shipbuilding, and the money that it brought in; but also, although the escort of the Thessalians gave the Lacedaemonians a means of reaching the allies of Athens as far as the Strymon, yet as long as they were not masters of the bridge but were watched on the side of Eion by the Athenian galleys, and on the land side impeded by a large and extensive lake formed by the waters of the river, it was impossible for them to go any further. Now, on the contrary, the path seemed open. There was also the fear of the allies revolting,

[2] owing to the moderation displayed by Brasidas in all his conduct, and to the declarations which he was everywhere making that he was sent out to free Hellas .

[3] The towns subject to the Athenians, hearing of the capture of Amphipolis and of the terms accorded to it, and of the gentleness of Brasidas, felt most strongly encouraged to change their condition, and sent secret messages to him, begging him to come on to them; each wishing to be the first to revolt.

[4] Indeed there seemed to be no danger in so doing; their mistake in their estimate of the Athenian power was as great as that power afterwards turned out to be, and their judgment was based more upon blind wishing than upon any sound prevision; for it is a habit of mankind to entrust to careless hope what they long for, and to use sovereign reason to thrust aside what they do not fancy.

[5] Besides the late severe blow which the Athenians had met with in Boeotia , joined to the seductive, though untrue, statements of Brasidas, about the Athenians not having ventured to engage his single army at Nisaea , made the allies confident, and caused them to believe that no Athenian force would be sent against them.

[6] Above all the wish to do what was agreeable at the moment, and the likelihood that they should find the Lacedaemonians full of zeal at starting, made them eager to venture. Observing this, the Athenians sent garrisons to the different towns, as far as was possible at such short notice and in winter; while Brasidas sent despatches to Lacedaemon asking for reinforcements, and himself made preparations for building galleys in the Strymon.

[7] The Lacedaemonians however did not send him any, partly through envy on the part of their chief men, partly because they were more bent on recovering the prisoners of the island and ending the war.

Geschichte des Peloponnesischen Kriegs First1KGreek (Thucydides. Geschichte des Peloponnesischen Kriegs. Wahrmund, Adolf, translator. Stuttgart: Krais and Hoffmann, 1864.) — 4.108 focus

Wegen des Verlustes von Amphipolis geriethen die
Athener in große Furcht, zumal ihnen auch die Stadt durch Lieferung von
Schiffsbauholz und Steuerzahlung nützlich gewesen war, und weil die
Lakedämonier ^bis jetzig zwar im Geleite der Thessaler gegen ihre
Bundesgenossen bis an den Strymonfluß vorbringen konnten, aber,
ohne den Brückenübergang in ihrer Gewalt zu haben, nicht weiter zu
kommen vermochten, weil sich von oben her längs einer großen Strecke
des Flusses ein bedeutender Sumpf hindehnteund die Athener
gegen Eion hin Kriegsschiffe zum Schutze aufgestellt hatten; jetzt aber,
glaubten sie, sei jenen die Sache leicht gemacht. Auch fürchteten sie
den Abfall der Bundesgenossen, denn Brasidas zeigte sich sowohl im
Uebrigen gemäßigt und erklärte auch in seinen Reden überall, daß
er ausgeschickt sei, um Hellas frei zu machen; und als die den
Athenern unterthänigen Städte von der Wegnahme von Amphipolis
hörten und welche Bedingungen jener anbiete und wie mild er sich zeige,
so wurden sie sehr geneigt, ihre Lage zu ändern und schickten heimlich
Herolde an jenen, mit der Aufforderung, bei ihnen zu erscheinen, und
jede wollte zum Abfall die erste sein. Und sie glaubten dieß auch ohne
Gefährde thun zu können; so sehr täuschten sie sich über die Macht der
Athener, die sich hinterher viel größer zeigte; aber die Menschen
beurtheilen ja die Dinge mehr nach ihren unklaren Wünschen, als mit
untrüglicher Voraussicht, und sind gewohnt, in Betreff dessen, was sie
wünshcen, sich ganz und gar einer blinden Hoffnung hinzugeben, was
sie aber nicht wünschen, mit willkürlicher Verstandesdeutung
abzuweisen. Auch weil die Athener kürzlich in Böotien geschlagen worden
waren, und Brasidas zwar Verführerisches, aber nicht der Wahrheit
gemäß vorbrachte, als ob nämlich bei Nisäa, wo die Athener sich nicht
zu schlagen wagten, er mit seinem Heere allein ihnen so furchtbar
gewesen wäre — auch deßhalb also faßten die Städte Muth und ver- ¹
trauten, daß niemals Jemand zur Ahndung gegen sie ziehen werde. ²
Der Hauptgrund war aber, weil es ihnen für den Augenblick erwunjckt
war, und weil sieden ersten guten Eifer der Lakedämonier zu
erproben dachten; dafür waren sie bereit, sich in jeder Weise Gefahren
zu unterziehen. Als die Athener dieß merkten, schickten sie, so weit
es sich in der Geschwindigkeit und der schlechten Jahreszeit wegen
thun ließ, Besatzungen in die Städte; Brasidas aber sandte nach
Lakedämon und verlangte dringend, ihm noch Truppen zuzuschicken,
und traf selbst am Strymon Vorkehrungen zum Bau von
Kriegsschiffen. Die Lakedämonier zeigten sich ihm jedoch nickt willfährig,
theils weil die ersten Männer unter ihnen auf jenen neidisch waren,
theils auch, weil sie mehr daran dachten, ihre Leute oon der Insel
(Sphakteria) zurückzuerhalten und dem Krieg ein Ende zu machen.

Histoire de la Guerre du Péloponèse First1KGreek (Thucydides. Histoire de la Guerre du Péloponnése, Vol. 1-2. Zévort, Marie Charles, translator. Paris: Charpentier, 1852.) — 4.108 focus

CVIII. La prise d’Amphipolis jeta l’effroi parmi les Athéniens : la possession de cette ville avait pour eux une grande importance, à cause des bois de construction et des revenus qu’ils en tiraient. D’un autre côté, les Ladémoniens avaient bien pu, jusque-là, arriver jusqu’aux bords du Strymon, guidés par les Thessaliens contre les alliés d’Athènes ; mais, n’étant pas maîtres du pont, rencontrant, au-dessus, l’obstacle de vastes marais que forme le fleuve, au-dessous, du côté d’Eion, les trirèmes qui gardaient le passage, ils ne pouvaient avancer au delà. Maintenant les Athéniens sentaient que ce serait chose facile, et ils redoutaient la défection de leurs alliés ; car Brasidas se montrait modéré en toutes choses, et répétait partout qu’il avait été envoyé pour affranchir la Grèce. Les villes soumises à Athènes, instruites de la prise d’Amphipolis, des promesses de Brasidas, de sa modération, n’en étaient que plus portées à la révolte : elles lui envoyaient secrètement des messages, et l’appelaient à elles ; c’était à qui se soulèverait le premier. On croyait n’avoir rien à craindre ; on se figurait la puissance athénienne bien au-dessous de ce qu’elle était et surtout de ce qu’elle se montra par la suite ; on jugeait plutôt sur d’aveugles désirs que sur les données exactes d’une saine prévoyance. Tels sont les hommes : quand ils désirent une chose, ils s’abandonnent inconsidérément à l’espérance ; et ils ont toujours des raisons sans réplique pour repousser arbitrairement ce qui leur déplait. D’ailleurs, l’échec récent des Athéniens en Béotie, les paroles séduisantes et mensongères de Brasidas, qui prétendait que les Athéniens n’avaient point osé se mesurer avec son armée, quoiqu’elle fût seule à Nisée, tout inspirait la confiance ; ils étaient persuadés que personne ne viendrait plus les attaquer ; mais, par-dessus tout, le charme de la nouveauté et la pensée qu’ils allaient essayer pour la première fois le zèle des Lacédèmoniens, les disposaient à tout risquer. Les Athéniens, instruits de ces dispositions, envoyèrent des garnisons dans les villes, autant du moins que le permettaient l’hiver et le temps qui les pressait. Brasidas, de son côté, fit demander une armée à Lacédémone et se prépara luimême à faire construire des galères sur le Strymon. Mais les Lacédémoniens ne le secondèrent pas, par suite de l’envie que lui portaient les premiers citoyens, et aussi parce qu’ils voulaient, avant tout, se faire rendre les guerriers de l’île, et terminer la guerre.

Histoire de la Guerre du Péloponnése First1KGreek (Thucydides. Histoire de la Guerre du Péloponnése. Bétant, Élie-Ami, translator. Paris: Librairie de L. Hachette, 1863.) — 4.108 focus

La perte d’Amphipolis plongea les Athéniens dans une profonde consternation. Cette place était pour eux d’une importance majeure, à cause des bois de construction et des revenus qu’ils en tiraient. Auparavant les Lacédémoniens avaient bien pu, en traversant la Thessalie, pénétrer jusqu’au Strymon pour attaquer les alliés; mais, tant qu’ils n’étaient pas maîtres du pont, ils ne pouvaient franchir ce fleuve, qui forme un vaste lac au-dessus de la ville, et dont l’embouchure, près d’É'ïon, était gardée par des vaisseaux. Désormais il n’y avait plus d’obstacle, et l’on appréhendait la défection des alliés. Brasidas tenait la conduite la plus mesurée ; il allait répétant partout qu’il avait été envoyé pour affranchir les Grecs. Aussi les villes sujettes d’Athènes, informées de la prise d’Amphipolis, des promesses de Brasidas et de sa modération, se montraient-elles disposées à se révolter. On l’appelait en lui envoyant de secrets messages ; c’était à qui s’insurgerait le premier.On croyait n’avoir rien à craindre, et l’on ne se figurait pas la puissance d’Athènes aussi grande qu’elle parut dans la suite ; on la jugeait d’après une passion aveugle et non d’après une saine appréciation. Tels sont les hommes : ils croient volontiers ce qu’ils désirent et ne font usage de leur raisonnement que pour repousser ce qui leur déplaît. Ajoutez à cela l’échec récent des Athéniens en Béotie et les paroles plus séduisantes (pie véridiques de Brasidas, qui prétendait que les Athéniens devant Niséa avaient refusé de se mesurer avec sa seule armée. Aussi les alliés s’enhardissaient, dans la persuasion que nul ne viendrait les attaquer. Le charme de la nouveauté, la pensée quils allaient mettre à l’épreuve le premier élan des Lacédémoniens, les engageaient à tout risquer.

Instruits de ces dispositions, les Athéniens envoyèrent des garnisons dans toutes les villes, autant du moins que le permettaient la brièveté du temps et la rigueur de la saison. Brasidas de son côté sollicita de Lacédémone l’envoi de nouvelles troupes, et se mit en devoir de construire des trirèmes sur le Strymon. Mais les Lacédémoniens ne le secondèrent pas. soit jalousie de la part des principaux citoyens, soit désir de recouvrer leurs prisonniers de l’île et de mettre fin à la guerre.

History of the Peloponnesian War First1KGreek (Thucydides, Vol. 1-4. Smith, Charles Foster, translator. London and Cambridge, MA: Heinemann and Harvard University Press, 1919-1923.) — 4.108.1 focus

[1] The Athenians were greatly alarmed by the capture of Amphipolis. The chief reason was that the city was useful to them for the importation of timber for ship-building and for the revenue it produced, and also that, whereas hitherto the Lacedaemonians had possessed, under the guidance of the Thessalians, access to the Athenian allies as far as the Strymon, yet as long as they did not control the bridge—the river for a long way above the town being a great lake and triremes being on guard in the direction of Eion—they could not have advanced further; but now at last the matter had become easy.¹ And they feared, too, the revolt of their allies.

[2] For Brasidas in other things showed himself moderate, and in his declarations everywhere made plain that he had been sent out for the liberation of Hellas.

[3] And the cities that were subject to Athens, hearing of the capture of Amphipolis and the assurances that were offered, and of the gentleness of Brasidas, were more than ever incited to revolution, and sent secret messengers to him, urging him to come on to them, and wishing each for itself to be the first to revolt.

[4] For it seemed to them that there was little ground for fear, since they estimated the Athenian power to be far less great than it afterwards proved to be, and in their judgment were moved more by illusive wishing than by cautious foresight; for men are wont, when they desire a thing, to trust to unreflecting hope, but to reject by arbitrary judgment whatever they do not care for.

[5] Furthermore, because of the recent defeat of the Athenians in Boeotia and the enticing but untrue statements of Brasidas,² that the Athenians had been unwilling to engage him when he came to the relief of Nisaea with only his own army, they grew bold, and believed that nobody would come against them.

[6] Above all, they were so moved by the pleasurable anticipations of the moment, and by the fact that they were now for the first time going to have a proof of what the Lacedaemonians would do when on their mettle, that they were ready to take any risk. Being aware of these things, the Athenians, so far as was possible at short notice and in the winter season, sent out garrisons among the cities; while Brasidas sent to Lacedaemon and urgently begged them to send him reinforcements, and was himself making preparations for building ships in the Strymon.

[7] The Lacedaemonians, however, did not comply with his request, partly on account of the jealousy of the foremost men, partly also because they wished rather to recover the men taken on the island and to bring the war to an end.

History of the Peloponnesian War First1KGreek (Thucydides. The history of the Peloponnesian War, Volume 1-2. Dale, Henry, translator. London: Heinemann and Henry G. Bohn, 1851-1852.) — 4.108.1 focus

[1] When Amphipolis was in the enemy's hands, the- Athenians were reduced to great fear, especially because the town was of service to them by supplying timber for ship building, and in point of payment of revenue; and because, though as far as the Strymon the Lacedaemonians had a passage open to them for reaching the allies of Athens, if the Thessalians allowed them to go through their country, yet so long as they were not masters of the bridge, they could have gone no further; as on the inland side a large lake, formed by the river, spread for a great distance, while in the neighbourhood of Eion they were watched by cruisers:

[2] but now the passage was considered to have been rendered easy. They were also afraid that their allies would revolt.

[3] For Brasidas both showed himself moderate in other respects, and in his speeches every where declared that he was sent out to give freedom to Greece. And the cities subject to Athens, hearing of the capture of Amphipolis, and ¹ what advantages it enjoyed, and the gentleness of Brasidas, were most strongly encouraged to make innovations, and sent secret messages to him, desiring him to come to them, and each wishing to be the first to revolt.

[4] For they thought they might do it with security; their mistake in the estimate of the Athenian power being as great as power afterwards showed itself, and their judgment resting on blind desire, rather than on safe forethought: since men are accustomed to grant to inconsiderate hope whatever they;

[5] but to thrust aside with despotic reasoning whatever they do not like. Besides, as the Athenians had lately met with a heavy blow in Boeotia, and Brasidas asserted what was attractive, but not true, that the Athenians had been unwilling to fight him at Nisaea with his own force alone, they were full of confidence, and believed that no one would come against them.

[6] Above all, from regard to what was agreeable at the moment, and because they would be likely to find the Lacedaemonians zealous in their behalf at first, they were ready on all accounts to run the risk. The Athenians perceiving this, distributed guards in the different states as well as they could in a short time, and in the winter season; while Brasidas sent despatches to Lacedaemon, begging them to send him additional forces, and himself prepared for building triremes in the Strymon.

[7] But the Lacedaemonians did not comply with his wishes, partly through envy felt by the principal men, and partly because they were more anxious to recover the men taken in the island, and to bring the war to a conclusion.

Historia Belli Peloponnesiaci First1KGreek (Historia Belli Peloponnesiaci. Haase, Friedrich, translator. Paris: Firmin Didot, 1869.) — 4.108.1 focus

[1] Amphipoli autem capta, Athenienses magnus terror incessit, praesertim quod haec civitas ipsis esset perutilis , tum propter materiam ad naves aedificandas aptam, quae illinc mittebatur, tum propter pecuniarum reditum, tum etiam quod ad Strymonem quidem usque Thessalis deducentibus accessus Lacedaemoniis adversus socios suos patefactus esset; jam vero si illi pontem in sua potestate non haberent, quod et a superiore pontis parte ingens lon-geque patens fluminis palus esset, et illa pars, quae Eionem spectabat, classe sua servaretur, illos haudquaquam ulte- ' rius progredi posse; tunc vero jam hoc quoque illis facile arbitrabantur factum esse.

[2] Et de sociis in metu erant, ne deficerent. Nam Brasidas quum in ceteris rebus se moderatum praebebat, tum vero verbis ubique declarabat, se ad Graeciam liberandam emissum.

[3] Atque civitates, quae Atheniensium imperio parebant, quum audirent et Amphipolin captam, et quae ille praestaret, ejusque mansuetudinem, tunc ad res novandas maxime erectae sunt, et caduceatores ad eum dam mittebant, rogantes, ut ad se accederet, et pro se quique ad illum primi deficere cupientes.

[4] Etenim et impunitas iis fore videbatur, partim quidem, quod in aestimanda Atheniensium potentia tanto magis falsi erant, quanto illa major postea apparuit, partim vero, quod incerta voluntate magis, quam certa providentia judicarent, ut solent homines id quod cupiunt, inconsiderata spe amplecti, quod vero non cupiunt, judicii licentia rejicere.

[5] Praeterea quod Athenienses cladem in Boeotia recens accepissent et quod Brasidas verbis ad animos hominum alliciendos appositis uteretur, nec vera referret, ut Athenienses secum apud Nisaeam, ubi suum exercitum solum haberet, non ausi sint confligere, fiduciam sumebant, nec quemquam contra se venturum credebant.

[6] Sed id quod maximum erat, propter rerum novarum studium, quod in praesentia voluptatem afferre solet, et quod tunc primum Lacedaemo-' niorum toto animo bello intentorum experimentum essent facturi, ad quodvis discrimen adeundum erant parati.

[7] Quae quum intellexissent inique, Athenienses quidem, ut in illis temporum angustiis et hieme licebat, praesidia in urbes dimittebant, ille vero, quum nuntium Lacedaemonem misisset, alias copias submitti jubebat, et ipse ad Strymonem naves struere parabat.

[8] Lacedaemonii vero, partim quidem propter invidiam, qua civitatis principes ejus gloriae invidebant, partim vero, quia suos cives in insula captos recuperare bellumqne finire malebant, ei non obedierunt.

La storia di Tucidide First1KGreek (Thucydides. Della storia di Tucidide volgarizzata libri otto. Anonymous translator. Florence: Tipografia Galileiana, 1835.) — 4.108 focus

Presa Amfipoli, vennero gli Ateniesi in gran timore, tanto più che quella città era ad essi utile non solo perchè ne ricavavano legname da navi e provento di danaro, ma ancora perchè ella offriva ai Lacedemoni condotti dai Tessali un passaggio fino allo Stilinone contro i loro alleati. Che se gli Spartani non si fossero insignoriti del ponte, non arebbero potuto progredire più oltre ; avvegnaché dalla parte di terra sarebbero stati impediti per Li vasta palude formata dal fiume ; e dalla parte di Eiona Je flotte ateniesi gli avrebbero osservati. Ma occupato il ponte , il passaggio compariva ornai troppo facile. Temevano inoltre che gli alleati non si ribellassero ; perocché Brasida in tutte le occasioni mostravasi discreto, e dappertutto dichiarava oo’ suoi disoorsi di essere spedito a liberare la Grecia. Onde le città soggette agli Ateniesi udendo l' presa di Amfipoli, e le profferte di Brasida , e la sua dolcezza , si invogliavano grandemente di novità ; e di nascosto spedivano a lui messaggi, confortandolo a mostrarsi presso loro, volendo ciascuno essere il primo a ribellarsi. Pareva loro di poter far ciò senza alcun pericolo, opinando falsamente non esser tanta la potenza ateniese, quanta mostrassi in processo di tempo ; perchè ne giudicavano più con mal foudato desiderio , che con sicura previdenza ; secondo P usato degli uomini, i quali sperano iocoosideratamente ciò che bramano, e ciò che non gradiscono arbitrariamente rigettano. Auimavansi inoltre alla ribellione per la recente sconfìtta degli Ateniesi in Beozia, e pei seducenti non già veridici discorsi di Brasida, del non aver essi voluto a ISisca combattere con lui contro quel solo suo esercito ; onde contìdavano che nessuno si moverebbe coutro di loro. Ma principalmente erano pronti ad esporsi a qualunque pericolo per quel momentaneo piacere che danno di sè le novità, e per esser quella la prima volta in che sperimenterebbero i Lacedemoni imperversili , contro Atene. Questi mali umori non erano ignoti agli : Ateniesi ed a Brasida , e però quelli spedirono presidii nelle diverse città, secondochè il permettevano il breve tempo e la vernata : e Brasida , intanto che si apparecchiava a fabbricar triremi sullo Strimone, mandò a Sparta sollecitando un nuovo esercito. Ma i Lacedemoni non lo compiacquero, parte per astio dei primari cittadiui, parie perchè amavano meglio di riavere la loro gente dell’ isola Sfatteria , e così terminare la guerra.

Thucydides History of the Peloponnesian War 4.108

Theodor Braun (Translator)

Search the Perseus Catalog for:

Current edition First1KGreek

Stable identifiers